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Is it a true fact
That a clause is not a thing
It is a Given.
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ABSTRACT
FACTIVE AND ASSERTIVE ATTITUDE REPORTS
Kajsa Djärv
Florian Schwarz
This dissertation investigates the semantics, pragmatics, and syntax of propositional at-
titude reports; in particular, how assertion and presupposition are reflected in these different
parts of the grammar. At the core of the dissertation are factive attitude reports, involving
predicates like know, discover, realize, resent, appreciate, and like. Since Stalnaker (1974),
factivity is taken to encompass both the discourse status of the embedded proposition p as
Common Ground and the projection of the inference that the speaker is committed to p
from the scope of operators—in both cases, unlike asserted content. Syntactically, factivity
and assertion are argued to provide the semantic-pragmatic underpinnings for a range of
complementation patterns (Kiparsky and Kiparsky 1970, Hooper and Thompson 1973, Rizzi
1997, a.o.).
The central contributions of the dissertation are: (i) demonstrating what precise dimen-
sions of assertion and presupposition are reflected in the syntax and semantics of clausal
embedding, and (ii) decomposing the classically multifaceted notion of factivity into a set
of more specific theoretical notions; importantly, dissociating the discourse status of p and
the projection-prone speaker commitment inference.
We attribute the speaker commitment inference to a lexical presupposition of an eviden-
tial modal base that entails p. We argue that this evidential base is always anchored to a
Judge, which, depending on the type of factive predicate, is bound by different individuals.
In the case of doxastic factives like discover, the judge is bound by the speaker, whereas in
the case of emotive factives like appreciate, it is bound by the attitude holder, and for fact
that nominals, it is realized as an index on the noun. The discourse status of p, we attribute
to a separate dimension of discourse new vs. Given content (in the sense of Schwarzschild
1999), which cross-cuts both factive and non-factive verbs. Among the predicates which
treat their complements as Given, we differentiate between the requirement (of response
ix
predicates like accept and not say) that p has an antecedent in the discourse, and the re-
quirement (of emotive factives like resent and appreciate) that the situation or individual
providing the attitude holder’s evidential basis for p is contextually accessible. We further
argue for a fundamental semantic distinction between primarily acquaintance-based predi-
cates —which include both factives (evidentials) like discover and non-factives like fear—
and fundamentally doxastic or epistemic predicates, like believe and trust.
Making these distinctions allows us to account for a wide range of apparently connected,
yet clearly disparate empirical phenomena, some of which represent open problems in the
literature and some of which are new observations made in the dissertation. Importantly, we
are able to capture: (i) the dissociation of the discourse status of p and the commitment-to-p
inference in doxastic factives (Chapters 3 and 5); (ii) a number of asymmetries between dox-
astic and emotive factives regarding their apparent entailment properties, interactions with
operators, and sensitivities to contextual effects (Chapter 5); (iii) variations in entailment
and argument-structural patterns across verbs like know and believe (Chapter 4); and (iv)
the distribution of a set of proposed syntactic correlates of assertion and presupposition;
in particular, V-to-C movement, wh-extraction, and selection for DP vs. CP-complements
(Chapters 2 and 3).
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Complex sentences of the type illustrated in (1) present a number of challenges for the
semanticist and the syntactician alike.
(1) a. Mary believes that Bill is moving to Canada.
b. Mary knows that Bill is moving to Canada.
1.1 Propositional attitude reports & factivity
1.1.1 Theoretical background
Semantically, verbs like know and believe describe attitudes, on the part of the attitude
holder (Mary) towards the proposition p expressed by the embedded that-clause. On the
standard conception of the semantics of propositional attitude reports, following Hintikka
(1969), attitude verbs like know and believe are analysed as quantifiers over worlds, and
semantically (s-)select for propositions. On this view, epistemic attitudes like know and
believe both quantify over the worlds w′ that are compatible with the attitude holder’s
beliefs in w (i.e. the modal base is a set of doxastic alternatives).
(2) a. World w′ is doxastically accessible for person x to world w iff w’ is compatible
with the beliefs that x holds in w.
b. Doxx(w) = {w′ ∈ W : w’ conforms to x’s beliefs in w}.
Hence, while the simple sentence Bill is moving to Canada is true iff Bill is moving to Canada,
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the truth of the complex sentence in (1-a) depends on whether or not Mary believes that
Bill is moving to Canada. More formally, we say that (1-a) is true at a world w iff Bill is
moving to Canada in every world w′ that is doxastically accessible to Mary in w.
In this framework, the difference between different attitude predicates stems from the
type of accessibility relation that determines the set of worlds quantified over: verbs like
hope and say for instance quantify over the worlds compatible with the hopes and claims,
respectively, of the attitude holder.
In the case of know vs. believe, however, the difference between the two predicates is
generally taken not to be about the type of attitude or accessibility relation. Intuitively,
we might think of know as a stronger version of believe, in the sense that for (1-b) to be
true, it seems like Mary must have some pretty good reasons to believe that Bill is moving
to Canada. However, this is not enough: for a speaker to utter (1-b), we find that the
speaker, too, needs to share Mary’s commitment to p. This property, shared by predicates
like discover, realize, resent, appreciate, be aware, and be happy, is known as factivity, and
will be a central running theme throughout this dissertation.
Standard denotations for know and believe are given in (3). On this view, both verbs re-
quire that the embedded proposition p is true in every world w′ that is doxastically accessible
to the attitude holder in the world of evaluation w. They differ in that know additionally
entails (or presupposes) that p is true in the world of evaluation.1 (Here, we follow the
convention of Heim and Kratzer 1998, where the presupposition is the underlined material
between the colon and the period.)
(3) a. [[believe]]w = λp<st>.λx<e>.∀w′ ∈ Doxx(w) → p(w′)
b. [[know ]]w = λp<st>.λx<e> : p(w).∀w′ ∈ Doxx(w) → p(w′)
Part and parcel of the Hintikkan approach to attitude reports is the view that finite declar-
ative that-clauses denote propositions. In linguistics and philosophy, propositions are stan-
dardly treated as intensional objects, as functions from worlds to truth values, such that (4)
1A perspective standard also in the philosophical tradition, where knowledge is typically taken to involve
‘justified true belief’ (though see Gettier 1963 and subsequent literature).
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is true at a world w iff Bill is moving to Canada in w.
(4) [[that Bill is moving to Canada]] = λw.Bill is moving to Canada(w)
The compositional meaning of the sentence in (1-a), Mary believes that Bill is moving to
Canada, evaluated at w, can thus be spelled out as in (5).
(5) a. [[believe]]w([[that Bill is moving to Canada]])([[Mary ]]) =
b. [λp<st>.λx<e>.∀w′ ∈ Doxx(w)→p(w′)](λw.Bill is moving to Canada(w))(Mary) =
c. 1 iff ∀w′ ∈ DoxMary(w) → Bill is moving to Canada(w′)
In terms of their semantics and pragmatics, factive predicates are a classic type of presuppo-
sition trigger. While there is substantial variation among different kinds of presupposition
triggers, they all give rise to inferences which (a) tend to be not-at issue in the discourse,
and (b) typically survive when embedded under operators that otherwise target entailments,
such as modals and negation. The second of these properties is referred to as presupposition
projection, and is illustrated with the factive predicate be happy in (6), and with the trigger
stop in (7).
(6) a. Anna is happy that [P Lisa got the job]. ↝ Anna , p↝ p
b. Anna isn’t happy that [P Lisa got the job]. ↝̸ Anna , p↝ p
(7) a. Anna stopped smoking. ↝ Anna no longer smokes↝ Anna used to smoke
b. Anna didn’t stop smoking. ↝̸ Anna no longer smokes↝ Anna used to smoke
Regarding the first property, it is probably intuitive that the sentences in (6) are statements
about Anna and her emotive attitude towards Lisa getting the job, and not primarily claims
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about Lisa and her getting the job. Similarly, it should be intuitive that the sentences in (7)
are not claims that Anna used to smoke, but statements about whether she gave it up or
not. This point can be made more clearly using explicit Question-Answer pairs, such as (8)
and (9) (this diagnostic draws on the notion of a Question Under Discussion, from Roberts
1996, 2012, Büring 2003).
(8) Q. Why is Anna looking so mopey?
A. She’s upset that Lisa got the job.
(9) Q. Why is Lisa looking so giddy?
A. She got the job.
A’. #Anna is upset that Lisa got the job.
In the tradition following Stalnaker (1974, 1978) and Heim (1982, 1983), among many others,
each of these properties —the not-at issue status of p, the projection of p from the scope
of operators, and the requirement that the speaker is committed to p—, are taken to follow
from the requirement of factive predicates that p is Common Ground, or entailed by the
context. (The same reasoning applies to the inference that Anna used to smoke, triggered by
the verb stop in (7), and to presuppositions more broadly.) This is unlike asserted content,
which in the Stalnakerian tradition is seen as the flip-side of presupposition: this is what
gets added to the Common Ground by an utterance, it is what’s at-issue in the discourse,
and it takes scope under embedding operators like modals and negation.
In addition to the view that that-clauses denote propositions, as in (4), there is a par-
allel tradition of research into the syntax-pragmatics interface, going back to Kiparsky and
Kiparsky (1970), Hooper and Thompson (1973), Rizzi (1997), and Speas and Tenny (2003),
where the notions of assertion and presupposition are invoked to explain an array of comple-
mentation patterns, including the availability of wh-extraction, V-to-C movement, topical-
ization, speech act adverbs, and different types of clausal anaphora, as well as the selection
or licensing of particular types of CP and DP complements.
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1.1.2 Challenges from the interface
While each of these approaches provide an elegant perspective on the different aspects of
meaning and composition of propositional attitude reports, there are several challenges both
to the individual approaches, as well as to the compatibility of the three perspectives.
To start, as we show in Chapters 2 and 3, factive verbs are not uniformly ‘non-assertive’,
neither in terms of the pragmatics of their complements, nor in terms of the proposed
mappings to the syntax. By investigating a range of attitude predicates from different
semantic classes through a combination of cross-linguistic experimental work, statistical
analysis of large-scale corpus data, and careful consideration of fine-grained semantic and
syntactic judgements, we find that a subtype of factives, the doxastic factives (e.g. discover
and realize), allow for both the assertion of the embedded proposition, and for V-to-C
movement and wh-extraction, contrary to a commonly held view that these operations are
both blocked in presuppositional contexts. In these chapters, we also observe that the
other subtype of factive verbs, the emotive factives like resent and appreciate, select only
for DPs (unlike the other types of attitude verbs examined, which are compatible with
both DP and CP-complements), and require their complement to be Given (in the sense
of Schwarzschild 1999). We find, however, that the Givenness-novelty distinction per se, is
not what determines the status of the complements of emotive factives as DPs: response
predicates like accept and not say, too, require their complements to be Given, but still
allow for both CP and DP-complements. (We account for this observation in Chapter 5.)
Moreover, as we observe in Chapter 4, know and verb show a surprising contrast in
whether a sentence like John believes the rumour that Lisa is moving to Canada entails
the corresponding CP-sentence, John believes that Lisa is moving to Canada. While believe
gives rise to this entailment, know does not. We further observe that the presence of this
entailment tracks the availability of a different type of DP, denoting the source of the attitude
holder’s belief that p, as in John believes Bill that Lisa is moving to Canada: we show that
this Source-construction is available with believe, but not with know and other factive verbs.
This pattern presents a number of challenges for the Hintikkan view, and further complicates
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the idea that factive verbs like know are essentially doxastic predicates which require p to
be Common Ground.
Overall, what these observations point to, is that the theoretical notion of factivity
has been stretched too thin, in terms of the range of phenomena it is intended to account
for. To answer the question of how and to what extent the lexical semantics of attitude
verbs constrain the interpretation of their complements as asserted or presupposed, and
how these pragmatic dimensions are reflected in the syntactic and semantic composition of
attitude reports, we need not just a theory of the semantics of attitude verbs and clausal
complementation, but also a theory of assertion, a theory of factivity, and a theory of the
syntax-meaning interface —and we need them all to add up. However, as we find from
surveying the empirical and theoretical landscape, the theoretical and empirical pieces often
don’t add up.
Adding to these complications, we find in Chapter 5 that current theoretical approaches
to factivity themselves face a number of challenges regarding the distribution of the kinds of
(non-)embedded contexts that allow for suspension of the speaker commitment to p infer-
ence with emotive and doxastic factives. Viewed in the context of the challenges from the
interface, these issues raise the question of whether we can provide an empirically satisfac-
tory account of factivity, that is not at odds with our broader theoretical understanding of
assertion and presupposition, and which does not pose a problem for the interface.
With this background in mind, the following section provides a chapter-by-chapter
overview of the three dimensions of propositional attitude reports investigated here: the
syntax-pragmatics interface (the focus of Chapters 2 and 3); the compositional semantics
(the focus of Chapter 4); and the issue of factivity itself (the focus of Chapter 5). Chapter
6 concludes with the main findings of the dissertation and points to interesting directions
for future research.
Section 1.3 spells out the theoretical framework and assumptions of the dissertation, and
introduces important terminology.
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1.2 Chapter overview
1.2.1 The syntax & pragmatics of clausal embedding: Part I (Ch 2)
In a tradition of research on clausal embedding going back to Hooper and Thompson (1973),
it is observed that, while (10-b) would typically be understood as an assertion about Mary’s
beliefs, there is also a reading of this sentence whereby the embedded proposition is intu-
itively the ‘main assertion’, as illustrated with the question-answer pair in (10) (cf. Roberts
2012, 1996, Simons 2007).
(10) a. Where is Bill?
b. I believe that he’s in Philly.
Interestingly, the availability of this kind of reading seems to depend on the type of attitude
verb: unlike believe, the factive verb resent, for instance, does not allow for embedded
assertions in this sense:
(11) a. Where is Bill?
b. #I resent that he’s in Philly.
The assertion of the embedded proposition has moreover been argued to have a number
of syntactic correlates, including the availability of wh-extraction from the embedded clause
(12), CP anaphora (13), as well as the licensing of a family of constructions known as Main
Clause Phenomena, illustrated with Swedish V-to-C movement (V2) in (14).2
(12) a. Whati do you believe (that) Lisa likes ti?
b. *Whati do you resent (that) Lisa likes ti?
(13) a. I believe so.
b. *I resent so.
2Indicated by the positioning of the finite verb relative to negation.
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(14) a. Jag
I
tror
believe
att
that
Lisa
Lisa
äri
is
inte
not
ti kapabel
capable
att
to
komma
arrive
i
on
tid.
time.
‘I believe that Lisa is not capable of arriving on time.’
b. *Jag
I
avskyr
resent
att
that
Lisa
Lisa
äri
is
inte
not
ti kapabel
capable
att
to
komma
arrive
i
on
tid.
time.
‘I resent that Lisa is not capable of arriving on time.’
This correlation has led a number of researchers to propose a link between the pragmatic
status of the embedded proposition as asserted, and the syntactic properties of the embedded
clause. In particular, a popular idea, building on work by Rizzi (1997), is that complements
of verbs like believe are ‘larger’ than the complements of verbs like resent. In an extension
of ideas of Kiparsky and Kiparsky (1970), it has also been proposed that the complements
of verbs like resent are in fact underlyingly DPs, and not CPs; thus tying the syntactic
category of the embedded clause to its status as presupposed. While these ideas are both
intuitively appealing, they turns out to face a number of empirical challenges, regarding
both the role of the matrix predicate, and the issue of identifying a precise characterization
of what specific dimensions of assertion and presupposition are relevant to the syntax.
In Chapter 2, we explore a number of approaches to these questions, finding that we are
facing a highly complex landscape, with substantial disagreement not just on the theoretical
side, but also in terms of what the empirical facts actually are. A set of commonly used
tests for CP vs. DP-status, including those illustrated in (12)-(14) shows us that while a sub-
type of factive verbs (namely the emotive factives) select for DPs, this is neither a general
requirement of factive verbs (cf. discover and notice), nor of verbs that require that their
complements have an antecedent in the discourse (cf. accept and not say), contrary to the
Kiparsky-Kiparsky account.
However, the insight that there is variation among factive verbs in terms of the syntactic
and pragmatic status of the embedded proposition has in fact been present since early work
on the topic (e.g. Karttunen 1971, Hooper and Thompson 1973). Circumventing the thorny
issue of factivity, a number of researches following Hooper and Thompson (1973) have instead
appealed to another ‘aspect’ of assertion, such as speaker (or attitude holder) commitment
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to p (in the sense of Stalnaker 1974, 1978), or the status of p as the Main Point or at-issue
content with respect to the Question Under Discussion (in the sense of Simons 2007, a.o.).
A review of previous experimental work (e.g. Djärv et al. 2017) allows us to rule out the
latter type of approach.
However, we are left at the end of this chapter with the conclusion that without compar-
ative data from a larger number of speakers and a wider range of verbs and constructions,
making further theoretical progress is difficult. The main empirical problem is that we are
unable to disentangle true empirical disagreement from the possibility of variation (across
speakers, types of Main Clause Phenomena, and languages). Providing such cross-linguistic
quantitative data, and arriving at an empirically supported theory of embedded Main Clause
Phenomena is the objective of Chapter 3.
1.2.2 The syntax & pragmatics of clausal embedding: Part II (Ch 3)
With many outstanding questions both regarding the pragmatic properties of different types
of attitude verbs, and the pragmatic and lexical restrictions on different kinds of Main Clause
Phenomena, Chapter 3 presents two quantitative studies probing these questions: a corpus
study of Swedish embedded V2, and a large-scale cross-linguistic study of four types of
Main Clause Phenomena (embedded V2, topicalization, scene setting adverbs, and speech
act adverbs) in three languages (German, English, and Swedish).
Based on the results from these studies, we propose that the relevant notion of assertion
for licensing V-to-C movement and wh-extraction is Discourse Novelty, where this is the
flip-side of Givenness, in the sense of Schwarzschild (1999). An interesting, and surprising,
finding for the theoretical study of the left-periphery and the syntax-pragmatics interface, is
that the Givenness-Novelty dimension is not relevant to any of the other types of Main Clause
Phenomena investigated. Regarding the role of the verb, we find, looking at interactions
with the polarity of the matrix verb, that while the embedding predicate plays a large role
in constraining the interpretation of the embedded proposition as new vs. Given, ultimately
the availability of a (syntactically and pragmatically) ‘assertive’ CP, is still a matter of the
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pragmatics of the utterance as a whole, rather than the selectional properties of the verb
itself. We moreover find that factive predicates vary with respect to the discourse status
of their complement, such that doxastic factives like discover, but not emotive factives like
appreciate, allow for the embedded proposition to be asserted, in the sense of providing
discourse new content. In this regard, the doxastic factives pattern with speech act verbs
(e.g. say), and doxastic non-factives (e.g. believe), whereas the emotive factives pattern with
the response stance verbs (e.g. accept).
This, then, takes us to one of those critical points of tension mentioned in Section 1.1.2
above, where the theoretical pieces of the puzzle don’t fit together. Chapters 2 and 3 brought
us an empirically substantiated theory of what particular pragmatic dimension of assertion
is relevant to wh-extraction and V-to-C movement, namely Givenness vs. discourse novelty,
a dimension which split the class of factive predicates into two sets. While this finding
aligns with some intuitions and judgements reported in previous work on the syntax and
pragmatics of attitude reports and clausal embedding, it actually goes counter to the way
that factivity is standardly understood in the semantics literature. As mentioned in Section
1.1, presuppositions are typically understood to be conditions on the context: in the case of
factive predicates, p must be Common Ground. The problem here is that while Givenness
doesn’t imply Common Ground status (cf. the response verbs), Common Ground status
clearly implies Givenness.
Further, as we observe in Chapter 2, emotive factives require their complements to be
DPs (unlike the other attitude verbs investigated here, which allow for both CP and DP
complements). This observation raises a related question: does the syntactic status of the
complements of emotive factives as DPs follow from their lexical semantics, and if so, in
what way? We know from the doxastic factives that it cannot be a consequence of their
factivity, and we know from the response verbs that it cannot be a consequence of Givenness
per se. We return to these two problems —the pragmatic status of the complements of the
doxastic factives, and the DP-selection of emotive factives— in Chapter 5, where we examine
the semantics and pragmatics of factivity and factive verbs.
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First, we turn to a more basic question, raised by the observation that most attitude
verbs are compatible with both DP and CP complements: given that DPs typically denote
individuals, how does this fit with the Hintikkan view (Section 1.1) whereby attitude verbs
s-select for propositions?
1.2.3 The semantics of attitude reports (Ch 4)
The idea that attitude verbs like believe and know s-select for propositions (type <st>) (see
Section 1.1) is complicated by the observation that they may also combine with individuals
(type e):
(15) a. Mary {knows, believes} that Bill is moving to Canada.
b. Mary {knows, believes} the claim that Bill is moving to Canada.
A challenge for the idea that know is simply the factive cousin of believe moreover arises
when we consider the availability and interpretation of different types of individuals under
know vs. believe. As we observe in Chapter 4, believe, but not know, allows for a DP-
argument (which unlike the claim in (15-b), is structurally independent of the that-clause),
which refers to the Source of the attitude holder’s belief that p:
(16) a. Mary believes Bill that he is moving to Canada.
b. *Mary knows Bill that he is moving to Canada.
This contrast has a further correlate in cases where the two verbs take only a DP-complement
like Bill : with believe in (17-a), Bill is understood to refer to the source of some contextually
provided proposition p, which the attitude holder, Mary, believes. With know in (17-b), on
the other hand, Bill is the object of Mary’s acquaintance, and no epistemic relation to a
proposition is inferred.
(17) a. Mary believes Bill.
b. Mary knows Bill.
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If know and believe both describe doxastic relations to propositions, why should there
be such contrast? Importantly, this contrast is not due to some lexical quirk of know or
believe, but generalizes across attitude verbs: we find both factive and non-factive verbs to
pattern with know ; for instance, discover, appreciate, forget, fear, and mention, whereas a
subset of non-factive verbs, e.g. trust and doubt, pattern with believe.
The key empirical contributions of Chapter 4 are (i) the observation of this contrast, and
(ii) the observation that this split among verbs correlates with an entailment contrast noted
by Prior (1971), Pietroski (2000), King (2002), Uegaki (2015) and Elliott (2016), shown in
(18)–(19):
(18) a. Sue believes [CP that Anna is to blame]. (b) ⊧ (a)
b. Sue believes [DP the rumour/claim that Anna is to blame].
(19) a. Sue knows [CP that Anna is to blame]. (b) ⊭ (a)
b. Sue knows [DP the rumour/claim that Anna is to blame].
With verbs like believe, the DP-case (18-b) entails (18-a). With verbs like know, on the other
hand, there is no entailment from (19-b) to (19-a). These and related data lead us to propose
a basic distinction between know -verbs, which describe (broadly speaking) acquaintance-
relations to individuals, and believe-verbs, which describe epistemic or doxastic relations to
propositional content. A schematic analysis of the two types of verbs is given in (20):3
(20) know and believe-verbs [Meaning Schema]
a. know -verbs : λxe.λsl.VERBAQ(s)(x)
b. believe-verbs : λxe.λsl.VERBDOX(s)(cont(x)(ws))
We further argue (contra Kratzer 2006 and Moulton 2009b) that clausal complements
of content nouns are propositions (mediated by a nominal C-head of type <st,st>) (22), and
that the clausal complements of verbs are content individuals (mediated by a verbal C-head
3The subscript s on ws in (20) denotes the world of the belief-state (or situation; see Section 4.2).
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of type <st,e>) (21):
(21) Clausal complements of verbs
a. [[CoV −cont]]w = λpst.ιxc.cont(xc)(w) = p
b. [[CPV −cont]]w = ιxc.cont(xc)(w) = p
(22) Clausal complements of nouns
a. [[CoN ]] = λp<st>.p
b. [[CPoN ]] = λw.John moved to Canada(w)
In Chapter 5, we expanded on our analysis of the factive members of the know -class, arguing
that these verbs are evidentials. In particular, we attribute the source of the (generally
projective) inference of speaker commitment to p to a presupposition of an evidential modal
base which entails p.
1.2.4 Factivity (Ch 5)
In Chapters 2 and 3, we observed that factive predicates vary with respect to the discourse
status of their complement, such that doxastic, but not emotive factives allow for the embed-
ded proposition to be asserted, in the sense of providing discourse new content. Meanwhile,
in the literature on factivity, we find the doxastic-emotive split to track a separate semantic
distinction. The observation, originally due to Karttunen (1971) (23), is that doxastic fac-
tives, like discover and realize, unlike emotive factives like regret and resent, tend to lose the
inference that p is true in certain embedded environments. Specifically, where the context
is inconsistent with the speaker being committed to the truth of p.
(23) Karttunen (1971, p. 64)
a. ‘Soft’ trigger: doxastic factives ↝̸ p
If I realize later that [P I haven’t told the truth], I’ll confess it to everyone.
b. ‘Hard’ trigger: emotive factives ↝ p?
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If I regret later that [P I haven’t told the truth], I’ll confess it to everyone.
In the broader presupposition literature, this contrast has been linked to a general split
between ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ triggers, following Abusch (2002, 2010). While this might seem
to conform to the emerging view that doxatic factives are ‘more assertive’, whereas emotive
factives are ‘more presuppositional’, the exact relationship between these two dimensions
—novelty vs. Givenness on the one hand, and presupposition projection on the other— is
not straightforward. As we observe in Chapter 4, the ability of doxastic factives to introduce
discourse new content is only present in unembedded sentences. Suspension of the speaker
commitment inference with the doxastics, on the other hand, requires embedding.
Adding to this complicated picture, we further observe that in a different respect, emotive
factives actually appear to be the ‘weaker’ of the two, allowing for contextual suspension of
the factive inference in certain unembedded contexts:
(24) a. John is happy that [P his parents are coming to visit him], though they actually
had to cancel their trip because of the weather. (Poor John will be sad when
he finds out!) ↝̸ p
b. #John is aware that [P his parents are coming to visit him], though they
actually had to cancel their trip because of the weather.
From examining these contexts in some detail, we propose a new analysis of the meaning
of factive predicates in terms of a presupposition of an evidential modal base which entails p
(cf. (2) above). To account for a number of observed asymmetries in the types of linguistic
and pragmatic contexts that allow for cancellation or suspension of the speaker commitment
inference across factive predicate, we propose that this evidential modal base is always
anchored to a Judge, which, depending on the type of factive predicate, is bound by different
individuals. In the case of the doxastic factives, the judge is bound by the speaker, whereas
in the case of the emotive factives, the judge is bound by the attitude holder. This, then
accounts for the observation that doxastic factives only allow suspension of the speaker
14
commitment inference in embedded contexts that are inconsistent with the speaker having
evidence for p (e.g. explicit ignorance contexts and first person conditionals); consistent with
the view that such contexts trigger local accommodation of the relevant presuppositions
(Heim 1982, 1983). Emotive factives, on the other hand, allow suspension or cancellation
of the speaker commitment inference also in unembedded contexts, provided that there is
sufficient ‘cognitive distance’ between the evidential base of the speaker and that of the
attitude holder. We further extend our analysis of factivity to fact that nominals, arguing
that these carry the same presupposition, though unlike in the case of the verbal factives,
the judge is not intrinsically tied to either speaker or attitude holder, but is realized as an
index on the noun, which might either be bound or receive its value through the assignment
function.
While this approach is able to capture a number of asymmetries regarding the sensitivity
to operators and contextual effects, observed across sub-types of factives, the analysis still
identifies a common source for the inference that the speaker endorses p across all factive
predicates, which does not rely on the discourse status of p.
We finally return to the observation regarding the syntactic status of the clausal com-
plements of emotive factives as DPs. In previous work, the presence of a D-layer in the
complements of emotive factives has been tied either to their status as factive, or to the
status of their complements as Given information. In Chapters 2 and 3, we observed that
neither of those claims can be correct. The account developed here, instead links the pres-
ence of this D-layer under emotives to a particular type of Givenness; a requirement that
the situation or individual providing the source of the attitude holder’s evidential basis for
p has a contextual antecedent.
This chapter also tests experimentally the predictions of a set of recent proposals ty-
ing the speaker commitment inference to the status of p as (not-)at issue with respect to
the Question Under Discussion, especially as mediated by prosodic focus (e.g. Beaver 2010,
Simons, Tonhauser, Beaver, and Roberts 2010, Simons, Beaver, Roberts, and Tonhauser
2017, Abrusán 2011b, 2016, Anand and Hacquard 2013, Tonhauser 2016). While the pre-
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dictions of these pragmatic accounts are not borne out for English (but rather support a
lexical approach, such as that offered here), we do observe certain intriguing weak focus-
based interactions, which are not predicated on either type of account. This chapter ends
with a short section on how to model these interactions probabilistically, and a note on the
cross-linguistic picture.
1.2.5 Methodological contribution
In addition to the empirical and theoretical contributions of the dissertation, an important
contribution of this dissertation is bringing together and connecting three separate, but
mutually relevant, strands of research on propositional attitude reports: the literature on
the syntax of assertion and presupposition, the literature on the the semantics of attitude
verbs and clausal complementation, and the literature on presupposition and factivity. The
core challenge of this topic, as we have seen, lies not in each individual question, but in the
issue of how the different dimensions of grammar and meaning relate to one another. To
meet this challenge, this dissertation aims at carefully considering the different theoretical
and empirical options both in the context of each individual phenomenon, and in terms of
their interaction.
Moreover, we find that judgements about the phenomena examined here are often sub-
tle, context sensitive, and potentially variable—and in many cases, issues of data sparsity or
(apparently) contradictory data points reported in the literature make it difficult to properly
evaluate the available theoretical options. Another important contribution of this disserta-
tion is the use of a broad range of experimental methods to empirically substantiate or falsify
competing theoretical claims, while carefully controlling for possible points of variation (e.g.
among lexical items and apparently similar constructions, among pragmatic contexts, and
among speakers and languages). The experimental methods used in the dissertation include
a large-scale corpus study, a set of semantic and syntactic acceptability and inference studies,
using both written and auditory stimuli, as well as a cross-linguistic experiment which incor-
porates both judgements of well-formedness and judgements of interpretation. Importantly,
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the use of software like Ibex (Schwarz and Zehr 2018) and platforms for subject recruitment
online, allows us to incorporate both a quantitative and a comparative perspective in this
work.
1.3 Assumptions and terminology
I believe that the central empirical points made in this dissertation do not depend in a
crucial way on the adoption of a specific formal framework. I do, however, make certain
theoretical assumptions, mostly importantly the principle of compositionality, also known
as Frege’s principle, adapted from Krifka (1999, p. 8):
The meaning of a complex expression is a function of the meanings of its imme-
diate syntactic parts and the way in which they are combined.
Regarding the nature of these compositional mechanisms, I assume a distinction between
lexically encoded meaning and pragmatically derived inferences; though I don’t assume a
one-to-one correspondence between asserted and entailed content. Lexically encoded mean-
ing, I assume, has the specific property of being cancellable only when occurring in the
scope of entailment-targeting operators such as modals and negation. I also assume that
the semantics (both in terms of lexical items and the principle of compositionality) makes
reference to semantic types. The simple types referred to here are individuals of type e,
eventualities of type l, truth-values of type t, and world (or situation) arguments of type s.
Higher types are functions, composed of these simple types, and include predicates of type<et>, propositions of type <st>, etc. I assume, as is standard in the literature, that the
grammar sometimes makes reference to more specific sub-types of individuals and eventu-
alities. In particular, I assume (following Bach 1986), that eventualities cover both states
and events. I also assume that the set of individuals cover both particulars and content
individuals (e.g. Kratzer 2002, 2006, Moulton 2009b; see Section 4.2 for more detailed dis-
cussion). I take it to be a (minimal) requirement on composition that for two lexical items to
compose, their semantic types must be compatible. I implement this assumption using the
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formalism offered by the lambda-calculus. I further assume that the following compositional
mechanisms are provided by the grammar:
(25) Functional Application [FA] (Heim and Kratzer 1998, p. 49)
If α is a branching node, and {β, γ} is the set of α’s daughters, then α is in the
domain of [[ ]] (the interpretation function, KD) if both β and γ are, and [[β]] is a
function whose domain contains [[γ]]. In this case, [[α]] = [[β]]([[γ]]).
(26) Predicate Modification [PM] (Heim and Kratzer 1998, p. 65)
If α is a branching node, and {β, γ} is the set of α’s daughters, and [[β]] and [[γ]]
are both in De,t, then [[α]] = λx ∈ De . [[β]](x) = [[γ]](x) = 1.4
I assume also, following Kratzer (1996), that the external argument is introduced by Voiceo
(27), the functional head which assigns Accusative case. Voiceo combines with the vP via
Event Identification (28).5
(27) [[Voiceo]] = λxe.λel.agent(e)(x)
(28) Event Identification [EID] (Kratzer 1996, p. 122) (own formulation)
If α is a branching node, and {β, γ} is the set of α’s daughters, and [[β]] is of type<e,lt> and [[γ]] of type <lt>, then [[α]] = λxe. λel. [[β]](x)(e) & [[γ]](e).6
In terms of the syntax, I adopt a generative perspective along the lines of Chomsky (1995)
(bare phrase structure), assuming in particular that the grammar is binary branching, and
includes the operations merge and move. I also assume that DPs need to be syntactically
licensed (via case-assignment) (Vergnaud 2008, et seq). To the extent that I discuss word-
internal composition, I assume a broadly Distributed Morphology framework (Halle and
Marantz 1993, Harley and Noyer 1999, Embick and Marantz 2008, among others).
4This can be extended to include intensional predicates, where {β, γ} are both of type <e,st> as in
Moulton (2015, p. 313). Here, [[α]] = λxe.λww. [[β]](x)(w) = [[γ]](x)(w) = 1.
5The focus here is on the internal, rather than the external arguments of attitude verbs, so nothing in
the current discussion hinges on the choice to sever the external argument.
6I assume that the same operation is available with states to give us state holders, in addition to agents
of events. Again, I assume that this can be straightforwardly extended to include intensional predicates.
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A note is also in order about the empirical scope of the dissertation. Here, we look only
at finite declarative that-clauses. Our primary theoretical and empirical focus is moreover
on the clausal complements of verbs, though in some places, we also turn our attention to
the clausal complements of adjectival attitude predicates (like be aware and be happy) and
content nouns (like the claim and the fact). These choices are essentially practical, due to
limitations of time. Despite these limitations, I hope that this dissertation will provide a
valuable contribution to the larger enterprise of developing a comprehensive theory of the
syntax, semantics, and pragmatics of clausal embedding and propositional attitude reports.
Finally, a note on the terminological choices made here: This dissertation brings together
and connects several, more or less inter-connected, strands of research on propositional
attitude reports. For this reason, the predicate classes discussed here have been referred
to by many different names, depending on the theoretical and empirical context. To make
it clear how the present discussion connects to previous work, I will introduce these labels
when necessary and relevant. For consistency and clarity, I will, however, use the labels
introduced in (29) throughout the dissertation:
(29) a. Jane said that [P Bill is moving to Canada ]. Speech act verbs
b. Jane believed that [P Bill is moving to Canada ]. Doxastic non-factives
c. Jane doubted that [P Bill is moving to Canada ]. Response (stance) verbs
d. Jane resented that [P Bill is moving to Canada ]. Emotive factives
e. Jane discovered that [P Bill is moving to Canada ]. Doxastic factives
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Chapter 2
The syntax of assertion and presuppo-
sition
2.1 Introduction
2.1.1 Chapter goals and overview
Recall the questions posed above, of how and to what extent the lexical semantics of attitude
predicates constrains the interpretation of their complements as asserted or presupposed,
and to what extent these pragmatic dimensions are reflected in the syntactic and semantic
composition of attitude reports. As we pointed out above, answering this question requires
several theoretical and empirical pieces to fit together. In this and the following chapter we
address the following, more specific, questions:
(1) a. Are attitude predicates of different classes, semantically defined, selective with
regard to the category of their complement as a CP or a DP?
b. Does the availability of different types of complementation patterns, syntactically
defined, depend on the discourse pragmatics of the embedded proposition as
asserted or presupposed?
c. Is there a correlation between on the one hand, CP vs. DP syntax, and on the
other hand, the pragmatic status of the embedded proposition as asserted vs.
presupposed?
d. What specific dimensions of assertion and presupposition are relevant to the
syntax?
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The first part of this chapter is devoted to the question of the c-selectional properties
of different types of attitude verbs, and the extent to which they track various semantic
and pragmatic dimensions. Section 2.2 reviews a set of proposals (going back to Kiparsky
and Kiparsky 1970) arguing that certain predicate types, namely factive verbs like discover
and resent, and response stance verbs like doubt and accept, select DPs as the consequence
of the presuppositional status of their complements. In Section 2.3, we show that at least
some aspects of these proposals must be incorrect. Based on a set of commonly applied
diagnostics, we show that while a subset of factive verbs (namely emotive factives like resent
and appreciate) only select DP complements, both the response stance verbs and the doxastic
factives (e.g. discover and notice) allow both CP and DP complements, just like speech act
verbs like say and argue and doxastic non-factives like believe and think ; thus answering the
question in (1-a).
The second part of this chapter (Section 2.4 and 2.5) examines the popular idea that the
status of the embedded clause as asserted makes available a particular type of construction
in the embedded clause, namely constructions that require an extended C-domain. This
family of constructions is known as (embedded) Main Clause Phenomena, and is commonly
taken to include topicalization, embedded Verb Second and speech act adverbs (see Section
2.1.3). While our review of the previous empirical and theoretical claims in this area allows
us to set aside certain theoretical options, the picture which emerges is one of substantial
disagreement, not just theoretically, but also about the nature of the data, thus making it
difficult to address the remaining questions in (1). In particular, we conclude that with-
out comparable data from different Main Clause Phenomena across different languages, to
rule out the possibility of variation (among speakers, languages, and different verbs and
constructions), it is difficult to falsify and evaluate competing theoretical accounts.
To close this data-theory gap, we take a broad empirical approach, combining cross-
linguistic experimental work and statistical analysis of large-scale corpus data to investigate
the availability of different kinds of MCP in different languages, across lexical and pragmatic
contexts. Due to their scope, these two studies, and the answers and conclusions that we
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are able to draw from them, are presented separately in Chapter 3: Section 3.1 presents
results from a large-scale corpus study, investigating the distribution of embedded V2 in
Swedish (based on Caplan and Djärv 2019). Section 3.2 follows up on this study with a
cross-linguistic experimental study looking at the distribution, and the pragmatic licensing
conditions, of four purported Main Clause Phenomena in English, German, and Swedish
(speaker oriented adverbs in all three languages; embedded V2 in Swedish and German;
topicalization and scene-setting adverbs in English). Importantly, this study allows us to
probe the possibility of variation, a significant empirical problem, as we will see in this
chapter: between speakers; between different kinds of MCP; between languages; as well as
between (classes of) attitude predicates, in terms of their semantic and pragmatic inferences.
Together, these two studies provide strong empirical support for a distinction between
predicates that pragmatically treat the embedded proposition as Given, in the sense of
Schwarzschild (1999) (response stance verbs and emotive factives), and predicates that are
flexible with respect to the discourse status of p as new vs. Given information (speech act
verbs, doxastic non-factives, and doxastic factives). It is this dimension of Givenness vs.
discourse novelty, we show, that is relevant to the licensing of (a subset of) Main Clause
Phenomena, namely embedded V2 (other Main Clause Phenomena turn out not to be sen-
sitive to any of the pragmatic dimensions investigated here1,2). In particular, we show that
embedded V2 is licensed in contexts where p is discourse new; and blocked when p is Given.
These, it turns out, are the same types of contexts that allow wh-extraction from the embed-
ded clause in English (Section 2.3.1), This then, answers one part of the remaining questions
in (1): (1-b)–(1-d).
The other part of these questions, regarding the possible semantic and pragmatic under-
pinning of the status of the complements of emotive factives as DPs, are left for Chapters 4
and 5, where we look in more detail at factivity (Chapter 5) and the s-selectional properties of
1This finding is intriguing, given that Hooper and Thompson’s (1973) original work on Main Clause
Phenomena was based on English; the study of V2 as a type of Main Clause syntax came later (e.g. Andersson
1975, Den Besten 1983).
2Note that throughout the dissertation, our empirical focus is on subject-initial V2, to avoid the confound
of topic or focus initial V2-clauses. See examples of the two types of V2 in Section 3.1.1.
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the different types of attitude verbs, including the interpretation imposed by different types
of verbs on their DP and CP-complements (Chapter 4). Importantly for these questions,
however, this and the following chapters show: (i) that Givenness is not about selection
per se, but follows from the semantic and pragmatic properties of the matrix clause more
broadly, (ii) that neither factivity nor DP-selection track the Givenness-novelty dimension,
and (iii) that factivity does not track DP-selection. A final important contribution of the ex-
periments in Chapter 3 (Section 3.2.6.1) is that they provide a solid empirical underpinning
for the common assumption in theoretical syntax and semantics, that predicates cluster into
classes, based on their pragmatic properties, and moreover, that this association is robust,
both across different languages and across different types of discourse conditions.
2.1.2 Introducing the syntax and pragmatics of clausal embedding
The enterprise of examining fine-grained semantic, pragmatic, and syntactic distinctions
among classes of attitude predicates, and the way in which these dimensions are connected,
goes back at least to Kiparsky and Kiparsky (1970), Karttunen (1971, 1974), Hooper and
Thompson (1973) and Cattell (1978). Since these early authors, a key distinction has been
made between ‘assertive’ and ‘non-assertive’ predicates. For unembedded sentences, the
notion of assertion is relatively well-understood. Following Stalnaker (1974), it is generally
assumed that for a speaker to assert a proposition p, it is required that:
(2) a. The speaker is committed to p;
b. The speaker is attempting to add p to the Common Ground (the set of propo-
sitions mutually taken to be true by the discourse participants).
But what does it mean for an embedded proposition to be asserted? There is an intuitive
sense in which the embedded proposition in the (a)-sentence, but not the (b)-sentence in
(4), can be understood as asserting that p.3
3On this reading, the matrix clause plays a parenthetical function. The availability of this reading is
often illustrated using a slifting construction, as in (3).
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(4) a. John said that [P Lisa and Bill broke up].
b. John regrets that [P Lisa and Bill broke up].
In this and the following chapter, we address some of the questions involved in answering
the broader question of what it means for an embedded proposition to be asserted.
On the view examined in Section 2.2, a key distinction is drawn between factive and non-
factive predicates, such that doxastic non-factives like believe, assume, and think are taken to
be assertive, whereas doxastic factives like know, discover, and realize are assumed to be non-
assertive. On this view, factive predicates (encompassing also emotive factives like appreciate
and resent), are understood to be a subset of a more general class of ‘presuppositional’ or
‘referential’ predicates.4
Sections 2.2 and 2.3 examine, and reject, the claim (going back to Kiparsky and Kiparsky
1970, and taken up in recent work by Kastner and Haegeman, among others), that ‘assertive’
predicates select for CPs, whereas ‘presuppositional’, or ‘non-assertive’, predicates select for
DPs. We will refer to this idea as the CP/DP Interface Hypothesis. Importantly, this idea
is based primarily on the second component of assertion, as presented in (2), that for a
proposition to be asserted, it must not already be part of the Common Ground. This idea is
illustrated in (5), with the (by hypothesis) assertive verb say and non-assertive verb regret :
(5) a. Anna said [CP that Lisa got the job].
b. Anna regretted [DP D [CP that Lisa got the job]].
An overview of the proposed empirical consequences of this hypothesis is given in (6)–(7).5
(6) Assertive attitudes
a. Pragmatic consequence: p is discourse neutral, potentially new
(3) a. Lisa stole the money, I believe.
b. *Lisa stole the money, I regret.
4Though as we mentioned in the introduction (Chapter 1), a central contribution of this dissertation
will be to formally dissociate the ‘truth’-presupposition of factive predicates from the discourse status of p.
5Topicalization, shown in (6)/(7) (b-1) is part of the family of Main Clause Phenomena, discussed in
more detail in Section 2.1.3.
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b. Syntactic consequences:
(i) 3Embedded Main Clause Phenomena: I said that pizza, she doesn’t eat.
(ii) No weak island effects: Who did you say doesn’t eat pizza?
(iii) Clausal anaphora: I said so/#it.
(7) Non-assertive attitudes
a. Pragmatic consequence: p is discourse old/Given/presupposed
b. Syntactic consequences:
(i) 7Embedded Main Clause Phenomena: *I regret that pizza, she doesn’t eat.
(ii) Weak island effects: *Who did you regret doesn’t eat pizza?
(iii) Clausal anaphora: I regret it/*so.
In Section 2.4, we examine another set of proposals, developed in the context of the first
of the syntactic consequences in (6)–(7), embedded Main Clause Phenomena (henceforth,
MCP). These proposals take as their central tenet the first part of (2): commitment to p.
While this ‘criteria’ is relatively straightforward to implement with unembedded sentences, it
becomes complicated with embedded propositions. The main issue is whether an embedded
assertion requires reference to the speaker, or whether—at least for the purpose of the
syntax— it is sufficient that the sentence describes a ‘reported assertion’, i.e. an assertion
of the attitude holder. The question of the role of the identity or class of the embedding
predicate will again become important. As will become clear, quite little is in fact known
about the extent to which different predicates lexically encode speaker or attitude holder
belief.
Section 2.5 discusses a third kind of approach, which relies on a somewhat different
pragmatic notion, similar, but crucially distinct from the notion of assertion offered in (2).
Building in particular on Simons (2007) (and more recent work by Simons, Tonhauser,
Beaver, and Roberts 2010), the idea is that an embedded proposition is asserted when it
provides the Main Point of the Utterance (or what is at-issue, given the Question Under Dis-
cussion; Roberts 1996, 2012). Again, the role of the matrix predicate vis à vis the discourse
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context will come under scrutiny.6 Based on a review of previous experimental work testing
this hypothesis, we are able to reject this hypothesis and set it aside for the remainder of
our discussion. Next, we briefly introduce the class of (embedded) Main Clause Phenomena,
and some of the central questions in the study of this family of constructions.
2.1.3 Introducing Main Clause Phenomena
The study of Main Clause Phenomena [MCP] goes back to Emonds (1970), who identified
a class of transformations that he took to occur only in main clauses.
Classic instances of English MCP involve, but are not limited to: VP-preposing (8-a),
topicalization (8-b), subject-auxiliary inversion (8-c), left/right-dislocation (8-d), and speech
act adverbs (9). Another well-studied MCP, which we will investigate in great detail in
Chapter 3, is V-to-C movement, or verb second (henceforth, V2) (10): V2 is not present in
English, but is found in several other Germanic languages, including Swedish and German.
(8) Hooper and Thompson (1973, p. 467-8)
a. Mary plans for John to marry her, and [marry her]i he will ti.
b. [Each part]i Steve examined ti carefully.
c. Willi James ti ever finish reading that book?
d. (i) [This book]i, iti has the recipe in it.
(ii) You should go to see iti, [that movie]i.
(9) I could seriouslySpeaker use a holiday.
(10) Holmberg (2015, p. 1)
Jag
I
har
have
ärligt
honestly
talat
speaking
aldrig
never
sett
seen
huggormar
adders
i
in
den
this
här
here
skogen.
forest.def
‘To be honest I’ve never seen adders in this forest.’
In an important update of Emonds’s (1970) work, Hooper and Thompson (1973) showed
6We return to the notion of the Question Under Discussion and the (not-)at issue status of p in more
detail in Chapter 5 where we investigate factivity.
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that some MCP are also possible in certain embedded environments:7
(11) Hooper and Thompson (1973, p. 474-479)
a. Sally plans for Gary to marry her, and he vows that marry her, he will.
b. *Sally plans for Gary to marry her, and it bothers me that marry her, he will.
(12) McCloskey (2006, p. 32)
a. A referendum on a united Ireland . . . will be a good thing, because franklySpeaker
they need to be taken down a peg and come down to earth and be a little bit
more sober in their approach to things.
b. *I didn’t drop the class because franklySpeaker I didn’t like it, I dropped it
because it was too expensive.
The study of MCP has been centered around two problems: (a) identifying the types
of lexical and/or pragmatic contexts that license MCP; and (b) properly characterizing
the syntactic and interpretive properties associated with the MCP themselves. Here, we
will focus on the first question; we don’t aim or attempt to provide a syntactic analysis
of the fine-grained syntactic properties of the left-periphery. Of primary interest here are
the lexical and pragmatic properties proposed to correlate with or predict different kinds of
complementation patterns, including the availability of MCP.
The intuition about the licensing of MCP, going back to Hooper and Thompson (1973),
is that MCP are licensed by assertion —hence, its relatively free occurrence in main clauses,
and its restricted availability in embedded clauses. Regarding the role of the embedding pred-
icate, Hooper and Thompson (1973) claimed that only certain classes of predicates, given
7A comprehensive literature review is well beyond the scope of the current discussion. A selection of
work on this topic includes Andersson (1975), Hooper (1975), Green (1976), Maki et al. (1999), Bhatt and
Yoon (1992), Den Besten (1983), Wechsler (1991), Holmberg and Platzack (1991), Hegarty (1992), De Haan
(2001), Zanuttini and Portner (2003), Emonds (2004), Truckenbrodt (2006, 2009), Heycock (2006), Heycock
et al. (2010), Aelbrecht et al. (2012), Julien (2009, 2015), Wiklund (2010), Bentzen (2010), Woods (2015,
2016a,b), Gärtner and Michaelis (2010), Wiklund et al. (2009), Bianchi and Frascarelli (2009), Jensen and
Christensen (2013), Djärv et al. (2017), Kastner (2015), Haegeman and Ürögdi (2010), De Cuba and Ürögdi
(2009), Haegeman (2012, 2014), Holmberg (2015), De Cuba (2017a,b), Jiménez-Fernández and Miyagawa
(2014), Miyagawa (2017), Caplan and Djärv (2019), Jacob (2018).
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in (13), but not others, in (14), allow MCP in their complements (Hooper and Thompson
1973, p. 473-4):8 Again, the intuition is that the predicates in (13) are somehow assertive,
unlike those in (14). Providing a precise characterization of what exactly this amounts to,
and how it is reflected in the grammar, is the focus of the proposals examined in Sections
2.2–2.5.9
(13) Predicates that allow MCP:
a. Speech act non-factives, e.g. say, argue, tell, claim
b. Doxastic non-factives, e.g. think, guess, believe, imagine
c. Doxastic factives, e.g. know, find out, realize, discover (also known as “semi-
factives”, following Karttunen 1971)
(14) Predicates that do not allow MCP:
a. Emotive factives, e.g. regret, appreciate, like, resent
b. Response predicates, e.g. deny, doubt, accept, admit
Regarding the status of the complement itself, there are (very broadly speaking) two
prominent approaches. On one type of approach, assertion is encoded in some kind of
extended C-domain, such as (15), which syntactically encodes illocuationary force, as well
as other discourse features like topic and focus:
8The labels used here are not those used originally by Hooper and Thompson; nor are the current labels a
perfect description of the five categories they assumed. For instance, they do not invoke the doxastic/emotive
distinction in their discussion, but use the notions of ‘semifactive’ vs. ‘factive’ from Karttunen (1971),
however, as we will see in Chapter 5, this terminology is somewhat misleading and will not be adopted
here. Moreover, while the class of verbs in (14-b) (Hooper and Thompson’s (1973) Class C) does involve
the response stance predicates doubt, deny, be (un)likely, be (im)posisble, be(im)probable; the term ‘response
(stance) predicate is from a separate classification due to Cattell (1978), who in his discussion of interrogative
adverbs distinguishes between three classes of predicates: response stance predicates; ‘volunteer stance’
predicates (which include the speech act and doxastic non-factives); and ‘non-stance’ predicates (which
include the factive predicates). Hooper and Thompson (1973, p. 478) describe these verbs as “neither
asserted nor presupposed”.
9Note that the current discussion (and empirical investigation) is focused entirely on MCP in declarative
complements of clause-taking attitude verbs. As we saw in (8) and (10), however, MCP is also possible in
other kinds of embedded environments, for instance in interrogatives and in certain adverbial clauses. While
the distribution/licensing of MCP in such environments is certainly crucial to a general theory of MCP, we
will leave these cases to the side for the remainder of this dissertation, as the goal of this dissertation is not
such a theory, but rather, to forward our understanding of propositional attitude reports and declarative
embedding.
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(15) Rizzi (1997, p. 297)
[ForceP Forceo [TopP Topo [FocP Foco [TopP Topo [FinP Fino IP ]]]]]
A related, but different, way of modelling the syntax of asserted clauses can be found in
Speas and Tenny (2003), Tenny and Speas (2004), who posit designated discourse-projections
making reference to the speaker and hearer. While there are disagreements about the exact
nature of the left-periphery, the idea that asserted clauses involve additional structure mak-
ing reference to pragmatic dimensions of meaning has been widely adopted in the literature
on MCP, in particular in the kind of approach discussed in Sections 2.4–2.5.10 On this
kind of approach, the explanatory burden is placed on the contexts which do allow MCP
—the idea being that topicalization, V-to-C movement, etc., are syntactic reflexes of the
discourse-pragmatics, triggered by features in the C-domain.
On the second kind of approach, on the other hand, the explanatory burden is on the
kinds of contexts that disallow MCP. As mentioned above, the flip-side of assertion is gen-
erally taken to be presupposition (Stalnaker 1974, 1978). Regarding the syntax-pragmatics
interface, a popular view going back to Kiparsky and Kiparsky (1970) is that presupposed
complements are syntactically definite DPs. Again, there are different implementations of
this general perspective, but the idea, broadly, is that topicalization, V-to-C movement, and
other MCP, are either blocked or simply not licensed, by the presence of the D-layer. This
the kind of approach is examined, and rejected, in Section 2.2.
In this preliminary discussion, we have already encountered the central tension in this
literature: the empirical (and theoretical) status of the doxastic factives. On the line of
reasoning going back to Hooper and Thompson (1973), they are treated as assertive. In the
tradition going back to Kiparsky and Kiparsky (1970), on the other hand, they are treated
as non-assertive and presuppositional. As we will see in Chapter 5, the latter approach
is in line with the received view on factivity, according to which factive predicates require
(presuppose) that the embedded proposition is Common Ground. However, this is of course
at odds with Hooper and Thompson’s (1973) observation that MCP is available with these
10See also Bhatt and Yoon 1992, Haegeman 2002, 2003a,b, Julien 2007, 2009, Heycock et al. 2010.
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predicates, and that MCP is licensed by assertion —if we accept the full Stalnakerian picture
of assertion, given in (2). So something has got to give.
In this chapter, we discuss various ways of getting around this problem, either through
appealing to alternative ways of understanding assertion (the proposals in Section 2.4–2.5),
or by claiming that MCP are in fact not available under doxastic factives (the proposals in
Section 2.2). With this background in mind, let us consider the CP/DP Interface Hypothesis
in more detail.
2.2 The CP/DP Interface Hypothesis
In Section 2.2.1, we introduce the CP/DP Interface Hypothesis. Section 2.2.2 discusses
theoretical issues with the proposal. In Section 2.3, below, we test this claim against a
number of commonly adopted diagnostics for the status of the embedded clause as a CP
vs. a DP, showing that this hypothesis is incorrect in its empirical claims: both regarding
the verbs which (c-)select for DPs, and regarding the connection between DP-syntax and
various types of complementation patterns (specifically wh-extraction and —as we will see
in Chapter 3— Main Clause Syntax).
2.2.1 Introducing the hypothesis
The claim examined in this section is that certain, presuppositional, or non-assertive verbs
select (only) for DPs. The idea, which goes back at least to Kiparsky and Kiparsky (1970),
is that the pragmatic status of p as discourse old is encoded syntactically and semantically in
a definite D-head in the embedded clause. We will refer to this idea as the CP/DP Interface
Hypothesis (16).
(16) The CP/DP Interface Hypothesis
a. Some clauses are DPs;
b. Some verbs are ‘assertive’ and some verbs are ‘non-assertive’;
c. Assertive verbs select CPs and non-assertive verbs select DPs.
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Regarding the syntax-pragmatics interface, the claim of this proposal is that the availability
of certain kinds of complementation patterns depends on whether the embedded clause is
a CP or a DP. The following syntactic effects are often discussed: (i) Availability of MCP
(17); (ii) Weak island effects (18)–(19); and (iii) Clausal anaphora (20)–(21).
(17) a. *John {regrets, resents} that [this book], Mary read.
(Haegeman and Ürögdi 2010, p. 112-113, 122, Haegeman 2012, p. 257, De Cuba
2017a, p. 4, De Cuba and Ürögdi 2010, p. 43; Maki et al. 1999, p. 3, Kastner
2015, p. 3)
b. *John {denies, remembers} that this book, Mary read.
(Kastner 2015, p. 3, 17)
c. *Mary realizes that [this book], John read.
(De Cuba 2017a, p. 4; Haegeman 2012, p. 257, Maki et al. 1999, p. 3; Hegarty
1992, p. 52, fn. 19)
(18) Haegeman and Ürögdi (2010, p. 119), from Hegarty 1992, p. 1
a. Howi do you suppose [that Maria fixed the car ti]?
b. *Howi did you notice [that Maria fixed the car ti]?
(19) Kastner (2015, p. 11)
a. Whoi do you think [ti stole the cookies]?
b. *Whoi do you {deny, remember, regret} [ti stole the cookies]?
(20) Haegeman and Ürögdi (2010, p. 142)
a. John supposed [that Bill had done it]i, and Mary supposed [itDP /soCP ]i too.
b. John regretted [that Bill had done it]i, and Mary regretted [itDP /*soCP ]i too.
(21) Kastner (2015, p.23)
a. John {thought, said} so.
b. *John {remembered, forgot} so
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This idea has gained quite a lot of traction in recent years. Here, we focus on the accounts
from Haegeman and Ürögdi 2010, Haegeman 2014, and Kastner (2015), as theoretically
explicit and empirically comprehensive implementations of this account (but see also Hegarty
1992, Maki et al. 1999, Basse 2008, De Cuba and Ürögdi 2009, Haegeman and Ürögdi 2010,
Haegeman 2009, 2012, De Cuba 2017a,b, Hanink and Bochnak 2016, 2017, Korsah and
Murphy 2017, Ishii 2017, Jarrah 2017, Berrebi and Bassel 2017, Miyagawa 2017, among
others).
On the original proposal of Kiparsky and Kiparsky (1970), the important difference is
between factive and non-factive predicates, the idea being that factive predicates select a
clause with a potentially null DP corresponding to the fact, as illustrated in (22).
(22) [vP v [DP D [NP FACT [CP that p ] ] ] ]
In more recent implementations of this view, the idea of a full factive NP has been aban-
doned, in favour of a D-layer (23), ensuring that the clause is interpreted as ‘familiar’ or
that the embedded proposition refers to some type of (discourse) entity in the conversational
Common Ground (following Hegarty 1992), though not necessarily factive.
(23) [DP Do [CP that p ]]
According to Kastner (2015), factive predicates, along with response stance predicates like
accept and deny, form a class of predicates which he refers to as ‘presuppositional’:11
(24) Adapted from Kastner 2015
a. John said [P that the moon was made of kale]. (No one had claimed p before)
b. Bill denied [P that he stole the cookies]. (#No one had claimed p before)
c. Bill knows [P that the moon is made of kale].(#No one had told him p before)
This view is typically motivated by the empirical claim that factive predicates tend to favour
11Haegeman (2014) doesn’t explicitly discuss these, but it is clear from her discussion that she intends
for her class of ‘referentials’ to be understood in a similar way.
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complements with nominal properties, whereas speech act predicates tend to dis-prefer them,
as shown in (25).
(25) Haegeman and Ürögdi (2010, p. 133)
a. I {resent, remember, know} / *{think, said, claimed} [DP the claim that John
stole the jewels].
b. Mary resents/*asserted [DP the fact that she is pregnant].
c. Mary resents/*asserts [DP being pregnant].
Though as was already observed by Hooper and Thompson (1973), this is not necessarily
true for the doxastic factives (26). We return to this issue shortly.
(26) a. *I learned Lucy’s getting a speeding ticket.
b. *Mary found out Daniel’s cutting class.
c. *I see the fact that the Bruins lost.
d. *I know the fact that you’re not speaking to me.
According to Haegeman and Ürögdi (2010) and Haegeman (2014), referentiality or famil-
iarity is derived via operator movement from a TP-internal position. On this view, factive
complements are essentially relative clauses.12 Importantly for Haegeman, this also accounts
for the weak-island effects found with factive complements. Non-referential clauses, on the
other hand, they argue are CPs that have combined with illocuationary force and which do
not involve operator movement. Importantly for Haegeman, this also captures the distribu-
tion of scene setting adverbs in English (27), which appear not to be restricted in the same
way as fronted topics, despite being merged in the left-periphery. On this view, these do
not involve movement, and do therefore not give rise to intervention effects. (In Chapter 3,
we probe this empirical claim experimentally.)
12This is also the position adopted by Hanink and Bochnak (2016, 2017) in their account of clausal
complements of factive vs. non-factive verbs in Washo.
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(27) Haegeman (2014, p. 190)
a. John regrets that [last week] Mary did not turn up for the lecture.
b. I resent the fact that [last week] Mary did not turn up for the lecture.
c. but nothing could alter the fact that [on the previous evening] he had got
engaged to be married to a girl without a bean (P.G. Wodehouse. 1960. The
most of P.G. Wodehouse. Simon and Schuster. 521, from Santorini 2001)
On Kastner’s (2015) account on the other hand, the type of complement is determined by
selection: presuppositional verbs select a covert definite determiner (∆, from Adger and Quer
2001), which in turn selects a CP headed by a Force-head endowed with a presuppositional
feature (he refers to these as ‘Selected Embedded Presuppositionals’). According to Kastner,
‘presuppositional Force’ does not license topic or focus, which explains why topic/focus-
movement is disallowed in these contexts. He takes ‘presuppositional verbs’ to select a
presuppositional determiner, which in turn selects a C-head (Force or Fin) that constraints
the availability of Topic and Focus in the embedded clause. When the matrix context is
presuppositional, Kastner argues that a presupposition sensitive definite determiner ∆ will
be licensed. The choice of the C-head is thus restricted by the semantics of that higher
licensor. Regarding the availability of Main Clause Phenomena, Kastener argues:
“Topic and Focus projections are not present in Selected Embedded Presupposi-
tionals, leaving would-be fronted elements with no landing site. Force is supposed
to be sensitive to the discourse environment of both the matrix predicate and
the embedded predicate . . . Force licenses Topic and Focus, so it stands to rea-
son that they are sensitive to certain features on it. Now, the presuppositional
embedding verb would carry a feature [F] relevant to presupposition; such a fea-
ture has been proposed before, though at this point it is not crucial whether
it is [-ASSERT] (De Cuba 2007, Basse 2008), [+FACTIVE] or [+REFEREN-
TIAL] (Haegeman and Ürögdi 2010). The end result is the same: after V checks
this feature on ∆, this definite determiner imposes a selectional requirement on
Force similar to that which takes place in [Unselected Embedded Questions]. ∆
licenses a Force with a presuppositional feature, and a presuppositional Force
does not license Topic or Focus. (Kastner 2015, p. 18-20)
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Before testing the empirical underpinning of this hypothesis, let us consider some theo-
retical and empirical problems and questions for the approach.
2.2.2 Theoretical and empirical issues
An important question for this view concerns the theoretical and empirical assumptions
about factivity and referentiality. Recall from our introduction in Chapter 1 that propo-
sitions are commonly assumed to refer to sets of possible worlds. However, it is not clear
how this would distinguish between the complements of verbs like say and think and com-
plements of verbs like know, regret, and doubt. (This point was raised by Bhatt 2010 in his
review of Haegeman and Ürögdi 2010.) Without a more explicit definition of what is meant
by ‘referential’, the proposal as it stands is not very informative or predictive.
Moreover, as we will discuss in more detail in Chapters 3 and 5, whether a predicate
gives rise to a projective inference that the speaker is committed to p, must be dissociated
from the predicate’s requirements regarding the discourse status of p: in (28), the factive
verb discover patterns with non-factive tell and think, in allowing p to be presented as new
information, unlike the factive verb appreciate and the non-factive (response stance) verb
doubt. (See also discussion in Simons 2007.)
(28) [Uttered out of the blue:] Guess what — (Adapted from Caplan and Djärv 2019)
a. John {said, thinks} that [P Bill and Anna broke up]. Non-factive
b. John discovered that [P Bill and Anna broke up]. Factive
c. #John appreciates that [P Bill and Anna broke up]. Factive
d. #John doubts that [P Bill and Anna broke up]. Non-factive
Nevertheless, appreciate and discover are both factive, in the sense that they both give rise
to the projective inference that the speaker is committed to p (unlike the other predicates):
(29) [I just saw my good friends Bill and Anna, who told me that they got engaged.]
a. #John {discovered, appreciated} (wrongly) that [P Bill and Anna broke up].
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b. John {said, thought} (wrongly) that [P Bill and Anna broke up].
c. John doubted (rightly) that [P Bill and Anna broke up].
This is clearly a problem for proposals that take factive verbs to impose the requirement that
p represents discourse old information.13 The response stance predicates raise a number of
questions too. While it is clear that these predicates require that the issue of p is on the
table, it is also clear that they neither require either speaker commitment to p, nor for p to
be Common Ground, in the Stalnakerian sense:
(31) a. Q. Where is John?
b. A1. Well, Mary thinks that [P he’s in New York]i, but I doubt it/thati.
c. A2. [Where p is not on the table:] #I doubt/accept that [P he’s in New York].
Hence, the relevant pragmatic notion cannot be presupposition in the sense of Stalnaker
(1974), Heim (1982) et seq. In theoretical terms then, it clearly does matter whether the
relevant feature F, that Kastner posits, is [-assert], [+factive], or [+referential].
Moreover, while Kastner is very clear about the predictions his account makes for topic
and focus, it is less clear how his account would rule out V-to-C movement. It seems like
this would require a further stipulation that presuppositional Force lacks an EPP-feature.
A further, empirical problem for this approach concerns the judgements reported about
the availability of MCP. First, the judgements in (17), indicating that MCP are ill-formed
under doxastic factives, are clearly at odds with those from Hooper and Thompson (1973):
(32) Hooper and Thompson (1973, p. 481)
13Regarding (24-c), there is another salient reason why the sentence would comes across as infelicitous:
namely that it is implausible that someone would know that the moon is made of kale, unless they had been
told (by some very reliable source) that it is. However, we could easily imagine a scenario where the sentence
is fine, for instance in a fictional context where the speaker has been to the moon, discovered that it’s made
of kale, then says about Bill, after his trip to the moon:
(30) After his trip to the moon, Bill now knows that it is made of kale. No one had told him this fact
before, so boy, was he in for a surprise when he arrived!
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a. Sally plans for Gary to marry her, and he recognizes that, whether he likes it
or not, marry her he will.
b. I found out that never before had he had to borrow money.
c. I noticed that playing in next month’s concert would be Artur Rubinstein.
d. The scout discovered that beyond the next hill stood a large fortress.
e. The boys finally realized that to read so many comic books is a waste of time.
f. We saw that each part he had examined carefully.
g. I discovered that this book, it has the recipes in it.
However, it is also not clear that MCP are ruled out in the complements of emotive factives:
Bianchi and Frascarelli (2009) give (33) to show that English topicalization is licensed un-
der emotive factives, in direct contrast to both (17) and the judgements from Hooper and
Thompson (1973) (we will come back to these judgements in Chapter 3).
(33) Bianchi and Frascarelli (2009, p. 69)
a. I am glad that [this unrewarding job], she has finally decided to give up.
b. Mary didn’t tell us that [Bill] she had fired, and [John] she had decided to
promote.
A number of empirical questions arise in this context. To start, it is not immediately clear
that (17) and (33) are in fact contradictory judgements. First, it is possible that they rep-
resent some further relevant dimension of variation (e.g. the verbal/adjectival contrast). A
second point, regarding all of these data points, is that these judgements appear to be subtle
and potentially context-sensitive. Hence, it is difficult to tell whether conflicting empirical
claims of this type are in fact due to a failure to control properly for potential pragmatic
confounds. It is also possible that we might be dealing with inter-speaker variation. It’s also
true that most of these data points are based on a small number of predicates, leaving open
the possibility that what appears to be correlates of certain, semantically or pragmatically
defined lexical classes and their complementation patterns, are simply the effects of idiosyn-
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cratic lexical properties of specific predicates (e.g. regret vs. be glad). These are empirical
issues that would benefit from more systematic, quantitative, data. This will be the sole
focus of Chapter 3, so we leave the issue to the side for the remainder of this discussion.
2.3 Diagnostics for CP vs. DP complementation
2.3.1 Weak island effects
As we saw above, the theoretical claim of the proposals discussed here is that A-bar move-
ment from the embedded to the matrix clause is blocked by a (covert) D-layer embedded
clause.14 The empirical claim is that factive predicates, and response stance verbs, give rise
to weak island effects. However, looking at a wider range of predicates, a different picture
emerges: while the island-effects appear to be robust with the response verbs (34-c) and the
emotive factives (34-d), the doxastic factives are weakly degraded at best (34-e). Moreover,
we find that even some of the speech act verbs are slightly degraded, on par with the doxastic
factives, as shown in (34-a).15
(34) a. Whoi did he {say, claim, (?)mention, (?)tell (to) her} [ti stole the cookies]?
b. Whoi did he {believe, assume, guess, suppose} [ti stole the cookies]?
c. Whoi did he {*accept, *admit, *doubt, *deny} [ti stole the cookies]?
d. Whoi did he {*appreciate, *resent, *love, *hate} [ti stole the cookies]?
e. Whoi did he {(?)discover, (?)find out, (?)notice, (?)hear, (?)know} [ti stole the
cookies]?
We further observe that the cases in (34-a) and (34-e) marked with (?) improve in contexts
where they are interpreted as echo questions, or with added material. While this is not
14See also Rizzi (1990), Cinque (1991) and Rooryck (1992), and much subsequent literature. Accounts that
appeal to the semantics of factive verbs, rather than syntactic effects include Szabolcsi and Zwarts (1993),
Fox and Hackl (2006), Oshima (2006), Abrusán (2011a, 2014), Chierchia (2013), Schwarz and Simonenko
(2018).
15For consistency across different tests, the verbs we look at here are the same as those used in the
experiments in Chapter 3. The English judgements reported in this and the following sub-section are
primarily from Luke Adamson, and have been corroborated by Julie Legate. Julian Sahasrabudhe, Larry
DiBello, and David Embick have also provided judgements about a number of the English sentences.
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surprising per se (it is often observed that A-bar movement improves with D-linking), this
however, does not improve the sentences with the response verbs and the emotive factives.
(35) a. Whoi did you notice ti left their backpack after school?16
b. Whoi did he know for sure ti stole the cookies?17
(36) a. WHOi did he {mention, tell (to) her} [ti stole the cookies]?
b. WHOi did he {*accept, ?admit, *doubt, *deny} [ti stole the cookies]?
c. WHOi did he {*appreciate, *resent, *love, *hate} [ti stole the cookies]?
d. WHOi did he {discover, find out, notice, hear, know} [ti stole the cookies]?
Similar data can in fact be found in Rooryck (1992), who notes that the weak island effects
can be made to go away under certain conditions. However, he doesn’t distinguish between
the two sub-types of factives.
It seems, then, like the doxastic factives are a problem for this kind of account given
that it predicts that all factives should pattern the same. In fact, this appears to be a
more general problem for accounts of factive islands: I am not aware of any accounts of
propositional islands, either semantic or syntactic, that distinguishes between doxastic and
emotive factives. (We return to this issue in Sections 2.3.1, 3.3, where we tie the availability
of wh-extraction to the possibility of V-to-C movement, and the pragmatic status of p as
discourse new content.)
More generally, we might conclude that if the island effects are a reliable guide to the
categorical status of the embedded clause, then the conclusion ought to be that the clausal
complements of emotive factives and response stance verbs are in fact DPs.
2.3.2 Clausal anaphora
As we saw in Section 4.3.2.1, the clausal proform so is a CP-anaphor. This is based on
distributional evidence, as shown in (37). Based on similar considerations, it is standardly
16Thanks Julie Anne Legate, p.c., for this data point.
17Thanks Luke Adamson, p.c., for this data point.
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assumed that the clausal proform it is a DP-anaphor (38).18
(37) Moulton (2015, p. 306)
a. It seems [CP so].
b. It seems [CP that John left].
c. *[DP That/it] seems.
d. *It seems [DP that/it].
e. *It seems [DP the fact/idea/notion/claim/rumor that John left].
f. *It seems [DP John’s leaving].
(38) Haegeman and Ürögdi (2010, p. 142), Kastner (2015, p. 23): from Kiparsky and
Kiparsky (1970, p. 166)
a. Mary believes [DP the claim that John left]i, and Bill believes [it/*soi too.
b. Mary believes [CP that John left]i, and Bill believes [it/so]i too.
Again, however, we find that the distribution of proform so is less restricted than pre-
dicted on these accounts. (39) shows naturally occurring data with so embedded under the
doxastic factive know, and (40) shows examples with the response stance predicate admit.
(39) Moulton (2015, p. 307-308)
Rooney knew he was special from a young age. And those who nurtured a talent
that comes along rarely in any sport knew so, too.19
(40) Moulton (2015, p. 308)
a. She did pay the woman who cared for her daughter with drugs because that
is what the woman asked for. She would not admit so to DYFS because she
feared the consequences.20
18The anaphora test goes back at least to Kiparsky and Kiparsky (1970), Adams (1985), though they
draw the line between factive and non-factive clauses. See also Stowell (1987).
19http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sport/article-389647/Walking-miracle.html
20Ryan, Edward S. 2000. Case studies of the psychological and forensic assessment of parental child
abuse. Journal of Instructional Psychology 27:3
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b. Gebara further asserted that politically “advanced” priests and nuns favor de-
criminalization, but admit so only in “very restricted circles.”21
Looking further at the wider set of predicates, we observe that while the emotive factives
and the response verbs consistently disallow so, there is a fair amount of variation among
different verbs of the other classes:
(41) a. I {said, told her, *mentioned, *claimed} so.
b. I {believe, assume, suppose, guess} so.
c. *I {accept, admit, doubt, deny} so.
d. *I {appreciate, resent, love, hate} so.
e. I {*discovered, *found out, *noticed, ??heard} so.
However, the picture for so turns out to be slightly more complicated: to start, we find that
so sometimes improves by fronting:22,23
(44) a. So I {mentioned, claimed}.
b. So I {found out, noticed, heard, discovered}.
c. [Mary walks into the room with soaked shoes.]
(i) Lisa says: Oh by the way, the basement flooded.
(ii) Mary responds: So I found out/discovered (the hard way)! 24
21Serbin, Ken. 1995. Simmering abortion debate goes public in Brazil. Christian Century 112(8):2666)
22Thanks Keir Moulton, pc. for this observation.
23The role of fronting brings to mind the pattern found with wager -verbs, discussed above (42), as well
as that of finite clauses with null-complementizers (43):
(42) Rezac (2013, p. 313)
a. We alleged them/*THEM/*the propositions to be inconsistent.
b. The propositions were alleged [ to be inconsistent].
(43) Pesetsky and Torrego (2004, p. 7)
a. *[Sue left] is obvious.
b. Mary thinks [Sue left].
We leave this potentially interesting connection for future research to investigate.
24Thanks Julian Sahasrabudhe for this example.
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(45) [Lisa is the witness in a trial, and she’s on the stand. The lawyers are trying to
discredit her statement by pointing out that she’s done something illicit.]
a. Lawyer: But isn’t it true that you killed a man?
b. Lisa: So I’ve already admitted.25
(46) [Mary has been waiting, hopelessly, for weeks, for her lover, who said he’d soon
return.]
a. Lisa: You know he’s gone, you know he’s not coming back. . .He’s skipped town.
b. Mary: So I’ve accepted./So I’ve come to accept.26
However, this is not a fully general rescue strategy for so:27
(49) a. *So he keeps denying/doubting.
b. *So I’ve come to love/hate/appreciate/resent.28
An observation that we will come back to in more detail in Chapter 3, is that matrix negation
gives rise to an inference, similar to that of response predicates, that p is somehow already
present in the discourse; a property we observe correlates with the availability of embedded
V2 (though surprisingly not other MCP; see Caplan and Djärv 2019 and discussion in
Chapter 3). Based on this, we might expect that so (as a potential correlate of MCP)
should also be bad in negated contexts. However, what we find is that matrix negation
changes the judgement for some, though not all, of the verbs that allow so in the positive
25Thanks Luke Adamson for this example.
26Thanks Luke Adamson for this example.
27know is different in that it appears to disallow fronting:
(47) a. Bill believes that [P John and Mary broke up]i, but I know {it/?so}i.
(i) Bill doesn’t believe that [P John and Mary broke up]i, but I KNOW {it/so}i.
(ii) *So I know.
A similar pattern is found with not seem:
(48) a. So it seems.
b. *So it doesn’t seem.
28Some speakers find appreciate and resent marginally acceptable here.
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polarity:
(50) a. He didn’t {say, *mention, tell her, *claim} so.
b. He didn’t {believe, assume, suppose, ?guess} so.
c. He didn’t {*accept, *admit, *doubt, *deny} so.
d. He didn’t {*appreciate, *resent, *love, *hate} so.
e. He didn’t {*discover, *find out, *notice, *hear, know} so
f. I don’t KNOW so for sure, but I definitely believe it.29
And moreover, so is still preferred with matrix negation for think (even in a context where
p is clearly given in the discourse):
(51) Bill believes that [P John and Mary broke up]i, but I don’t think {so/#it}i.
To summarize, we seem to find four distinct patterns (52). Importantly, the verbs that never
allow so, seem to be the emotive factives, and the negative response stance verbs.
(52) a. Allow so in any position: {say, tell me, believe, guess, suppose, assume, hear}
b. Allow so only when fronted: {mention, claim, admit, accept, discover, find out,
notice}
c. Allow so only in object position: know
d. Never allow so: {deny, doubt, love, hate, appreciate, resent}
It seems, then, that the contexts that disallow so are even more specific than what we saw
with the island effects. Given the pattern observed with matrix negation (51), it doesn’t
seem as though this is related to the status of p as referential or presupposed.
While the apparently complex licensing conditions on so suggest that more can be said
on this topic, what’s important here is what so can tell us about the availability of a CP-
complement with a given predicates. Setting further complications aside, then, we can
29As in (47), contrastive focus appears to play a role with know.
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conclude that if a predicate allows for so in any position (setting any complications about
fronting and negation aside), then it allows for a CP-complement. If that is correct, then
we may conclude, based on this test, that all of the verbs investigated here, apart from the
emotive factives and the negative response verbs, permit CP-complements.
2.3.3 Expletive associate construction
Given the various interactions observed with so, however, it might still be the case that
the negative response verbs (doubt, deny) and the emotive factives (appreciate, resent, love,
hate) do license CP-complements, and that so is bad for independent reasons.
To test this, let us consider one more test for whether a verb may take a CP-complement,
this is the expletive associate construction [EAC] (53), as we saw in (37), repeated in (54).
As with so, this test is based on distributional evidence.
(53) It seems [CP that John left].
(54) Moulton (2015, p. 306)
a. It seems [CP so].
b. *[DP That/it] seems.
c. *It seems [DP that/it].
d. *It seems [DP the fact/idea/notion/claim/rumor that John left].
e. *It seems [DP John’s leaving].
As expected at this point, the EAC is generally available with the speech act verbs (55), the
doxastic non-factives (56), and the doxastic factives (57):
(55) a. It was always said that John would get the job.
b. It’s often mentioned that John would get the job.
c. It had been claimed that John would get the job.
d. It’s been told to me that John would get the job.
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(56) a. It was generally {believed, assumed, supposed} that John would get the job.
b. It had been guessed before that John would get the job.
(57) a. It was recently {discovered, noticed, ??heard} that John got the job.
b. It was recently found out that John was the culprit.
c. It was always known that John would get the job.
However, we find that, unlike so, the EAC is also available with all of the response verbs:
(58) a. It was generally {accepted, doubted} that John would get the job.
b. It had finally been admitted (by the other candidates) that John deserved it.
c. It had been denied (by multiple new sources) that John would get the job.
Among the emotive factives, there is some variation, with love and hate being more degraded
in the EAC than appreciate and resent :
(59) a. (?)It’s always been appreciated by the residents that the landlord doesn’t raise
the rent every year.
b. ?(?)It has long been resented by the residents that the landlord keeps raising the
rent every year
c. *It’s always been loved by the residents that the landlord doesn’t raise the rent
every year.
d. *It’s long been hated by the residents that the landlord keeps raising the rent
every year
For completeness sake, we might note that there is no effect of matrix negation on the
acceptability of the EAC:
(60) a. It hasn’t always been said that John would get the job.
b. It hadn’t yet been mentioned (by anyone) that John would get the job.
c. It wasn’t generally {believed, assumed, supposed} that John would get the job.
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d. It wasn’t ever doubted that John would get the job.
e. It hadn’t yet been admitted (by any other candidate) that John deserved it.
f. It hasn’t been denied (by the accused) that the allegations are true.
g. It hadn’t yet been {discovered, noticed} that the moon isn’t made of cheese.
h. It wasn’t generally known that John would get the job.
Compared with the so-test, this test shows fewer complications. Overall, the results align
with those from the so-test, with the exception of the negative response stance verbs, doubt
and deny. Based on this, and the proform so-test, we might conclude that all of these verbs,
apart from the emotive factives allow CP-complements. It seems likely, given these tests,
that the emotive factives select for DP-complements.30 To test this hypothesis, let us look
at one more test: the DP-requirement.
2.3.4 The DP-requirement
Another potential test for the status of the embedded clause as a DP or a CP is what is
known as The DP-requirement (see for instance Koster 1978, Alrenga 2005, Takahashi 2010,
Moulton 2013, Ott 2017). This is the observation that (apparently) fronted CPs are only
possible if a DP is licensed in its base-position. This hypothesis is motivated by data such
as (62)–(63):
(62) a. Bill expected that John would be unqualified.
b. That had been expected.
30Though note that there might be some variation within this class; as indicated by (59). A further
important caveat to note in this context is that adjectival emotives like be sad and be surprised do not
license overt DP-complements and do license expletive subjects (thanks Keir Moulton, p.c., for this comment)
(though note that e.g. be happy does not license expletive subjects, thank L:
(61) a. Lisa is surprised *(about) it/the rumour that John got the job.
b. It is surprising that John got the job.
This raises a number of questions regarding the syntactic and semantic differences between the verbal and
adjectival (factive) predicates. An interesting point in this context, is the data in (65) (discussed in fn. 31),
showing some variation in the availability of dropping propositions in clausal contexts, depending on the
position of the clause. The verbal-adjectival contrast represents its own interesting dimension of variation,
which we will not focus on here (though see for instance the results from Section 5.3.2.5; Figure 5.5).
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c. That John would be unqualified had been expected.
d. Bill expected it.
e. Bill expected him to be unqualified.
(63) a. Bill objected that John would be unqualified.
b. *That had been objected.
c. *That John would be unqualified had been objected.
d. *Bill objected it.
e. *Bill objected him to be unqualified.
f. That John would be unqualified had been objected to.
The same pattern is found for instance in Swedish, as shown in (64)–(65). This data
further shows us that there may be difference across verbs of the same predicate class: while
the response verb acceptera (‘accept’) licenses a DP-complement, this is not the case with
tvivla (‘doubt’), as we see with both the availability of overt DPs, and with CP-fronting:31
(64) Swedish (own judgement)
a. Jag
Jag
accepterar
accept
inte
not
att
that
Lisa
Lisa
alltid
always
fuskar.
cheats.
‘I don’t accept that Lisa always cheats.’
b. Jag
I
accepterar
accept
inte
not
det.
it.
‘I don’t accept it.’
c. Jag
I
accepterar
accept
inte
not
[DP {det,
it,
ditt
your
påstående}
claim
att
that
Lisa
Lisa
alltid
always
fuskar].
cheats.
‘I don’t accept the idea/your claim that Lisa always cheats.’
d. Att
That
Lisa
Lisa
alltid
always
fuskar
cheats
accepterar
accept
jag
I
inte.
not.
‘That Lisa always cheats, I don’t accept.’
31Interestingly, with a bare that-clause (65-a), it is marginally acceptable to drop the proposition. Cru-
cially, both overt DPs (65-c) and fronted CPs (65-d) are sharply ungrammatical without an overt PP. This
pattern is not unique to the response verbs, or to verbal predicates: we also find this pattern also with
adjectival attitude predicates, such as vara säker (be sure) and vara glad (be happy).
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(65) Swedish (own judgement)
a. Jag
I
tvivlar
don’t
inte
doubt
??(på)
on
att
that
Lisa
Lisa
alltid
always
fuskar.
cheats
‘I’m not happy that Lisa always cheats.’
b. Jag
I
tvivlar
doubt
inte
not
*(på)
on
det.
it.
‘I don’t doubt it.’32
c. Jag
I
tvivlar
doubt
inte
not
*(på)
on
[DP {det,
it,
ditt
your
påstående}
claim
att
that
Lisa
Lisa
alltid
always
fuskar].
cheats
‘I don’t doubt the idea/your claim that Lisa always cheats.’
d. Att
That
Lisa
Lisa
alltid
always
fuskar
cheats
tvivlar
doubt
jag
I
inte
not
*(på).
on
‘That Lisa always cheats, I don’t doubt.’
For a theoretical discussion of the DP-requirement, see the authors cited above. For
current purposes, what matters is the observation that fronted CPs distribute like overt
DPs, in that they need to be syntactically licensed (either by a verb or a PP). We can thus
use CP-fronting to test whether or not an attitude verb licenses a DP.
Given the basic empirical claim of the CP/DP Interface Hypothesis, and the findings
regarding wh-extraction, the CP proform so, and the expletive associate construction, as
well as the simple observation that emotive factives are clearly acceptable whit overt DPs
(67), it is surprising that several of the emotive factives disallow CP-fronting, as shown in
(68).33
(67) I {appreciated, resented, loved, hated} the claim/fact/rumour that Bill and Mary
broke up.
(68) a. That John was unqualified for the job had been {said, mentioned, told (to) me,
32Note that in Swedish, the proform det (‘it’) is used with both CP and DP complements.
33One might ask whether topicalized CPs are better than passivized ones. This does not seem to be borne
out, as shown in (66):
(66) That John broke up with Mary, I really/totally {?appreciated, ?(?)resented, *loved, *hated}.
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claimed} for a long time.
b. That John was unqualified was generally {believed, guessed, assumed, ??sup-
posed}.
c. That John was unqualified was generally {accepted, admitted, doubted, de-
nied}.
d. That John broke up with Mary was {?appreciated, ?(?)resented, *loved, *hated}
by most of our friends.
e. That John was unqualified has been {discovered, found out, noticed, (is) known,
?heard} by almost everyone.
We might note here that some speakers find CP-fronting somewhat degraded also with
suppose and hear. Note also that, unlike with English object or Swedish tvivla (doubt),
there is no PP-option to “rescue” the ill-formed examples in (68).
2.3.5 Conclusions: DP/CP diagnostics
Taken together then, the tests discussed in this section seem to speak in favour of the seem-
ingly paradoxical conclusion that clausal complements of emotive factives are underlyingly
DPs (according to the weak island effects, so-anaphora, and the expletive associate con-
struction), while the emotive factives themselves do not in fact license DPs (according to
the DP-requirement).
However, this conclusion is obviously too simplistic. To start, it is clear that emotive
factives can combine with content nominals, as we saw for instance in (67).
A natural thing to ask, at this point, is what these tests actually show. Clearly, one
thing that these commonly used tests tell us, when taken together in this way, is that a lot
more work has to be done in order for it to be clear exactly what conclusions we can draw
from them. Here, some headway has been made in this direction.
To see if there are more helpful conclusions to be drawn, let us do a brief recap of
the tests and the conclusions they each lead us to (recall that the first two tests involved
DP-diagnostics, and the last two CP-diagnostics):
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Test License CP License DP
Weak islands Response Stance, Emotive Fac-
tive
Fronted CP Speech Act, Doxastic Non-
factive, Doxastic Factive, Re-
sponse Stance
so-anaphora Speech Act, Doxastic Non-
factive, Doxastic Factive, Posi-
tive Response Stance
Expl. Assoc. Speech Act, Doxastic Non-
factive, Doxastic Factive, Re-
sponse Stance
Table 2.1: Tests for the status of the embedded clause as a CP or a DP: conclusions.
Regarding the CP-tests, we saw that so-anaphora imposed various pragmatic restrictions
on its occurrence and distribution. We might thus conclude that if a verb is possible either
with proform so or with the expletive associate construction, then the verb allows a CP-
complement. This appears to be the case for all verbs except the emotive factives.
The question of the status of the complement as a DP is clearly more complicated. In
Chapter 4, we will see that the interpretation of content DPs matters for their felicity with
a given verb, which is an altogether different matter from the verb syntactically licensing a
DP. Given the availability of content nominals and proform it across verbs, along with the
DP-requirement, we might conclude that all of these verbs are in principle capable of taking
DP-complements (with the possible exception of suppose).
It must be then, that the weak island and CP-fronting tests are picking up on more
specific properties of the complements (as we saw in the case of content nominals). Fore-
shadowing conclusions to come, we will find that the weak island test tracks (a) the dis-
tribution of embedded V2 in Swedish and German, and (b) the pragmatic requirement of
the predicate that p is discourse old content. See discussion in Section 3.3. Regarding the
seemingly paradoxical findings about the emotive factives, a possible answer is that CP-
fronting requires both that the predicate can syntactically (case) license a DP-operator in
the complement of the verb, but also that the verb can combine with a CP. Emotive factives
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meet only one of those criteria, and are hence incompatible with CP-fronting. As the goal
here is not to provide a theory of CP-fronting, but simply to use its distribution to examine
the selectional properties of the various classes of attitude verbs, we leave this intriguing
possibility for future research.
To conclude, this section examined a core empirical tenet of the CP/DP Interface Hy-
pothesis, namely that a subclass of ‘presuppositional’ attitude verbs —the response verbs
and the emotive factives— only c-select for DPs (the proposed syntactic reflex of ‘presup-
position’). Looking at a set of proposed diagnostics for DP vs. CP status, we found that
all of the verbs investigated allow DP-complements; and that all verbs except the emotive
factives allow CP-complements. In the previous section, we also saw that this theory ran
into problems also regarding the pragmatic side of the proposal. This hypothesis framed the
restriction on Main Clause Phenomena, clausal anaphora, and weak island effects in terms
of the second component of assertion, given in (2): whether or not the speaker attempts to
add p to the Common Ground. In Section 2.2.2, however, we saw that this account ran in
to a number empirical and theoretical problems, in particular with regards to the class of
the doxastic factives.
While these obstacles might lead us to reject this hypothesis, as we saw in Section 2.2.2,
it is still an open empirical question what drives the availability of Main Clause Phenomena:
in particular, is the licensing of MCP sensitive to factivity, or a more general notion of
‘presupposition’ (in tour terms, Givenness)? This section also raised the complication of
inter-speaker variation. In the following section, we find that there might also be substantive
variation among both languages and among different MCP.
2.4 Embedded V2: belief or commitment to p
In this section, we examine a set of accounts of the syntax and pragmatics of embedded
assertions, which focus on the first component of assertion, as stated in (2): that the speaker
(or the attitude holder) is committed to p. The accounts discussed in this section are all
formulated in the context of embedded V2.
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A central issue for these theories concerns the question of whose belief or commitment
is at stake. (2) is formulated as a statement about unembedded propositions; clearly what
matters in this case is whether or not the speaker is committed to p. Regarding propositions
embedded under attitude verbs, however, there are in principle two different agents available
for evaluating the embedded proposition. As we have seen above, and will discuss in more
detail in Chapter 5, different verbs differ in terms of whether they make reference to the
speaker or the attitude holder, or both. For instance, while factive predicates generally
require that the speaker is committed to the embedded proposition, this is typically not the
case for non-factive predicates, as illustrated in (69).
(69) a. Mary {thinks, claims, is sure, is convinced} that John left the country, but
she’s clearly wrong— I just saw him on the bus this morning. [Non-factive]
b. #Mary {discovered, knows, resents, loves} that John left the country, but she’s
clearly wrong— I just saw him on the bus this morning. [Factive]
While it seems intuitive that verbs like think, believe, assume, know, and accept all express
some epistemic commitment to the embedded proposition on behalf of the attitude holder,
it is less clear to what extent this is the case for speech act predicates like say, tell, and
mention. This point is reminiscent of Anand and Hacquard (2014), who draw a key dis-
tinction between reports of private mental states (doxastic predicates) and reports of public
communicative acts, that make reference to a reported common ground (speech act pred-
icates). Anand and Hacquard (2014) refers to the latter type as “assertives”. However, if
speaker commitment is what’s at stake, for an embedded proposition to be understood (and
syntactically represented) as asserted, then it might make more sense to think about the
doxastics as “assertive”.
Of course, it is ultimately an empirical question —which we probe in some detail in
Chapter 3— exactly to what extent a given verb actually gives rise to these inferences.
Testing for these inferences, for a set of verbs of different classes, alongside with the ability
of the same verbs to take MCP-complements, will allow us to tease apart the various lexical,
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pragmatic, and syntactic properties that are argued to characterize embedded assertions.
Next, we briefly review there proposals pointing to commitment to p as the dimension
of assertion relevant for licensing embedded V2.
2.4.1 Truckenbrodt (2006), Julien (2015)
Looking at embedded V2 in German, Truckenbrodt (2006) argues that V2 is possible as
long as there is someone in the context who believes p. Formally, he implements this as a
context index <Epist> on C, which triggers movement of the finite verb. This index carries
a presupposition that there is a belief that p in the context, which he argues can be satisfied
either by speaker or attitude holder belief that p (e.g. “the beliefs in [the speaker’s] assertion
can satisfy the presupposition of <Epist>”; p. 300).
According to him, main clause V2 additionally requires that the speaker wishes to add p
to the Common Ground. He implements this via a second context index: <Deont>, which in-
volves “expanding the common ground by desires of the part of [the speaker]” (Truckenbrodt
2006, p. 301). Unembedded CPs therefore carry <Deont+Epist>.
Regarding the availability of embedded V2 under the different classes of predicates dis-
cussed here, an intuitively correct prediction of this account is that V2 is available under
glauben (believe), as shown in (70):
(70) German (Truckenbrodt 2006, p. 278)
Maria
Maria
glaubt,
believes
Peter
Peter
geht
going
nach
to
Hause.
home
‘Maria believes Peter is going home.’
He also gives examples of V2 under sagen (say):
(71) German (Truckenbrodt 2006, p. 287)
Maria
Maria
sagt,
says
Peter
Peter
geht
going
nach
to
Hause.
home
‘Maria says Peter is going home.’
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The claim is that verbs of saying, like behaupten (claim), erzählen (narrate), berichten
(report), as well as manner of speech verbs like flüstern (whisper) and schreien (yell), allow
V-to-C, because they “entail committing to a belief of p.” (p. 288).
However, Truckenbrodt (2006) also discusses what he takes to be a separate category
of doxastic non-factives, e.g. sich vorstellen (imagine) and annehmen (suppose), which also
allow V2 complements, and which he describes as “verbs in which the degree of commitment
to p is noticeably weaker than belief” (p. 290). To account for what he takes to be a lack
of attitude holder belief with these verbs, he relaxes the condition on V-to-C to allow for
other attitudes aside from beliefs to satisfy the presupposition of <Epist> (such as “an act
or imagination or a dream”; p. 290).
In his Section 4.5., Truckenbrodt also discusses negated attitude verbs, and inherently
negative predicates (like doubt and deny), arguing that, on the reading where (72) reports
not just the negation of the belief, but the belief that not p (i.e. the neg-raising reading),
V-to-C is blocked. Similarly, to the extent that verbs like doubt (73) mean something like
‘believe not p’, these should also block verb movement, given that the presupposition of<Epist> is not satisfied.
(72) German (Truckenbrodt 2006, p. 295)
*Hans
Hans
glaubt
believes
nicht,
not,
Peter
Peter
geht
going
nach
to
Hause.
home
‘Hans doesn’t that believe Peter is going home.’
(73) German (Truckenbrodt 2006, p. 297); from Romberg (1999, p. 5)
*Hans
Hans
bezweifelt,
doubts,
Peter
Peter
geht
going
nach
to
Hause.
home
‘Hans doubts that Peter is going home.’
In terms of the types of types of attitude verbs discussed here, then, Truckenbrodt’s theory
makes some fairly clear predictions about the availability of embedded V2. For instance, we
expect to find a contrast between positive response stance predicates like accept and admit,
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and negative ones like doubt and deny (as well an interaction with negation for attitude
verbs that do express an epistemic commitment to p).
Truckenbrodt doesn’t distinguish between asserted beliefs and presupposed beliefs. How-
ever, given that speaker belief that p is said to able to satisfy the presupposition of <Epist>,
we should expect that both emotive and doxastic factives should be able to license V2,
given that they assert (in the case of doxastics) attitude holder belief, and presuppose either
speaker belief (in the case of doxastics) or attitude holder belief (in the case of emotives).
This also seems to be in line with the very liberal condition that attitudes like dreaming
or imagining that p can satisfy <Epist>. Given projection —i.e., the ability of the pre-
supposed inference to survive under entailment-targeting operators such as negation— we
should expect also negated factives to be able to license embedded V2.
Finally, while Truckenbrodt claims that the speech act predicates express the attitude
holder’s belief that p, it is not clear to me that this is correct. Unlike beliefs, one can easily
say or claim things, without being committed to them (for instance, when lying, or telling
stories). It seems to me, then, like an empirical question whether or not Truckenbrodt’s
account makes the right predictions for these predicates: i.e., whether the availability of
V2 is actually due to the presence of a belief context (as opposed to some other lexical or
pragmatic property of these verbs).
A related proposal can be found in Julien (2015), who looks at embedded V2 in Mainland
Scandinavian (primarily Swedish and Norwegian). She argues that V2-clauses are “speech
act potentials”, in the sense that they are syntactic objects that can become assertions when
uttered (drawing on Krifka 2014). Like Truckenbrodt (2006), she allows for the assertion of
the embedded proposition to be anchored to both the speaker and the attitude holder (what
she refers to as ‘direct’ vs. ‘indirect’ assertions):
“[T]he generalization that can be made is that an embedded declarative V2 clause
represents either a direct assertion, an assertion made by the actual speaker, or an
indirect assertion, an assertion attributed to an implicit speaker and reproduced
by the actual speaker, who does not then have to be committed to its truth.”
(Julien 2015, p. 167)
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Formally, Julien (2015) takes a speech act potential to require a C-domain which includes:
a Force head, specifying the type of illocutionary force (question, assertion, etc), as well as
a set of C/edge ‘linkers’, which represent the speaker and hearer (following Sigurðsson 2011;
see also Speas and Tenny 2003, Tenny and Speas 2004).
Regarding the role of the embedding attitude predicates, she states that: “embedded V2
in Mainland Scandinavian is not dependent on formal licensing by any element in the matrix
clause. What matters is that the matrix clause is semantically compatible with an asserted
embedded clause” (Julien 2015, p. 172). Looking at a range of embedding environments
(pp. 164-167), she takes V2 to be possible under what she refers to as ‘strongly assertive
predicates’ (including verbs like say and claim, as well as adjectives like be true and be clear),
as well as a class of predicates that she calls ‘weakly assertive’ (which includes doxatic non-
factives, as well as predicates like seem to and be possible). In line with the judgements
reported by Hooper and Thompson (1973), she also takes doxastic factives, like discover
and notice, to allow V2 (see also Julien 2009, Wiklund et al. 2009, Bentzen 2010, Jensen
and Christensen 2013, Djärv et al. 2017, a.o.). She includes among her examples of factives
(74), which she translates as ‘I thought about the fact that p’.34
(74) Norwegian (Julien 2015, p. 166)
Jeg
I
tenkte
thought
på
on
at
that
jeg
I
greide
managed
ikke
not
jobben
job.def
slik
such
jeg
I
skulle.
should
‘I thought about (the fact) that I was not able to do the job as I ought to.’
In my native judgement, V2 is possible also with an overt fact nominal (75). This is
interesting, given the claim in Section 2.2, that MCP are blocked in ‘definite’ contexts.
(75) Swedish, adapated from (74) (own judgement)
Jag
I
tänkte
thought
på
on
det
the
faktum
fact
att
that
jag
I
klarade
managed
inte
not
jobbet
work.def
som
as
jag
I
skulle.
should.
34As pointed out by Julie Anne Legate, p.c., the presence of a preposition seems like a fairly robust
diagnostic for the status of a clause as a DP (in line with the so called DP-requirement, discussed in Section
4.3.2.2).
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‘I thought about the fact that I wasn’t able to deal with my job the way I was
supposed to.’
Regarding factives, she takes their ability to embed V2-complements to follow from their
status as ‘asserted’ (building on Krifka 2014): “in an assertion, the speaker takes on the
commitment to guarantee that the content of the assertion is true” (Julien 2015, p. 167-8).
Thus, she claims, that what is technically presupposed (i.e. factive complements) can still
be asserted, for instance as a reminder.
2.4.1.1 Empirical issues
As for Truckenbrodt (2006) and the approaches examined in Section 2.2, Julien takes em-
bedded V2 to be disallowed under negative response stance predicates like deny and be
impossible. Like Truckenbrodt (2006), she doesn’t mention the positive response predicates
(e.g. accept, admit), which would provide an important test case for the view that V2 is
licensed by commitment to p. However, she claims that V2 is possible with verbs like doubt
and deny in negative contexts, as in (76):
(76) Swedish (Julien 2015, p. 165)
Det
There
är
is
ingen
no.one
som
who
tvekar
doubts
på
on
att
that
dom
they
gör
do
det
it
alltid
always
för
for
att
to
få
get
upp
up
försäljningen.
sales.def
‘Nobody doubts that they always do it to raise sales.’
In my judgement, however, (76) is strongly ill-formed, and crucially, no different from a
version of the sentence with a referential subject:35
35It’s worth noting here, too, that I get a different reading of the sentence with the adverb alltid (always);
closer to a discourse particle rather than the universal quantifier. If we substitute alltid for inte (not) in the
embedded clause, the sentence becomes even more sharply ungrammatical.
(77) Swedish (own judgements)
a. Det
There
är
is
ingen
no.one
som
who
tvekar
doubts
på
on
att
that
dom
they
inte
not
gillar
like
varandra.
each.other
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(78) Swedish (adapted from Julien 2015, p. 165; own judgements)
a. ??/*Det
There
är
is
ingen
nobody
som
who
tvekar
doubts
på
on
att
that
dom
they
gör
do
det
it
alltid
always
för
for
att
to
få
get
upp
up
försäljningen.
sales.def
‘Nobody doubts that they always do it to raise sales.’
b. ??/*Han
He
tvekar
doubts
på
on
att
that
dom
they
gör
do
det
it
alltid
always
för
for
att
to
få
get
upp
up
försäljningen.
sales.def
‘He doubts that they always do it to raise sales.’
A more serious problem for any theory that takes the presence of a belief context to be
a sufficient condition on V2 licensing comes from matrix clause disjunction.36 As discussed
by Gärtner and Michaelis (2010) in the context of German, in these sentences, the speaker
is actually committed to neither disjunct. Nevertheless, V2 is obligatory here:
(79) German (Gärtner and Michaelis 2010, p. 4)
In
in
Berlin
Berlin
schneit
snows
es
it
oder
or
in
in
Potsdam
Potsdam
scheint
shines
die
the
Sonne.
sun
‘It is snowing in Berlin or the sun is shining in Potsdam.’
For current purposes, we might observe that the same is true also in Swedish:
(80) Swedish (Caplan and Djärv 2019, p. 13)
Antingen
either
snöar
snows
det
it
i
in
Umeå,
Umeå
eller
or
så
so
skiner
shines
solen
sun
i
in
Skellefteå.
Skellefteå
‘It is ether snowing in Umeå or the sun is shining in Skellefteå.’
Gärtner and Michaelis (2010) present a view according to which V2 involves a weaker notion
‘Nobody doubts that they don’t like each other.’ V-in situ
b. *Det
There
är
is
ingen
no.one
som
who
tvekar
doubts
på
on
att
that
dom
they
gillar
like
inte
not
varandra.
each.other
‘Nobody doubts that they don’t like each other.’ V2
36The following discussion in this section is adapted from joint work with Spencer Caplan (Caplan and
Djärv 2019) (p. 13; prepared by the second author).
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of assertion than that given in (2); rather than operating at the level of speech acts, they
take the relevant notion of context update to be one which operates only at the propositional
level. Their analysis of a sentence like (79) is given in (81):
(81) [[p-V2 or q-V2]] = [ p ∩ CG ] ∪ [ q ∩ CG ]
Noting however, that their account nevertheless over-generates, in the case of matrix nega-
tion and conditionals, neither of which allow V2, they add a so called “progressivity require-
ment on assertive update”:
Progressive update: “An assertive update CG’ of a common ground CG by an
utterance ud containing meaning components ▸φ1 . . .▸φn is progressive if CG’ ⊆
[CG ∩ (φ1 ∪ . . .∪ φn)]. (Gärtner and Michaelis 2010, p. 9)
They further state that ‘Progressive update captures the intuition that (dependent) root
phenomena [MCP] in general, and V2-declaratives in particular, come with an informativity
requirement related to providing “new information” ’ (Gärtner and Michaelis 2010, p. 10). I
will return to the role of discourse novelty of p below.
Before ending, it is worth pointing out that this problem does not only arise in the
context of matrix clause V2; V2 disjunction is also possible in embedded clauses:
(82) Swedish (own judgement)
Jag
I
sa
said
att
that
antingen
either
snöar
snows
det
it
i
in
Umeå,
Umeå
eller
or
så
so
skiner
shines
solen
sun
i
in
Skellefteå.
Skellefteå
‘I said that ether it’s snowing in Umeå or the sun is shining in Skellefteå.’
Next, we move on to a different account, found in Woods 2016a. On this proposal,
German V2-clauses are anchored unambiguously to the speaker, whereas non-V2 clauses,
like certain other proposed MCP, including Mainland Scandinavian embedded V2 and speech
act adverbs (e.g. honestly, seriously), can be anchored to either the speaker or the attitude
holder.
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2.4.2 Woods (2016a)
In a different version of the general perspective, Woods (2016a) (see also Woods 2015, 2016b)
suggests that embedded V2 is part of a broader class of utterances, which she refers to as Em-
bedded Illocutionary Acts.37 Syntactically, these involve merging elements in Forceo, either
through verb-movement to Force or through realizing Force as a particular complementiser.38
Pragmatically, she argues that these involve what she calls ‘perspective disambiguation’.39
Her empirical discussion focuses primarily on embedded inverted questions [EIQs] (84),
thought she extends her account to embedded V2. Looking at a range of factors, including
speech act adverbs (85), and binding of discourse particles and expressive elements in the
embedded clause, she argues that only attitude holder orientation is available in EIQs.
(84) Adapted from Woods (2016a, p. 77)
Jane asked him would he cook her dinner.
(85) Woods (2016a, p. 77)
37Woods’ data is primarily from different varieties of British and Irish English, though she also mentions
data from Indian English and certain varieties of English spoken in North America, including Newfoundland
English and African American English.
38She points to the Japanese to/koto distinction and Romance recomplementation as examples of this.
39A similar line of reasoning can be found in Wiklund (2010), who suggests that while a V-in situ clause
can be associated with either the attitude holder or the speaker, V2 clauses are associated only with the
point of view of the speaker. In her words: “being responsible for evaluating the truth of the embedded
proposition” (Wiklund 2010, p. 88). Unlike Woods, she doesn’t take speaker commitment to p to be required.
To support her claim, Wiklund gives the sentence in (83); the idea being that her proposal correctly predicts
that speaker-oriented discourse elements like swear words should be compatible with both word orders:
(83) Wiklund (2010, p. 88)
a. Hon
she
såg
saw
att
that
han
he
fan-i-mig
devil-in-me
inte
not
hade
had
läst
read
brevet.
letter.def
‘She saw that he hadn’t read the letter, dammit.’ V-in situ
b. Hon
she
såg
saw
att
that
han
he
hade
had
fan-i-mig
devil-in-me
inte
not
läst
read
brevet.
letter.def
‘She saw that he hadn’t read the letter, dammit.’ V2
This is unlike Woods (2016a, p. 150), who claims that while German V2-clauses must speaker-oriented,
speech act adverbs can be anchored to either the speaker or the attitude holder. In either case, it should
be clear that the distribution of discourse particles are not going to be a useful diagnostic for testing the
claim that V2-clauses are speaker anchored, if it is also the case that V-in situ clauses can be associated
with either the speaker or the attitude holder: in either case, discourse particles should be available with
both word orders.
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a. Janei asked him seriouslyi/∗speaker would he cook her dinner. EIQ
b. Janei asked him, “Seriouslyi/∗speaker, will you cook me dinner?” Quote
c. *Jane asked him if seriously he would cook her dinner. Regular Embedded Q
Regarding the difference between embedded V2 and EIQs, and the possibility of variation
across languages, Woods states that:
“[W]hile perspective disambiguation also occurs in EV2, it is not the same as
perspective disambiguation in EIQs. In fact, there are also differences across
the EV2 languages I am treating here: in German, all attitudinal, epistemic and
expressive elements in EV2 are evaluated with respect to the speaker, not the
matrix subject, and the proposition expressed in the embedded clause is also
interpreted as being asserted by the speaker. In Mainland Scandinavian [MSc],
however, both fully speaker-oriented and fully subject-oriented EV2 clauses are
possible.”. (Woods 2016a, p. 212)
Building on Speas and Tenny (2003), McCloskey (2006), Sudo (2012, 2016), Woods
(2016a) formally implements this proposal in what she refers to as an Illocutionary Act
Phrase [IAP], which hosts in its specifier a ‘Center of Evaluation’. This is a pair consisting
of a situation pronoun (fixes the relevant world and discourse context) and a ‘perspectival
monster operator’ (Sudo 2012, 2016) which can be indexed to either the speaker or the
attitude holder. Woods follows previous literature in taking embedded V2 to involve verb
movement to Forceo. She argues, however, that the illocutionary force features themselves
are inherited by Forceo from the Illocutionary Act head that selects it; if Forceo is not
selected by such a head, V-to-C should not be possible.
With respect to role of the embedding attitude verb, Woods takes these to select for an
(optionally realized) nominal argument, of type e (a conclusion we will reach on independent
grounds in Chapter 4); the embedded V2-clause she argues, is a type of non-restrictive
modifier on the nominal, providing its content and discourse properties.40 Woods argues that
V2-clauses (and other clauses representing Embedded Illocutionary Acts) are appositives;
40Hence, the relationship between the attitude predicate and the Embedded Illocutionary Act (the V2 or
EIQ clause) is indirect. Thus, any seemingly local effects of the matrix predicate follows in the same way as
more global discourse pragmatic effects.
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specifically, a type of apposition involving two semantically saturated objects (what Potts
2005 refers to as ‘isolated conventional implicatures’):
(86) Woods (2016a, p. 218), from Potts (2005, p. 65)
Luke—and you’ll never believe this—ate 50 eggs!
The following is her analysis of the composition of Embedded Illocutionary Acts: she gives
(87) to account for EIQs; (88) represents my understanding of how her analysis applies to
embedded V2:
(87) EIQs (Woods 2016a, p. 222, 224)
DP<e>
DP<e>
the question
IAP<e>
CoE<s>
Monster<s,s> pron<s>
IA’<s,e>
IA<tt,se>
QUESTION
ForceP<t,t>
Force<t,tt>
would
TP<t>
he make dinner for me
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(88) Embedded V2 (Based on Woods 2016a, p. 222, 224)
DP<e>
DP<e>
it/the claim
IAP<e>
CoE<s>
Monster<s,s> pron<s>
IA’<s,e>
IA<tt,se>
ASSERTION
ForceP<t,t>
Force<t,tt>
Vfin
TP<t>
Importantly, for current purposes, apposition involves a very particular type of discourse
structure, such that the material in the content in the appositive provides non at issue
content, as shown in (89) and (90).
(89) Potts (2012, p. 2)
Even Bart passed the test.
a. At issue content: Bart passed the test
b. Non at-issue: ≈ Bart was among the least likely to pass
(90) Woods (2016a, p. 218); from Potts (2005, p. 65)
Luke—and you’ll never believe this—ate 50 eggs!
a. At issue content: Luke at 50 eggs
b. Non at-issue: ≈ You’ll never believe what I’m about to tell you
Following Potts (2005), Woods (2016a, pp. 218–219) assumes that only the at-issue
content ends up composing with the matrix predicate. According to Potts 2005, p. 128, this
mode of composition is only available to elements with conventionally implicated content
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that are fully saturated; an assumption that is satisfied on Woods’ analysis, according to
which both the IAP-projection and the associated DP are of type e. On this perspective,
then, a V2-clause contains both a DP that is part of the at-issue content, and a non-at issue
IAP-clause. According to Woods, aside from implying speaker/attitude holder commitment
to p, a V2-clause additionally involves the information structure in (91).
(91) German (Woods 2016a, p. 220)
Hans
Hans
glaubt,
thinks,
Peter
Peter
hat
was
gewonnen.
won.
‘Hans thinks Peter has won.’
a. QUD = What is happening; what is Hans thinking?
b. Sub-QUD = Did Peter win?
2.4.2.1 Empirical issues
The discourse structure proposed in (91) fits with Woods’ descriptions of the pragmatics of
EIQs, which she convincingly shows “presuppose that the embedded question was at some
point the QUD of the original discourse, regardless of the matrix predicate and whether or
not it usually communicates an explicit questioning act.” (Woods 2016a, p. 101).
For embedded V2, the claim is that the sentence in (91) —by virtue of having embedded
V2—presupposes the existence of two QUDs in the discourse. To the main question (91-a)
it gives the answer: ‘Hans thinks something (namely Peter won)’. However, it is also
interpreted as providing the following answer to the sub-QUD in (91-b): ‘ISpeaker think that
Peter won’. For a sentence with embedded V2 in MSc, the answer to the sub-QUD could
presumably also be ‘Hans thinks that Peter won’.
A prediction of Woods’ proposal then, is that embedded V2 should be licensed in contexts
that make available such a QUD. However, as we will see in Section 2.5.2, Djärv, Heycock,
and Rohde (2017) tested this claim for Swedish embedded V2 (in the context of a similar
proposal from Jensen and Christensen 2013; also discussed in Section 2.5.1), and found that
such a context manipulation had no effect at all on the acceptability of embedded V2. This
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then, is problematic for the application of Woods’ analysis of EIQs to embedded V2.41
Another issue that arises in the context of Woods’ proposal concerns the question of
whether EV2 (and other MCP) clauses differ semantically, as well as pragmatically, from
their unmarked counterparts. Woods supports her analysis with data showing that V2-
clauses can co-occur with the standard definite neuter pronoun det in object position (93),
as well as data showing that EIQs are possible in equative constructions (94)–(96):
(93) Swedish (Woods 2016a, p. 131; from Petersson 2010, p. 141)
Han
he
sa
said
det
it.3.neut.def
att
that
Gusten
Gusten
har
has
faktiskt
actually
inte
not
höns
chickens
längre.
any.more
‘He said that Gusten actually doesn’t have chickens any more.” V2
(94) Woods (2016a, p. 202–203)
a. Seems like Wilko is the bookies favourite for the England job when it becomes
available. This is quite distressing news, but [the question] is [would he take it
if offered]? BNC, J1G 1639
b. I asked (him) would he take it if offered.
c. [The question] is [what did she truly take away from the culture]? medium.com
d. I asked (her) [what did she truly take away from the culture]. EIQs
(95) Norwegian (Julien 2015, p. 166)
Poenget
point.def
er
is
at
that
dette
this
appellerer
appeals
ikke
not
til
to
unge
young
jenter.
girls
‘The point is that this does not appeal to young girls.’ V2
(96) Swedish (own judgement)
41Further evidence for the pragmatic difference between EIQs and embedded V2 concerns their availability
in negated contexts: Woods reports that EIQs are available under matrix negation (92). This appears to be
different from V2, as we saw in (72)–(73) above (and confirmed by corpus and experimental data in Ch. 4).
(92) Woods (2016a, p. 67)
a. He didn’t know why did they come. Irish Eng., (Berizzi 2010)
b. I can’t remember did you want to practise tonight. North West Eng., attested
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Påståendet
claim.def
var
was
att
that
det
it
funkar
works
inte
not
med
with
ungdomar.
youths
‘The claim was that it doesn’t work with young people.’ V2
However, these are both possible also with non-V2 clauses, as shown in (97)–(98).
(97) Swedish (own judgement; adapted from (93))
Han
he
sa
said
det
it.3.neut.def
att
that
Gusten
Gusten
faktiskt
actually
inte
not
har
has
höns
chickens
längre.
any.more
‘He said that Gusten actually doesn’t have chickens any more.” V-in situ
(98) Swedish (own judgement)
Påståendet
claim.def
var
was
att
that
det
it
inte
not
funkar
works
med
with
ungdomar.
youths
‘The claim was that it doesn’t work with young people.’ V-in situ
In Chapter 4, we use similar data from English to argue that embedded declaratives are
of type <e>. What this seems to show us then, is that V2 clauses are of the same semantic
type as V-in situ sentences (and embedded declaratives in English). However, it doesn’t tell
us anything about the semantic composition of embedded V2 per se.
Woods also points to the observation that V2-clauses (unlike V-in situ clauses) are
weak islands for extraction as support for her claim that V2-clauses are complex nominals.
Woods only gives data from EIQs to illustrate this claim; the following is my own judgement
(without the complemetnizer att, the sentence becomes even more ill-formed).
(99) Swedish (own judgement)
a. Vemi
who
sa
said
John
John
att
that
Peter
Peter
inte
not
gillar
likes
ti.
‘Who did John say that Peter doesn’t like?’ V-in situ
b. *Vemi
who
sa
said
John
John
att
that
Peter
Peter
gillar
likes
inte
not
ti.
‘Who did John say that Peter doesn’t like?’ V2
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There are two problems with this test, however. First, as we saw in Section 2.3.1 above, it is
not clear that islandhood is a reliable test for the DP-status of the embedded clause. While
sentences with response predicates are robustly weak islands for movement (in line with the
DP/CP Interface Hypothesis), we saw in Section 2.3.2 that complements of response verbs
pattern with CPs on the so-proform and Expletive Associate tests.
Second, and more problematically, this is not what we observe in German. According
to my consultant,42 wh-movement is possible with embedded V2, but not with V-in situ.
With V-in situ order, the wh-pronoun must also remain in situ:
(100) German
a. *Weni
Who.acc
sagte
said
John,
John
dass
that
Peter
Peter
ti mag?
likes
‘Who did John say that Peter likes?’ V-in situ + WH movement
b. Weni
Who.acc
sagte
said
John,
John
mag
likes
ti Peter?
Peter
‘Who did John say that Peter likes?’ V2 + WH movement
c. John
John
sagte,
said
dass
that
Peter
Peter
wen
who.acc
mag?
likes
‘Who did John say that Peter likes?’ V-in situ + WH in situ
This then is problematic for Woods’ approach, which ties the pragmatics of embedded V2
(as a kind of new information that additionally provides perspective disambiguation) to its
status as a complex nominal. As we will show in Chapter 3, Swedish and German embedded
V2 show both the same distribution and sensitivity to the same pragmatic restrictions. The
movement contrast is therefore interesting, and worth following up on in future research.
The main focus here, however, is the question of the pragmatic licensing conditions on
embedded V2. In Section 3.2, we test the approaches discussed in this and the previous
section experimentally for embedded V2 in both Swedish and German, and for a wider
range of MCP.
42Thanks to Stefan Schulze, p.c., for this judgement.
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2.5 Embedded V2: Main Point status vs. lexical licensing
2.5.1 Jensen and Christensen (2013)
In accounting for their observation that the doxastic factives allow MCP, Hooper and
Thompson (1973) capitalize on their observation that while these verbs are presupposi-
tional in the traditional sense, the doxatic factives nevertheless (similarly to verbs like think
and say), “have a parenthetical reading on which the complement proposition is considered
the main assertion.” (p. 481). A recent implementation of this idea comes from Jensen and
Christensen (2013), looking at Danish embedded V2. These authors adopt the notion ‘Main
Point of Utterance’ [MPU] from Simons (2007). The MPU corresponds to the content of
an utterance which most directly addresses the Question Under Discussion (Roberts 1996,
2012, Büring 2003); more recent literature tend to use the term ‘at-issue content’.
Broadly speaking, the QUD is the topic of discussion in the present discourse. It may,
but need not, correspond to an actual question asked. Theoretically, the QUD is formulated
as a set of alternative propositions. For instance (allowing for domain restriction), a question
like that in (101-a) corresponds to the set of propositions, the QUD, in (101-b):
(101) a. Where is Anna?
b. {p: Anna is at home, Anna is at work, Anna is at the gym, . . . }
For a conversational move to be felicitous, it must attempt to contribute to resolving the
current QUD. This can be done either by completely resolving it, thereby eliminating all
the alternatives but one, as in (102-a), or partially resolving it, thereby eliminating at least
one alternative, as in (102-b).
(102) a. She’s at work.
b. I’m not sure, though I know she’s not at home. . .
At-issueness, or Main Point status, then, is understood in terms of relevance to the QUD
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(see Section 5.2.0.2.2 for more detailed discussion):
(103) Relevance to the QUD (Simons et al. 2010, p. 316)
a. An assertion is relevant to a QUD iff it contextually entails a partial or com-
plete answer to the QUD.
b. A question is relevant to a QUD iff it has an answer which contextually entails
a partial or complete answer to the QUD.
In this sense then, we can understand an embedded proposition as asserted, without getting
into thorny problems about speaker vs. attitude holder commitment to p. As illustrated in
(104), given the question Where is John, the Main Point, or at-issue content in both (104-a)
and (104-b) is John is in New York.
(104) [Q: Where is John?]
a. [P He’s in New York.]
b. I think that [P he’s in New York].
As shown in (106), there is a clear contrast in this respect between doxastic and emotive
factives in whether they allow the embedded proposition to provide the Main Point content.
We find that the doxastic factives pattern with the doxastic non-factives and the speech act
verbs, whereas the emotive factives are infelicitous here.43
(106) [Q: Where is John?]
a. I {think, believe, found out} that [P he’s in New York].
b. #I resent that [P he’s in New York].
43As above, the response stance predicates depend on whether the possibility that John is in New York
has been brought up, along the lines of (31). We saw that in (31) above, repeated here:
(105) a. Q. Where is John?
b. A1. Well, Mary thinks that [P he’s in New York]i, but I doubt it/thati.
c. A2. [Where p is not on the table:] #I doubt/accept that [P he’s in New York].
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The claim advanced by Jensen and Christensen (2013) is that it is this notion of Main
Point content that distinguishes between those embedding environments that allow MCP,
and those that do not. On this view, any observed predicate restriction on embedded V2 is
essentially epiphenomenal, reflecting simply the relative ease with which a given predicate
may function parenthetically.
In support of their view, Jensen and Christensen (2013) look at the rates of embedded
V2 in a manually tagged corpus of sociolinguistic interviews in Danish. They find the
highest rates of V2 under speech act predicates and doxastic factives, with lower rates under
doxastic non-factives, and the lowest rates under emotive factives (they did not look at
response predicates). Their results are reproduced in Figure 2.1.44
Figure 2.1: Results plot from Jensen and Christensen (2013, p. 50): rates of Danish embed-
ded V2 under different predicate types: doxastic non-factives (“Cog”), speech act predicates
(“Com”), emotive factives (“Factive”), doxastic factives (“Semifactive”).
While these data are purely distributional, in the sense that no further elements of the
context were taken into account, Jensen and Christensen (2013) interpret the distribution
44I’m leaving to the side the categories they refer to as ’Other’ and ’Causative’.
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as reflecting an underlying effect of the Main Point status of p under the different predicate
types. This account then predicts that in a discourse such as (107), embedded V2 should be
very strongly favoured, if not obligatory.45 Importantly, on this view, any apparent predicate
restrictions should be able to be overwritten by pragmatic factors, to the extent that it is
possible to construe a relevant or plausible parenthetical reading of the matrix predicate.
(107) Q. Where’s John?
A. I think [P he’s in New York].
In Section 2.5.2, next, we review previous experimental work from Djärv, Heycock, and
Rohde (2017), testing both of these predictions.
.
2.5.2 Testing the QUD-approach
Regarding the hypothesis of Jensen and Christensen (2013) discussed in the previous sec-
tion, Wiklund, Bentzen, Hrafnbjargarson, and Hróarsdóttir (2009) present judgement data
suggesting that neither is V2 obligatory in these contexts, nor is it ruled out in a context
where the embedded proposition is not the pragmatic Main Point:
(108) Swedish (Wiklund et al. 2009, p. 1929)
[‘Why didn’t he come to the party?’)]
Kristine
Kristine
sa
said
att
that
han
he
fick
was.allowed
inte.
not.
‘Kristine said that he wasn’t allowed to.’ V2
According to Wiklund et al. (2009), the answer in (108) can either be read as ‘he didn’t
come to the party because he wasn’t allowed to, as Kristine told me’, or ‘he didn’t come to
the party because Kristine said that he wasn’t allowed to go’. However, on a strong version
45This view is presented primarily as a ‘licensing approach’ to embedded V2, in the sense that Main Point
status makes V2 available, rather than non Main Point status removing the possibility of V2.
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of Jensen and Christensen’s (2013) hypothesis, the second reading should not be available,
given their claim that embedded V2 is only possible when the embedded proposition (he
wasn’t allowed to go), is the Main Point of the Utterance, and not when the content of the
main clause (Kristine said something) is the Main Point of the Utterance.
On the alternative view advanced by Wiklund et al. (2009), a predicate allows V2 and
other MCP if it also allows for the embedded proposition to have Main Point status. Unlike
the above accounts then, they take the availability of MPU to be essentially a matter of
selection: the predicates in (13) select for a larger CP, like that in (15) from Rizzi (1997),
which is compatible with V-to-C movement, as well as with the illocuationary force of
assertion (on this view, p being the Main Point of the Utterance). The predicates in (14),
however, select for a smaller CP, which they take to be compatible with neither V-to-C and
other MCP, nor with illocuationary force and related pragmatic notions.
Noting that the critical judgements are subtle and based on the intuitions of only a few
speakers, Djärv, Heycock, and Rohde (2017) tested experimentally whether participants’
judgements of acceptability for sentences with embedded V2 in Swedish were sensitive to
this type of context manipulation. To test this, we looked at whether it would be possible
to manipulate the discourse context experimentally to give rise to a reading such that the
embedded proposition would provide the Main Point of the utterance. The form of the
manipulation is illustrated in (109)–(110) from Djärv et al. (2017, p. 6)
(109) a. Q. Why didn’t Kate come to the party?
b. A. John thinks that [P she’s left town].
(110) a. Q. Why didn’t John invite Kate to the party?
b. A. John thinks that [P she’s left town].
As a measure of Main Point status, they asked participants to rate how directly they
thought that a given answer addressed a particular question. Using a 2×3 design, they
manipulated both the type of question and the type of answer, as shown in (111).
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(111) Djärv et al. (2017, p. 17)
a. [Background]: I hear that you went to Paris last summer.
b. [Q-Cond=Match]: What was the city like?
c. [Q-Cond=NonMatch]: How was it?
d. [A-Control=Direct]: The city was really great.
e. [A-Control=Emb]: I got the impression that the city was really great.
f. [A-Critical=EmoFact]: I was surprised that the city was really great.
The point of interest were the scores assigned to answers like I was surprised that the
city was really great. (involving emotive factives), to questions such as What was the city
like?. If emotive factives indeed imposed a strong, lexical restriction on the ability of the
embedded proposition to constitute the Main Point, these should receive generally low scores,
since they did not directly address the previous question. As controls, they also included
unembedded sentences (The city was really great.) as a ceiling-condition for directness, and
sentences embedded under predicates like I got the impression, which by hypothesis would
yield lower directness scores, given the hedging function of the matrix predicate. A more
general question (How was it? ) was also included to provide a floor baseline for directness
for all three response conditions. Here, unlike in the more specific question (What was the
city like? ) the wording of the question did not match the wording of the answer.
As shown in Figure 2.2, reproduced from Djärv et al. (2017, p. 20), they found that
the sentences with emotive factives [A-Critical=EmoFact] did not differ significantly from
the unembedded sentences [A-Control=Direct] (p=0.54). However, the factives did show
significantly higher ratings than the hedged non-factive responses (p<0.001).
The experiment used only emotive factives in the factive condition, which are generally
expected to be bad with embedded Main Point or at-issue content. Simons (2007) takes this
to be due to an essentially Gricean reasoning process, such that the doxastic factives are
able to provide a source of information for p (e.g. someone else discovering that p); whereas
it is not clear how the emotional state of the attitude holder would be relevant to a question
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Figure 2.2: Directness ratings by question type (NonMatch vs. Match) and response type
(Emotive Factive vs. Non-Factive Embedding vs. Unembedded) [n=47]. Adapted from
Djärv et al. (2017, p. 20).
concerning p (this is reflected in the formulation in (103)).
Importantly, Djärv et al. (2017) were able to show that this type of Question-Answer
manipulation is in fact a good way of setting up the context to mark particular content as
having at-issue or Main Point status. This, then, supports the prediction that if Jensen
and Christensen’s (2013) account of MCP is right, then we should indeed expect that in a
discourse such as (107), the embedded clause should show V2-order (or at least that this
kind of context manipulation should influence the acceptability of V2 across predicate types,
including emotive factives).
Hence, in a second experiment, Djärv et al. (2017) tested this prediction for Swedish
embedded V2. This time, the manipulation of Main Point status was achieved via a com-
74
bination of the question asked and the ‘position of mention’ of the two individuals in the
target sentence, as shown in (112). Here, the target sentence mentions Carina as the matrix
subject and Albin as the embedded subject. The question to trigger main clause Main Point
status therefore asked about Carina; the embedded clause Main Point trigger is a question
about Albin. The word order (V2 vs. V-in situ) manipulation was indicated via the position
of negation relative to the verb (V>Neg vs. Neg>V). Both Main Point status and word order
were manipulated within items, such that each item occurred in 4 conditions (Matrix Main
Point + V2; Embedded Main Point + V2; Matrix Main Point + V-in situ; Embedded Main
Point + V-in situ). They also varied the type of matrix predicate across items: speech act
predicates, doxastic non-factives, doxastic factives, and emotive factives.
(112) Djärv et al. (2017, p. 20)
a. Background:
Lille Albin och hans mamma Carina gick och såg en film på bio.
‘Little Albin and his mother Carina went to see a movie in the cinema.’
b. Embedded Clause At-issue Trigger:
Hur upplevde Albin biobesöket?
‘How did Albin find the visit to the cinema?’
c. Main Clause At-issue Trigger:
Hur upplevde Carina biobesöket?
‘How did Carina find the visit to the cinema?’
d. Target:
Carina
Carina
gissade
guessed
att
that
[P {hanEC
{he
/
/
AlbinMC}
Albin}
(hade)
(had)
nog
probably
inte
not
(hade)
(had)
väntat
expected
sig
self
så
so
mycket
much
action].
action.
‘Carina guessed that {he / Albin} probably hadn’t expected that much action.’
As indicated in Figure 2.3, there was a main effect of word order such that V-in situ
was rated higher than V2 (p < 0.001). There was also a significant effect of predicate type
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(p < 0.001): speech act predicates and doxastic factives were rated higher than the doxastic
non-factives and the emotive factives. The main effect of predicate class was driven by
a word order × predicate type interaction (p < 0.001): As predicted under an account in
which the licensing of embedded V2 is lexically defined, ratings for V<Neg vs. Neg<V order
varied by predicate type. However, there was no main effect of the Main Point manipulation
(p=0.88), and no interaction with Main Point status (p’s > 0.75).
Figure 2.3: Acceptability judgements of target sentences, by MPU status, predicate class;
and word order [n=104]. Adapted from Djärv, Heycock, and Rohde (2017, p. 24).
Based on these results, Djärv et al. (2017) rejected the view that embedded V2 is driven
by the Main Point status of the embedded proposition (proposed by Jensen and Christensen
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2013, and implied also by Woods 2016a). Rather, the results are in line with the lexical
licensing account proposed by Wiklund et al. (2009), whereby V2 is lexically licensed by
certain predicates selecting for a ‘large enough’ CP, compatible with V-to-C movement.
2.6 Discussion
In this chapter, we examined a set of proposals attempting to account for various distinctions
in the complementation patterns of different attitude verbs, in terms of (a) fine-grained
semantic and pragmatic distinctions among (classes of) attitude verbs, and (b) different
ways of understanding what it means for an embedded proposition to be asserted.
What we found was a rather complicated theoretical and empirical landscape: neither
is there agreement on what semantic and pragmatic notions are actually at play when an
embedded proposition is interpreted as asserted; nor is there agreement on what dimension(s)
of assertion are relevant to the syntax. Before moving on, let’s take stock of what we have
seen so far.
In Section 2.2 we discussed what we called the CP/DP Interface Hypothesis, accord-
ing to which the pragmatic status of p as referential/presupposed is encoded syntactically
and semantically in a D-head in the embedded clause. We saw in Section 2.2.2 that this
view faced some challenges regarding (a) the proper theoretical implementation of the ref-
erentiality/presupposition restriction, and (b) the availability of Main Clause Phenomena:
specifically, it has been reported, since the earliest work on this topic, that MCP are al-
lowed under doxastic factives, contrary to the empirical and theoretical assumptions of this
hypothesis. Section 2.3 then looked at the other purported syntactic correlates, along with
a set of other tests for the status of the embedded clause as a DP or a CP, finding syn-
tactic evidence for the claim that the emotive factives select for DPs. Both the doxastic
factives and the response verbs, however, were found to pattern with doxastic non-factives
and speech act verbs, in that they allow both CP and DP-complements.
In Section 2.4, we examined a set of approaches arguing that what matters for an
embedded proposition to count as asserted, from the point of view of the grammar, is whether
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or not the speaker (or the attitude holder) is committed to p. Among these accounts, we saw
quite a lot of variation in the precise nature of the theoretical and empirical claims: while
some authors point to speaker commitment only, others argue that either speaker or attitude
holder commitment to p will suffice to make an embedded proposition count as asserted for
the purpose of the syntax. Another point of disagreement concerned the issue of cross-
linguistic variation, as well as variation among MCP. According to Woods (2016a), German
embedded V2 is obligatorily speaker-oriented, while Mainland Scandinavian embedded V2
can be either speaker or attitude holder oriented (like speaker oriented adverbs). According
to Truckenbrodt (2006), however, German embedded V2 can be licensed by either speaker
or attitude holder belief that p. For Wiklund (2010) and Julien (2015), on the other hand,
Mainland Scandinavian embedded V2 is licensed by speaker commitment to p.
Finally, we looked at an approach, which took the relevant pragmatic notion to be
whether or not the embedded proposition constituted the Main Point or at-issue content of
the utterance, relative to the Question Under Discussion. We saw, in Section 2.5.2, however,
experimental evidence from Djärv, Heycock, and Rohde (2017) showing that this kind of
approach, while appealing from a semantic and pragmatic point of view, does not explain
the intended syntactic effects, namely the availability of embedded V2.
In the following chapter, we take a broad empirical approach to the empirical questions
that we are left with at the end of this discussion. Here, we examine in much greater
empirical detail the role of different kinds of context updates, and the discourse status of
p as new vs. given, first in the context of embedded V2 in Swedish (Section 3.1) and then
for a wider range of MCP across Swedish, English, and German (Section 3.2). The main
empirical questions that we are faced with, which the following chapter will begin to answer,
are summarized here:
(113) What dimension of assertion is relevant to the syntax:
a. Speaker commitment to p?
b. Attitude holder commitment to p?
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c. The status of p as ‘old’ vs. ‘new’ information?
(114) What is the role of the embedding predicate:
a. To what extent do different verbs encode the pragmatic dimensions in (113)?
b. Are MCP/assertion-compatible clauses lexically selected for?
c. Are the pragmatic and syntactic properties of verbs like think, say, doubt,
regret, and know reflective of broader classes of predicates?
d. What, if any, is the role of factivity?
(115) Is there variation:
a. Across languages (e.g. Mainland Scandinavian, German, English)?
b. Between different MCP (e.g. embedded V2, topicalization, speaker oriented
adverbs, embedded inverted questions)?
c. Among speakers?
(116) Are conflicting judgement due to not controlling for elements of the context?
Without comparable data from different kinds of MCP across different languages, which
controls for contextual and lexical properties of the relevant sentences (as per (116)), it is
difficult to falsify and evaluate competing theoretical accounts. Ideally, to get around the
issue of possible inter-speaker variation, we would like such comparative data to come from
a greater number of theoretically naive speakers. In the following chapter, we present such
quantitative data. Regarding the questions in (113), we show that while discourse novelty
vs. Givenness is a clear predictor of one type of MCP, namely embedded V2 (in both German
and Swedish), neither speaker nor attitude holder commitment to p are in themselves active
in the licensing of embedded V2. As for the questions in (114): We find that the different
pragmatic dimensions discussed are (cross-linguistically) robust properties of the different
classes of verbs. However, MCP/assertion compatible clauses are not selected for. Nor does
factivity play any role in the licensing of V2. Regarding the question in (115), we find that
the acceptability of the other MCP investigated is not predicted by any of the accounts
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examined here, or sensitive to any of the lexical and pragmatic dimensions tested for; an
observation which is fully in line with the extensive disagreement about the acceptability of
these constructions across contexts, as we saw in particular in Section 2.2.2. We do not find
variation either between speakers, or among languages (e.g. German vs. Swedish embedded
V2). We now turn to these studies.
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Chapter 3
The syntax-pragmatics interface: new
quantitative data
In the previous chapter, we began to address the guiding question of this dissertation, of
how, and to what extent, the lexical semantics of attitude predicates constrain the inter-
pretation of their complements as asserted or presupposed, and to what extent these prag-
matic dimensions are reflected in the syntactic and semantic composition of attitude reports.
Specifically, this chapter examined a set of hypotheses aimed at accounting for variation in
the complementation patterns of different attitude verbs, in terms of (a) various semantic
and pragmatic distinctions among (classes of) attitude verbs, and (b) different ways of un-
derstanding what it means for an embedded proposition to be asserted. Recall from Chapter
2 that in the Stalnakerian tradition, it is generally understood that for a speaker to assert
a proposition p, it is required that:
(1) a. The speaker is committed to p;
b. The speaker is attempting to add p to the Common Ground (the set of propo-
sitions mutually taken to be true by the discourse participants).
We found that previous accounts fall into two broad camps, regarding which dimension
of assertion they take to be relevant to the syntax of clausal embedding. In Section 2.2,
we examined a set of proposals, referred to here under the label of the DP/CP Interface
Hypothesis, for which the focus is on the second dimension of assertion (1-b). Given the
standard understanding of factivity in the semantics literature (see Section 1.1 and further
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discussion in Chapter 5), it follows from this view of assertion that propositions embedded
under factive verbs cannot be asserted. The syntactic consequence, on this hypothesis,
is that namely factive verbs like discover and resent, along with response stance verbs
like doubt and accept, select DPs as a consequence of the presuppositional status of their
complements. In Section 2.3, however, we showed using a battery of tests, that this claim
is incorrect: while emotive factives select specifically for complements that are (overtly or
underlyingly) DPs, both the doxastic factives and the response stance verbs allow both CP
and DP complements.
In the second part of this chapter (Section 2.4 and 2.5), we looked at a set of proposals
which focused primarily on the first part of assertion (1-a). These proposals argue that the
status of the embedded clause as asserted makes available a particular set of constructions
in the embedded clause, namely constructions that require an extended C-domain. This
family of constructions is known as (embedded) Main Clause Phenomena [MCP] (see Section
2.1.3). We concluded our discussion of the syntax of embedded assertion and presupposition
by noting that there is neither agreement on which specific semantic and pragmatic notions
are at play when an embedded proposition is interpreted asserted; nor is there agreement on
what dimension(s) of assertion are relevant to the syntax. Moreover, we found a fair amount
of disagreement about the nature of the data, an observation which raised the possibility of
variation, both among speakers, among languages, and among different types of MCP.
One important contribution of the previous chapter was to spell out and carefully con-
sider the various theoretical and empirical options. To make further progress, and to close
the various data-theory gaps identified, this chapter presents two large-scale quantitative
studies, a corpus study of Swedish embedded V2 (Section 3.1), and a cross-linguistic experi-
mental study investigating the pragmatics associated with different classes of attitude verbs,
along with the lexical and pragmatic licensing conditions on four different MCP: embedded
V2 in Swedish and German, topicalization and scene-setting adverbs in English, and speaker
oriented adverbs in all three languages (Section 3.2).
From the corpus study we develop the hypothesis that the dimension of assertion which
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is relevant to the licensing of Swedish embedded V2 is in fact status of p as discourse new
information, which we will argue in Chapter 5 is orthogonal to factivity (we propose an
analysis which dissociates the inference that p is Given from the projective inference of
speaker commitment to p). In the experimental study in Section 3.2, we test this hypothesis
against the theoretical alternatives identified in Chapter 2. The results from this study
allow us first to derive an independent and empirically motivated measure of the various
pragmatic dimensions claimed to be responsible for the licensing of the various MCP, which
we then use to test the various (anti-)licensing accounts. The main findings of this study are:
(i) embedded V2 tracks the status of p as discourse new; (ii) the availability of embedded
V2 and discourse novelty across different types of predicates tracks the verb classification of
Hooper and Thompson (1973) (Section 2.1.3), such that emotive factives and response verbs
disallow discourse new information in their complement; (iii) embedded V2 and discourse
novelty are not selected for, but are sensitive to the polarity of the matrix clause; (iv) none
of the other MCP investigated are sensitive to assertion, in either of the senses in (1).
Finally, in Section 3.3, we sharpen the notion of ‘discourse new’ invoked here, arguing
that the relevant dimension is in fact novelty as it contrasts with Givenness, in the sense of
Schwarzschild (1999). The main conclusion then, is that embedded V2 is licensed in contexts
where p is discourse new; and blocked when p is Given. Relating these findings to those of
the previous chapter: while the novelty-Givenness dimension is orthogonal to both factivity
and DP-licensing, it does interestingly track the availability of wh-extraction across different
predicates (Section 2.3.1), a finding which is in line with the claim, going back to Weerman
et al. (1986), Iatridou and Kroch (1992) and Vikner (1995) (see also more recent work by
Featherston 2004), that V2 is licensed in the complements of so-called bridge verbs. It is
surprising, however, given the received view, discussed in Section 2.2, that wh-extraction is
conditioned by factivity or DP-licensing. Section 3.4 concludes.
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3.1 Swedish embedded V2: a corpus study
This study is based on co-authored work with Spencer Caplan (Caplan and Djärv 2019).
The study uses large-scale data extracted from a series of Swedish corpora to investigate the
factors responsible for conditioning the choice of embedded Verb Second [V2] in Swedish.
Through statistical analysis of the Swedish corpus data, combined with results from a
semantic-inference task, we are able to falsify certain previous (theoretical and empirical)
claims about the distribution and interpretation of embedded V2. We argue instead, based
on the current results, that the relevant interpretive notion driving the distribution of em-
bedded V2 is ‘discourse novelty’; whether the embedded proposition is treated as discourse
new or given information. While this is fundamentally a pragmatic notion, it is nevertheless
tightly constrained by both lexical-semantic properties of the matrix predicate and other
aspects of the grammatical context.1
In Section 2.1.3, we introduced the general class of MCP. However, given the focus on
embedded V2 in this chapter, the following section provides some more theoretical detail.
3.1.1 Introducing embedded V2
Syntactically, the type of embedded V2 found in German and the Mainland Scandinavian
languages involves movement of the finite verb to CP.2 In this way, V-to-C languages are
different from V-to-T languages.3 In the latter type, V2 is obligatory in all tensed matrix
and embedded clauses.
In the Mainland Scandinavian languages, which are SVO, it is not always clear from the
surface constituent order whether a subject-initial clause has undergone V-to-C movement
1Caplan and Djärv (2019) additionally evaluate —and find no evidence to support— a processing or
usage-based view of optionality in embedded V2. The paper also contains a discussion of the methodological
consequence of this work: that statistical analysis of usage data can be used to test specific predictions made
by syntactic and semantic-pragmatic theory (see also Caplan 2019).
2Note that this description is likely somewhat simplified. As we saw in Section 2.1.3, much work on V2
and related phenomena has argued that the C-domain consists of an ordered sequence of syntactic heads;
as our focus is the pragmatic and lexical licensing conditions on embedded V2, we leave those distinctions
to the side.
3As in Romance, e.g. Pollock (1989). See also Platzack (1987), Platzack and Holmberg (1989), Holmberg
and Platzack (1991, 1995), Holmberg (2015), for differences between the different Scandinavian languages
in this respect. See also Holmberg (2015) for a recent survey of V2-phenomena.
84
or not. This is because such movement often results in the same surface-order as a clause
without movement, as shown in (2).
(2) Swedish
a. Hon
she
gillar
likes
katter.
cats
‘She likes cats.’
b. CP
Subj
hon C
Vfin
gillar
TP
Subj
T
Vfin
vP
Subji
v
Vfin
Obj
katter
In these languages, there are two common diagnostics for identifying verb movement. The
first is the presence of a topicalized or focused non-subject XP in Spec,CP (3). The second
is the presence of sentence adverb (including negation), occupying the left edge of vP (4)
(illustrated in (4-b)). As these examples illustrate, V2 is obligatory in main clauses.
(3) Swedish
a. [Den filmen]i
[that movie]i
gillade
liked
hon
she
ti.
‘That movie, she liked.’ V2
b. *[Den filmen]i
[that movie]i
hon
she
gillade
liked
ti.
‘That movie, she liked.’ *V-in situ
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(4) Swedish
a. Hon
she
gillar
likes
inte
not
(*gillar)
likes
katter.
cats
‘She doesn’t like cats.’
b. CP
Subj
Hon C
Vfin
gillar
TP
Subj
T
Vfin
vP
neg
inte
vP
Subj
v
Vfin
Obj
katter
While V2 is possible in certain embedded contexts, it is by no means obligatory here:
(5) Swedish
a. Jon
Jon
sa
said
att
that
han
he
hade
had
inte
not
sett
seen
filmen.
movie.the.
‘Jon said that he hadn’t seen the movie.’ V2
b. Jon
Jon
sa
said
att
that
han
he
inte
not
hade
had
sett
seen
filmen.
movie.the.
‘Jon said that he hadn’t seen the movie.’ V-in situ
As we saw in the previous chapter, the syntax of German V2 is different. First of all, V2 is
in complementary distribution with the complmentizer dass. Secondly, given that German
has SOV word order, V-to-C movement can be detected without the presence or absence of
negation or other sentence adverbs, as in the Mainland Scandinavian languages.
(6) German
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a. Peter
Peter
hat
has
gesagt,
said
(*dass)
(that)
Anna
Anna
wurde
was
gefeuert.
fired
‘Peter said that Anna was fired.’ V2
b. Peter
Peter
hat
has
gesagt
said
dass
that
Anna
Anna
gefeuert
fired
wurde.
was
‘Peter said that Anna was fired.’ V-in situ
With this background in mind, let us look at the way in which we coded for both the status
of the embedded clause as V2 vs. V-in situ and for the semantic class of the embedding
predicate.
3.1.2 Corpus methods
Natural language usage data was extracted from several very large Swedish corpora (Borin,
Forsberg, and Roxendal 2012) totaling 12,873,778 sentences, subsequently referred to as
BFR. BFR represents a balanced set of genres ranging from informal blogs and forums to
formal academic writing and government texts. These are summarized in Table 3.1.
Owing to the Zipfian distribution of frequencies inherent to language use (Piantadosi
2014, Yang 2013), the majority of sentences only include a limited number of highly frequent
verb types, with most predicates occurring only rarely. As such, the large sample of extracted
data is required for the type of analysis presented here. This is particularly relevant since
only about 5% to 10% of sentences provide a diagnostic test of embedded V2 status, and of
those, V2 order is only used approximately 5% of the time. This means that one would need
to analyse on the order of 40,000 sentences to encounter 100 diagnosably positive examples.
As the goal of this study is to examine sentences with the potential for embedded V2
order (regardless of whether or not that was actually realized), we created a subcorpus for
analysis according to the following method.4 Data was collapsed according to the ‘lemma’
tags which were automatically assigned in BFR. The use of ‘lemma’ here does not reflect
a theoretical assumption regarding underlying roots, but is simply a limited technical im-
plementation aimed at providing a single representation across surface-divergent inflected
4Code is available open-source at https://github.com/scaplan/V2-optionality under the MIT license
for replicability and extension to related data sets and analyses.
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Proportion
Genre Corpus Sentences Non-ambiguous p(V2)
Blogs/Forums
Familjeliv-känsliga 5971907 0.1163 0.0636
Familjeliv-nöje 458699 0.0809 0.0555
Familjeliv-adoption 77008 0.0936 0.0545
Familjeliv-expert 57478 0.0966 0.0522
Bloggmix 2713376 0.0765 0.0502
Flashback-Politik 2841872 0.0972 0.0457
Historical News Tidning 1870 17084 0.06 0.0724Tidning 1860 58839 0.062 0.0512
Academic Sweacsam 52678 0.0736 0.0375Academy-humanities 60931 0.0741 0.0283
Goverment
Rd-bet 372054 0.0698 0.0163
Rd-ds 172657 0.0848 0.0141
Rd-fpm 5259 0.0686 0.0138
Rd-skfr 81800 0.0865 0.0098
Accessible news Åttasidor 8059 0.0768 0.0081
Table 3.1: Rates of embedded V2 across corpora of varying formality. ‘Genre’ represents a
coarse categorization of corpora by source material. ‘Corpus’ is the division provided within
BFR. ‘Sentences’ is the total number of sentences extracted from the original sub-corpus.
‘Proportion Non-ambiguous’ represents the proportion of sentences within each subcorpus
over which our extraction algorithm is able to apply the diagnostic for estimating V2 vs.
in-situ status. ‘p(V2)’ is the proportion of such sentences surfacing with embedded V2 order
rather than embedded in-situ. Note that while the proportion of diagnostic cases is more or
less steady by corpus, there is a clear effect of genre on the rates of embedded V2. Formal or
more heavily prescriptive content has lower rates of V2 compared to colloquial and informal
material. Even in the most formal styles V2 is still consistently attested.
forms.5 The analysis was also replicated over raw inflected verb forms: we did not identify
any major qualitative differences. However, the use of lemmas reduces data sparsity; even in
a large corpus many possible inflected forms are unattested, and so grouping together inflec-
tional variants can alleviate that. BFR data are not parsed and automatic syntactic parsing
faces numerous technical limitations on data of this diverse type and size (McClosky et al.
2010, Sekine 1997). Instead, we utilized several filters over BFR-provided part-of-speech
tags (Brill 2000) in order to differentiate cases in which an embedded verb has remained in
5For example, ‘spring’, ‘springa’, ‘springer’,‘sprang’, are all identified by the unifying lemma ‘spring’
(run) and identified as such in the subsequent analysis.
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situ rather than undergone V-to-C movement.
For technical simplicity, we only consider single, rather than multiple, embeddings (ap-
proximately 20% of all sentences with the overt complementizer att contain more than one
instance). Sentences are further excluded if the complementizer is directly followed by a verb,
with no intervening potential subject information, since this is indicative of a non-finite com-
plement rather than a tensed embedded clause. Additionally, we exclude sentences in which
the matrix verb is the copula, since these can correspond to a broad range of predicate types.
A few additional filters exclude potential false-positives such as future-marking kommer att
(‘will’), adverbial clauses involving eftersom/(där)för att (‘because’), and embedded clauses
with relative clause subjects, as these are problematic for unambiguously identifying the
tensed verb of the embedded clause.
This set of embedded declaratives is then diagnosed for V2 status by considering the
relative linear order of the embedded verb and negation (as outlined in Section 3.1.1). The-
oretically, this diagnostic can be applied with any adverb in the embedded clause, however
for tractability we limit our diagnostics to negation (inte, icke, etc.).
This results in a set of embedded V2/in-situ sentences which is necessarily a subset of
the total instances in the corpus.6 However, we have no theoretical reason to expect factors
such as the type of adverbial (in the embedded clause) or multiple embedding to have a
profound and significant impact on the availability of embedded V2. Limiting our search to
single-embedded sentences with negation allows technical tractability and high-confidence
in the quality of output data while still providing a representative sample of over one million
diagnosed sentences.
A highly frequent but limited set of 108 lemmas was tagged for semantic class based on
their classification in previous literature on the topic (Hooper and Thompson 1973, Cattell
1978, Wiklund et al. 2009, Djärv et al. 2017, Kastner 2015). A range of statistical informa-
tion was additionally extracted for each sentence and for each lemma overall. This includes
frequencies, lexical semantic information such as lexical class à la Hooper and Thompson
6Though not necessarily a proper subset.
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(1973), polarity information, and several conditional probability events (e.g. matrix intro-
ducing embedded clause, matrix introducing V2 clause, embedded predicate surfacing in
embedded clause, embedded predicate surfacing with V2 order, etc.) A full enumeration of
extracted information is available in the source code.
3.1.3 Lexical information and variation
At a descriptive level, Table 3.1 provides a summary of embedded V2 by corpus. We find
that overall rates of V2 are graded by formality, with more colloquial Swedish such as blog
and forum text exhibiting higher rates than formal writing. This potentially reflects a so-
ciolinguistic property of a (perceived) prescription against embedded V2. It is striking,
though, that V2 appears stable diachronically, without a significant change between histor-
ical newspaper texts dating back to the 1860’s and modern online forums.7 This stability
suggests that synchronic proportions of use do not represent a case of language change in
progress, but rather a fact about the interaction of grammatical representation and use in
context.
In Caplan and Djärv (2019), we show that the rates of embedded V2 across predicates
cannot be accounted for in terms of a processing or usage-based view of optionality. A
curious reader is encouraged to look at Section 2.3. of the paper. In the following sections,
we evaluate a set of the theoretical accounts discussed in the previous chapter, focusing in
particular on the claims about factive predicates made by Haegeman and Ürögdi (2010),
Haegeman (2014), and Kastner (2015) (§ 3.1.4.1), as well as the kind of lexical licensing
account provided by Wiklund et al. (2009) (§ 3.1.4.2).
3.1.4 Lexical accounts of V2
In this section we test the predictions of the two types of lexical accounts discussed above.
First, in Section 3.1.4.1, we test the predictions of the DP/CP Interface Hypothesis (dis-
cussed in Section 2.2 above) for Swedish embedded V2. Secondly, in Section 3.1.4.2, we
7As in Table 3.1 the rates of embedded V2 in historical newspaper data (1860-1880) range from 5% to
7% in line with the contemporary rate in online forums.
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test the predictions of the type of account discussed in Section 2.5, proposed by Wiklund,
Bentzen, Hrafnbjargarson, and Hróarsdóttir (2009), according to which V2 is available,
though essentially optional, under certain predicate types; i.e., those that (independently)
license embedded assertions. We test the predictions made by these accounts against BFR
data, showing that for neither of these accounts are their predictions straightforwardly borne
out.
3.1.4.1 Factivity
On the CP/DP Interface Hypothesis, discussed in Section 2.2, factive verbs are predicted to
categorically disallow embedded V2, given the (standard) assumption that factives require p
to be Common Ground. We noted that this line of analysis is at odds with the observation
made by Hooper and Thompson (1973) and subsequent work, that the doxastic factives
allow MCP and V2 complements. Nevertheless, given that judgements in this area appear
to be subtle and prone to variability, we wanted to test the empirical claim that factive and
non-factive predicates differ fundamentally in their ability to license MCP in the context of
V2, against the large scale data available in the BRF-corpora. If these views were correct,
we would expect significantly lower rates of V2 under factive than under non-factive verbs.
However, as shown in Figure 3.1, we find that factivity does not influence the rates of
embedded V2. In fact, from this plot, it looks as though factive verbs (the gold bar) show
slightly higher rates of V2 than the non-factive verbs (the gray bar); though this difference
is not statistically significant.
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Figure 3.1: Rates of V2 under factive vs. non-factive verbs; plot based on data from the
Flashback-Politik corpus (2,841,872 sentences)
We also ran a Wilcoxon Rank Sum test (a non-parametric alternative to the two-sample
t-test), which allowed us to reject the hypothesis that the distribution of V2 sentences is
different for factive as opposed to non-factive verbs (W = 748, p = 0.6949). This was true
for all corpora that we investigated.
3.1.4.2 ForceP selection
On the view advanced by Wiklund et al. (2009), discussed in Section 2.5, V2 is optional
in the complements of certain predicate types, namely speech act predicates, doxastic non-
factives, and doxastic factives; but not in the complements of emotive factives and response
predicates. The rationale for this claim was that the former set of predicates select for a
ForceP, which is compatible with embedded V2 (and other MCP), whereas the latter set of
predicates select for a smaller clause, incompatible with V-to-C movement. They argued,
however, that there is no direct link between embedded V2 and assertion.
In terms of the distribution of embedded V2 in the corpus, this account predicts that
the relevant factor determining the rates of V2 is simply membership of a particular lexical
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class. Moreover, given that pragmatic factors play no explanatory role on this account, we
expect that if it were correct, then the rates of V2 across predicate classes should be more or
less constant, both across different discourse types; represented by the genre of the corpora
(see Table 3.1), as well as across the different predicates within a given predicate class. More
specifically, we expect that if there is an effect of formality and genre (for instance), then
we should observe this effect categorically for all predicates in this context.
Contrary to the first of these two predictions, we find that, while the distribution of
V2 to some extent varies across predicate classes along the lines predicted by this account
(overall higher rates of V2 in the complements of speech act predicates, doxastic non-factives,
and doxastic factives), the rates of V2 across predicate classes varied substantially across
different corpora, as shown in Figure 3.2. What we found was a type of ‘genre effect’, i.e.
an overall effect of lexical class, but where the distribution of V2 by verb class varied across
corpora representing different discourse types,
It is also worth noting that in neither corpus do the rates of V2 straightforwardly track
the rates of V2 found in Jensen and Christensen’s (2013) Danish corpus, which were also
reflected in the Swedish judgement data from Djärv, Heycock, and Rohde (2017), where
the speech act and doxastic factives showed the highest rates/judgements of acceptability
for V2, followed by the doxastic non-factives and the emotive factives. This is suggestive
of a scenario whereby the rates of embedded V2 is sensitive to pragmatic properties of the
discourse; however, in an experimental context, the identity of the predicate might impose
some default assumptions about the context. We return to this possibility in Section 3.2.
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Figure 3.2: Rates of embedded V2 from three of the BRF-corpora. From top to
bottom: Familjeliv-känsliga (family-oriented discussion forum; 5,971,907 sentences),
Flashback-Politik (online forum for political discussion; 2,841,872 sentences), and Rd-bet
(government texts; 372,054 sentences)
Moreover, contrary to the second prediction made by this account, we also found that
there was significant variability within the different verb classes: Figure 3.3 shows the vari-
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able rates of V2 for the 21 speech act predicates in our data set. Note that similar variation
was found across the other verb classes as well.
Figure 3.3: Probability of V2 by lemma within the class of speech act verbs (the x-axis
represents the 21 different verbs in this class ordered by proportion of V2); plot based
on data from a corpus of text from a political online forum (Flashback-Politik corpus;
2,841,872 sentences)
We take this as evidence against this type of strong lexical licensing account, whereby
membership of a given lexical class is what determines whether V2 is available or not.
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In this section, we tested the predictions made by the two types of lexical accounts
discussed in Chapter 2 against large-scale data from the BRF corpus: one according to
which embedded V2 should not be available in the complements of factive verbs; and one
whereby V2 is available, but optional, in the complements of certain predicate types, but not
others. We found that for neither of the two accounts were their predictions straightforwardly
borne out. Rather, the distribution illustrated in Figure 3.2 suggests to us that, in addition
to the lexical semantics of the embedding predicate, discourse factors play a significant role
in driving the distribution of embedded V2. In particular, the distribution we observe looks
like what we would expect if it were the case that embedded V2 is associated with some
kind of pragmatic meaning; the use of which is influenced by (but not solely determined by)
the meaning of the embedding predicate, along with the type of discourse context in which
the sentence is uttered. In the following section, we suggest that this pragmatic meaning is
whether or not the embedded proposition p is discourse-new.
3.1.5 Proposal: embedded V2 and discourse novelty
To account for the interaction of discourse context and lexical semantics illustrated in Figure
3.2, we proposed that:8
(7) a. V2-clauses have some interpretive effect. The distribution or use of this inter-
pretive effect is influenced both by the meaning of the embedding predicate, and
the type of discourse context in which the sentence is uttered.
b. The proposition denoted by a V2 clause is interpreted as constituting discourse-
new information.
While (7-a) was based on the effect observed in Figure 3.2, the motivation for (7-b) came
from considering the kinds of discourse contexts in which the relevant predicate types can
felicitously be used. We observe that the different types of predicates vary in their ability
to introduce entirely new information into the discourse; essentially, whether or not p has
8This was the proposal made and tested in Caplan and Djärv (2019): our proposal for the licensing of
embedded V2 will be developed further in Section 3.3.
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been previously discussed by the speaker and hearer. As shown in (8), this ability appears
to correlate with the availability of V2.9
(8) [Uttered out of the blue:] Guess what — / You know what —
a. John told me that [P Bill and Anna broke up]. 3V2
b. John thinks that [P Bill and Anna broke up]. 3V2
c. John discovered that [P Bill and Anna broke up]. 3V2
d. #John appreciates that [P Bill and Anna broke up]. 7V2
e. #John doubts that [P Bill and Anna broke up]. 7V2
A reader might object that these judgements are based on English rather than Swedish.
In Section 3.2 (in particular Section 3.2.6.1) we present experimental results that provide
empirical support for the hypothesis that these judgments do in fact reflect robust semantic-
pragmatic properties of these different (classes of) attitude verb across Swedish, English, and
German.
Caplan and Djärv (2019) argued, in the spirit of the proposals in Haegeman and Ürögdi
(2010), Haegeman (2014), Kastner (2015) a.o., that V2 is not licensed in contexts where
the embedded proposition p is discourse old information. However, this proposal differed
crucially in terms of our assumptions about factive predicates: whereas those authors as-
sumed all factive predicates to require p to be Common Ground, we followed Simons (2007),
in disassociating givenness and factivity (in the sense of projecting speaker commitment to
p).10
However, we observed that the lexical semantics of the embedding predicate is only one
factor that constrains the ability of an embedded proposition to be presented as discourse-
9The # notation refers to the readings where p is presented to the hearer as discourse new information,
as opposed to where the sentence makes a comment about the attitude holder. The same holds for (10) and
(11).
10In Chapter 5 we present a novel analysis of factivity, different from that of Simons (2007), which ties
the projective inference of speaker commitment to presuppositions of evidential support for p, rather than
p being Common Ground, or any type of entailment of factive verbs. This account is based primarily on
judgements about the types of contexts that allow suspension or cancellation of the inference that p is true
for emotive and doxastic factives in (un-)embedded contexts.
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new information. The type of discourse, along with other properties of the sentence, matter
too. The following examples with embedded V2 from the Flashback-Politik corpus (a polit-
ical forum), involving the response verb ‘acceptera’ (accept) illustrates this point:
(9) a. kan
can
du
you
inte
not
bara
just
slappna
chill
av
out
och
and
acceptera
accept
att
that
socialisterna
socialists.def
kan
can
inte
not
vinna
win
alla
every
gånger
time
?
?
‘Why can’t you just relax and accept that the socialists aren’t going to win every
time?’
b. acceptera
accept
att
that
du
you
kan
can
inte
not
älska
love
alla
everyone
men
but
du
you
kan
can
inte
not
hata
hate
alla
everyone
heller
either
‘Accept that you can’t love everyone, but you can’t hate everyone either.’
What appears to be happening in these cases is indeed that the speakers are presenting
the embedded propositions (‘the socialists can’t win every time’, and ‘you can’t love every-
one, but you can’t hate everyone either’) as new information, in an attempt to update the
Common Ground.
If the relevant dimension is truly the discourse status of the embedded proposition, the
issue arises of how to test the hypothesis against corpus data, given that there is no direct way
of measuring the discourse status of a given proposition in a corpus— especially not in one of
this scale. However, it turns out that we can test whether or not the embedded proposition
may constitute discourse-new information in a way that is quantifiable—but nevertheless
independent of the identity of the matrix predicate—thus providing an independent test
for our hypothesis. What we observe is that the speech act predicates and the doxastic
non-factives, under negation, take on the property of requiring their complement to be
discourse-old (similarly to the response predicates and the emotive factives):
(10) [Uttered out of the blue:] Guess what — / You know what —
a. John told me that [P Bill and Anna broke up].
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b. John thinks that [P Bill and Anna broke up].
c. #John didn’t tell me that [P Bill and Anna broke up].
d. #John doesn’t think that [P Bill and Anna broke up].
e. #John appreciates that [P Bill and Anna broke up].
f. #John doubts that [P Bill and Anna broke up].
g. #John doesn’t appreciate that [P Bill and Anna broke up].
h. #John doesn’t doubt that [P Bill and Anna broke up].
Of course, as has been observed in previous work (e.g. Truckenbrodt 2006, Gärtner and
Michaelis 2010), negating these verbs also negates their belief components. This has been
taken to support a view such as that discussed in Section 2.4, whereby V2 is licensed by a
belief context. The experimental study in Section 3.2 is designed to tease these two accounts
apart.
Based on this observation then, our hypothesis now predicts that the speech act and
non-factive doxastic predicates, when negated, should show equally low rates of V2 as the
response predicates and the emotive factives (in both polarities), as shown in (11).
(11) V2: predicted distribution (verb type by negation interaction)
a. John told me that [P Bill and Anna broke up]. 3 V2
b. John thinks that [P Bill and Anna broke up]. 3 V2
c. #John didn’t tell me that [P Bill and Anna broke up]. 7 V2
d. #John doesn’t think that [P Bill and Anna broke up]. 7 V2
e. #John appreciates that [P Bill and Anna broke up]. 7 V2
f. #John doubts that [P Bill and Anna broke up]. 7V2
g. #John doesn’t appreciate that [P Bill and Anna broke up]. 7V2
h. #John doesn’t doubt that [P Bill and Anna broke up]. 7 V2
Before testing these predictions in the BRF-corpus, we wanted to make sure that this
was indeed a robust property of these predicate classes, beyond our own intuitions about
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the particular verbs in (11). To this end, we carried out an experimental judgement task,
which we describe in the following section.
3.1.6 Experiment: negation & discourse novelty
The predictions illustrated in (11) are based on the observation that the speech act predicates
and the doxastic non-factives, under negation, require their complement to be discourse-old.
To make sure that this observation is empirically robust, we ran an experiment probing the
effect of negation on whether or not p can be interpreted as discourse-new information under
the different predicates types.
3.1.6.1 Methods
3.1.6.1.1 Design and Materials
The experiment employed the “Guess what” test used above; here, framed in the context of
a conversation between two friends, as shown in (12).
(12) Two friends, Tom and Sue, run into each other. Tom says to Sue:
Guess what! I just ran into Aaron, and he VERBS/DOESN’T VERB that [P Joel
left his wife].
To measure the perceived discourse status of p, the participants were asked to complete a
statement in which they had to rate on a Likert scale how likely they thought it was that
the speaker and the hearer had talked about p before (7=not likely; 1=very likely), as shown
in Figure 3.4.
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Figure 3.4: Screenshot of an experimental trial
Since our predictions were specifically about the interaction of negation with the speech
act predicates and the doxastic non-factives, compared to the emotive factives and the
response predicates, we did not include the doxastic factives in this experiment. We included
three verbs from each lexical class:11
(13) a. Speech act predicates: say, mention, tell (me)
b. Doxastic non-factives: believe, think, assume
c. Response predicates: accept, deny, admit
d. Emotive factives: appreciate, regret, resent
The experiment included 24 critical items, and 24 fillers, plus two practice items that
were excluded from the analysis. Each item consisted of one verb and one (unique) comple-
ment clause, with variations in the two polarity conditions: positive (no matrix negation) vs.
negative (with matrix negation). Whereas each embedded clause content occurred only in
one item, every verb occurred in two items, so that each participant would see all conditions;
[speech act vs. doxastic non-factive vs. emotive factive vs. response] × [negative vs. posi-
tive], across items, but with the specific content of the embedded clause shown only in one
condition, counterbalanced across subjects using a latin-square design. Each subject thus
11The doxastic factives were excluded for the purpose of keeping the experiment size manageable; we had
no specific prediction about how they should interact with negation. In the experiment reported in Section
3.2, we replicate this experiment, but include also the doxastic factives, as well as a larger set of predicates
of each class.
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saw each verb twice, once in the negative and once in the positive polarity (with different
contents for the interlocutors and embedded clauses). Since there were three verbs per verb
class, each participant saw each predicate type six times (three positive and three negative).
We also included baseline floor and ceiling conditions for discourse-old vs. new status,
as illustrated in (14).12 There were eight items of each kind.
(14) Control conditions:
a. Discourse-new baseline (predict high ratings):
Guess what! Joel left his wife.
b. Discourse-old baseline (predict low ratings):
Guess what! John thinks, like you do, that Joel left his wife.
Additionally, the experiment included eight pure fillers, involving conditionals (15). For
these, the participants rated the likelihood of the proposition in the antecedent being old
vs. new (here, that Nadine traveled to Asia).
(15) Guess what! I just ran into Lisa, and she said that if Nadine traveled to Asia, then
she must have lots of interesting stories to tell.
Importantly, the “Guess what” experiment was run in English rather than Swedish with
translations of the original predicates. Because of this, we remove any potential lexically-
specific confounds present between acceptability judgements in English and rates of V2
in Swedish; the only properties shared between translations are abstract semantic ones
rather than Swedish-specific distributional information (frequency, rates of V2, etc.). This
was to ensure that the link between the judgments for discourse novelty and the rates of
embedded V2 is not attributable to something like learned co-variation.13 Empirical support
12A reader may wonder whether participants’ judgements of acceptability might influence their behaviour
in the experiment, thus creating a confound in the data. In the experiment in Section 3.2, we test the same
items both for acceptability and for discourse novelty, as well as for speaker and attitude holder commitment
to p. The results from this study both replicates the current findings (for English, Swedish, and German),
and show us that participants’ judgments of acceptability do not influence their judgments of interpretation.
13Thanks Spencer Caplan for this point.
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showing that these (classes of) verbs in English and Swedish share these abstract semantic-
pragmatic properties, comes from the experimental results reported in Section 3.2.6.1: this
study replicates the findings of the current experiment in English, Swedish and German.
The experiment was implemented in Ibex, and took 10-15 minutes to complete.14
3.1.6.1.2 Participants
56 undergraduate students, recruited through the University of Pennsylvania’s Psychology
Department’s subject pool (SONA), participated in the study for course credit. They were
given a link to the experiment to take it online in their own time. Based on responses in the
control conditions, we excluded the responses from five participants who appeared to have
reversed the scale, leaving us with the responses from 51 participants.
3.1.6.1.3 Analysis
The data was analysed in R (version 3.5.0). To test our predictions, we carried out a regres-
sion by fitting a linear mixed effects model, using the lmer function from the lme4 package.
The package lmerTest was used to generate p-values. The dependent variable was the per-
ceived likelihood of p being new information. The model included Predicate Type, Polarity
type, and their interaction (base levels: predicate type=Speech Act; polarity=Positive) as
fixed effects. It also included a random intercept for participant and item.
We also ran a model predicting the responses from the individual predicates (Verb
Lemma). The conditional fillers (15) were excluded from the analysis.
To identify outliers we created two sets of subjects based on their responses in the two
control conditions (14): (a) subjects whose average response was more than one standard
deviation below the mean in the discourse-new condition, and (b) subjects whose average
response was more than one standard deviation above the mean in the discourse-old condi-
tion. We then took the intersection of the two sets, thus giving us only the participants who
were outliers for both control conditions (n=5). Thus, the subjects that we excluded from
14An archived version of the experiment is available at: http://spellout.net/ibexexps/SchwarzLab/
DiscFam.Archive/experiment.html?id=archive.
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the analysis were those who deviated from the mean by more than one standard deviation
in the ‘unexpected’ directions for the two control conditions. To compare the data with and
without the outliers, we used r.squaredGLMM() from the MuMin package, to calculate the
(marginal and conditional) R squared values for a model with the full data set (n=56), and
the subsetted data set (n=51), to determine how well the model fits the data. R squared
is a statistical measure of how close the data are to the fitted regression line (R squared =
Explained variation / Total variation). The data was plotted using ggplot from the ggplot2
package; error bars represent the standard error of the mean.
3.1.6.1.4 Predictions
We predict that matrix negation will interact with predicate type, such that the speech act
predicates and the doxastic non-factives receive significantly higher ratings in the positive
than in the negated condition. We predict that the response predicates and the emotive
factives should receive low ratings in both polarity conditions.
3.1.6.2 Results
Figures 3.5–3.6 show the responses for the critical items and the two control conditions (14)
(the responses for the conditional fillers (15) are not included).
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Figure 3.5: Response patterns by embedding predicate type and polarity (critical and control
conditions). The blue horizontal line shows the overall mean.
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Figure 3.6: Response patterns by embedding verb and polarity (critical and control condi-
tions). The blue horizontal line shows the overall mean.
The R squared values for the data with and without the outliers are given in Table 3.2.
As expected, we find that with the subsetted data (without the outliers) the model fits the
data better than with the full data set. This is true both for the models based on predicate
type and verb lemma. We also observe that for none of the models is there a big difference
between the conditional and the marginal R squared values, showing us that most of the
variation in the data is explained by the fixed effects.
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Data Marginal R2 Conditional R2
Predicate Type: With outliers (n=56) 0.67 0.71
Predicate Type: Without outliers (n=51) 0.71 0.75
Verb Lemma: With outliers (n=56) 0.61 0.65
Verb Lemma: Without outliers (n=51) 0.72 0.75
Table 3.2: R squared values for the data set with and without outliers. Marginal R squared
values consider only the fixed effects; the conditional R squared values consider both the
fixed and the random effects.
The linear mixed effects model (based on predicate type, without outliers, n=51) shows
a main effect of predicate type. Relative to the intercept (6.0920; this is the mean of the
dependent variable for the two base levels: predicate type=Speech Act and polarity=positive),
the model shows that the following conditions are significantly different (p’s < 0.001) (the
numbers represent the model estimated difference relative to the base levels): Doxastic Non-
factive (β = -1.7744); Response (β = -4.1227), Emotive Factive (β = -3.5806), old information
controls (β = -5.0297), and polarity (β = -4.0726, p < 0.001). The new information controls
did not differ significantly from the base levels (β = 0.1532, p = 0.361).
Additionally, the model shows the following significant interactions (p’s < 0.001): the
difference between the positive and the negative polarity is greater for the Speech Act
predicates than for the other predicate types; Doxastic Non-factives (β = 2.0267), Response
(β = 3.9924), and Emotive Factives (β = 4.3679). Given the fixed effect of polarity we just
observed (β = -4.0726, p < 0.001), this means that the difference between the two polarity
conditions for the Doxastic Non-factives is about half the size of that for the Speech Act
predicates, whereas for the Response predicates and Emotive factives, there is essentially
no difference between the two polarities: in these conditions, the effect of negation is close
to zero. (In fact, the Emotive Factives appear to show a small difference in the opposite
direction from the other conditions.)
These results then are precisely what we predicted (Section 3.1.6.1.4). Additionally, the
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difference between the Speech Act and Non-factive Doxastic predicates is in line with the
observation that the Speech Act predicates show the overall highest levels of V2.
3.1.7 Testing our predictions: negation interaction
Having confirmed that matrix negation independently impacts the interpretation of the em-
bedded proposition as discourse-old vs. -new information, for the Speech Act predicates and
the Doxastic Non-factives, we were able to test our prediction that the rates of V2 in the
corpus should be notably lower for the negated Speech Act and Doxastic Non-factive predi-
cates, than for their non-negated counterparts. As shown in Figure 3.7, this prediction was
borne out. This effect was confirmed by a Wilcoxon Rank Sum test (W = 749, p=0.007677),
and holds across all corpora we looked at.
Figure 3.7: Rates of V2 with the speech act predicates and the doxastic non-factives under
negative and positive polarity.
Importantly, this was not due to a main effect of negation, but reflects specifically the
interaction of negation and the speech act and non-factive doxastic predicates, as predicted
from the experimental results in Section 3.1.6. We also predicted that negation should not
significantly impact the rates of V2 for the Response stance predicates and the Emotive
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factives, as is borne out in Figure 3.8. This (lack of) effect was confirmed by a Wilcoxon
Rank Sum test (W = 133, p-value = 0.7322).
Figure 3.8: Rates of V2 with the response stance predicates and emotive factives under
negative and positive polarity.
On the account discussed in Section 2.4, that takes V2 to be licensed by a context
that entails speaker or attitude holder belief that p, we predict an asymmetry between
the positive and the negative response stance verbs (e.g. accept and admit vs. doubt and
deny), as well as an interaction with negation. In particular, this hypothesis predicts: (i)
that V2 should be possible under the positive, but not the negative response predicates;
and (ii) that the negated positive response predicates should show lower rates of V2 than
the non-negated ones, and vice versa for the negative response predicates. Looking at the
rates of V2 under the response predicates in the BRF corpus, we observe no clear difference
between the positive and the negative response predicates. A Wilcoxon Rank Sum test
shows no significant difference in V2 under negated vs. positive response stance verbs (W
= 13, p-value = 0.4396). This supports the view whereby V2 is licensed in contexts where
p is treated as discourse new information. Further evidence for this conclusion comes from
the experimental results in Section 3.2.
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3.1.8 Summary
The findings presented here are clearly problematic for a selection-based account of em-
bedded V2. The results also show clearly that factivity is not relevant for the distribution
of embedded V2. Rather, the results suggested that V2 is licensed in contexts where the
embedded proposition constitutes discourse new information. Importantly, this is a prag-
matic property of an utterance in context — constrained, but not determined, by the lexical
semantics of the matrix predicate. Other factors that play a role include the pragmatic
context of the utterance, as well as other grammatical properties of the sentence. Here, we
investigated the effect of one such factor, namely matrix negation, and showed that certain
predicates interact with negation in a way that constrains the potential discourse-status of a
sentence. These results then made novel predictions regarding the distribution of embedded
V2 in the corpus, which we showed were borne out. Note that while we only looked at the
interaction with negation, the naturally occurring sentences in (9), from the BRF corpus,
suggest that negation is only one potentially relevant grammatical factor.15
An open issue is whether the observation that Swedish embedded V2 is licensed by
discourse novelty can be extended to other MCP in a wider range of languages. Given the
range of empirical and theoretical claims seen in Chapter 2, it is far from clear that this
should be the case. Recall for instance Bianchi and Frascarelli’s (2009) examples in (33),
repeated here, suggesting that English topicalization is available both under emotive factives
and under negated speech act verbs:
(16) Bianchi and Frascarelli (2009, p. 69)
a. I am glad that [this unrewarding job], she has finally decided to give up.
b. Mary didn’t tell us that Bill she had fired, and John she had decided to promote.
15In addition to the effect of discourse novelty, we also observed that the rates of V2 are graded by
formality, such that rates of V2 are much lower in written, formal contexts. This replicates results from
Heycock and Wallenberg (2013), and is in line with the observation that (at least in Swedish) there exists
a prescriptive bias against V2. Given the rates of V2 found in the Danish corpus-study by Jensen and
Christensen (2013), the overall low rates of V2 in our corpus data were somewhat surprising. We leave this
a question for future work to investigate.
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It is also worth noting that some of the proposals discussed in Chapter 2 invoke discourse
novelty as a condition alongside other pragmatic effects: On the account of Woods (2016a),
for instance, the main driving force of embedded V2 was speaker commitment to the embed-
ded proposition, whereas on the CP/DP Interface Hypothesis, discourse novelty was taken
to depend on factivity. While the latter claim was clearly not borne out by the Swedish
corpus data, it might nevertheless be the case that factivity is relevant to other MCP, such
as topicalization. Similarly, with predicates like say, think, and doubt, the predictions of
discourse novelty and speaker commitment are difficult to tease apart. While the Swedish
data was more line with the former hypothesis, it will be helpful to substantiate our findings
against experimental data, to further differentiate between these possibilities.
The experiments reported in Section 3.2 will also allow us to address these issues, and
to address a number of other empirical questions identified in Chapter 2, summarized in
(113)–(116) of that chapter and repeated here:
(17) What dimension of assertion is relevant to the syntax:
a. Speaker commitment to p?
b. Attitude holder commitment to p?
c. The status of p as ‘old’ vs. ‘new’ information?
(18) What is the role of the embedding predicate:
a. To what extent to different verbs encode the pragmatic dimensions in (113)?
b. Are MCP/assertion-compatible clauses lexically selected for?
c. Are the properties of verbs like think, say, doubt, regret, and know reflective of
more general features of larger classes of predicates?
d. What, if any, is the role of factivity?
(19) Is there variation:
a. Across languages (e.g. Mainland Scandinavian, German, English)?
b. Between different MCP (e.g. embedded V2, topicalization, speech act adverbs,
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embedded inverted questions)?
c. Among speakers?
(20) Are conflicting judgement due not controlling for elements of the context?
3.2 MCP across languages: new experimental data
The core aim of this section is to address the questions in (17)–(20). As we saw in Chapter 2,
many of the theoretical accounts we looked at use distributional data —observations about
the availability of MCP under different predicates or predicate types— as the basis for claims
about the pragmatic licensing conditions of different MCP. However, as we also observed, it
is far from clear (a) what pragmatic properties are in fact associated with different verbs,
and (b) which of those properties are in fact relevant to the availability of MCP.16
Using distributional data as a ‘proxy’ for discourse pragmatics in not necessarily in
itself a big problem in itself. Empirically, however, it becomes problematic as a basis for
theoretical analysis, given that: (a) theoretical claims are often based on sparsely selected
observations, involving a small set of verbs and sentences (e.g. say, think, know, and regret);
and (b) in a lot of these cases, different accounts end up making exactly the same predictions.
The negated speech act and doxastic non-factive verbs (e.g. not say, not believe), discussed
in the previous section, is a case in point: do they disallow embedded V2 (and other MCP?)
because they negate the speaker’s (or attitude holder’s) commitment to p, or because they
require p to be a given issue in the discourse?
Fortunately, there are contexts where the predictions of these accounts come apart, for
instance in the case of the positive and negative response stance verbs (e.g. accept/admit
vs. doubt/deny), as mentioned in the previous section, or in the case of negated and non-
negated doxastic and emotive factives (e.g. not appreciate, not discover). To disentangle
these accounts, the current experiment therefore looks at the availability of MCP across a
wider set of lexical contexts (20 verbs from the five verb classes discussed above).
As we noted above, however, while believe clearly entails the attitude holder’s belief that
16See Djärv (2019a) for a more condensed version of the experiments reported in this section.
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p, it is less clear to what extent this holds of other “assertive” predicates (e.g. say, tell, claim,
assume, guess, imagine, etc.). To tease apart lexical and pragmatic accounts, therefore,
the current experiment further derives independent, empirically motivated estimates of the
pragmatic dimensions at stake, for each verb (class)–polarity combination, and use those as
independent predictors of different MCP; enabling us to address questions (17)–(18).
Recall the accounts discussed in Chapter 2. Regarding the role of the embedding verb,
we identified the following two proposals taking the availability of MCP to be predicted by
the lexical class of the embedding attitude verb (the labels and short-hands introduced will
be used throughout this chapter to refer to these proposals):
(21) Lexical Class à la Hooper and Thompson (1973) [Lex-HT]
3 {Speech act, Doxastic non-factives, Doxastic factives}
7 {Response verbs, Emotive factives}
(Hooper and Thompson 1973 for MCP in general; Wiklund et al. 2009 for Mainland
Scandinavian embedded V217)
(22) Lexical Class à la The CP/DP Interface Hypothesis [Lex-CP/DP]
3 {Speech act, Doxastic non-factives}
7 {Response verbs, Emotive factives, Doxastic factives}
(Kastner 2015, Haegeman and Ürögdi 2010, De Cuba and Ürögdi 2009, Haegeman
2009, 2012, 2014, De Cuba 2017a,b, a.o., for MCP in general)
We also identified the following accounts, taking the availability of the different types of
MCP to be predicted by pragmatic factors.
(23) Speaker believes p [Prag-Sp]
(Wiklund 2010 for Mainland Scandinavian V2 and speech act adverbs)
(24) Speaker believes p & p is new information [Prag-Sp-New]
(Woods 2016a for German V2)
17See also Djärv, Heycock, and Rohde (2017).
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(25) Speaker or attitude holder [AH] believes p [Prag-SpAH]
(Truckenbrodt 2006 for German V2; Julien 2015 for Mainland Scandinavian V2;
Woods 2016a for speech act adverbs)
(26) Speaker or AH believes p & p is new information [Prag-SpAH-New]
(Woods 2016a for Mainland Scandinavian V2)
To this we add the pragmatic account of Caplan and Djärv (2019), outlined in Section 3.1:18
(27) p is discourse new information [Prag-New]
(Caplan and Djärv 2019 for Swedish V2)
Testing these hypotheses will be the central aim of the current experiment. To get at the
question of whether there is variation along various dimensions (19), the experiment collects
comparable data from four MCP (speech act adverbs, embedded V2, topicalization, scene
setting adverbs) in three languages (English, German, Swedish). This allows us to test for
variation in a given language across different MCP, as well as for variation for a particular
type of MCP across languages. The experimental method further allows us to control for
any effects of contextual factors (20).
The present experiment also allows us to ask the more open-ended question of whether
there is in fact a coherent class of MCP, such that there is some set of constructions that
all share a particular distributional pattern or some set of pragmatic licensing conditions.
This section is structured as follows: Section 3.2.1.1 describes the languages and MCP
investigated, and Section 3.2.1.2 the pragmatic and lexical variations; Section 3.2.2 describes
the controls and fillers used; Section 3.2.3 describes the participants in the study; Section
3.2.4 describes the process of trimming the data; Section 3.2.5 details the statistical analysis
of the data; Section 3.2.7 looks at the question of inter-speaker variation; Section 3.2.6 states
the results of this study; and Section 3.2.8 summarizes this section.
18See also Gärtner and Michaelis (2010) on German V2; Section 2.4.1.1.
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3.2.1 Experimental variations
3.2.1.1 Language and MCP-type
The experiment investigated four MCP in three languages, as shown in Table 3.3. Each
language and MCP-condition was varied between participants.
Types of MCP Ex. Languages
Speech act adverbs (30) English German Swedish
Topicalization (Object DP) (31) English — —
Scene Setting Adverbs (32) English — —
Embedded V2 (29) – German Swedish
Unmarked Control Sentences (28) English German Swedish
Table 3.3: Languages and MCP varied in the experiment.
In addition to the MCP-manipulations, each item also occurred in an unmarked condition
(28), which served as a (ceiling) baseline for the acceptability of each of the sentences used,
independently of any MCP-manipulation. This is important, since while the consensus
among linguists is that a sentence like Mary doubts that Lisa got the job is grammatical,
this does not mean that naive participants in an experiment will judge such sentences to
be as acceptable or natural as Mary thinks that Lisa got the job. Thus, including unmarked
versions of each sentence, provides a baseline relative to which we can measure the effect of
the MCP variation, independently of the effect of the embedding predicate, or the particular
choice of embedded clause.
As discussed in Section 3.1.1, V2 in Swedish is diagnosed using the order of the finite
verb and negation. In German, the V2-manipulation is achieved by varying the order of the
finite verb with respect to its complement:
(28) Unmarked (English, German, Swedish)
a. Anna said that Lisa got fired. Eng
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b. Anna
Anna
hat
has
gesagt,
said
dass
that
Lisa
Lisa
gefeuert
fired
wurde.
was
‘Anna said that Lisa got fired.’ Ger
c. Anna
Anna
sa
said
att
that
Lisa
Lisa
inte
not
har
has
fått
got
sparken.
fired
‘Anna said that Lisa didn’t get fired.’ Sw
(29) Verb Second (German, Swedish)
a. Anna
Anna
hat
has
gesagt
said
Lisa
Lisa
wurde
was
gefeuert.
fired
‘Anna said that Lisa got fired.’ Ger
b. Anna
Anna
sa
said
att
that
Lisa
Lisa
har
has
inte
not
fått
got
sparken.
fired
‘Anna said that Lisa didn’t get fired.’ Sw
(30) Speech Act Adverbs (English, German, Swedish)
a. Anna said that Lisa honestly got fired.
b. Anna
Anna
hat
has
gesagt,
said
dass
that
Lisa
Lisa
offen gestanden
frankly.said
gefeuert
fired
wurde.
was
‘Anna said that Lisa, to be frank, got fired.’ Ger
c. Anna
Anna
sa
said
att
that
Lisa
Lisa
ärligt
honestly
talat
speaking
fått
got
sparken.
fired
‘Anna said that Lisa, to be frank, got fired.’ Sw
(31) Topicalization (English)
Anna said that the people he lived with, Tom didn’t like. Eng
(32) Scene Setting Adverbs (English)
Anna said that in college, Tom didn’t like the people he lived with. Eng
A note is in order regarding the scene setting adverbs. As mentioned in Section 2.2.1,
Haegeman claims that these are less restricted than other MCP like topicalization, despite
being merged in the left-periphery, as illustrated in the following examples from English:19
19Haegeman also makes the same claim for Romance CLLD. However, Bianchi and Frascarelli (2009)
argue from Italian that this generalization is in fact only partially correct, and that CLLD is possible in
contexts not otherwise compatible with MCP (e.g. under verbs like regret), only to the extent that they
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(33) Haegeman (2014, p. 190)
a. John regrets that last week Mary did not turn up for the lecture.
b. I resent the fact that last week Mary did not turn up for the lecture.
Recall, however, (33) from Bianchi and Frascarelli (2009), repeated here:
(34) Bianchi and Frascarelli (2009, p. 69)
a. I am glad that [this unrewarding job], she has finally decided to give up.
b. Mary didn’t tell us that Bill she had fired, and John she had decided to promote.
If the judgements reported in (34) are indeed representative of English topicalization under
emotive factives and negated speech act predicates, we shouldn’t necessarily expect a dif-
ference between embedded topicalization and embedded scene setting adverbs: while they
might both be somewhat marked compared to completely ‘unmarked’ sentences with no
material in the left-periphery, they should not be sensitive to specific aspects of the lexical
and pragmatic contexts. On the other hand, on a view where emotive factives simply do not
select a complement with the appropriate kind of left-periphery (as in both Wiklund et al.
2009 and Kastner 2015), both constructions should be degraded here. Given the amount of
disagreement found in the literature about the empirical facts, it seems reasonable to treat
this as an open empirical question.
It should also be mentioned that the choice of constructions investigated across these
different languages was partially constrained by practical considerations. To start, English
does not have V2, which made it impossible to investigate. While both Swedish and Ger-
man allow for Topicalization of a DP in object position and high Scene Setting Adverbs,
such sentences are obligatorily V2, as we saw in Section 3.1.1, thus making it difficult to
disentangle the impact of toplicalization from that of V-to-C movement.
The current design, illustrated in Table 3.3, nevertheless has the advantage of allowing us
instantiate “G(iven)-topics” (topics that pick up on referents already in the Common Ground). This then is
unlike English (left-peripheral) topicalization (e.g. (31)), which is necessarily contrastive, and therefore (in
their terms) “pertain to Common Ground management”. Contrastive CLLD topics in Romance are equally
restricted in “non-root contexts”, i.e. contexts endowed with illocuationary force.
117
to compare both the distribution and licensing conditions of particular constructions across
different languages (V2 in German and Swedish, and speech act adverbs in English, German,
and Swedish), as well as the distribution and licensing conditions of different constructions
within a particular language. Thus, the current study is able to address both the question
of whether there is variation across different constructions, and whether there is variation
among particular constructions across different languages.
To achieve the language/MCP manipulation, the embedded clauses were first con-
structed, in the unmarked condition, by the author in English, and subsequently translated
to Swedish and German. The unmarked stimuli were then varied, for each language, in each
of the MCP-variations. The materials were then checked for naturalness and typos, etc, by
bilingual native speakers of English, German and Swedish, respectively.20 Names were also
replaced in the different languages to seem more natural.
3.2.1.2 Pragmatic and lexical variations
The study collected judgements of acceptability for 20 sentences, which were varied between
participants in each of the language and construction combinations outlined in Table 3.3.
One item consisted of one sentence, which occurred in two conditions, corresponding to the
presence or absence of matrix negation, as illustrated in (35).
(35) Example item
a. John said that Lisa decided to break up with the guy she’s been dating.
b. John didn’t say that Lisa decided to break up with the guy she’s been dating.
In total, the critical items included 20 verbs from five classes of attitude verbs, with four
verbs per class.21
As illustrated in (36)–(37), each verb occurred in exactly two items (i.e. with different
20In the case of English, a set of small pilot studies were run online (on Prolific.ac) to minimize the
variation in the unmarked items. In the case of Swedish, the translator was the author. The German
stimuli were translated by Lukas Stein at the University of Tübingen and Astrid Gößwein at Goethe-
Universität Frankfurt, and extensively checked by Florian Schwarz at the University of Pennsylvania. Melanie
Hobich at Goethe-Universität Frankfurt, and Alex Göbel at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst also
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Verb Class English German Swedish
Speech Act Verbs (A)
say sagen säga
mention erwähnen nämna
tell me mir erzählen berätta
claim behaupten hävda
Doxastic Non-factives (B)
believe glauben tro
assume annehmen anta
reckon meinen förmoda
guess/suppose vermuten gissa
Response verbs (C)
accept akzeptieren acceptera
admit zugeben erkänna
doubt bezweifeln vivla
deny aleugnen förneka
Emotive Factives (D)
appreciate gefallen uppskatta
resent missfallen avsky
love lieben älska
hate hassen hata
Doxastic Factives (E)
discover entdecken upptäcka
find out herausfinden få veta
notice merken märka
hear hören få höra
Table 3.4: Verbs and verb classes manipulated in the experiment. The letters in parenthesis
represent the names assigned to each class in Hooper & Thompson’s classic 1973-paper, and
which are commonly used in the MCP literature as a short-hand for the different classes.
subjects and embedded clauses). To avoid effects specific to particular combinations of
matrix negation and material in the embedded clause, the experiment used a Latin square
design with two subject groups (Gr1, Gr2):
(36) Example Item 1
Gr1. John said that Lisa decided to break up with the guy she’s been dating.
Gr2. John didn’t say that Lisa decided to break up with the guy she’s been dating.
(37) Example Item 2
Gr2. Mel said that Becky ignored the people at the party.
contributed helpful input and feedback to the German translations.
21Guess was used in the MaxContrast condition, and suppose in the MaxNewness condition. To
the extent possible, the closest counterparts were chosen for each verb in the different language variations
(aiming for similarities in entailments, presupposition, and conventional use).
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Gr1. Mel didn’t say that Becky ignored the people at the party.
In total, then, each participant saw 40 items involving 20 attitude verbs from the five
predicate classes in Table 3.4. Because of the group-design, the participants saw each verb
twice (with different contents), once with matrix negation, and once without.
The items were all presented in the same discourse context. The English study was
carried out in two discourse conditions, varied between participants: one designed to pro-
mote an interpretation of the embedded proposition as constituting discourse new content
(MaxNewness) (this was the set-up used in Caplan and Djärv 2019; see Section 3.1.6);
and one designed to promote an interpretation of the utterance as containing contrastive
information (MaxContrast); this was partially to test the ‘pragmatic flexibility’ of the
different predicates, given the discourse context. The MaxContrast condition also served
the purpose of promoting the licensing of English topicalization, which is known to be con-
trastive (e.g. Bianchi and Frascarelli 2009). The MaxNewness context on the other hand
was designed to promote the kind of ‘discourse new’ context that we have argued is relevant
to the licensing of V2. This allowed us to better tease apart any effects due to the predicate
from the context manipulation. Due to limitations of resources (time, funds, participants),
the Swedish and German experiments were only run in the MaxNewness condition. The
two discourse conditions are illustrated in 3.9 and 3.10, which show screen-shots from the
two variants (in the Attitude Holder belief condition).
Figure 3.9: Discourse Condition 2: Maximize Contrast [ MaxContrast]
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Figure 3.10: Discourse Condition 2: Maximize Newness (MaxNewness)
The participants’ task was to rate the acceptability (naturalness) of the target sentences
on a 9-point Likert Scale with the endpoints marked, as shown in Figure 3.11; a screenshot
from the experiment instructions (from the English MaxContrast condition).
Figure 3.11: Task Instructions (MaxContrast)
For an independent, empirically motivated, measure of the pragmatic dimensions of in-
terest (i.e. one that is not inferred by the researcher, based on the identity or class of the
embedding predicate), the 40 critical items were independently tested in the unmarked con-
trol version for: speaker commitment to p; attitude holder [AH] commitment to p; likelihood
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that p is discourse new. The manipulations are illustrated in Figures 3.12–3.14 (again, from
the English MaxContrast condition). As with the naturalness ratings, the judgements
were given on a 9-point Likert Scale with the end/mid-points marked. The type of judgement
was varied between participants, so that each participant only gave one type of judgement.
Figure 3.12: Attitude holder belief, task Instructions (MaxContrast)
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Figure 3.13: Speaker belief, task Instructions (MaxContrast)
Figure 3.14: Discourse familiarity, task Instructions (MaxContrast)
The reason for using the unmarked sentences here was to get an estimate of the pragmatic
constraints placed on each target sentence, given its specific lexical content, including the
attitude holder, the type of embedding verb, the presence or absence of matrix negation,
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and the content of the embedded clause. If, given these different factors, the sentence got
high scores on any of the pragmatic dimensions, and that dimension is in fact relevant to the
licensing of a given type of MCP, then we predict that this MCP variation should receive
high acceptability ratings, for that particular sentence.
3.2.2 Controls and fillers
In addition to the unmarked control sentences, mentioned in Section 3.2.1.1, the acceptability
studies included three further control conditions:
(38) Control conditions
a. 8 unembedded MCP sentences, providing a baseline for each type of MCP,
independently of embedding (e.g. The new neighbors, Lisa didn’t like.)
b. 8 unembedded unmarked items, providing an overall ceiling for acceptability
(e.g. Lisa didn’t like the new neighbors.)
c. 16 sentences involving 8 attitude verbs taking ‘fact that p’ complements, pro-
viding a floor for acceptability (e.g. Bill thought the fact that Lisa didn’t like
the new neighbors.)
The fact that p controls involved the following 8 attitude verbs:
(39) English/Swedish/German
a. reply/svara/entgegnen
b. affirm/bekräfta/bekräftigen
c. express/uttrycka/äußert
d. suppose/menar/meinen
e. allege/anförde/behaupten
f. argue/argumenterar/argumentieren
g. respond/reagera/erwidern
h. think/tänka/denken
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These items had all been confirmed by several native speakers to be generally ill-formed
with the fact that p complements. The idea was that these items would still be relatively
close to the degraded MCP-variations —both involving relatively weak semantic/pragmatic
ill-formedness. This would prevent leading the participants to give the degraded MCP items
ceiling ratings, by comparison — which would be a worry if strong syntactic violations were
used as floor controls.
The pragmatic inference tasks included their own fillers and controls (40)–(42). Ex-
amples are given below each condition. These were relativized to the three different tasks
(which are illustrated in Figures 3.12–3.14 above), such that each task had its own ceiling
and floor condition (i.e. conditions designed to provide high and low ratings, respectively,
for each type of pragmatic inference).22
(40) Speaker Belief Controls
a. Ceiling: Unembedded sentences
“Scarlett really enjoyed the last concert.”
b. Floor: Explicit denial of p (believe, mention, tell me, and assume)
“Peter believes, although he’s wrong, that Liam enjoyed the dinner.”
(41) Attitude Holder Belief Controls
a. Ceiling: Embedding under be sure, certain, convinced, confident
“Allison is convinced that Ethan doesn’t like the people he works with.”
b. Floor: Negated p followed + question about the attitude holder’s belief that p
“Scarlett assumes that Ben didn’t like the service.”
(42) Discourse Old/New Controls
a. Ceiling: Unembedded sentences
“Scarlett really enjoyed the last concert.”
b. Floor: Explicit reference to a previous discussion regarding p (believe, mention,
22By mistake, the English MaxNewness speaker belief experiment used the floor condition controls
from the discourse familiarity experiments: (42-b), instead of (40-b). This variation then ended up without
a proper floor condition for speaker belief.
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tell me, and assume)
“Cole told me, like you did, that Martin insulted the visitors.”
Additionally, each of the pragmatic sub-experiments also included 8 fillers. These con-
sisted of conditional sentences embedded under believe, mention, tell me, and assume, as
illustrated in (43).
(43) Fillers: embedded conditionals (believe, mention, tell me, and assume)
“Kaylee believes that if Alyssa climbed Mount Everest, then she must be really fit.”
All experimental materials, including data sources, instructions, scripts used by Ibex, etc,
are available for replication in a set of labeled repositories on https://osf.io/nsm89/
(Djärv 2019b).
3.2.3 Participants
In total, with the six types of judgements collected for Swedish and German respectively
(three MCP variants and three pragmatic judgements), and the seven types of judgements
collected for English (four MCP variants and three pragmatic judgements), in the two dis-
course conditions, we ended up with a total of 26 between-subject versions of the experiment.
A total of 1,272 participants took part in the study. The total number of participants for
each between-subject condition, before and after exclusion, is listed in Table 3.5. In total,
117 participants were excluded from the data, leaving a total of 1,155 participants in the
final data set for analyzing and plotting the data (details in Section 3.2.4, next).
The 845 English speaking participants were either recruited on Prolific.ac, a crowd-
sourcing tool for recruiting participants to participate in scientific studies online, or through
Penn’s Psychology department’s subject pool (Sona). The latter group of participants
were undergraduate students at the University of Pennsylvania, taking the experiment for
credit. The study took approximately 15 minutes to complete. For the MaxNewness sub-
experiments, the responses for the MCP sub-experiments (unmarked controls, topicalization,
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scene setting adverbs, and speaker-oriented adverbs) came entirely from Prolific. For the
discourse novelty and speaker belief sub-experiments, the responses came from Sona. For
the attitude holder belief study however, responses came from one of three sources: Prolific
(n=26), Sona (n=20), or the 2018 Ling001 summer class (n=13).23 For all of the sub-
experiments in the MaxContrast condition, on the other hand, the responses came from
a (roughly even) mixture of participants from Prolific and Sona. The participants taking
the experiment via Proflic were paid at rate of 6.96 USD per hour for their participation.
285 German speaking participated in the study. The participants were recruited on
Prolific. Participants were paid at rate of 6.80 USD per hour for their participation. 142
Swedish speakers participated in the study. Due to there being a limited number of Swedish
speakers on Prolific, the participants were recruited through both Prolific and through var-
ious personal and professional contacts of the author: this was done through a combination
of: (i) distributing a link to the experiment online, and (ii) setting up temporary labs at
the Umeå Academy of Fine Arts and at the Umeå University Library, where participants
were able to take the experiment directly on my computer.24 The participants taking the
experiment via Proflic were paid at rate of 6.80 USD per hour for their participation. Other
participants took the experiment on a voluntary basis. Due to the difficulty in recruiting
Swedish speakers remotely and over a relatively short period of time, the number of partic-
ipants recruited for the Swedish versions of the experiment (see Table 3.5) was based on a
power simulation, using pilot-data from 10 participants (using the simr package in R; Green
and MacLeod 2016).25
The experiments were implemented using PennController (Schwarz and Zehr 2018)
23Thanks to Ava Irani, instructor of Ling001 for reaching out to these students.
24Thanks to Robert Djärv for letting me set up a temporary lab in the Umeå Academy of Fine Arts, as
well as to all of the curious and welcoming students and staff for welcoming me and feeding me gingerbread
and coffee! Thanks also to Susanne Sjöberg at the Umeå University Library for granting me access to the
library for recruiting participants. Thanks also to Kicki Djärv, Amy Goodwin Davies, Anna-Sofia Lundgren
(Department of Culture and Media Studies, Umeå University), Daniel Kjellander (Department of Language
Studies, Umeå University), Elizabeth Coppock (Department of Philosophy, Linguistics, Theory of Science,
University of Gothenburg), Christian Waldmann (Department of Swedish, Linnaeus University), Annika
Nordlund (Department of Psychology, Umeå University), and Christiane Müller (Centre for Languages and
Literature, Lund University) for sharing the link with their students, colleagues, and personal connections.
25Thanks to Amy Goodwin Davies for this suggestion, and for help with the simulation.
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on http://spellout.net/ibexfarm/. Thus, regardless of the recruitment method, each
participant was given a link to the experiment to take the experiment over the internet. In
the EnglishMaxNewness condition, counter-balancing participants across sub-experiments
was done internally to Ibex, such that regardless of the version of the experiment they took,
all participants had access to only one link on Prolific or Sona. This was a link to a
so-called ‘Gateway-experiment’ on Ibex; essentially just a page with an internal counter
that assigned participants to each of the six sub-experiments. However, as we can see in
Table 3.5, this resulted in a slight imbalance in the number of subjects assigned to each
sub-experiment. As a consequence, the English MaxContrast version (which was run
after the MaxNewness experiments) listed each between-subject version as a separate
experiment to better handle the counter-balancing (both within Sona and Prolific). This
however, had the major disadvantage that it enabled participants on Prolific to take multiple
sub-experiments. The German and Swedish versions, therefore, were run using the gateway
method for counter-balancing.
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Language Measure N pre-exclusion N removed N post-exclusion
English
MaxNew
Unm 55 6 49
Top 63 5 58
Scene.Adv 77 4 73
SpAct.Adv 50 7 43
AHbel 61 2 59
SpBel 61 1 60
DiscNew 61 6 55
Total N 428 31 397
English
MaxContr
Unm 56 4 52
Top 62 16 46
Scene.Adv 62 7 55
SpAct.Adv 58 4 54
AHbel 53 3 50
SpBel 61 4 57
DiscNew 65 10 55
Total N 417 48 369
German
Unm 48 1 47
SpAct.Adv 50 2 48
V2 44 3 41
AHbel 51 0 51
SpBel 47 1 46
DiscNew 45 5 40
Total N 285 12 273
Swedish
Unm 34 5 29
SpAct.Adv 20 7 13
V2 33 12 21
AHbel 14 0 14
SpBel 24 1 23
DiscNew 17 1 16
Grand Total N 142 26 116
Total N 1,272 117 1,155
Table 3.5: Number of participants, and outliers removed, by sub-experiment.
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3.2.4 Trimming and organizing the data
3.2.4.1 Data trimming
As a first step of processing the data, the participants’ responses were transformed into
z-scores. This transformation involves the following steps. For each participant, we first cal-
culate the mean and standard deviation of each their judgements. We next subtract each of
that participant’s judgements from their mean, and then divide each of these differences by
their standard deviation. The resulting set of (z-scored) responses represent the standard-
ized responses for each participant, such that the responses are now expressed in standard
deviation units from each participant’s mean. This is a linear transformation, meaning that
all the relationships that existed within the original data are preserved. This was done in R
using the functions ave() (for group wise application) and scale() for calculating z-scores.
There are two main motivations for z-scoring the data. First, this transformation allows
us to eliminate potential scale bias, i.e. when different participants use the response scale
in different ways; this can involve using only one end of the scale (“skew”) or using only a
limited range of responses (“compression”). Second, it normalizes the data, which allows us
to run parametric statistical tests (such as linear mixed effects models, see Section 3.2.5),
which are generally more powerful than non-parametric tests (see discussion in Schütze and
Sprouse 2014, p. 18).
As a second step of processing the data, for each sub-experiment, participants were
excluded from further analysis if they were unable to sufficiently distinguish between the floor
and ceiling control conditions. This was done in R by creating a new data set from each of the
larger ones, with one row corresponding to one participant (identified via their Subject ID),
their average z-score in the ceiling condition (MeanCeiling), their average z-score in the
floor condition (MeanFloor), as well as the difference between these two (MeanCeiling-
MeanFloor). From this, I created a set of outliers, consisting of all participants for whom
this “difference z-score” was less or equal to 0.5. These participants were then removed from
the original data sets. Here, having z-scored the data came in as a further benefit, since the
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effect size was generally much larger in the pragmatic interpretation experiments, than in the
MCP acceptability experiments. Using the raw scores for subject-trimming would’ve forced
me to use different ‘floor-ceiling differences’ for different sub-experiments. Using z-scores,
on the other hand, allows for consistent exclusion criteria across studies.
Additionally, there were a number of participants who took the experiment multiple
times. For each of these participants, only their first submission was included in the analysis.
Subsequent submission were all excluded in R, using the combination of participant ID, time
stamp, and IP number.
3.2.4.2 Organizing the data
Recall the theoretical proposals regarding the lexical and pragmatic licensing conditions on
MCP, summarized in (21)–(27) in Section 3.2 and repeated here:
Lexical accounts of MCP licensing:
(44) a. Lexical Class à la Hooper and Thompson (1973) [Lex-HT]
3 {Speech act, Doxastic non-factives, Doxastic factives}
7 {Response verbs, Emotive factives}
b. Lexical Class à la The CP/DP Interface Hypothesis [Lex-CP/DP]
3 {Speech act, Doxastic non-factives}
7 {Response verbs, Emotive factives, Doxastic factives}
Pragmatic accounts of MCP licensing:
(45) a. Speaker believes p [Prag-Sp]
b. Speaker believes p & p is new information [Prag-Sp-New]
c. Speaker or attitude holder [AH] believes p [Prag-SpAH]
d. Speaker or AH believes p & p is new information [Prag-SpAH-New]
e. p is discourse new information [Prag-New]
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To test these hypotheses, the data was further coded (in R). First, to test the effect
of commitment to p against that of discourse familiarity, the response verbs was split into
two sub-groups: positive (accept, admit) and negative (doubt, deny). By hypothesis, these
should differ in term of attitude holder commitment to p, but should both require discourse
novelty. Second, to test the views in (44-a) and (44-b), two new variables were created
representing these classifications. For each of these two variables, each verb was assigned
one of the two levels {1,0}, as illustrated below:
(46) Lex-HT (44-a)
1: Speech act, Doxastic non-factives, Doxastic factives
0: Response verbs, Emotive factives
(47) Lex-CP/DP (44-b)
0: Speech act, Doxastic non-factives
1: Response verbs, Emotive factives, Doxastic factives
To test the different pragmatic hypotheses (45-a)–(45-e), two steps were taken. First, for
each of the data frames with the pragmatic scores, new data sets were created, that took
the mean z-scores across all participants in each sub-experiment, by verb and polarity. This
was done using the ddply() function in the dplyr package in R. This gave us a new variable
for each pragmatic dimension (discourse novelty [z.New], speaker commitment to p [z.Sp],
attitude holder commitment to p [z.AH]), directly reflecting the pragmatic scores in each
verb (class)-polarity combination in the data. In order to use these scores in our models to
predict the availability of a given type of MCP, the new variables were joined to the different
data sets with the MCP-acceptability judgements (by verb and polarity), using the join()
function in R.
The idea behind doing it this way, was to abstract away from any variation between
the two items in which a given verb-polarity combination occurred, as in (36)–(37) above,
thus getting a directly empirically motivated estimate of the pragmatic properties of that
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specific verb-polarity combination, e.g. didn’t say. As we will see when we look at the results
in Section 3.2.6.3, however, these different variables ended up predicting only a very small
amount of the variation in the data predicted by the different models. To see this, and how
it compares with the ‘better’ models based on verb (class) and polarity, the reader may
consult the (marginal and conditional) R squared values listed (for each regression model)
for each MCP in Section 3.2.6.3. R squared is a statistical measure of how close the data
are to the fitted regression line (i.e. how well the model fits the data), and was calculated
using the r.squaredGLMM() function from the MuMIn package in R.
While this might at first glance seem discouraging for the project of using the pragmatic
scores as predictors of the MCP-acceptability judgements, there are a number of practical
or methodological reasons why this method didn’t work that are not due to the predictive
power of the various pragmatic dimensions per se.26 The first thing to bear in mind is that
while the aggregate data over the sampled population comes out displaying a clear pattern
at the level of the different conditions, there might still be substantial individual differences
among participants, either in the judgements themselves, or in how the participants use the
various scales. The problem with this method, is that it is using by-condition population
average interpretation scores —itself a dependent variable— to predict specific individual
by-participant, by-item, scores. Adding to this problem is the fact that the two measures
came from different groups of participants, thus making it hard to control for and eliminate
potential scale bias (as discussed in Section 3.2.4.1). The latter problem is also tied to
the methodological choice of using a likert scale (here, transformed to z-scores), rather
than a binary (or ternary) choice. The (transformed) likert scale assumes that judgements
of acceptability and discourse status/commitment to p are continuous or gradient; and
that if there is a correlation, gradient judgements for the one dimension should directly
track gradient judgements for the other. However, this assumption may not be true: it is
possible that reaching a certain level or threshold of a particular pragmatic dimension is
what ‘switches the trigger’ for licensing a given type of complement. Not knowing what
26Thanks to Meredith Tamminga, p.c., for helpful input on this issue.
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that threshold might be was a large part of the motivation for the likert scale; however,
with the results from the current study (Section 3.2.6), future quantitative work on the
topic can make more informed methodological choices in this regards. For transparency and
completeness, Section 3.2.6 reports the (marginal and conditional) R squared values for these
models. For evaluating the different theoretical accounts, however, the method adopted will
follow the reasoning standardly used in theoretical linguistics (and in previous literature
on the pragmatics of MCP): if a given condition shows high ratings for a given pragmatic
dimension, and some MCP is in fact licensed by that pragmatic dimension, then we expect
high acceptability scores for that MCP in that condition. Conversely, if a condition shows
low acceptability scores for some pragmatic dimension, then we expect low acceptability
scores for that MCP in that condition.
Recall from Section 2.4.2 that Woods (2016a) claims that the contexts that license V2 in
German are a subset of those that license V2 in Mainland Scandinavian: (45-b) vs. (45-d).
The prediction then, should be that German embedded V2 is more restricted than embedded
V2 in Mainland Scandinavian. However, this prediction really depends on the distribution of
meanings across embedding predicates. And in fact, this is the case for all of the conjunctive
and disjunctive hypotheses in (45-b)–(45-d). To see what I mean, imagine that we have two
languages: L1Ger and L2MSc, which both have (the same) 3 attitude verbs: AV1, which
implies only speaker but not attitude holder belief that p; AV2, which implies only attitude
holder but not speaker belief that p; and AV3, which implies speaker and attitude holder
belief that p. Suppose that in L1Ger, operation Ω is licensed by speaker belief only, whereas
in L2MSc, Ω is licensed by either speaker or attitude holder belief. In this scenario, it is
clear that L2MSc will allow Ω in a wider set of contexts than L1Ger: under 3/3 attitude
verbs (L2MSc: AV1, AV2, AV3) as opposed to under 2/3 (L1Ger: AV1, AV3).
Clearly there are at least some verbs like AV1 in natural language: given that doxastic
factives presuppose speaker commitment, but encode attitude holder commitment to p as
part of their asserted meaning, negated doxastic factives (like doesn’t know or didn’t discover)
will come out as expressing only speaker but not attitude holder belief that p. I cannot think
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of a case, however, that obviously works like AV2 (implying attitude holder belief that p
but not speaker belief that p). If this is indeed the case, then German and Mainland
Scandinavian will simply end up allowing V2 in all of the same contexts, given that every
context where the speaker is committed to p is one where the speaker or the attitude holder
is committed to p.27,28 As we will see in Section 3.2.6.1, this turns out to be the case in
our data. That is, the contexts that imply speaker or attitude holder commitment to p are
exactly the same as those that imply speaker commitment to p. We find the same results
with discourse novelty alone (45-e) vs. the statements that appeal to some other factor in
addition to discourse novelty; (45-b) and (45-d). Hence, the remainder of this section will
deal only with the pragmatic hypotheses in (45-a) [Prag-Sp: speaker believes p] and (45-e)
[Prag-New: p is discourse new information].29
A final step was taken in organizing the data. To account for any variation in the items
or across conditions that was not due to the MCP-manipulation, the data was residualized.30
Practically, this involved running a simple linear model, predicting the responses for each
type of MCP from those in the unmarked control condition (recall that the only difference
between these conditions was the MCP manipulation31). The residuals from the model (i.e.
any variation not captured by the variation in the unmarked control version) were then
bound to the data frames and used as the new dependent variables (for each MCP).
This was motivated by the observation that there was quite a lot of variation in the
unmarked data, as an effect of both item, type of embedding verb, and polarity. This is
illustrated in Figures 3.15–3.17, showing the results from the unmarked control conditions
27This follows from the logical inference known as Disjunction Introduction, which states that if P is true,
then P or Q must be true: P → (P ∨ Q).
28Of course, since verbs like believe are non-factive, it is possible to construe such a context pragmatically
(John believes that p, but I don’t). The prediction would then be that V2 is possible in those contexts in
MSc, but not in German. However, without an explicit denial of p, by the speaker, it is plausible that a
sentence like John believes that p as a pragmatic default gives rise to an inference that the speaker is also
committed to p.
29An analysis was carried out that created dummy variables for the disjunctive and conjunctive state-
ments; however, neither of these were better predictors of any MCP than the simpler statements in Prag-Sp
and Prag-New. The data is available for replication of this result. It is omitted here, however, for the
purpose of brevity.
30Thanks to Meredith Tamminga for this suggestion.
31This was done within language, and in English, for each of the two context variants, MaxNewness
and MaxContrast.
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in the English and German experiments. In Section 3.2.4.3, we discuss the Swedish controls.
Figure 3.15: Acceptability responses in the English MaxNewness unmarked control con-
dition (by verb type and negation).
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Figure 3.16: Acceptability responses in the English MaxContrast unmarked control con-
dition (by verb type and negation).
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Figure 3.17: Acceptability responses in the German unmarked (InSitu) control condition
(by verb type and negation).
Having thus factored out the variation inherent in the individual items, we were able
to use the residuals as the new dependent variable for each type of MCP: topicalization,
embedded V2, speech act adverbs, and scene setting adverbs. Effectively, this allowed us to
rule out any interpretation of a pattern in the data whereby what looks like a given MCP
being given low ratings in a particular embedded context, is in fact just the product of a
general degradation of any sentence occurring in this context (perhaps further compounded
by a general dis-preference for complex sentences, relative to simple, unembedded sentences).
We thus ended up with 8 final data sets, listed in (48)-(50). Each data set contained
1 observation per subject per verb-polarity combination (hence: 8 observations per subject
per predicate type, and 4 observations per subject per predicate type-polarity combination
— recall the number of subjects per condition from Table 3.5):
(48) English MaxNewness
a. MCP = Speech act adverbs
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b. MCP = Topicalization
c. MCP = Scene Setting Adverbs
(49) English MaxContrast
a. MCP = Speech act adverbs
b. MCP = Topicalization
c. MCP = Scene Setting Adverbs
(50) German
a. MCP = Speech act adverbs
b. MCP = Embedded V2
The results from the 12 pragmatic inference variations were also analysed separately.
Each of the 12 data sets contained 1 observation per subject per verb-polarity combination
(hence: 8 observations per subject per predicate type, and 4 observations per subject per
predicate type-polarity combination).
(51) English MaxNewness, MaxContrast, German, Swedish
a. Pragmatics = Speaker commitment to p
b. Pragmatics = Attitude holder commitment to p
c. Pragmatics = p is likely discourse new
3.2.4.3 Swedish MCP experiments
In Figures 3.15–3.17 in the previous section, we saw that there was some amount of variation
among conditions in the English and German control conditions. In the Swedish MCP
experiments, however, there was much more substantial variation in the (intended to be)
unmarked condition, as shown in Figure 3.18. Compare that to the unresidualized V2 data
in Figure 3.19.
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Figure 3.18: Acceptability responses in the Swedish unmarked (InSitu) control condition
(by verb type and negation).
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Figure 3.19: Unresidualized, raw scores for the acceptability of Swedish V2 (by verb type
and negation).
As is clear from this visualization, the V2 and unmarked responses show a broadly similar
pattern (similar to that found in the German V2 study, as we shall see in Section 3.2.6).
This meant that residualizing the results from the V2 study would remove essentially all of
the variation in the data, as shown in Figure 3.20. This posed a problem for analyzing and
interpreting the Swedish V2-results. That is, do we treat the residualized data as showing
the ‘true’ effect of the V2-manipulation (as in the German and English data), or do we say
that something went wrong with the Swedish control condition, and treat the raw data as
showing the true effect of the data? Clearly, neither option seems ideal.
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Figure 3.20: Residualized acceptability scores for Swedish V2 (by verb type and negation).
Interestingly, we find a lot less variation in the unresidualized speech act adverb responses
(top graph of Figure 3.21) than in the V2 and unmarked variations in Figures 3.18–3.19.
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Figure 3.21: Unresidualized acceptability scores in the Swedish speech act adverb data (by
verb type and negation).
This suggests that the variation is really due to the way in which V2 was manipulated:
by varying the order of the finite auxiliary and negation, as shown in (28)–(29) above,
repeated in (52). Crucially, to avoid a confound with V2 vs. in-situ order, the speech act
adverb condition did not include a finite auxiliary at all, but only the critical adverb and
the participle.
(52) Swedish MCP manipulation
a. Anna
Anna
sa
said
att
that
Maja
Maja
inte
not
har
has
gjort
made
slut
end
med
with
sin
her
pojkvän.
boyfriend
‘Anna said that Maja hasn’t broken up with her boyfriend.’ InSitu
b. Anna
Anna
sa
said
att
that
Maja
Maja
har
has
inte
not
gjort
made
slut
end
med
with
sin
her
pojkvän.
boyfriend
‘Anna said that Maja hasn’t broken up with her boyfriend.’ V2
c. Anna
Anna
sa
said
att
that
Maja
Maja
ärligt
honestly
talat
speaking
gjort
made
slut
end
med
with
sin
her
pojkvän.
boyfriend
‘Anna said that Maja honestly hasn’t broken up with her boyfriend.’ SpAct
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Recall from Section 2.5.2 that Djärv, Heycock, and Rohde 2017 were able to use the relative
order of the finite verb and a sentence-level adverb to successfully manipulating V2 vs. in-situ
order, without introducing additional degradation in the unmarked control condition (see
Figure 2.3 above). However, their experiment did not manipulate negation in the matrix
clause. It is plausible that the large effect of negation across verb types in the Swedish V2
and in-situ data is essentially due to there being ‘too much negation’ in the sentence, perhaps
leading to parsing difficulties. Recall also that the German V2 variation was simpler, in that
it only varied the placement of the finite verb, and did not require additional elements like
negation. This would then explain why we didn’t see such an effect in the German data.
Unfortunately, due to the difficulty in analysing and interpreting the Swedish MCP data,
I’m excluding it from further analysis. While this may somewhat undermine the empirical
basis for some of the discussion and conclusions about embedded V2 to follow, it is worth
bearing in mind that we do already have quite a lot of quantitative data, specifically on
Swedish embedded V2 vs. V in-situ (see Sections 2.5.2 and 3.1). This should reassure us
then, that the pattern in the current Swedish data is not due to a weird restriction in Swedish
on clausal embedding (period) under negation and under verbs like doubt and resent.32
The Swedish pragmatic inference data is kept for analysis, as this will provide a useful
empirical reference point for a theoretical interpretation of the data from both this study
and the corpus study presented in Section 3.1.
3.2.5 Analysis
The data was analyzed with linear mixed-effects models (using lmer from the lme4 package
in R). To test the hypotheses about the licensing of MCP, now narrowed down to the smaller
set in (53)–(56), I ran the 6 models in Table 3.6 for each of the 8 datasets in (48)–(50). The
filler and control conditions were excluded from the statistical analysis (but included in the
plots, as shown below). Subject and Item were included as random effects in all models.
32A broader lesson from this section, is that good controls are essential for interpreting data. The moral
of this story, for future work on this, is that it is worth investing in more piloting of one’s experiments than
might seem called for.
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(53) Lexical Class à la The CP/DP Interface Hypothesis [Lex-CP/DP]
3 {Speech act, Doxastic non-factives}
7 {Response verbs, Emotive factives, Doxastic factives}
(54) Lexical Class à la Hooper and Thompson (1973) [Lex-HT]
3 {Speech act, Doxastic non-factives, Doxastic factives}
7 {Response verbs, Emotive factives}
(55) Speaker believes p [Prag-Sp]
(56) p is discourse new information [Prag-New]
Regression models to predict 3MCP Shorthand
(1) Verb class × Polarity Interaction VerbClass-Pol
(2) Verb × Polarity Interaction Verb-Pol
(3) Verb-classification in (53) Lex-CP/DP
(4) Verb-classification in (54) Lex-HT
(5) Speaker believes p (55) Prag-Sp
(6) p is discourse new information (56) Prag-New
Table 3.6: Models predicting the (z-scored) acceptability ratings for each MCP type. Predi-
cate types: speech act verbs; doxastic non-factives, positive response verbs, negative response
verbs, emotive factives, doxatic factives. See Table 3.4 for a full list of verbs.
For each of the 12 pragmatic datasets, I ran the following four models, predicting the
z-scored responses from the identity and type of predicate, polarity, and their interaction.
Here, the conditional fillers were excluded from the analysis, but the controls were included.
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Regression models to predict pragmatic scores Shorthand
(1) Verb class × Polarity Interaction VerbClass-Pol
(2) Verb × Polarity Verb-Pol
(3) Verb-classification in (53) Lex-CP/DP
(4) Verb-classification in (54) Lex-HT
Table 3.7: Models predicting the (z-scored) pragmatic ratings. Predicate types: speech
act verbs; doxastic non-factives, positive response verbs, negative response verbs, emotive
factives, doxatic factives. See Table 3.4 for a full list of verbs.
In the models based on verb class, the positive speech act predicates were used as the
intercept. For the models based on verb identity, the intercept was positive say.
In the following section, we present the statistical and graphic data from the experiment.
The tables included show the output of the Verb class × Polarity interaction models. These
include the following columns: [1.] Coefficient: Name of the coefficients (the levels of
the independent variables). [2.] Estimate: The estimated values for the coefficients. [3.]
Standard Error: The standard errors of the coefficients; can be used to construct lower and
upper bounds for the coefficient, and is used to test whether the parameter is significantly
different from zero (if it is, then it is understood to have an impact on the dependent
variable). [4.] t-value: the ratio of the regression coefficient β to its standard error; it tests
the hypothesis that a regression coefficient is zero (if it is, and this is not due to random
variation, then it has an effect on the dependent variable); used to determine the p-values.
[5.] p-value: the probability of seeing the observed t-value, for a given model, if the null-
hypothesis were true; a low p-value indicates a low probability of seeing the observed results,
if the null-hypothesis were true. For example, a significance level of 0.01 indicates that there
is less than a 1% chance that the coefficient might be equal to 0 and thus be insignificant.
The asterisks in this columns indicate the significance ranking of the p-values, using the
following significance codes: 0.001 (***); 0.01 (**); 0.05 (*); 0.1 (.) For reasons of space,
I’m not including the output of the other models in 3.6 and 3.7. However, for each dataset,
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we provide a table comparing the R squared values for each model, to compare the amount
of variation predicted by the different models (representing different theoretical accounts).33
For mixed models, the marginal R squared considers only the variance of the fixed effects,
whereas the conditional R squared takes both the fixed and random effects into account.
3.2.6 Results
3.2.6.1 Pragmatics of attitude verbs
Recall the main motivation for collecting the pragmatic judgement data: as we noted above,
while it is fairly clear that certain verbs, like believe entails attitude holder’s belief that p,
and some verbs, like regret, require p to be a discourse old issue, it is less clear to what extent
these properties hold across predicates. Hence, to tease apart different lexical and pragmatic
accounts of MCP, we wanted to derive independent, empirically motivated estimates of the
pragmatic dimensions at stake, for a given sentence in a particular context, and use those
as independent predictors of the acceptability of MCP.
With this goal in mind, let us start by looking at the results from the pragmatic inference
studies, as a preliminary step for establishing the pragmatics of the different verbs and verb
classes. These will then form the basis for the predictions from the MCP studies, reported
in the following section. We start by looking at the results for attitude holder commitment
to p, then move on to speaker commitment, and finally to discourse novelty.
3.2.6.1.1 Attitude holder commitment to p
As shown in Figure 3.22 from English, the results are very much in line with the intuitive
meaning of these verb types. As expected, both the speech act verbs and the doxastic non-
factives show high scores in the positive polarity, and significantly lower scores in the negative
polarity (β=1.297, p < 0.001). The same pattern is observed with the positive response
stance verbs (accept, admit). The negative response verbs (doubt, deny), as hypothesized,
show the opposite pattern, with high scores in the negative condition and low scores in the
33I’m not using an ANOVA for model comparison, given that the models are not nested, but include
completely different sets of predictor variables.
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positive condition (β=-1.980, p < 0.001). The factives, too behave as we would expect.
Given that (as we pointed out above, and will discuss in more detail in Chapter 5) the
emotive factives presuppose attitude holder belief that p, we predict high scores in both
polarities (e.g. appreciates, doesn’t appreciate). The doxastic factives, we claimed above,
encode attitude holder belief as part of its asserted meaning. Thus, we’d expect low scores
in the negative polarity and high scores in the positive polarity (like believe). Both of these
expectations are borne out.
Figure 3.22: Attitude Holder commitment to p [English MaxContrast; MaxNewness].
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Looking at Swedish and German data, in Figure 3.23, we find that while the magnitude
of the effects vary slightly, the overall pattern, including the various interactions and main
effects, is remarkably similar to the English data.
Figure 3.23: Attitude Holder commitment to p [German; Swedish].
A minor contrast between the languages is a small, but significant, difference between
the speech act verbs and the doxastic non-factives in the English and Swedish data, which is
not found in the German data. Aside from this, the only verb class that differed significantly
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from the speech act verbs were the negative response stance verbs. Overall, then, while we
find some variation across the different data sets, the pattern that emerges is remarkably
stable across the three languages, and two discourse conditions. This is confirmed by the
regression models, predicting the participants’ estimates of the attitude holder’s commitment
to p, from predicate class, polarity, and their interaction (Summarized in Tables 3.8–3.11).
Coefficient Estimate Std. Error t-Statistic Pr(>|t|)
VerbClass = SpeechAct (Intercept) 0.810 0.062 13.098 < 2e-16 ***
VerbClass = Dox.NonFact -0.501 0.087 -5.725 2.76e-07 ***
VerbClass = Response.Pos 0.115 0.107 1.069 0.2888
VerbClass = Response.Neg -1.980 0.107 -18.488 < 2e-16 ***
VerbClass = Emo.Fact 0.148 0.087 1.688 0.0962 .
VerbClass = Dox.Fact -0.032 0.087 -0.370 0.7125
VerbClass = Control.be.sure 0.026 0.084 0.310 0.7576
VerbClass = Control.belief.not.p -2.126 0.084 -25.256 < 2e-16 ***
Polarity = Neg -1.297 0.047 -27.402 < 2e-16 ***
VerbClass = Dox.NF : Polarity = Neg -0.030 0.067 -0.454 0.6499
VerbClass = Response.Pos : Polarity = Neg 0.073 0.082 0.893 0.3718
VerbClass = Response.Neg : Polarity = Neg 2.903 0.082 35.405 < 2e-16 ***
VerbClass = Emo.Fact : Polarity = Neg 1.188 0.067 17.740 < 2e-16 ***
Class = Dox.Fact : Polarity = Neg -0.087 0.067 -1.300 0.1935
Table 3.8: English MaxNewness data. Output of regression model: predicting attitude
holder commitment to p from the embedding predicate and polarity of the matrix clause.
3304 observations, from 59 subjects and 56 items.
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Coefficient Estimate Std. Error t-Statistic Pr(>|t|)
VerbClass = SpeechAct (Intercept) 8.399e-01 5.917e-02 14.194 < 2e-16 ***
VerbClass = Dox.NonFact -2.710e-01 8.368e-02 -3.238 0.00183 **
VerbClass = Response.Pos -2.331e-03 1.025e-01 -0.023 0.98192
VerbClass = Response.Neg -1.757e+00 1.025e-01 -17.141 < 2e-16 ***
VerbClass = Emo.Fact 8.317e-02 8.368e-02 0.994 0.32366
VerbClass = Dox.Fact -3.366e-02 8.368e-02 -0.402 0.68874
VerbClass = Control.be.sure 3.039e-02 7.980e-02 0.381 0.70470
VerbClass = Control.belief.not.p -1.960e+00 7.980e-02 -24.563 < 2e-16 ***
Polarity = Neg -1.203e+00 5.040e-02 -23.872 < 2e-16 ***
Class = Dox.NF : Polarity = Neg -3.265e-01 7.128e-02 -4.581 4.84e-06 ***
Class = Response.Pos : Polarity = Neg -1.274e-01 8.730e-02 -1.459 0.14464
Class = Response.Neg : Polarity = Neg 2.648e+00 8.730e-02 30.327 < 2e-16 ***
Class = Emo.Fact : Polarity = Neg 1.089e+00 7.128e-02 15.275 < 2e-16 ***
Class = Dox.Fact : Polarity = Neg -5.589e-01 7.128e-02 -7.841 6.35e-15 ***
Table 3.9: English MaxContrast data. Output of regression model: predicting attitude
holder commitment to p from the embedding predicate and polarity of the matrix clause.
2800 observations, from 50 subjects and 56 items.
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Coefficient Estimate Std. Error t-Statistic Pr(>|t|)
VerbClass = SpeechAct (Intercept) 0.91179 0.04820 18.917 < 2e-16 ***
VerbClass = Dox.NonFact -0.11197 0.06816 -1.643 0.1036
VerbClass = Response.Pos -0.11631 0.08348 -1.393 0.1667
VerbClass = Response.Neg -1.89459 0.08348 -22.694 < 2e-16 ***
VerbClass = Emo.Fact -0.13833 0.06816 -2.029 0.0451 *
VerbClass = Dox.Fact -0.06705 0.06816 -0.984 0.3277
VerbClass = Control.be.sure -0.09073 0.06263 -1.449 0.1518
VerbClass = Control.belief.not.p -1.99455 0.06263 -31.845 < 2e-16 ***
Polarity = Neg -1.64863 0.05380 -30.645 < 2e-16 ***
VerbClass = Dox.NF : Polarity = Neg -0.17494 0.07608 -2.299 0.0216 *
VerbClass = Response.Pos : Polarity = Neg 0.41983 0.09318 4.506 6.89e-06 ***
VerbClass = Response.Neg : Polarity = Neg 3.32733 0.09318 35.709 < 2e-16 ***
VerbClass = Emo.Fact : Polarity = Neg 1.56323 0.07608 20.547 < 2e-16 ***
Class = Dox.Fact : Polarity = Neg -0.08581 0.07608 -1.128 0.2595
Table 3.10: German data. Output of regression model: predicting attitude holder commit-
ment to p from the embedding predicate and polarity of the matrix clause. 2856 observations,
from 51 subjects and 56 items.
152
Coefficient Estimate Std. Error t-Statistic Pr(>|t|)
VerbClass = SpeechAct (Intercept) 0.87260 0.10293 8.477 5.07e-13 ***
VerbClass = Dox.NonFact -0.65995 0.14557 -4.534 1.83e-05 ***
VerbClass = Response.Pos -0.93844 0.14557 -6.447 6.05e-09 ***
VerbClass = Emo.Fact 0.02305 0.14557 0.158 0.874575
VerbClass = Dox.Fact -0.02856 0.14557 -0.196 0.844917
VerbClass = Control.be.sure -0.01287 0.13591 -0.095 0.924842
VerbClass = Control.belief.not.p -2.13081 0.13591 -15.678 < 2e-16 ***
Polarity = Neg -1.65622 0.10431 -15.878 < 2e-16 ***
VerbClass = Dox.NonFact : Polarity = Neg 0.52716 0.14752 3.574 0.000375 ***
VerbClass = Response.Pos: Polarity = Neg 1.85194 0.14752 12.554 < 2e-16 ***
VerbClass = Emo.Fact: Polarity = Neg 1.60479 0.14752 10.879 < 2e-16 ***
VerbClass = Dox.Fact: Polarity = Neg -0.13460 0.14752 -0.912 0.361832
Table 3.11: Swedish data. Output of regression model: predicting attitude holder commit-
ment to p from the embedding predicate and polarity of the matrix clause. 784 observations,
from 14 subjects and 56 items.
For the sake of space, I’m only stating the results from the Verb Class × Polarity in-
teraction models (VerbClass-Pol), and omitting the other models (listed in Table 3.7).
However, the R-squared values from the four models provide us with a simple method for
comparison. As we can see from Tables 3.12–3.15, the VerbClass-Pol models predict
a lot more variation in the data (marginal R2>0.677) than the models based on a priori
verb classifications in Lex-CP/DP and Lex-HT (mR2<0.1). (Marginal R squared values
consider only the fixed effects; the conditional R squared values consider both the fixed and
the random effects, i.e. item and participant.)
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Attitude holder commitment to p (English, n=50) Marginal R2 Conditional R2
(1) Verb Class × Polarity 0.727 0.745
(2) Verb × Polarity 0.752 0.752
(3) Lex-CP/DP 0.015 0.189
(4) Lex-HT 0.052 0.187
Table 3.12: R squared values for the English MaxContrast attitude holder commitment
to p data.
Attitude holder commitment to p (English, n=59) Marginal R2 Conditional R2
(1) Verb Class × Polarity 0.729 0.749
(2) Verb × Polarity 0.749 0.753
(3) Lex-CP/DP 0.048 0.244
(4) Lex-HT 0.062 0.244
Table 3.13: R squared values for the English MaxNewness attitude holder commitment
to p data.
Attitude holder commitment to p (German, n=51) Marginal R2 Conditional R2
(1) Verb Class × Polarity 0.712 0.718
(2) Verb × Polarity 0.721 0.725
(3) Lex-CP/DP 0.038 0.103
(4) Lex-HT 0.016 0.104
Table 3.14: R squared values for the German attitude holder commitment to p data.
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Attitude holder commitment to p (Swedish, n=14) Marginal R2 Conditional R2
(1) Verb Class × Polarity 0.677 0.717
(2) Verb × Polarity 0.772 0.777
(3) Lex-CP/DP 0.050 0.203
(4) Lex-HT 0.085 0.203
Table 3.15: R squared values for the Swedish attitude holder commitment to p data.
The R-squared values also show us that a lot of the variation in the data is captured
simply by the class of predicate and polarity, and that hardly anything is gained by also
considering the identity of the verb or the random effects. This is confirmed by the graphs
in Figures 3.24–3.25, plotting the data by verb.34
34For purposes of space, the by-verb plots for the rest of the sub-experiments have been made available
on https://github.com/kajsadjarv in the repository Djarv2019-Sec326-ByPredicatePlots-Prag-MCP.
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Figure 3.24: Attitude Holder commitment to p, by verb [English MaxContrast;
MaxNewness].
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Figure 3.25: Attitude Holder commitment to p, by verb [German, Swedish].
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3.2.6.1.2 Speaker commitment to p
Moving on to speaker commitment to p, we find, again, that while there is some variation
across the different data sets, the pattern that emerges is again remarkably stable across
the three languages, and two discourse conditions. And once again, the observed results
are pretty much in line with what we would expect, intuitively, as illustrated in Figures
3.26–3.27.
Figure 3.26: Speaker commitment to p [EnglishMaxNewness, English MaxContrast].
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Figure 3.27: Speaker commitment to p [German, Swedish].
The consistently highest scores are found with the factive verbs, in both polarities, a
result that is expected on the standard view whereby factive verbs presuppose speaker com-
mitment to p. There is some variation across the different language/context conditions as
to whether the factives differ significantly from the positive speech act verbs (the intercept),
but in neither case do we find a large effect size. As we pointed out above, none of the other
predicate types are typically taken to make reference to the speaker, so it is not surprising
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to observe that there is quite a lot more variation among these verbs. It is worth noting that
we find overall high scores with the positive response stance verbs in both polarities, a pat-
tern reminiscent of projection (cf. Tonhauser et al. 2018); as with the factives, there is some
variation with respect to whether these conditions differ significantly from the intercept.
For the negative response verbs, the negated predicates are generally rated higher than the
positive ones for speaker commitment to p. We also find a significant main effect of negation
in the English and Swedish datasets, though the size of the effect varies, as shown in Tables
A.1–A.4 in Appendix A.1.1. We also observe a significant interaction with negation with
the doxastic non-factives in all datasets except the English MaxContrast data, such that
the difference between the two polarities is smaller here than with the speech act verbs. For
reasons of space, the full regression models (from the Verb Class × Polarity analysis) can be
found in the Appendix.35
Again, we can compare the model based on verb class and negation with the other three
models. These comparisons are summarized in Tables 3.16–3.19. In each case, we find
that the current model predicts substantially more of the variation in the data (marginal
R2>0.38) than the models based on a priori verb classifications (mR2<0.2). We also find,
as with attitude holder commitment to p, that a lot of variation is captured by the type
of predicate and polarity alone, in that not much more of the variation is predicted by
considering the identity of the verb or the random effects. The lack of variation among the
predicates of the different classes is illustrated in the by-verb plots, which can be found in
the Appendix.
35As mentioned above, the English MaxNewness speaker belief experiment used the wrong items in
the floor control condition (namely those from the discourse familiarity experiments. Because of this, the
controls have been excluded from this analysis.
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Speaker commitment to p (English, n=60) Marginal R2 Conditional R2
(1) Verb Class × Polarity 0.394 0.451
(2) Verb × Polarity 0.470 0.471
(3) Lex-CP/DP 0.164 0.372
(4) Lex-HT 0.089 0.374
Table 3.16: R squared values for the EnglishMaxNewness speaker commitment to p data.
Speaker commitment to p (English, n=57) Marginal R2 Conditional R2
(1) Verb Class × Polarity 0.529 0.559
(2) Verb × Polarity 0.567 0.567
(3) Lex-CP/DP 0.117 0.306
(4) Lex-HT 0.044 0.309
Table 3.17: R squared values for the English MaxContrast speaker commitment to p
data.
Speaker commitment to p (German, n=46) Marginal R2 Conditional R2
(1) Verb Class × Polarity 0.383 0.394
(2) Verb × Polarity 0.399 0.399
(3) Lex-CP/DP 0.132 0.195
(4) Lex-HT 0.075 0.197
Table 3.18: R squared values for the German speaker commitment to p data.
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Speaker commitment to p (Swedish, n=23) Marginal R2 Conditional R2
(1) Verb Class × Polarity 0.690 0.746
(2) Verb × Polarity 0.760 0.761
(3) Lex-CP/DP 0.206 0.425
(4) Lex-HT 0.108 0.428
Table 3.19: R squared values for the Swedish speaker commitment to p data.
3.2.6.1.3 Discourse novelty
Turning to discourse novelty, we find again that, while there is some variation across the
different datasets, the pattern that emerges is again remarkably stable across the three
languages, and —perhaps unexpectedly— across the two discourse conditions in English. In
fact, it is interesting that among the three pragmatic dimensions, discourse novelty appears
to be the most robustly associated with particular verb classes.
As shown in Figures 3.28–3.29. there is a large and significant effect of negation across
all language/context conditions, such that the negated speech act verbs get lower ratings
than the non-negated ones. This contrast is also observed with the doxastic factives and the
doxastic non-factives. For the response verbs and with the emotive factives, both polarities
scores low on discourse novelty. We also find that all verb classes, except the doxastic fac-
tives, differ significantly from the speech act condition, in all four datasets. In the case of
the doxastic non-factives, this effect, however, is relatively small. In the English MaxNew-
ness data and in the German data, also the doxastic factives differ significantly from the
intercept, though in both cases, the effect size is small (p’s < 0.05). These experiments, then,
replicate the results from Caplan and Djärv (2019), reported in Section 3.1.6, and further
shows us that this is truly a robust property of these verb classes both across languages,
and across different kinds of discourse contexts. As with the speaker commitment data, the
full regression models are given in Appendix A.1.2.
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Figure 3.28: Likelihood that p is discourse new [EnglishMaxNewness, English MaxCon-
trast, German, Swedish].
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Figure 3.29: Likelihood that p is discourse new [EnglishMaxNewness, English MaxCon-
trast, German, Swedish].
As shown in Tables 3.20–3.23, if we compare the model based on verb class and negation
with the other three models, we find again that the current model predict a lot more of the
variation in the data (marginal R2>0.72) than the models based on a priori verb classifica-
tions (mR2<0.063).36 Again, a lot of the variation in the data is captured simply by the
36Note that in this case we observe a fairly large difference in the two discourse conditions. While all the
(non-)significant main effects and interactions are the same, the MaxNewness data predicts much more
of the variation in the data (marginal R2>0.72) than the MaxContrast data (marginal R2>0.35). The
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type of predicate and polarity, such that not much more variation is captured by considering
the identity of the verb or the random effects. (This is confirmed by the by-verb plots in
the Appendix.)
p is discourse new (English, n=55) Marginal R2 Conditional R2
(1) Verb Class × Polarity 0.611 0.616
(2) Verb × Polarity 0.616 0.622
(3) Lex-CP/DP 0.053 0.133
(4) Lex-HT 0.105 0.130
Table 3.20: R squared values for the English MaxNewness p is discourse new data.
p is discourse new (English, n=55) Marginal R2 Conditional R2
(1) Verb Class × Polarity 0.358 0.378
(2) Verb × Polarity 0.375 0.390
(3) Lex-CP/DP 0.043 0.100
(4) Lex-HT 0.044 0.100
Table 3.21: R squared values for the English MaxContrast p is discourse new data.
p is discourse new (German, n=40) Marginal R2 Conditional R2
(1) Verb Class × Polarity 0.499 0.522
(2) Verb × Polarity 0.525 0.535
(3) Lex-CP/DP 0.017 0.117
(4) Lex-HT 0.042 0.116
Table 3.22: R squared values for the German p is discourse new data.
German and Swedish data, which both used the MaxNewness context, have intermediate R2 values.
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p is discourse new (Swedish, n=16) Marginal R2 Conditional R2
(1) Verb Class × Polarity 0.577 0.599
(2) Verb × Polarity 0.604 0.623
(3) Lex-CP/DP 0.015 0.120
(4) Lex-HT 0.049 0.118
Table 3.23: R squared values for the Swedish p is discourse new data.
3.2.6.2 Predictions for MCP
The results from the pragmatic judgement confirmed one important intuition behind a lot
of theoretical work in this area, namely that certain pragmatic properties are systematically
and fairly robustly associated with certain classes of predicates —as opposed to being as-
sociated with particular items on a purely lexical basis, or as arising solely as a property of
an utterance in a given discourse context. Importantly, however, these dimensions are not a
simple consequence of a given verb, but have been shown to depend heavily (and in different
ways) on the presence or absence of negation.
In Chapter 5, we return in greater detail to the question of whether these properties
are part of the lexical meaning of these verbs. For now, what matters is that we have been
able to derive, for each lexical class in both polarities, an independently motivated measure
of each pragmatic dimension. Before moving on to the findings of the MCP acceptability
studies, let us look at what results we expect to find, given the accounts in (54)–(56).37
To start, on the selection-based views in (54) and (53), repeated here, we predict no
interaction with negation. That is, if a verb selects a type of complement that permits
MCP, that should hold regardless of higher elements such as negation.38
37Of course, in some cases, the ratings are intermediate, thus making it hard to evaluate what the
predictions should be on these pragmatic accounts: do the MCP judgements vary with the various pragmatic
dimensions in a gradient fashion, or are MCP licensed in a binary fashion, given sufficiently high levels of
the relevant pragmatic dimension? Rather than going into this, rather thorny, issue, we will focus here on
those conditions where the predictions of the different accounts clearly come apart.
38At least on a standard conception of selection. More recent work has pointed to various forms of
‘non-local’ selection, e.g. Roberts T. (2019). We leave this possibility for future work to consider.
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Predictions of lexical accounts for the acceptability of MCP:
(57) Lexical Class à la Hooper and Thompson (1973) [Lex-HT]
3 {Speech act, Doxastic non-factives, Doxastic factives}
7 {Response verbs, Emotive factives}
(58) Lexical Class à la The CP/DP Interface Hypothesis [Lex-CP/DP]
3 {Speech act, Doxastic non-factives}
7 {Response verbs, Emotive factives, Doxastic factives}
As we pointed out above, the more complex (disjunctive or conjunctive) pragmatic
accounts ended up reducing to the simpler accounts whereby MCP are licensed by either
speaker belief that p, or p being discourse new information. This is illustrated in Table
3.24: a check mark (3) indicates that, given the results in the previous section, the different
pragmatic accounts predict MCP to be acceptable.
Sp Act Dox −Fact Response+ Response− Emo Fact Dox +Fact
(say) (believe) (accept) (doubt) (resent) (discover)
+ − + − + − + − + − + −
Prag-Sp 3 7? 3? 7 3 3 7 3 3 3 3 3
Prag-SpAH 3 7? 3 7 3 3 7 3 3 3 3 3
Prag-New 3 7 3? 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 3 7
Prag-Sp-New 3 7 3? 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 3 7
Prag-SpAH-New 3 7 3? 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 3 7
Table 3.24: Predictions from the different pragmatic accounts for the availability of MCP.
Hence, we can feel confident in our choice to focus on the hypotheses based on speaker
commitment to p and discourse novelty. Table 3.25 shows a more concise summary of the
predictions of these accounts.
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Sp Act Dox −Fact Response+ Response− Emo Fact Dox +Fact
(say) (believe) (accept) (doubt) (resent) (discover)
+ − + − + − + − + − + −
Prag-Sp 3 7? 3? 7 3 3 7 3 3 3 3 3
Prag-New 3 7 3? 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 3 7
Table 3.25: Predictions from the different pragmatic accounts for the availability of MCP.
As we can see in Table 3.25, the two pragmatic accounts make essentially the same
predictions for the speech act verbs and the doxastic non-factives in both polarities, and the
negative response predicates and the doxastic factives in the positive polarity. The cases to
focus on, then, to differentiate between these accounts, are the following:
Predictions of pragmatic accounts for the acceptability of MCP:
(59) a. Positive response stance verbs: both polarities (e.g. accept, not accept)
b. Negative response stance verbs: negated (e.g. not doubt)
c. Emotive factives: both polarities (e.g. resent, not resent)
d. Doxastic factives: negated (e.g. not discover)
(60) For each of these,
a. Prag-Sp predicts: 3MCP
b. Prag-New predicts: 7MCP
Let us now turn to the main results: the MCP acceptability judgements.
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3.2.6.3 Main Clause Phenomena
3.2.6.3.1 German Embedded V2
Looking first at the results from German Embedded V2 (61), illustrated in Table 3.30, we
find a very similar pattern to that reported for Swedish V2 in Caplan and Djärv (2019)
(Section 3.1) and in Djärv, Heycock, and Rohde (2017) (Section 2.5.2). A similar pattern
was also found for Danish V2 by Jensen and Christensen (2013) (Section 2.5.1).
(61) Maria
Maria
sagt,
says
Peter
Peter
geht
going
nach
to
Hause.
home
‘Maria says Peter is going home.’
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Figure 3.30: German embedded V2
We find that, regarding the effect of predicate type, all verb classes except the doxastic
non-factives differ significantly from the speech act verbs (p’s < 0.005). In the case of the
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doxastic factives, however, the effect size is small (β = -0.51) relative to the emotive factives
(β = -1.3) and the negative response verbs (β = -1.01). The positive response verbs show
an intermediate effect size (β = -0.7). We also observe a main effect of negation (β = -0.71,
p < 0.005), as well as a significant interaction with negation in all cases except the doxastic
factives (p’s < 0.05). For the doxastic non-factives, this interaction was driven by the fact
that these are rated slightly higher in the positive condition (β = 0.24), an effect that was
not significant. In the other cases, the interaction was driven by the low scores in the positive
polarity. The output of the regression model is summarized in Table 3.26.
Coefficient Estimate Std. Error t-Statistic Pr(>|t|)
VerbClass = SpeechAct (Intercept) 0.27505 0.09347 2.943 0.005034 **
VerbClass = Dox.NonFact 0.24370 0.12962 1.880 0.066755 .
VerbClass = Response.Pos -0.70042 0.15875 -4.412 6.58e-05 ***
VerbClass = Response.Neg -1.01332 0.15875 -6.383 9.40e-08 ***
VerbClass = Emo.Fact -1.30212 0.12962 -10.046 6.13e-13 ***
VerbClass = Dox.Fact -0.50703 0.12962 -3.912 0.000315 ***
Polarity = Neg -0.71346 0.06324 -11.281 < 2e-16 ***
VerbClass = Dox.NF : Polarity = Neg -0.28846 0.08944 -3.225 0.001285 **
VerbClass = Response.Pos : Polarity = Neg 0.24438 0.10954 2.231 0.025827 *
VerbClass = Response.Neg : Polarity = Neg 0.58801 0.10954 5.368 9.17e-08 ***
VerbClass = Emo.Fact : Polarity = Neg 1.12070 0.08944 12.530 < 2e-16 ***
VerbClass = Dox.Fact : Polarity = Neg 0.12574 0.08944 1.406 0.159969
Table 3.26: German V2 data. Output of regression model: predicting acceptability scores
from the embedding predicate and polarity of the matrix clause. Number of observations =
1640, on 41 subjects and 40 items.
Looking first at the lexical accounts, it should be clear from considering the positive
doxastic factives that the account based on the classification of the CP/DP Interface Hy-
pothesis is too restrictive, since it predicts all factives to disallow MCP. The classification
from Hooper and Thompson (1973) clearly do better in this regard. However, contrary to
the view of Wiklund et al. (2009), this cannot be due to selection, given the interaction with
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negation for each of the speech act verbs the doxastic non-factives, and the doxastic factives.
This is confirmed by comparing the models based on these classifications with those based
on verb (class) × polarity. As shown in Table 3.27, the highest Marginal R squared value is
found for Verb × polarity (mR2=0.48), followed by Verb Class × Polarity with an mR2 of
0.36. These are markedly higher than the values for the other models (mR2’s=0.17,0.13).
(As in the above data, we also find only a small gain in the amount variation accounted for
if we also consider the individual verbs or the random effects).
German V2 data (n=41) Marginal R2 Conditional R2
(1) Verb Class × Polarity 0.362601 0.4680442
(2’) Verb × Polarity 0.4811563 0.5097774
(3) Lex-CP/DP 0.172379 0.2793046
(4) Lex-HT 0.1324976 0.2807856
Table 3.27: R squared values for the German V2 data: lexical accounts.
Turning then to the pragmatic accounts, we can now compare their predictions with the
observed results.
(62) a. Positive response stance verbs: both polarities (e.g. accept, not accept)
b. Negative response stance verbs: negated (e.g. not doubt)
c. Emotive factives: both polarities (e.g. resent, not resent)
d. Doxastic factives: negated (e.g. not discover)
(63) For each of these,
a. Prag-Sp predicts: 3MCP
b. Prag-New predicts: 7MCP
c. Observed result: 7MCP
The distribution of embedded V2, then, is clearly as we would predict on the account based
on discourse novelty, in line with Caplan and Djärv (2019).
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Note that the models predicting the acceptability of V2 from speaker commitment to p
or the status of p as discourse new content both account for very little of the variation in the
data (Table 3.28). As we discussed in Section 3.2.4.2, however, this is likely a methodological
problem relating to the implementation of these specific statistical predictors, rather than
the predictive power of the various pragmatic dimensions per se. Here, we report this data
for transparency and completeness, however, the focus in evaluating the various account will
be on the specific patterns found in the data, rather than these variables.
German V2 data (n=41) Marginal R2 Conditional R2
(5) Prag-Sp 0.1432901 0.6459056
(6) Prag-New 0.1097904 0.3694876
Table 3.28: R squared values for the German V2 data: pragmatic accounts.
3.2.6.3.2 Scene Setting Adverbs
Turning next to the scene setting adverbs (64), we find very little sensitivity to the various
predictors, as illustrated in Figure 3.31.
(64) John said that, last week, Mary read a great book.
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Figure 3.31: Scene Setting Adverbs [English MaxNewness, MaxContrast]
This lack of variation is corroborated by the statistical models, shown in Tables 3.29–
3.30. While it is true that certain contrasts come out as significant in this model, the effect
sizes are all relatively small. Note also that none of the statistically significant effects track
any of the predictions made by the various theoretical accounts.
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Coefficient Estimate Std. Error t-Statistic Pr(>|t|)
VerbClass = SpeechAct (Intercept) 9.847e-03 8.339e-02 0.118 0.90650
VerbClass = Dox.NonFact 8.042e-02 1.176e-01 0.684 0.49727
VerbClass = Response.Pos 1.689e-02 1.440e-01 0.117 0.90714
VerbClass = Response.Neg -7.372e-01 1.440e-01 -5.120 5.51e-06 ***
VerbClass = Emo.Fact 1.196e-01 1.176e-01 1.017 0.31431
VerbClass = Dox.Fact 2.346e-02 1.176e-01 0.200 0.84271
Polarity = Neg -1.733e-01 6.506e-02 -2.664 0.00777 **
VerbClass = Dox.NF : Polarity = Neg -1.052e-01 9.201e-02 -1.143 0.25308
VerbClass = Response.Pos : Polarity = Neg -1.102e-01 1.127e-01 -0.978 0.32818
VerbClass = Response.Neg : Polarity = Neg 8.334e-01 1.127e-01 7.395 1.85e-13 ***
VerbClass = Emo.Fact : Polarity = Neg 3.350e-02 9.201e-02 0.364 0.71583
VerbClass = Dox.Fact : Polarity = Neg 2.091e-01 9.201e-02 2.272 0.02314 *
Table 3.29: EnglishMaxNewness Scene Setting Adverb data. Output of regression model:
predicting acceptability scores from the embedding predicate and polarity of the matrix
clause. Number of observations = 2920, on 73 subjects and 40 items.
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Coefficient Estimate Std. Error t-Statistic Pr(>|t|)
VerbClass = SpeechAct (Intercept) 0.12570 0.09499 1.323 0.191939
VerbClass = Dox.NonFact -0.05204 0.13300 -0.391 0.697389
VerbClass = Response.Pos -0.11074 0.16289 -0.680 0.499947
VerbClass = Response.Neg -0.46130 0.16289 -2.832 0.006803 **
VerbClass = Emo.Fact -0.28135 0.13300 -2.115 0.039747 *
VerbClass = Dox.Fact -0.19913 0.13300 -1.497 0.141063
Polarity = Neg -0.40647 0.07223 -5.628 2.07e-08 ***
VerbClass = Dox.NF : Polarity = Neg 0.18165 0.10215 1.778 0.075502 .
VerbClass = Response.Pos : Polarity = Neg 0.32231 0.12510 2.576 0.010054 *
VerbClass = Response.Neg : Polarity = Neg 0.72318 0.12510 5.781 8.56e-09 ***
VerbClass = Emo.Fact : Polarity = Neg 0.38427 0.10215 3.762 0.000173 ***
VerbClass = Dox.Fact : Polarity = Neg 0.22175 0.10215 2.171 0.030055 *
Table 3.30: English MaxContrast Scene Setting Adverb data. Output of regression
model: predicting acceptability scores from the embedding predicate and polarity of the
matrix clause. Number of observations = 2200, on 55 subjects and 40 items.
More importantly, none of the regression models have a Marginal R squared value higher
than 0.06 (compared with R2 >0.4 for the German V2 data, and R2 >0.7 for the pragmatic
inference data), as shown in Tables 3.31–3.32.
English MaxNewness Scene Setting Adverb data (n=73) Marginal R2 Conditional R2
(1) Verb Class × Polarity 0.052 0.113
(2’) Verb × Polarity 0.087 0.154
(3) Lex-CP/DP 7.243437e-05 0.078
(4) Lex-HT 0.002 0.078
(5) Sp 0.053 0.133
(6) New 0.005 0.079
Table 3.31: R squared values for the English MaxNewness Scene Setting Adverb data.
176
English MaxContrast Scene Setting Adverb data (n=55) Marginal R2 Conditional R2
(2) Verb Class × Polarity 0.029 0.120
(2) Verb × Polarity 0.077 0.161
(3) def 0.003 0.088
(4) HT 0.001 0.088
(5) Sp 0.022 0.127
(6) New 0.028 0.128
Table 3.32: R squared values for the English MaxContrast Scene Setting Adverb data.
While this lack of differentiation based on embedding condition is perhaps not surprising,
given the claim from Haegeman that scene setting adverbs do not constitute a MCP in the
relevant sense, it turns out that the same lack of sensitivity to the type of embedding
condition is found in the English topicalization data.
3.2.6.3.3 Topicalization
As shown in Figure 3.32, English topicalization (65) shows the same lack of variation among
the different embedding environments as we saw with the scene setting adverbs.
(65) John said that, this book, Mary read.
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Figure 3.32: Topicalization [EnglishMaxNewness, MaxContrast]
Again, this lack of an effect is corroborated by the statistical analysis (Tables 3.33–3.34)
as with the scene setting adverbs, we find that while some of the effects do come out as
significant, the effect sizes are all very small, and not in line with the predictions of any
theoretical view. And again, as shown in Tables 3.35–3.36, none of the regression models
have a Marginal R squared value higher than 0.12.
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Coefficient Estimate Std. Error t-Statistic Pr(>|t|)
VerbClass = SpeechAct (Intercept) -0.39337 0.08307 -4.735 2.18e-05 ***
VerbClass = Dox.NonFact 0.22559 0.11716 1.925 0.06053 .
VerbClass = Response.Pos 0.12469 0.14350 0.869 0.38951
VerbClass = Response.Neg -0.37575 0.14350 -2.619 0.01200 *
VerbClass = Emo.Fact -0.03660 0.11716 -0.312 0.75619
VerbClass = Dox.Fact -0.01851 0.11716 -0.158 0.87515
Polarity = Neg -0.02092 0.05986 -0.350 0.72672
VerbClass = Dox.NF : Polarity = Neg -0.24932 0.08465 -2.945 0.00326 **
VerbClass = Response.Pos : Polarity = Neg -0.24333 0.10368 -2.347 0.01901 *
VerbClass = Response.Neg : Polarity = Neg 0.35448 0.10368 3.419 0.00064 ***
VerbClass = Emo.Fact : Polarity = Neg 0.14907 0.08465 1.761 0.07839 .
VerbClass = Dox.Fact : Polarity = Neg 0.07869 0.08465 0.930 0.35271
Table 3.33: English MaxNewness Topicalization data. Output of regression model: pre-
dicting acceptability scores from the embedding predicate and polarity of the matrix clause.
Number of observations = 2320, on 58 subjects and 40 items.
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Coefficient Estimate Std. Error t-Statistic Pr(>|t|)
VerbClass = SpeechAct (Intercept) -3.133e-01 7.293e-02 -4.296 5.55e-05 ***
VerbClass = Dox.NonFact 8.556e-03 9.917e-02 0.086 0.931530
VerbClass = Response.Pos -3.930e-02 1.215e-01 -0.324 0.747356
VerbClass = Response.Neg -2.628e-01 1.215e-01 -2.164 0.034417 *
VerbClass = Emo.Fact -3.489e-01 9.917e-02 -3.518 0.000831 ***
VerbClass = Dox.Fact -1.983e-01 9.917e-02 -2.000 0.050022 .
Polarity = Neg -1.845e-01 7.044e-02 -2.620 0.008881 **
VerbClass = Dox.NF : Polarity = Neg -8.013e-02 9.962e-02 -0.804 0.421288
VerbClass = Response.Pos : Polarity = Neg -6.550e-02 1.220e-01 -0.537 0.591430
VerbClass = Response.Neg : Polarity = Neg 3.675e-01 1.220e-01 3.012 0.002632 **
VerbClass = Emo.Fact : Polarity = Neg 2.848e-01 9.962e-02 2.858 0.004308 **
VerbClass = Dox.Fact : Polarity = Neg 1.534e-01 9.962e-02 1.539 0.123899
Table 3.34: English MaxContrast Topicalization data. Output of regression model: pre-
dicting acceptability scores from the embedding predicate and polarity of the matrix clause.
Number of observations = 1840, on 46 subjects and 40 items.
English MaxNewness Topicalization data (n=58) Marginal R2 Conditional R2
(1) Verb Class × Polarity 0.033 0.125
(2) Verb × Polarity 0.085 0.162
(3) Lex-CP/DP 0.002 0.098
(4) Lex-HT 0.003 0.098
(5) Sp 0.027 0.132
(6) New 0.001 0.096
Table 3.35: R squared values for the English MaxNewness Topicalization data.
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English MaxContrast Topicalization data (n=46) Marginal R2 Conditional R2
(1) Verb Class × Polarity 0.027 0.102
(2) Verb × Polarity 0.061 0.116
(3) Lex-CP/DP 0.007 0.079
(4) Lex-HT 0.004 0.079
(5) Sp 0.001 0.082
(6) New 0.013 0.084
Table 3.36: R squared values for the English MaxContrast Topicalization data.
While this may seem surprising, given the many accounts taking English Topicalization
to be the example of MCP, it should perhaps not be that unexpected after all, given the
vast disagreement about its distribution, shown in Chapter 2.
3.2.6.3.4 Speech Act Adverbs
Turning finally to the speech act adverbs in English and German, we find that also in this
case is there is very little sensitivity to the various embedding conditions, as shown in Figures
3.33.
(66) a. Anna said that Lisa honestly got fired.
b. Anna
Anna
hat
has
gesagt,
said
dass
that
Lisa
Lisa
offen gestanden
frankly.said
gefeuert
fired
wurde.
was
‘Anna said that Lisa, to be frank, got fired.’
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Figure 3.33: speech act adverbs[English MaxNewness, MaxContrast, German]
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The lack of effect, as we saw with both the scene setting adverbs and with topicalization,
is corroborated by the regressions in Tables 3.37–3.39, showing some small but significant
effects — neither of which is in line with any theoretical account. And as in those cases,
comparing the R-squared values (Tables 3.40–3.42), we find that none of the models have a
Marginal R squared higher than 0.11.
Coefficient Estimate Std. Error t-Statistic Pr(>|t|)
VerbClass = SpeechAct (Intercept) 0.10970 0.13149 0.834 0.408862
VerbClass = Dox.NonFact -0.17849 0.18596 -0.960 0.342620
VerbClass = Response.Pos -0.27993 0.22775 -1.229 0.225871
VerbClass = Response.Neg -0.44722 0.22775 -1.964 0.056210 .
VerbClass = Emo.Fact -0.38341 0.18596 -2.062 0.045445 *
VerbClass = Dox.Fact -0.53087 0.18596 -2.855 0.006661 **
Polarity = Neg -0.30460 0.08355 -3.646 0.000275 ***
VerbClass = Dox.NF : Polarity = Neg 0.27497 0.11816 2.327 0.020080 *
VerbClass = Response.Pos : Polarity = Neg 0.23824 0.14472 1.646 0.099901 .
VerbClass = Response.Neg : Polarity = Neg 0.65528 0.14472 4.528 6.38e-06 ***
VerbClass = Emo.Fact : Polarity = Neg 0.22650 0.11816 1.917 0.055429 .
VerbClass = Dox.Fact : Polarity = Neg 0.47744 0.11816 4.041 5.57e-05 ***
Table 3.37: English MaxNewness speech act adverb data. Output of regression model:
predicting acceptability scores from the embedding predicate and polarity of the matrix
clause. Number of observations = 1720, on 43 subjects and 40 items.
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Coefficient Estimate Std. Error t-Statistic Pr(>|t|)
VerbClass = SpeechAct (Intercept) -0.27040 0.11683 -2.315 0.0253 *
VerbClass = Dox.NonFact 0.13780 0.16277 0.847 0.4020
VerbClass = Response.Pos 0.22829 0.19936 1.145 0.2586
VerbClass = Response.Neg -0.18418 0.19936 -0.924 0.3608
VerbClass = Emo.Fact -0.35142 0.16277 -2.159 0.0366 *
VerbClass = Dox.Fact -0.12385 0.16277 -0.761 0.4510
Polarity = Neg -0.08200 0.07270 -1.128 0.2595
VerbClass = Dox.NF : Polarity = Neg 0.06061 0.10281 0.590 0.5555
VerbClass = Response.Pos : Polarity = Neg 0.20637 0.12591 1.639 0.1014
VerbClass = Response.Neg : Polarity = Neg 0.49559 0.12591 3.936 8.56e-05 ***
VerbClass = Emo.Fact : Polarity = Neg 0.26226 0.10281 2.551 0.0108 *
VerbClass = Dox.Fact : Polarity = Neg 0.23036 0.10281 2.241 0.0251 *
Table 3.38: English MaxContrast speech act adverb data. Output of regression model.
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Coefficient Estimate Std. Error t-Statistic Pr(>|t|)
VerbClass = SpeechAct (Intercept) -0.56149 0.09148 -6.138 7.04e-08 ***
VerbClass = Dox.NonFact 0.36612 0.12322 2.971 0.004521 **
VerbClass = Response.Pos 0.54001 0.15091 3.578 0.000771 ***
VerbClass = Response.Neg 0.16357 0.15091 1.084 0.283514
VerbClass = Emo.Fact 0.13927 0.12322 1.130 0.263668
VerbClass = Dox.Fact 0.33734 0.12322 2.738 0.008505 **
Polarity = Neg 0.16594 0.07441 2.230 0.025853 *
VerbClass = Dox.NF : Polarity = Neg -0.34276 0.10523 -3.257 0.001145 **
VerbClass = Response.Pos : Polarity = Neg -0.38309 0.12887 -2.973 0.002991 **
VerbClass = Response.Neg : Polarity = Neg 0.01201 0.12887 0.093 0.925768
VerbClass = Emo.Fact : Polarity = Neg -0.01129 0.10523 -0.107 0.914596
VerbClass = Dox.Fact : Polarity = Neg -0.31206 0.10523 -2.966 0.003060 **
Table 3.39: German speech act adverb data. Output of regression model: predicting ac-
ceptability scores from the embedding predicate and polarity of the matrix clause. Number
of observations = 1840, on 48 subjects and 40 items.
English MaxNewness speech act adverb data (n=43) Marginal R2 Conditional R2
(1) Verb Class × Polarity 0.032 0.183
(2) Verb × Polarity 0.076 0.248
(3) Lex-CP/DP 0.015 0.155
(4) Lex-HT 0.003 0.156
(5) Sp 0.006 0.170
(6) New 0.001 0.152
Table 3.40: R squared values for the English MaxNewness speech act adverb data.
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English MaxContrast speech act adverb data (n=54) Marginal R2 Conditional R2
(1) Verb Class × Polarity 0.048 0.197
(2) Verb × Polarity 0.096 0.243
(3) Lex-CP/DP 0.003 0.176
(4) Lex-HT 0.001 0.176
(5) Sp 0.005 0.192
(6) New 8.506115e-06 0.173
Table 3.41: R squared values for the English MaxContrast speech act adverb data.
German speech act adverb data (n=48) Marginal R2 Conditional R2
(1) Verb Class × Polarity 0.026 0.148
(2) Verb × Polarity 0.083 0.180
(3) Lex-CP/DP 0.003 0.130
(4) Lex-HT 0.002 0.130
(5) Sp 0.004 0.132
(6) New 0.001 0.128
Table 3.42: R squared values for the German speech act adverb data.
3.2.7 Inter-speaker variation?
Before concluding this section, recall the concern raised above, that (at least some of)
the variable and conflicting judgements reported in the literature might be due to variation
across speakers. To test for this, we plotted the participants responses for each MCP variant,
including the unmarked control conditions.39 The x-axis represents the participants in the
different studies, ordered by their average acceptability score for the particular condition.
Figure 3.34 show these responses plotted for the unmarked unembedded (main clause)
39To do this, we took the participants mean responses by predicate type and polarity, thus giving us a
dataset consisting of one data point per participant, for each predicate type and polarity combination. This
was done using the ddply function in the dplyr package in R, with the options summarise and mean().
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control sentences in each language variant (in German, these are of course V2). Compare
this to the topicalization and V2 data in Figures 3.35–3.36, across both unembedded and the
various embedding conditions.40 As we can see from these plots, while there is clear variation
across speakers, there is no difference in the type of pattern observed in the unmarked
unembedded control clauses (of the type Mary likes Bill) and in the various MCP-variations,
regardless of the type of embedding condition. We also find no indication of any kind of
bimodal distribution, as would be expected if we’re looking at two different grammars.
40The difference between the German data in Figure 3.34 and Figure 3.35 is in terms of the subjects; the
stimuli for these are the same.
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Figure 3.34: By participant acceptability ratings for unmarked main clauses in each of the
language variants. From top to bottom: English MaxContrast; English MaxNewness;
German.
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Figure 3.35: By participant acceptability ratings for German main clause V2 (top) and
English main clause topicalization (MaxContrast) (bottom).
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Figure 3.36: By participant acceptability ratings for German embedded V2 (top) and English
embedded topicalization (MaxContrast) (bottom).
3.2.8 Summary
From the pragmatic inference studies, we were able to derive an independent and empirically
motivated measure of the various pragmatic dimensions claimed to be responsible for MCP
licensing —for the very same items that were then tested for the acceptability of various
MCP. By manipulating the polarity of the predicates, we were also able to disentangle
pragmatic and selection based accounts of the availability of MCP.
Interestingly, and somewhat surprisingly, we saw that among the four constructions
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investigated here, only German embedded V2 showed any sensitivity to the factors manipu-
lated in the experiment. The pattern we found was very similar to that observed for Swedish
V2 in Caplan and Djärv (2019) (Section 3.1) and Djärv, Heycock, and Rohde (2017) (Sec-
tion 2.5.2), as well as for Danish V2 in Jensen and Christensen (2013) (Section 2.5.1): V2
was rated as acceptable, only under the speech act verbs, the doxastic non-factives, and
the doxastic factives, and only in the positive polarity. The large effect of negation speaks
strongly against a purely selection-based account. Rather, the distribution tracked very
closely the cases that were found to allow for the introduction of discourse new content, in
line with the pragmatic approach of Caplan and Djärv (2019), outlined in Section 3.1. We
return in the next section to exactly what this statement amounts to.
The pragmatic accounts based on speaker (or attitude holder) commitment to p were
found to over-generate the kinds of contexts that are predicted to allow embedded V2. The
same was also true for attitude holder belief. To really get a sense for this, compare the
results for each of the pragmatic dimensions with the acceptability ratings for embedded V2,
repeated in Figure 3.37 below. Figures 3.38–3.39 below further illustrate how the predictions
of the different pragmatic accounts come apart (focusing on the most striking cases where
the predictions of the various accounts diverge: the interaction with polarity for negative
response verbs, and the distribution across factivity). From these plots, it is clear that the
distribution of German embedded V2 is best predicted by discourse novelty.
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Figure 3.37: German: Speaker commitment to p; Attitude holder commitment to p, p as
discourse new content; Embedded V2.
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Figure 3.38: Acceptability of German EV2 as predicted by different measures of assertion:
polarity interaction. The y-axis values represent the mean scores for each judgement type.
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Figure 3.39: Acceptability of German EV2 as predicted by different measures of assertion:
factivity. The y-axis values represent the mean scores for each judgement type.
It is of course possible, given these results, that some level of speaker commitment to
p is still necessary. A possible follow-up to test whether this is the case would be to test
the acceptability of embedded V2 in a context like the one used here (67), but to add a
manipulation that explicitly varies the speaker’s endorsement of the embedded proposition
as in the (a) vs. (b) continuations:
(67) Guess what! I just talked to John, and he said that Bill and Lisa broke up!
a. . . . Poor Bill! He must be heartbroken. [+Speaker commitment]
b. . . . but I know that can’t be right, because I just saw them, and they seemed
very much in love. [-Speaker commitment]
It is remarkable then, that only embedded V2 was found to show the distribution of MCP
as characterized by Hooper and Thompson (1973), given that their original discussion was
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based entirely on English. In another sense, however, it should perhaps not be too surprising,
given the vast disagreements in the theoretical literature about the data. Regarding the issue
of what a theory of MCP should look like, we are left with a swath of new questions. If
anything, what is generally taken to be a relatively cohesive class of MCP is in fact a fairly
heterogeneous set of constructions, in terms of their licensing conditions. Given the lack
of sensitivity to both the type of embedding predicate and negation, we might ask whether
what looked like a systematic prohibition on certain constructions in particular embedded
contexts is in fact due to a conglomerate of conspiring factors. As shown in Section 3.2.4.2,
even in the unmarked control conditions, there was a non-trivial penalty for (a) embedding
under negation, and (b) embedding under certain verb classes. Recall also that topicalization
in English must be contrastive. It is fairly plausible that the availability of contrast depends
to some degree on the embedding predicate (Bianchi and Frascarelli 2009). However, as
shown by the examples in (68), and corroborated by the current data, this can clearly be
solved by sufficient contextual support.
(68) Bianchi and Frascarelli (2009, p. 69)
a. I am glad that [this unrewarding job], she has finally decided to give up.
b. Mary didn’t tell us that [Bill] she had fired, and [John] she had decided to
promote.
It might just be then that the much-cited sentence in (69),41 often taken as evidence that
factives (or presuppositional/referential predicates) disallow MCP, is simply lacking sufficient
context to support a contrastive reading of the topicalized DP.
(69) *John {regrets, resents, denies, remembers, realizes} that this book, Mary read.
It is plausible, then, that compounded with a general dis-preference for embedding under
some of these predicates, the overall effect amounts to something that looks like a systematic
41E.g. in Hegarty (1992), Maki et al. (1999), Haegeman and Ürögdi (2010), De Cuba and Ürögdi (2010),
Haegeman (2012), Kastner (2015), and De Cuba (2017a).
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restriction on MCP in these context. To resolve these issues, this kind of quantitative
comparative data has been very helpful. What is particularly informative in this regard,
is the magnitude, and the robustness, of the effect of predicate type and polarity in the
case of embedded V2. It is now an open empirical question exactly what –if anything– the
unifying characteristic or property is, that allows us to talk about MCP as a theoretically
meaningful construction. I will leave this question for future research to address, and focus
the remainder of this chapter on the licensing of embedded V2 in German and Swedish.
Finally, regarding the pragmatic dimensions of interest, an important finding of this
experiment was that it provided a solid empirical underpinning for the common assumption
in theoretical syntax and semantics, that predicates cluster into classes, based on their
pragmatic properties. In the pragmatic inference studies, we observed a robust association
of each of the three pragmatic properties with specific verb class and polarity conditions;
an association which we found to hold robustly across the three languages and the two
discourse contexts investigated. As shown by the comparisons of R squared values, we also
found that a lot of the variation in the data is really captured by the a priori classifications,
thus motivating the use of these classes as theoretically meaningful constructions.
In the following chapter, the notion of factivity will be examined in some detail. As
a primer for this discussion, it is worth pointing out that while the speaker commitment
inferences were generally the most variable across the various conditions, and did also not
distinguish between the different verb classes as clearly as discourse novelty and attitude
holder commitment, we found that the factive verbs were reassuringly robust in their pro-
jection behaviour. Interestingly, we also found that the positive response stance predicates
showed consistently high speaker commitment ratings, across all of the languages and dis-
course conditions (Figures 3.26–3.27). This raises the question of whether factivity might
a more fluid or gradient property than is generally thought. This view has been adopted
for instance by Tonhauser et al. (2018), who (following Abrusán 2011b, 2016, Simons et al.
2010, 2017, Tonhauser 2016, a.o.) argue that content projects to the extent that it is not
at-issue. In Chapter 5, we show that, despite some intuitive appeal, this view faces serious
196
problems in view of the data.
3.3 Assertion, Givenness, and the left-periphery
Before concluding this chapter, let us say a little bit more about what it means for a
proposition to be discourse new.
As mentioned at several points above, the relevant notion cannot be that p is Common
Ground, as shown most clearly by the negative response stance verbs, and matrix negation.
It is intuitive that (70) would be infelicitous in a context where the question of ?p (Will
John and Bill get along? ) had not previously been discussed. However, there is no sense in
which either the speaker or the hearer need to be committed to p.
(70) a. I doubt that [P John and Bill will get along].
b. I don’t think that [P John and Bill will get along].
Rather, what seems to be important is simply that p has some kind of antecedent in the
discourse. Importantly, while the response predicates and the emotive factives both share
this general property, they differ in whether this antecedent has to be linguistic or not. As
shown in (71)–(72), the emotives seem to require simply that the attitude holder’s belief
that p, and the source of this belief, can be plausibly inferred from the context.
(71) [Context: Mary and Bill are walking through the Scottish highlands on a windy and
rainy day. Not having previously discussed the weather, Mary says:]
#I’m so happy that it turned out to be such a nice day!
(72) [Context: Mary and Bill are lying on the beach on a beautiful sunny day. Not
having previously discussed the weather, Mary says:]
I’m so happy that it turned out to be such a nice day!
The response predicates (and negated verbs like say and think), on the other hand, requires
an actual linguistic antecedent, such that p has either been proffered, or that the question
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of ?p has bee raised (73).
(73) [Context: Mary and Bill are lying on the beach on a beautiful sunny day. Not
having previously discussed the weather, Mary says:]
#I {doubt, didn’t say} that it’s going to rain later.
The emotives are also odd in such contexts, as shown in (74). As this example shows us,
neither type of predicate requires that the issue of p has been the topic of the present
conversation.
(74) [Context: Mary and Bill are on the subway. They overhear someone say:
“I read that Weinstein is going to prison.” Mary turns to Bill and says:]
a. I doubt that will ever happen.
b. I’m happy he’s finally getting what he deserves.
The relevant pragmatic dimension, then, seems to be very similar to Schwarzschild’s (1999)
notion of Givenness. Schwarzschild (1999) uses the notion of ‘antecedent’ broadly, to en-
compass both overt linguistic antecedents, as well as accommodated or contextually entailed
antecedents.
While this speaks in interesting ways to the often observed semantic parallels between
clausal and nominal elements, it is worth noting that the claim that V2 is the syntactic
expression of discourse novelty —as the complement of Givenness—, is actually quite con-
trary to Schwarzschild’s (1999) conception of Givenness. Looking at prosodic prominence,
Schwarzschild (1999) states, regarding (75):
. . . deictics and other words appear to be inherently given . . . but one doesn’t
find words that are inherently novel. I submit therefore that the grammar makes
reference to givenness and includes a statement like (75-a), but that no mention
is made of novelty, hence there is nothing like (75-b). This cannot be the whole
story, however. Even if it is too broadly stated, (75-b) does have some truth to
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it, and this will be explained in terms of a constraint, AvoidF. This constraint
has the effect of requiring a speaker to refrain from accenting material that is
given. (Schwarzschild 1999, p.142)
(75) a. Lack of prominence indicates givenness.
b. Prominence indicates novelty.
This raises the question of whether the syntax is somehow different, in that it explicitly
encodes discourse novelty, or whether the idea that V2 is somehow the marked option,
triggered by some feature in the syntax is actually misguided. Perhaps it makes more sense
to think of V2 as the syntactic analogy to focus. We leave this intriguing possibility, and
the question of how this idea might be implemented formally, for future research.
3.4 Conclusions: Chapters 2 & 3
Our investigation of embedded V2, topicalization, etc. started out with the observation, due
to Hooper and Thompson (1973), that Main Clause Phenomena are licensed by assertion.
Reviewing the literature on MCP and embedded assertion in Chapter 2, however, revealed
that there is in fact very little agreement about what actually constitutes an embedded
assertion; both pragmatically and for the purpose of the syntax. Quantitatively examining
(in parallel) the syntax and the pragmatics of a variety of verb (classes) and MCP has
allowed us to tease apart the different lexical and pragmatic factors proposed to predict
the distribution of MCP. We found that the contexts that disallow V2 are such that the
embedded proposition has an antecedent in the discourse; where p is Given, in the sense of
Schwarzschild (1999).
At a first glance, this seems to be compatible with the intuitions of the CP/DP In-
terface Hypothesis, which takes ‘referential’ predicates to select for complements that are
syntactically DPs, and semantically and pragmatically presupposed. However, this hypoth-
esis cannot be right: first, as we saw from the so-anaphora and expletive associate tests in
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Section 2.2, the response stance verbs do in fact allow CP-complement. Hence, the fact that
they disallow embedded V2 cannot be explained by appealing to DP-selection. The same
point is made even more sharply, when we consider the effect of matrix negation. Like the
response verbs, these both disallow embedded V2 and require p to have an antecedent in
the discourse. Nevertheless, they clearly allow for CP-complements, even in contexts where
p has an obvious discourse antecedent:
(76) I know you think that roller-coasters are a blast, but I certainly don’t think so.
In fact, the tests in Chapter 2 showed us that, aside from the emotive factive verbs, all
of the predicates considered here allow CP-complements. This, then, is much more in line
with the view, common in theoretical work on V2, that the contexts which do vs. do not
allow V-to-C movement are distinguished syntactically in terms of the size of the embedded
CP.
Interestingly, as we saw in Section 2.3.1, the availability of wh-extraction in English
tracks the distribution of embedded V2 and discourse novelty across predicate types, such
that it is available under speech act verbs, doxastic non-factives, and doxastic factives, but
degraded under the response verbs and the emotive factives. As we have seen, this cannot
follow from the selection of a DP that blocks movement, as per Kastner’s account. Nor
can the island-effects follow straightforwardly from the semantics of factive predicates, as in
Szabolcsi and Zwarts (1993), Fox and Hackl (2006), Oshima (2006), Abrusán (2011a, 2014),
Chierchia (2013), Schwarz and Simonenko (2018), a.o. Rather, the weak island effects arise
precisely in those contexts that disallow embedded assertions, in the sense of p constituting
discourse new content.
This, then, is in line with the idea, going back to Weerman et al. (1986), Iatridou and
Kroch (1992) and Vikner (1995) (see also more recent work by Featherston 2004), that V2 is
licensed in the complements of so-called bridge verbs. However, as we have seen here, this is
not a matter of selection. Rather, whether or not an embedded declarative can be asserted
depends in part on the semantics of the matrix predicate, along with other aspects of the
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linguistic and pragmatic context (for instance, matrix negation). Moreover, the clauses that
allow V-to-C and wh-extraction vs. those that do not, must be differentiated by properties
of the CP, not by whether the clause is a CP or a DP.
In line with research in the Rizzian tradition, we might say that the syntactic expression
of assertion (i.e. discourse novelty) is an extended C-domain, which in turn is required for
V-to-C movement and wh-extraction from the embedded clause.42 One might ask, then,
why (English) topicalization should be excluded from this requirement, given that this,
too, involves movement to the left-periphery. Pragmatically, however, it is clear that while
topicalization involves a type of context-update, it does not require discourse novelty. In
fact, because topicalization in English is contrastive, topicalization would be quite odd in a
context where p represents an entirely discourse new issue.43 Pragmatically, then, there is
good reason to distinguish the type of context-update relevant to V2, and that involved in
topicalization.44 In terms of the syntax-pragmatics mapping, this seems to be in line with
the Rizzian conception of the C-domain, whereby Topic is encoded in a projection below
Forceo, along the lines of (77):45
(77) Conclusions: Syntax-Pragmatics Interface
a. [ p is Discourse New [ p is Contrastive [ p ]]]
b. [CP+ V-to-C; wh-extraction [CP Topicalization [TP Clause ]]]
This hypothesis, however, takes the position required for wh-extraction in English to be
the same as that which is involved in V-to-C movement in Swedish and German (recalling
the idea of bridge-verbs/complements); a position which we have shown is licensed by the
pragmatic status of p as discourse new. Saying that this position is structurally higher than
42Note also that this supports the claim that wh-movement has to be successively cyclic, at least in
English. More work is needed to investigate the interaction of V2 and movement, as shown in Section 2.4.2.
43One might worry that this would be a problem for the conclusions for the experiment. Recall, however,
that we also found no differentiation among embedding contexts in the MaxContrast condition.
44For relevant discussion of different kinds of “Common Ground management”, see Bianchi and Frascarelli
(2009).
45We use the theoretically more neutral label CP+, given that the label ForceP is generally associated
with commitment-based pragmatic accounts.
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the position involved in topicalization —where p is Given, and may be contrastive— may
not be the right characterization, however. Because of the V2-property, it is difficult to
find good evidence both for the presence of a full Rizzian C-domain, and for the relative
height of different projections, in languages like German and Swedish. From a comparative
point of view, however, it is worth noting that much work in the Rizzian tradition have
argued that Topic is structurally higher than wh-features (e.g. Obenauer and Poletto 2000,
Rizzi 2001, 2004, Poletto 2006). To probe this issue and the relationship between V2 and
movement (which we touched on in Section 2.4.2), further investigation of the discourse
pragmatics associated with topicalization in Swedish and German, as well as a closer look
at the interaction of V2 and wh-extraction in these languages, would be helpful.
In Section 3.2, we saw experimental evidence supporting the claim from Section 3.1,
that contrary to the traditional conception of factivity, it is not the case that factives in
general require p to be Common Ground, or Given. In fact, the doxastic factives were found
to promote a reading of p as discourse new. The question then is where this leaves our
understanding of factivity. This issue will be the focus of Chapter 5.
In the final two chapters of the dissertation, we address two issues raised in this and the
previous chapter. In Chapter 2, we saw that emotive factive verbs select for clauses that are
underlyingly DPs. As we saw here, however, this is neither a consequence of their factivity
nor the status of their complement as Given. The question then, is whether this reflects some
other semantic or pragmatic property, and if so, which one? The other problem concerns the
status of the doxastic factives as ‘assertive’, in the sense that their complements are readily
interpreted as discourse new information (an observation already made by Simons 2007).
The question is what this means for our theory of factivity, which defines factive verbs as
verbs which require that their complement p is Common Ground (thus entailing that p is
Given, in a strong sense).
The question about the doxastic factives, and the theory of factivity, will be the focus of
Chapter 5, the final chapter of the dissertation. In Section 5.6.2, we will also offer an answer
to the question of why emotive factives select for DPs. Next, in Chapter 4, we return
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to the more basic issue, of the s-selectional properties of the different types of attitude
verbs examined here. Recall from Section 1.1 that on the standard, Hintikkan approach
to the semantics of propositional attitude reports, attitude verbs are taken to select for
propositions (functions from worlds to truth values; type <st>, the semantic type of that-
clauses). In Section 2.3, we saw that all verbs investigated here46 license DPs (typically
understood to denote individuals, of type e), and as we just mentioned, that the clausal
complements of emotive distribute like DPs. The central question of Chapter 4, is what this
flexibility tells us about (i) the selectional properties of the various types of attitude verbs,
and (ii) the semantic types of that-clauses more broadly. Based on the argument structure
and entailment patterns of verbs like know and believe, we distinguish between two types
of attitude predicates: verbs like believe, which extract propositional content from content
individuals (in the sense of Kratzer 2006, Moulton 2009b), and verbs like know, which
describe acquaintance-relations (broadly construed) to individuals of any kind. The insights
of this chapter will provide a semantic foundation for the analysis of factivity developed in
Sections 5.6.1–5.6.2
‘
46With the apparent exception of suppose.
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Chapter 4
Why knowing me is different from be-
lieving me
I know that you believe that you know the difference between ‘know’ and ‘believe’.1
In this chapter, we examine the basic semantic properties of declarative propositional atti-
tude reports. We focus on the s-selectional properties of clause-taking attitude verbs like
know and believe, the semantic types of their clausal and nominal complements, as in (1)
and (2), and the mechanisms by which they compose.
(1) (b) ⊧ (a)
a. Sue believes [CP that Anna is to blame].
b. Sue believes [DP the rumour that Anna is to blame].
(2) (b) ⊧ (a)
a. Sue knows [CP that Anna is to blame].
b. Sue knows [DP the rumour that Anna is to blame].
As has been observed by a number of authors (e.g. Pietroski 2000, Uegaki 2015, Elliott 2016),
attitudes differ in terms of whether a sentence with a content DP (the b-sentences) entail
the corresponding CP-version (the a-sentences): while believe, along with trust and doubt,
gives rise to such an entailment, know, along with discover, fear, mention, and explain, does
not. Thus, this contrast is not due to an isolated lexical quirk of either believe or know, and
1Lefteris Paparounas, p.c. (Philadelphia, 2019).
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moreover, does not correspond to the contrast in factivity.
Here, we offer an observation that sheds new light on this contrast, namely that the
availability of the DP-to-CP entailment for a given verb tracks the availability of another
type of DP argument, which is structurally independent of the that-clause, and denotes the
source of the content provided by the that-clause. This contrast is given in (3).
(3) a. I believe John that it’s going to rain.
b. *I know John that it’s going to rain.
This pattern is unexpected on the standard Hintikkan picture. Recall from Section 1.1 that
on the Hintikkan approach to propositional attitude reports, attitude verbs are analyzed as
quantifiers over worlds. On this approach, know and believe both quantify over the worlds
w′ that are compatible with the attitude holder’s beliefs in w. They differ in that know
additionally entails (or presupposes) that p is true in w:
(4) a. [[believe]]w = λp<st>.λxe.∀w′ ∈ Doxx(w) → p(w′) = 1
b. [[know ]]w = λp<st>.λxe : p(w) = 1 . ∀w′ ∈ Doxx(w) → p(w′) = 1
On this view, why should there be (i) this difference in their argument structure (3), (ii)
a contrast in whether the DP-case entails the CP-case (1)–(2), and (iii) why should these
two properties pattern together? Here, we will offer a new approach, proposing a basic
distinction between verbs like believe, which describe fundamentally epistemic or doxastic
relations to content individuals (in line with Hintikka 1962, 1969, Kratzer 2006, Moulton
2009b, 2015), and verbs like know, which describe (broadly speaking) acquaintance-based
relations to individuals of any kind (this analysis is further refined in Section 5.6, where we
show that factive know -verbs are evidentials). A schematic picture of the two types of verbs
is given in (5):2
(5) know and believe-verbs [Schematic templates: see §5.6]
2Note that while we’re using s l for states, in the denotations given here, it is clear, especially with the
verbs like discover, realize, and explain from the know -class, that these verbs include both states and events.
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a. know -verbs : λxe.λsl.VERBAQ(s)(x)
b. believe-verbs : λxe.λsl.VERBDOX(s)(cont(x)(ws))
On the view proposed here, then, clausal complements of verbs are of type e (in line with
Cresswell 1973, Chierchia 1984, 1985, Potts 2002, and Woods 2016a).3 We propose that
the selection for a content individual is mediated by a verbal C-head of type <st,e> (6)
(which also accounts for the distribution of that-clauses in equatives; see Section 4.3.2.1.1).
In Section 4.3.2.1, we argue that content nouns, on the other hand, select propositions
(mediated by a nominal C-head of type <st,st> (7)).
(6) Clausal complements of verbs
a. [[CoV −cont]]w = λp<st>.ιxc.cont(xc)(w) = p
b. [[CPV −cont]]w = ιxc.cont(xc)(w) = p
(7) Clausal complements of content nominals
a. [[CoN ]] = λp<st>.p
b. [[CPoN ]] = λw.John moved to Canada(w)
Section 4.1 introduces the core empirical observations of this chapter: the Source-
construction and its link to the DP-to-CP entailment contrast. Before developing the analy-
sis proposed here, in Section 4.4, Section 4.2 reviews some necessary theoretical background,
and Section 4.3 considers two theoretical alternatives: a polysemy-based approach (Section
4.3.1), and a recent popular approach to the semantic composition of clauses with content
nouns (like the claim or the rumour) and attitude verbs, from Kratzer (2006) and Moulton
(2009b, 2015) (an approach which is essentially Hintikkan, but takes a different approach
to the semantic composition of clauses and predicates) (Section 4.3.2). While important as-
pects of this proposal will be adopted in the account proposed here for believe, the analysis
developed here for know is quite different in nature, as shown in (5). Section 4.4 first spells
3At least the kind of attitude verb investigated here, which is able to combine with both DP and CP-
complements.
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out the argument for treating clauses as individuals (Section 4.4.1), and then discusses some
consequences of —and provides further support for— treating know -verbs as fundamentally
acquaintance-based, rather than epistemic or doxatic. Section 4.5 summarizes.
4.1 Individuals and propositions
In this section, we examine the syntactic and interpretative properties of sentences where
clause-taking attitude verbs combine with nominal arguments. This leads us to the conclu-
sion that know and believe differ fundamentally at the level of argument structure, and that
this split generalizes across attitude verbs.
As noted by Prior (1971), Pietroski (2000), King (2002), Uegaki (2015) and Elliott
(2016), attitude verbs differ in whether a sentence with a DP-complement entails the corre-
sponding sentence with a CP-complement. As shown in (8), know and believe differ in this
regard:
(8) Uegaki (2015, p. 626)
a. John believes the rumour that Mary left. ⊧ John believes that Mary left.
b. John knows the rumour that Mary left. ⊭ John knows that Mary left.
As noted also by Pietroski (2000), Uegaki (2015), and Elliott (2016), the pattern displayed
by know does in fact appear to be the majority pattern, and moreover, does not track
the factive/non-factive distinction. While the factives all seem to pattern like know (e.g.
discover, notice, hear, remember, love, appreciate, resent), there are also a number of non-
factive verbs that behave like know (e.g. fear, imagine, expect, report, predict, assume, and
mention).
(9) Elliott (2016, p. 3)
Jeff {fears, knows, imagined} the rumour that he is balding. ⊭
Jeff {fears, knows, imagined} that he is balding.
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(10) Elliott (2016, p. 3)
Jeff expects the rumour that he will bald. ⊭ Jeff expects that he will bald.
(11) Uegaki (2015, p. 626)
John {knows, discovered, reported, predicted} the rumor that Mary left. ⊭
John {knows, discovered, reported, predicted} that Mary left.
While the interpretation of the various verb-complement combinations vary, broadly speak-
ing, the verbs of the know -variety are all understood to denote some type of direct or
acquaintance-based relation to a specific content individual, a rumour or a claim, etc.
(whether of reference, familiarity, or some emotional relation, and so on). Importantly,
in the cases where the verb+CP version implies some epistemic or doxastic meaning, as is
the case for all of the factives as well as the doxastic non-factives, this entailment too is lost
in the corresponding DP-case:
(12) a. Sue {discovered, noticed, heard, remembered, loved, appreciated, resented,
imagined, assumed} that [P Mary was leaving]. ⊧ believe(p)(Sue)
b. Sue {discovered, noticed, heard, remembered, loved, appreciated, resented,
imagined, assumed} the claim that [P Mary was leaving]. ⊭ believe(p)(Sue)
As pointed out by Pietroski (2000), this is particularly surprising in cases like (13), in-
volving the content noun fact, given the common assumptions that (i) that-clauses denote
propositions, and (ii) facts are true propositions.4
(13) Pietroski (2000, p. 655)
Nora explained the fact that Fido barked. ⊭ Nora explained that Fido barked.
On Pietroski’s (2000) account, this contrast follows from explain assigning two different
theta roles, depending on the type of the argument. Nominal arguments are assigned a
4The interpretive difference between the two is that in the DP-case, Nora (the explainer) is offering an
explanations for why Fido barked. In the CP-case, on the other hand, that Fido barked is offered as the
explanation for something else.
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theme-role, whereas clausal arguments are assigned a content-role. However, this account
fails to account for the pattern observed with believe, where the DP-case (8-a) does entail
the CP-case (8-a).
A similar problem arises for Elliott (2016). According to Elliott, content DPs are always
themes, and as such need to be thematically licensed by the verb. On his view, then, all
verbs that permit content DPs assign a theme-role to their DP-complements. Regarding
the entailment contrast, he states that “the entailment from the [DP-case] to the [CP-case]
sometimes goes through, due to arbitrary facts about what it means to be the theme of,
e.g., believe” (p. 4).5
The problem with this move, is that the entailment contrast is part of a more general
split between verbs like know and verbs like believe. First, believe, unlike know, may occur
in a particular kind of construction, in which an entity-denoting DP co-occurs with a finite
CP. However, rather than describing a thing with propositional content, the DP denotes
the source of the content provided by the CP. Moreover, as we saw in (8-a) (. . . believe the
claim/rumour that p), (14-a) preserves the entailment that the attitude holder believes p.
(14) Source Construction
a. I believe you [P that Anna is to blame].
b. *I know you [P that Anna is to blame].
Crucially, the Source-construction is ungrammatical with all of the verbs which, like know,
lack the DP-to-CP entailments.
(15) *I {discovered, noticed, heard, remembered, loved, appreciated, resented, feared,
imagined, expected, reported, predicted, assumed, explained} you that Anna is to
blame.
While the pattern exhibited by believe appears to be the minority pattern, the correlation
5See Appendix A.2 for discussion of the relation of Elliott’s (2016) proposal to the complicated issue of
Pesetsky’s (1991) wager -class.
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between the preservation of the DP-to-CP entailment, on the one hand, and the availabil-
ity of the source-DP, on the other, is found with other clause-embedding attitude verbs,
including trust and doubt :
(16) a. Uegaki (2015, p. 626)
John trusted the rumor that Mary left. ⊧ John trusted that Mary left.
b. I trust him that he will do the best for me6
(17) a. John doubted the rumor that Mary left. ⊧ John doubted that Mary left.
b. do you have any reason to doubt him that it was on that night that that
conversation happened?7
That doubt should pattern with believe is not surprising, given that doubt is essentially
synonymous with not believe.8
This contrast is reflected also in cases where the verbs take only a DP-complement.
With believe-verbs (19-a), the DP is interpreted as the source of some contextually provided
proposition p. And, as we saw in (8-a) and (14-a), the doxastic relation of the attitude
holder to p is preserved. With know -verbs, on the other hand, no epistemic or source-
relation is inferred. Here, the DP-complement is interpreted as a concrete specific individual
(a particular, using the terminology of Kratzer 2002; see Section 4.2). In this case, the verb
is now understood to denote some type of acquaintance-relation:
(19) a. I believe John. ≈ I believe that what J. said is true/that J. is right about p.
b. I know John. ≈ I am acquainted with J.
6Free Children’s Ministry Resources; equipu.kids4truth.com
7Independent Counsel Solomon L. Wisenberg in a transcript of the Clinton Grand Jury Testimony, in
Kuntz, Phil (ed). The Evidence: The Starr Report, p. 375.
8Interestingly, however, there appears to be a contrast between doubt in the positive and the negative
polarity, as shown in (18). We leave the interesting issue of the effect of the polarity for future research.
(18) a. ?I doubt him that Lisa was the culprit.
b. I don’t doubt him that Lisa was the culprit.
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While the exact relation described by the other verbs of these two types varies, the general
distinction should be clear; between on the one hand treating the DP as relating to some
inferred proposition (the believe-class)(20-a), and on the other, simply describing a relation
to an individual, with no inference of a proposition being generated (the know -class) (20-b):
(20) a. I {believed, trusted, doubted} the large dinosaur.
b. I {knew, discovered, noticed, heard, remembered, loved, appreciated, resented,
feared, imagined, expected, reported, predicted, assumed} the large dinosaur.
With the know -class verbs in(20-b), the DP the large dinosaur is clearly interpreted as a
particular, itself the object of the attitude. Here, there is no kind of epistemic or doxastic
relation implied. In the case of believe and trust, however, the doxastic relation is pre-
served: here, the DP is interpreted as the source of some (contextually given) proposition.
With the believe-verbs, the DP the large dinosaur receives an anthropomorphized, agentive,
interpretation, which is not present with any of the verbs in (20-b).9
Overall, what we observe here is a distinction between verbs that treat denote acquain-
tance relations to individuals (of any type), and verbs that obligatorily extract propositional
content from their DP-complements.10
This presents a problem for how to analyse the selectional requirements of the know -
class verbs: Do they denote a relationship to a proposition, in which case they select for a
that-clause? Or do they denote an acquaintance relation to an entity, and select for a DP?
In Section 4.4 below, we offer an answer to these questions (expanded in Sections 5.6.1–
5.6.2 of Chapter 5). First, however, let us introduce properly the notions of particular and
9Trust and doubt also have readings whereby the attitude holder trusts or doubts that the DP the large
dinosaur is generally reliable; that it will do the right thing, etc. (Thanks Julie Anne Legate for highlighting
this alternative.) However, there is also a reading of (20-a) where the large dinosaur is understood as a (non-
)trustworthy source of some inferred proposition.
10Though note that there are some predicates that seem to be more agnostic in this regard. We find while
(21-b) commits the speaker to p being true, (21-a) has a reading where what is correct is not necessarily p
itself, but rather, what is correct is something about the motivation or process behind the intuition:
(21) a. The intuition that [P sums of independent random variables are well-behaved] is correct.
b. The claim that [P sums of independent random variables are well-behaved] is correct.
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content individual.
4.2 Particulars and content individuals
Recall from Section 1.3 that we recognized individuals as part of our inventory of semantic
types, along with eventualities, and so on. Just like eventualities come in different flavours
(i.e. states and events, à la Bach 1986), it is common also to recognize more specific sub-
types of individuals. The ones most relevant for the study of clausal embedding are probably
particulars and content individuals (following, among others, Kratzer 2002, 2006, Moulton
2009b).
The idea that some individuals (like rumours, claims, and ideas), but not others (like
tables, tigers, and pianos), have propositional content associated with them, is probably
intuitive. However, as Moulton (2009b, p. 36) points out, while content nouns allow for
propositional content to be extracted from them, they are not themselves propositions.
Rather, the things described by content nouns (unlike propositions) are entities associated
with particular properties: “Proposals – and rumors, stories, theories, ideas, and others –
come into existence at particular times (the proposal that. . . was made last year); they may
be reported or spread and they may have qualities like being mean or nasty (they spread a
nasty rumor that. . . ), and they may cease to exist (that proposal that. . . is dead).” (p. 36).
On the analysis developed by Kratzer (2006) and Moulton (2009b), which we discuss in
Section 4.3.2), the propositional content of a content individual is derived via a function,
cont, which returns the propositional content of individuals of the appropriate kind (22-a).
According to Kratzer (2006), this is the meaning of Co (22-b). Combined with a proposition
(the meaning of TP), this will return the meaning of the CP given in (22-c); a predicate of
propositional content.11
(22) From Kratzer (2006, 2013b), Moulton (2009b); Moulton (2015, p. 312)
a. cont(xc)(w) = {w′ : w′ is compatible with the intentional content determined
11The exact formulation in (22-a) is from Kratzer (2013b, p. 195 (25)).
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by xc in w}
b. [[Co]] = λp<st>.λxc.λw.[cont(xc)(w) = p]
c. [[that it’s raining ]] = λxc.λw.[cont(xc)(w)=λw′.raining(w′)]
The notion of particulars is from situation semantics (e.g. Barwise 1981, 1989, Barwise
and Perry 1983, Kratzer 1989, 2002). On this perspective, situations are parts of the world,
and are made up of individuals and relations among them. In that sense, individuals and
situations are both particulars, in that they are both part of the world.12 The diagram in
Figure 4.1, from Kratzer (2002, p. 661), shows a situation s consisting of three tea pots.
We say that the situation in Figure 4.1 exemplifies the proposition in (23):
(23) There are tea pots.
Figure 4.1: Teapot situation: diagram from Kratzer (2002, p. 661).
The exemplification relation is from Kratzer (2002):
(24) Exemplification (Kratzer 2007, based on Kratzer 2002)
A situation s exemplifies a proposition p if whenever there is a part of s in which p
is not true, then s is a minimal situation in which p is true. Any sum of situations
12As are eventualities, seeing as these too, are made up of individuals and relations among them; in dis-
cussing previous literature, we have talked about these as being of a different semantic type than individuals.
However, on the perspective adopted here, it is more accurate to treat these as situations.
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that exemplify a proposition p broadly exemplifies p. (Intuitively, a situation that
exemplifies a proposition p is one that does not contain anything that does not
contribute to the truth of p.)
From this, it should be clear that nouns like rumour and claim (unlike nouns like tiger
and tea pot) lead a ‘double life’, as, on the one hand, particulars which exemplify properties
(like being long, well-meant, tedious, etc.), and on the other hand, as what we have loosely
referred to as vessels for propositional content. As we will argue in Section 4.4, the seman-
tics of certain attitude verbs is sensitive to this distinction.13 Adopting elements of the
Kratzer-Moulton approach, we propose that verbs like believe select for content individuals.
Verbs like know, however, we show are compatible with both kinds of individuals, including
content individuals and particular individuals like John or the tea cup. While these are both
technically individuals of type e, when necessary, I will adopt the common convention of
annotating these sub-types with the subscripts c (for content) and r (for particular).
4.3 Theoretical alternatives
4.3.1 Polysemy?
One way to account for the data in 4.1 would be to say that the verbs of the know -class are
all polysemous, with one acquaintance-based item that selects for individuals (syntactically,
DPs), and one, epistemic or doxastic item, selecting for propositions (CPs):
(25) knowx-class verbs, Type 1 [DP-complement]
a. s-select for individuals (xe)
b. denote acquaintance-based relations to those individuals
(26) knowp-class verbs, Type 2 [CP-complement]
a. s-select for propositions (p<st>)
13Just like the grammar can be sensitive to distinctions among states and events (e.g. Lisa was eating
pizza for two days vs. #Lisa finished the pizza for two days). Thanks Florian Schwarz, p.c. for this point.
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b. denote epistemic relations to propositions
While this might at a first glance seem motivated for the specific verb know, given the re-
ceived wisdom that in languages like German or Swedish, there are two forms corresponding
to these two meanings: känna (till)/kennen for (25), and veta/wissen for (26)’, there are
several points that speak against an analysis in terms of lexical ambiguity.
While this move might seem motivated for know, to capture the data discussed here, we
would have to posit two lexical items for discover, notice, hear, remember, love, appreciate,
resent, fear, imagine, expect, report, predict, assume, and explain, as well as any other verb
which shows the know -pattern (virtually all attitude verbs that can combine with both
DP and CP complements). To start, I am not aware of any language that systematically
distinguishes between CP-selecting forms and DP-selecting forms of these attitude verbs.
Moreover, a polysemy-based approach would not capture the strong intuition that the clause-
taking and the DP-taking “versions” of discover, fear, imagine, love, notice, etc., all share
a semantic core. On the approach which will be offered here (Section 4.4), the two cases
involve the same verb, thus automatically capturing their shared semantic core.
It is also worth noting that the känna/veta contrast is in fact more complex than what
we would expect on the type of analysis given in (25)–(26). While it is true that generally,
the form känna is used with a bare DP to mean be acquainted with, there are contexts where
it is possible to use veta with a bare DP to mean ‘know of’, as in (27-a). Känna is also
possible here, as in (27-b). However, it would have a slightly different meaning. A true
answer to (27-b) requires mutual acquaintance on the part of the addressee and Johan. In
(27-a), it is sufficient that the addressee is familiar with or knows about the existence of
Johan.14
(27) Swedish (own judgement)
a. Du
You
vet
know.prop
Johan?
Johan?
Vi
We
jobbar
work
ihop.
together.
14It is worth noting that (27-b) appears to require the presence of the discourse particle väl, which
translates roughly to English right?.
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‘You know John? We work together.’
b. Du
You
känner
know.fam
väl
part
Johan?
Johan?
Vi
We
jobbar
work
ihop.
together.
‘You know John, right? We work together.’
Moreover, both känna and veta can combine with a that-clause in the presence of a prepo-
sition, as shown in (28). In this case, the meaning of the predicate is more similar to that
of be aware of (often treated as the adjectival counterpart of know).
(28) Swedish (own judgement)
a. Jag
I
känner
know
till
of
att
that
Anna
Anna
och
and
Bill
Bill
har
have
gjort
made
slut.
end
‘I’m aware that Anna and Bill broke up.’
b. Jag
I
vet
know
om
of
att
that
Anna
Anna
och
and
Bill
Bill
har
have
gjort
made
slut.
end
‘I’m aware that Anna and Bill broke up.’
Both forms can also occur with a bare that-clause, without a preposition. In this case,
however, their meanings clearly diverge. In this case, känna means something like sense or
feel, whereas veta would clearly translate to (propositional) know.
(29) Swedish (own judgement)
a. Jag
I
känner
sense
att
that
Anna
Anna
och
and
Bill
Bill
har
have
gjort
made
slut.
end
‘I sense that Anna and Bill broke up.’
b. Jag
I
vet
know
att
that
Anna
Anna
och
and
Bill
Bill
har
have
gjort
made
slut.
end
‘I know that Anna and Bill broke up.’
With a content noun, both känna till and veta om are again possible, and seem to mean
roughly the same thing (approximately, be aware (of)). In both of these cases, the preposi-
tion is obligatory.
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(30) Swedish (own judgement)
a. Jag
I
känner
know
till
of
ryktet
rumour.def
att
that
Anna
Anna
och
and
Bill
Bill
har
have
gjort
made
slut.
end
‘I’m aware of the rumour that Anna and Bill broke up.’
b. Jag
I
vet
know
om
of
ryktet
rumour.def
att
that
Anna
Anna
och
and
Bill
Bill
har
have
gjort
made
slut.
end
‘I’m aware of the rumour that Anna and Bill broke up.’
Thus, while veta appears to be more proposition-oriented, and känna more acquaintance-
oriented, their semantic spaces do in fact overlap more than is generally recognized. And,
contrary to what we would predict on the polysemy-based account described in (25)–(26),
they can both be used —with a similar acquaintance-oriented meaning— with both a that-
clauses and DPs.15 Taken together, these various considerations lead us to reject a polysemy-
based account.
On the proposal which will be advanced in Section 4.4, the particular entailment-
properties of believe is a fundamental consequence of its lexical semantics. Because content
individuals are such that they allow us to extract propositional content (via the content
function in (22-a)), believing the rumour that p guarantees the belief that p. Likewise,
the lack of an entailment with know -verbs is a fundamental consequence of their semantics,
which does not make reference to the content function, but (in addition to other aspects
of meaning) denote acquaintance-based relations to individuals of any type. Since being
acquainted with a claim or a rumour that p does not entail the belief that p, no entailment
arises in this case.
Before moving on to this account, we look at the popular recent approach from Kratzer
(2006) and Moulton (2009b), developed in particular as a way of accounting for the compo-
sition of that-clauses and content nouns.
15I leave an examination of the semantic vs. syntactic contributions of the propositional complements for
future research.
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4.3.2 Clauses as predicates?
The argument that clauses denote propositional content comes primarily from considering
clausal complements of nouns, as in (31).
(31) the claim that John moved to Canada
This will be the main focus of this section (Section 4.3.2.1), though in Section 4.3.2.2, we
also consider briefly the extension of this account to the clausal complements of verbs.
4.3.2.1 Clausal complements of nouns
The basic theoretical claim advanced in Moulton (2009b, 2015), building on Stowell (1981)
and Kratzer (2006),16 is that the CP in (31) is in fact a predicate of propositional content,
of type <e,st> (43-a). The variable xc ranges over individuals from which it is possible to
recover propositional content, such as claim, rumor, idea, notion, or fact. The CP combines
with content nouns like (32-b), via Predicate Modification. The compositional meaning of
(31), on the Moulton-Kratzer view, is given in (32-c).
(32) a. [[that John moved to Canada]] =
λxc.λw.[cont(xc)(w) = λw′.John moved to Canada(w′)]
b. [[claim]] = λxc.λw.claim(xc)(w)
c. [[the claim that John moved to Canada]] =
ιxc.λw.[claim(xc)(w) & [cont(xc)(w) = λw′.John moved to Canada(w′)]]
On this view, de-verbal nouns like claim and belief are derived from their verbal counterpart
via existential closure of the verb’s eventuality-argument, as shown in (37) from Moulton
(2015), where existential closure is associated with the nominalizing head n.17
16See also Kratzer (2013a, 2014)
17Importantly, as we will see below, Moulton intends this specifically for object nominalizations, such
that the nominalized root in (37-c) ends up describing the thing that the verb’s object denotes, as illustrated
with the object nominals in (33)–(34) (see also Higgins 1973, Stowell 1981, Grimshaw 1990).
(33) Moulton (2015, p. 314)
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(37) Moulton (2015, p. 314)
a. [[
√
explain]] = λxc.λe.λw.explain(xc)(e)(w)
b. [[n]] = λP.λx.λw.∃e[P(x)(e)(w)]
c. [[explanation]] = λx.λw.∃e[explain(xc)(e)(w)]
The claim that verbal roots select complements of type e, rather than propositions, is mo-
tivated by the observation that clause-taking verbs select content nouns as their internal
arguments:
(38) Moulton (2015, p. 314)
a. He believed the mean rumor.
b. I understood your silly idea.
c. Sue claimed something false.
d. I accepted/admitted/confirmed/mentioned his position/idea/claim.
I return to the composition of attitude verbs and CPs shortly. First, let us consider the
motivation for the theoretical claim that clauses are predicates of propositional content,
which modify content nouns, rather than saturate their internal argument. Primary moti-
a. Paul explained that he was temporarily insane.
b. Paul’s explanation was that he was temporarily insane.
(34) Moulton (2015, p. 313)
a. Sue loved Edna.
b. Sue’s great love was Edna.
This can be contrasted with event-nominalizations, which describe the eventuality of its counterpart verb:
(35) Moulton (2015, p. 315); from Grimshaw (1990, p. 58)
a. The total destruction of the city in two days/*for days appalled everyone.
b. Only observation of the patient for several weeks/*in several weeks can determine the most
likely course of action.
(36) Moulton (2009b, p. 45)
a. John loved Mary.
b. John’s love of Mary lasted forever.
We’ll return to this contrast momentarily.
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vation for this claim comes from two related observations: (i) the observation from Higgins
(1973), Stowell (1981), and Potts (2002) that CPs and content nouns may occur together in
copular sentences; and (ii) Grimshaw’s (1990) observation that non-derived nouns like idea
and story don’t take (syntactic) arguments (independently of case). I review each of these
observations, and consider their theoretical consequences, in turn.
4.3.2.1.1 Distribution in copular sentences
The first observation is that CPs and content nouns may co-occur in copular constructions:
(39) Moulton (2009b, p. 38)
a. The belief that Edna was stealing (is false).
b. The belief is that Edna was stealing.
The crucial assumption here is that the sentence in (39-b) is equative. Equative copular
constructions (unlike predicational ones) involve two XPs of the same semantic type.18
Support for the claim that sentences like (39-b) are equative, and not predicational, comes
from Potts (2002), using the observation of Heycock and Kroch (1999) that only predication
—where one argument is of type e, and the other of type <et>— is possible in small clauses:
(41) Moulton (2009b, p. 31); from Heycock and Kroch (1999, ex. (29))
a. Your attitude towards Jones is my attitude towards Davies.
b. *I consider your attitude towards Jones my attitude towards Davies.
The argument from Potts/Moulton is that (39-b) cannot involve predication, in the canonical
18It is sometimes assumed that equation involves two XPs of the same syntactic type (e.g. Citko 2008).
However, the following example from Heycock (2012, p. 225) shows that it is in fact possible to equate a DP
and an adjective, as long as they are both interpreted as predicates (40-a)–(40-b). If the DP is interpreted
predicationally, on the other hand, it cannot be equated with a referential DP (40-c).
(40) Heycock (2012, p. 225)
a. Honest is the one thing that I want a man to be.
b. The one thing that I want a man to be is honest.
c. *The one thing that I want a man to be – honest – is John.
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sense, given the ungrammaticality of the corresponding small clause (on part with (41)).
(42) Moulton (2009b, p. 31); from Potts (2002, p. 68)
a. *I consider the problem that she is bonkers.
b. *I consider that she is bonkers the problem.
c. *I consider it the problem that she is bonkers.
If (39-b) is indeed equative, then this would be a problem for analyzing the DP as being of
type e and the CP of type <st>: the two XPs would have to be of the same semantic type.
As Moulton points out, we clearly do not want to analyze nouns like rumor as propositions:
a rumor can have a range of properties that propositions do not have, such as being mean,
boring, spread by people, etc. He proposes instead that such nouns denote individuals from
which it is possible to extract propositional content, as shown in (32-b). If true, it then
follows that the CP, too, must be of type <e,st>, as in (43-a).
While I agree that the argument from small clauses shows us that (39-b) cannot involve
predication, in the sense that the DP denotes an individual of type e, and the CP a predicate
of type <et>, it is less clear to me what it does show. Assume, for instance, that clauses
in fact denote propositions (as per the Hintikkan view). If the ungrammaticality in small
clauses is due to the requirement that the two XPs are of type e and <et>, respectively, then
this would also rule out the possibility of a proposition occurring in this construction.
Of course, this move raises the question of how to analyze (39-b). If it’s not predication,
then equation does indeed seem to be the most plausible alternative. But equation of what?
Clearly not of two propositions. Moulton proposes to analyze both clauses and content
nouns as predicates of type <e,st>. But in the sentence in (39-b), we have one definite DP
(the belief ) and one CP (that Edna was stealing), so presumably one thing of type e and one
thing of type <e,st>. So that cannot be equation. Perhaps the DP saturates the internal
argument slot of the clause (the copula being semantically vacuous). That would yield the
meaning in (43-c).
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(43) Alternative for composition with content nominals
a. [[that John moved to Canada]] =
λxc.λw.[cont(xc)(w) = λw′.John moved to Canada(w′)]
b. [[the claim]] = ιxc.λw.claim(xc)(w)
c. [[the claim is that John moved to Canada]] =
[[that John moved to Canada]]([[the claim]]) =
λxc.λw.[cont(xc)(w)=λw′.John moved to Canada(w′)](ιxc.λw.claim(xc)(w)) =
λw.[cont(ιxc.claim(xc)(w))= λw′.John moved to Canada(w′)]
Another option, which will be pursued here, and argued for in more detail in Section 4.4
below, is that both the DP the claim and the clause that John moved to Canada are of type
e, and thus, truly do involve equation.
The crucial analytical piece, which will be required, is the assumption that nouns and
verbs select for different complementizers. Specifically, we propose that nouns select for the
complementizer in (105-a), whereas verbs select for a complementizer that shifts propositions
into things of type e. On this view, then, it follows that the copula too will select a
complementizer that shifts the clause, of type <st>, to a thing of type e, thus allowing
us to analyse (39-b) as equation.
The composition with the noun also works out, if we assume that nouns do in fact
select propositions, as shown in (44). The end result is the same as on the Kratzer-Moulton
analysis, shown in (32-c) above.19
(44) Content nominals (current proposal)
a. [[CoN ]] = λp<st>.p
b. [[CoN ]]([[John moved to Canada]]) = λw.John moved to Canada(w)
c. [[claim]] = λp<st>.λxc.λw.[claim(xc)(w) & cont(xc)(w) = p]
d. [[claim]]([[that John moved to Canada]]) =
λxc.λw.[claim(xc)(w) & [cont(xc)(w) = λw′.John moved to Canada(w′)]]
19The meaning of the definite article remains standard.
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e. [[the claim that John moved to Canada]] =
ιxc.λw.[claim(xc)(w) & [cont(xc)(w) = λw′.John moved to Canada(w′)]]
The main difference between the two accounts is that here, the content function (22-a) is
part of the meaning of content nominals (105-c), rather than being the meaning of Co. This
strikes me as a desirable consequence, given how central the propositional content is to the
meaning of these nouns: while it is true that a rumor or claim or theory has properties
beyond its propositional content, it wouldn’t be anything without its information content.
In this way, there is something unintuitive about the modification analysis; in the case of
the relative clause modifier in (45-a), the fact that John read the books denoted by the
head nouns is treated as ‘extra’ information about the books, which would presumably be
whatever they are, independently of whether or not John had read them. In (45-b), on the
other hand, it doesn’t seem like the proposition ‘John read every book’ constitutes bonus
information about the claim in the same way.
(45) a. The books that John read.
b. The claim that John read every book.
Of course, this criticism might simply be dealt with by saying that the content of the nominal,
on the modification approach, must be contextually provided (and given the meaning of Co
and how Predicate Modification works, must be identical to the content of the CP). On the
current approach, after all, we must allow for the propositional content of the noun to be
contextually given, without pronouncing a full CP.
4.3.2.1.2 (Non-)argument structure nominalizations
Let us turn now to the second observation that was used to motivate the analysis of clauses
as predicates. This is the observation, due to Grimshaw (1990), that non-derived nouns like
idea and story don’t select for the kinds of DPs that otherwise can refer to propositional
content, independently of case, as in (46).
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(46) Moulton (2009b, p. 23)
*The {idea, story, theory, scoop, myth, notion} of that, I don’t believe.
As shown in (47), this is not the general case for nouns. It is also not the case for all nouns
that combine with CPs: de-verbal nouns like proof and hope may combine with DPs, as
shown in (48).
(47) Moulton (2009b, p. 22)
a. The niece of my brother’s father (is nice).
b. The capital of Wisconsin (is friendly).
(48) Moulton (2009b, p. 23)
a. John proved that he was a citizen.
b. Do you have any proof of/for that?
c. John hoped that he would win.
d. Do you have any hope for that?
Moulton (2009b) takes the observation that the verbs in (46) don’t take DP arguments
to further motivate the claim that these verbs are not relational, and that what would be
the CP counterparts of these DP arguments must therefore not be arguments of the nouns
either, but must combine with the noun via some other composition strategy; by hypothesis,
that shown in (43).20
Further elaboration of this argument in the realm of de-verbal content nouns like belief
is found in Moulton (2015), using Aktionsart modifiers as a diagnostic for ‘non-argument-
structure nominals’. The premise of the argument, from Grimshaw (1990), is that certain
nominalizations, namely those that describe the eventuality of its verbal counterpart, retain
20As Moulton (2009b) points out, it’s important here to distinguish the propositional content of a belief
or claim, from the so-called res argument: what the belief or claim is about (see Quine 1956, Stechow and
Cresswell 1982, Charlow and Sharvit 2014, a.o.).
(49) a. Mary’s belief about John was that he no longer lives in the US.
b. Mary believed of/about John that he no longer lives in the US.
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the argument structural properties associated with the verb, as shown in (50)–(52).
(50) Moulton (2015, p. 315), from Grimshaw (1990, p. 58)
a. The Romans destroyed the city in/*for three hours. Telic
b. The doctor observed the patient for/*in three hours. Atelic
(51) Moulton (2015, p. 315), from Grimshaw (1990, p. 58)
a. The total destruction of the city in/*for two days appalled everyone. Telic
b. Only observation of the patient for/*in several weeks can determine the most
likely course of action. Atelic
Moulton refers to such event nominals as ‘argument-structure nominals’. He further observes
that the Aktionsart modifier requires the internal argument of the verb:
(52) Moulton (2015, p. 315)
a. *The total destruction in two days was widespread.
b. *Only observation for several weeks can determine the best course of action.
If both the CP and DP complements were internal arguments of the de-verbal noun, as
well as of the verb, as we might expect from (53), then, Moulton (2015) argues, we should
expect that both a DP and a CP complement should be able to fill the internal argument
slot of observation in an event/argument-structure nominalization. However, as shown by
(54), only the DP-argument can satisfy this requirement.
(53) a. We observed the patient/that the patient was very ill.
b. The observation of the patient/that the patient was very ill.
(54) Moulton (2015, p. 316)
a. We observed the butler for several weeks.
b. Observation of the butler for several weeks is needed.
c. They observed that the butler was likely the killer for several weeks.
225
d. *Their observation that the butler was likely the killer for several weeks was
not supported by evidence.
This argument is essentially distributional: “non-derived nouns, what I call content nouns
like theory don’t take arguments, so the CPs they appear in construction with cannot be
arguments either. The conclusion is that they must stand in a modification relation to the
noun.” (Moulton 2009b, p. 20) However, what I take this argument to show, is that these
nominals don’t take type e arguments. It is not clear that this argument presents a problem
for the view proposed here, that nouns select for propositions.
The question remains to be answered, however, why the that-clause cannot satisfy the
internal argument requirement of event-nominals, as shown in (54). To some extent, the
analysis offered here fits the approach to the two types of nominalizations outlined in Moul-
ton (2009b, p. 43–45), in the sense that event nominalization requires saturation of the
individual argument, and (on the present approach) feeding the nominal its propositional
argument will return a predicate of individuals. However, I believe there is more to be said
about the issue. A benefit of Moulton’s approach is that it presents a very clear compo-
sitional picture of the relationship between the verbal and nominal counterparts of these
attitude/content roots. On the present approach, it is less clear how these are derivationally
related. I leave this issue for future research.
Before moving on to the issue of how clauses combine with verbs on the present approach,
let us consider a few more data points.
4.3.2.1.3 Clauses as modfiers vs. arguments
To support the claim that content nominals do not take arguments, but combine with clauses
through modification, Moulton (2015) points to the distribution of the clausal anaphor so.
The basic observation is that so is syntactically a CP (and not a DP). That is, it can serve
as a complement to verbs like seem, which only allow CP arguments, as shown in (55) (recall
the discussion in Section 2.3.2).
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(55) Adapted from Moulton (2015, p. 306)
a. It seems [CP so].
b. It seems [CP that John left].
c. *[DP That/it] seems.
d. *It seems [DP that/it].
e. *It seems [DP the fact/idea/notion/claim/rumor that John left].
f. *It seems [DP John’s leaving].
As pointed out by Moulton (2015), so can occur as the complement of attitude verbs, as
shown in (56).21 As shown in (57), however, so cannot occur as the complement of a
clause-taking content nominal.
(56) Bill said/believes that [P John and Mary broke up]i, and I said/believe soi, too.
(57) Moulton (2015, p. 308)
*the/her {admission, announcement, answer, assertion, assumption, claim, com-
ment, complaint, conclusion, expectation, guess, hope, indication, inference, judg-
ment, knowledge, objection, prediction, presumption, pretence, promise, prophecy,
proposal, reasoning, report, ruling, sense, speculation, statement, stipulation, sup-
position, suspicion, teaching, theory, thought, threat, understanding, worry} so
For Moulton (2015), this follows from the way that clauses and proforms combine seman-
tically with nouns and verbs respectively: clauses can combine with nouns through modifi-
cation; proform so, on the other hand, is of type e, and may combine with verbs, but not
nouns, as an argument. On the present approach, however, the contrast follows similarly
from the selectional restrictions of nouns and verbs, respectively (assuming, with Moulton,
that so is of type e). Whereas content nominals select propositional arguments, attitude
verbs select arguments of type e.
Further, as Moulton (2009b) points out, CPs that specify the content of the noun do not
21I discussed the conditions on so as the complement of attitude verbs in Section 2.3.2.
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stack, unlike relative clauses (58). On Moulton’s approach, this is achieved through ensuring
that the proposition specifies the unique content of the noun. On the current approach,
again, this falls out as a consequence of selection: whereas relative clause modifiers can
be stacked, complement/content clauses saturate the internal argument slot of the content
nominal: hence, only one clause is possible.
(58) Moulton (2009b, p. 29)
a. *The rumor that Fred was happy, that he was in Paris, that he could see ghosts.
b. The rumor that Fred made, that Jill believed, that Bill spread to his friends. . .
With regards to these two observations then, it seems like the two approaches are
both able to account for the data. A more conclusive piece of evidence comes from one-
replacement.22
(59) a. The rumor that Bill told Mary and the one that he told John.
b. *The rumor that Bill likes Mary and the one that he likes John.
As shown in (59), one-replacement is possible with relative clauses, but not with a com-
plement/content clause. On the assumption that one cannot target a nominal without also
targeting its internal argument (since Jackendoff 1977; see Harley 2005, 2014 for theoreti-
cal discussion and formal implementation of this in a Distributed Morphology/Bare Phrase
Structure framework), this shows us that while the relative clause in (59-a) is a modifier on
the noun rumor, the clause in (59-b) is an internal argument.
Before moving on, I should mention that Moulton (2009b) also looks at evidence from
binding/connectivity to support the claim that the CP is an adjunct, rather than an argu-
ment. The prediction is that if the CP is an adjunct, we should see selective bleeding of
condition C effects, because the CP can be Late Merged in the high position, and not in the
base-position (Van Riemsdijk and Williams 1981, Freidin 1986, Lebeaux 2009, Safir 1999).
On Lebeaux’s (2009) account, Late Merge is available for adjuncts, but not arguments, be-
22Thanks Luke Adamson, p.c., for this observation!
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cause of the Projection Principle, which states that all of the predicate’s arguments have to
be present at all levels of representation. The contrast is shown in (60), and the theoretical
implementation is given in (61).
(60) Moulton (2009b, p. 51); from Safir (1999, fn. 1, p. 589)
a. *Which investigation of Nixon1 did he1 resent? argument
b. Which investigation near Nixon’s1 house did he1 resent? modifier
(61) Moulton (2009b, p. 53)
a. Modifier – late-merged to higher copy (no Condition C violation)
[Which investigation near Nixon’s1 house] did he1 resent [which investigation]?
b. Argument – merged in base position (violates Condition C)
*[Which investigation of Nixon1] did he1 resent [which investigation of Nixon]?
Freidin (1986), Lebeaux (2009) observed such an asymmetry between relative clauses (62-a)
and clausal complements of nouns (62-b), thus supporting the analysis of the latter as an
argument and the latter as a complement, in line with the one-replacement data in (59).
(62) Moulton (2009b, p. 54); from Safir (1999, p. 589)
a. *Which claim that Mary had offended John1 did he1 repeat? CP comp
b. Which claim that offended John1 did he1 repeat? RC
As Moulton points out, however, several linguists have argued that these facts are not robust,
as shown in (63), where no Condition C violation appears to occur.
(63) Moulton (2009b, p. 56); (b) from Safir (1999, fn. 1, p. 589)
a. The fact that John1 has been arrested he1 generally fails to mention.
b. How many arguments that John’s1 theory was correct did he1 publish?
He argues that once we control for a number of confounds (see discussion in Moulton 2009b,
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Sec. 4.4), we do in fact observe a contrast between clausal complements of verbs (or verbal
gerunds, in this example), and clausal complements of nouns, which now pattern with the
relative clause modifier in (62-b).
(64) Moulton (2009b, p. 63)
a. *Whose loudly claiming that Bob1 is the murderer did he1 not hear? V+CP
b. Whose loudly claiming that he1 is the murderer did Bob1 not hear? V+CP
c. Whose loud claim that Bob1 is the murderer did he1 not hear? N+CP
d. Whose loud claim that he1 is the murderer did Bob1 not hear? N+CP
As Moulton points out, however, it is not clear how robust this contrast is. While this issue
certainly matters for evaluating the two approaches, I will leave this issue for future work.
Before moving on to the analysis (Section 4.4), let us consider the issue of how, on this
approach, clauses would combine with attitude verbs.
4.3.2.2 Clausal complements of verbs
In the previous section, we considered the compositional strategies available for clauses
to compose with (de-verbal) content nominals. I discussed in some detail the approach
articulated in Moulton (2009b), where clauses are treated as predicates, modifying the nouns
that they combine with. Here, I briefly review the compositional mechanism proposed for
clausal complements of verbs, on this approach, as outlined in Moulton (2015).
The denotation of attitude verbs, on this approach, is given in (65-a). If clauses are of
type <e,st>, as in (65-b), it is clear that they will not be able to combine with verbs.
(65) Moulton (2015, p. 320)
a. [[
√
explain]] = λxc.λe.λw.explain(xc)(e)(w) = (37-a)
b. [[that Fred left ]] λxc.λw.cont(xc)(w) = that Fred left
Moulton’s solution is to propose that clauses combine with verbs via two type driven move-
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ments: (i) CP-movement to Spec,AspP (below Existential Closure (∃)), which leaves a copy
of type e to saturate the verb’s selectional requirement, and triggers predicate abstraction
(allowing the CP to combine with the VP via Predicate Modification); (ii): Aspo-movement
to a position above ∃, which leaves an event-type trace to saturate the verb’s event-argument,
and triggers predicate abstraction (allowing Aspo to combine with the VP, a predicate of
eventualities, and return a predicate of times).
Part of the motivation for this analysis is the observation discussed above, that that-
clauses can combine with nouns that otherwise don’t take type e arguments (Stowell 1981,
Grimshaw 1990). The other empirical phenomenon that the movement-based account aims
to explain, is that that-clauses don’t move leftward (e.g. Alrenga 2005, see also Koster 1978,
Takahashi 2010, Moulton 2013, Ott 2017; see discussion in Section 2.3.4 ). This claim is
based on the observation that (apparently) fronted CPs are only possible if a DP is licensed
in its base-position (we refer to this as the DP-requirement, following Moulton 2013):
(66) Adapted from Ott (2017, p. 5),
a. Bill expected that John would be unqualified.
b. That had been expected.
c. That John would be unqualified had been expected.
d. Bill expected it.
e. Bill expected him to be unqualified.
(67) Adapted from Ott (2017, p. 5),
a. Bill objected that John would be unqualified.
b. *That had been objected.
c. *That John would be unqualified had been objected.
d. *Bill objected it.
e. *Bill objected him to be unqualified.
Moulton (2015, p. 306) discusses the consequences of this observation: “One line [of address-
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ing the DP-requirement, KD] is that a DP in the form of a null operator is recruited, and
CPs are high, base-generated satellites (Koster 1978, Alrenga 2005). The other line is that
CPs that move are in fact embedded in null DPs (Davies and Dubinsky 2010, Takahashi
2010). Both of these solutions have the following corollary. In order to capture the fact
that CPs must rely on one of these DP strategies, the grammar must prevent CPs from
themselves moving alone.”
As Moulton points out, this is not due to a general ban on things of category CP to
move. As we saw in (55), proform so is syntactically a CP, yet appears to be able to move
(recall from (55) that seem does not take DP-complements, thus allowing us to rule out
the hypothesis that so moves using the same kind of DP-strategy that is involved in the
movement of full that-clauses).
(68) So it seems.
Regarding the movement-facts, the theoretical claim from Moulton (2015) is that the re-
sulting configuration blocks further leftward movement, as this would either result in a
type-clash or semantically vacuous movement (see discussion in Moulton 2015, Sec. 4.2.).23
Recall from Sections 2.3.4–2.3.5 that, based on the availability of CP-fronting across differ-
ent types of predicates, we suggested that movement requires not only that a DP is licensed
in base-position, but also that the verb is able to combine with a CP. We leave further
exploration of the movement facts for future research, and turn now to the task at hand,
of accounting for the entailment and argument structural properties of know vs. believe
discussed in Section 4.1.
23The movement analysis is argued to have a number of other benefits, including capturing the right-
peripheral position of CPs relative to arguments and the verbal complex in German, freezing effects in the
VP, extraction from and binding into CPs, and similarities and difference among CP argument extraposition,
heavy NP shift, relative clause extraposition. See Moulton (2015) for discussion.
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4.4 Analysis
In Section 4.1, we looked at the interpretation of sentences involving nominal and clausal
complements of attitude verbs. We saw that with verbs like know, discover, fear, imagine,
and mention, etc., sentences with DP-complements are interpreted essentially as relations
of acquaintance (in relation to other aspects of meaning) to an individual. Here, the epis-
temic or doxastic relation present in the corresponding CP-case disappears. With believe
and trust, however, the verbs retain their epistemic or doxastic meaning with all kinds of
DP-complements. In cases involving content nouns like claim or rumour, the DP is sim-
ply interpreted as a “vessel of propositional content” (as on the standard picture of content
nominals, discussed in the previous section). With DPs that are not associated with propo-
sitional content, the DP gets interpreted as the source of the propositional content. In both
of these cases, the entailment to the corresponding CP-case is preserved.
We noted that this pattern raises a question for how to analyse the selectional require-
ments of the know -class verbs: Do they denote a relationship to a proposition, in which case
they select for a that-clause? Or do they denote an acquaintance relation to an entity, and
select for a DP? And moreover, what does this mean for the Hintikkan picture, according
to which know is simply the factive sibling of believe?
In Section 4.3.1, we considered a theoretical alternative based on polysemy, whereby
the facts are explained by all verbs of the know -class are ambiguous between a verb which
denotes an acquaintance-based relation and selects for individuals of type e (the DP-case)
and a doxastic or epistemc verb, which selects for propositions of type <st>. This alternative
was rejected on both conceptual and empirical grounds.
In Section 4.3.2, we examined a recent popular approach to the semantic composition
of clausal complements, which treats clauses as predicates of propositional content, which
combines with nouns as modifiers (via Predicate Modification), and with verbs via a set of
type-driven movements. Looking at the distribution of clauses and individuals in equative
sentences, we argued that clauses are in fact of type e. On this view, these attitude verbs
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select a complementizer which shifts propositions into things of type e, a process mediated
by selection for a complementizer of type <st,e>.
To account for the composition of clauses and content nouns, which would not be able
to compose semantically if they were both of type e, we proposed that content nouns do in
fact select for propositions, and that the content function is part of the meaning of content
nominals. Rather than selecting for a C-head which includes the content function as part of
its meaning, we proposed that content nouns select for a ‘classic’ C-head, which is simply a
function of type <st,st>. In Section 4.3.2.1.3, we saw evidence for this claim —that clausal
complements are arguments rather than modifiers— from the one-replacement test. In both
the verbal and the nominal case, then, the embedding predicate composes with the clausal
complement through Function Application.
With this background in mind, let us now turn to the claim that clauses are of type e.
Before putting the various analytical pieces together, let us consider in some more detail the
compositional possibilities for the Source-DP, which we find presents further motivation for
treating the clausal complements of believe-verbs as individuals. In Section 4.5, we present
arguments for treating the clausal complements of know -verbs as individuals.
4.4.1 Selecting for individuals: introducing Source-arguments
As we saw in 4.1, believe-verbs, but not know -verbs, allows for a Source-argument to co-occur
with a finite that-clause:
(69) Source-construction
a. I believe him [CP that he’s moving to Canada].
b. *I know him [CP that he’s moving to Canada].
In what follows, we examine the syntactic and semantic properties of this construction, and
discuss its implications for the compositional semantics of attitude verbs and that-clauses.
The same contrast is found in German. Interestingly, in German, which distinguishes
morphologically between Accusative (acc) and Dative (dat) case, we observe a contrast
234
between Source and content DPs: the Source-DP must have Dative case, as shown in (70-a),
whereas content DPs must have Accusative case, as shown in (70-b).24
(70) German
a. Ich
I
glaube
believe
ihm/*ihn,
him.dat/acc,
dass
that
Hans
Hans
Maria
Maria
das
the
Buch
book
gab.
gave.
‘I believe him that Hans gave Mary the book.’
b. Ich
I
glaube
believe
die/#dem
the.acc/dat
Behauptung,
claim,
dass
that
Hans
Hans
Maria
Maria
das
the
Buch
book
gab.
gave.
‘I believe the claim that Hans gave Mary the book.’
German, as we saw in Section 4.3.1 above, has different forms corresponding approximately
to acquaintance/familiarity know (kennen) and propositional know (wissen). As with the
English verb know, neither kennen nor wissen may participate in the Source-construction.
(71) illustrates
(71) German
*Ich
I
weiß/kenne
know.prop/know.fam
ihm,
him.dat,
dass
that
Hans
Hans
Maria
Maria
das
the
Buch
book
gab.
gave.
‘I know (from him) that Hans gave Mary the book.’
Importantly, German, unlike English, allows for the Source-DP (marked dat), and a content-
DP (marked acc) to co-occur, as shown in (72)–(73).
(72) German
Ich
I
glaube
believe
ihm
him.dat
die
the.acc
Behauptung,
claim
dass
that
Hans
Hans
Maria
Maria
das
the
Buch
book
gab.
gave.
‘I believe the claim that he told me, that Hans gave Mary the book.’
(73) *I believe him the claim that Hans gave Mary the book.
24Thanks Florian Schwarz for this observation.
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To account for the case- and DP-licensing contrasts in (70) and (72), I propose that in
German, the Source-DP is introduced in a Low Source Applicative (74) (recall that e is
the type of individuals and s is the type of events and states25). This is plausible, as this
construction is generally available in German, but not in English, as shown in (75) (e.g.
McIntyre 2006, Schäfer 2008)
(74) Pylkkänen (2008, p. 22)
[[ApploSource]] = λxe.λye.λf<e,st>.λes.[f(e,x) & TH(e,x) & source(x,y)]
(75) Source Applicative (Schäfer 2008, p. 76)
a. *John stole Mary a book.
(Intended: John stole a book from Mary) English
b. Hans
Hans.nom
stahl
stole
Maria
Maria.dat
das
the
Buch
book.acc
‘Hans stole the book from Maria.’ German
English, like German, has Goal Applicatives (76), as shown with (77-a)–(77-b).
(76) Pylkkänen (2008, p. 22)
[[ApploGoal]] = λxe.λye.λf<e,st>.λes.[f(e,x) & TH(e,x) & recipient(x,y)]
(77) Goal (Recipient) Applicative (Schäfer 2008, p. 76)
a. John gave Mary a book. English
b. Hans
Hans.nom
gab
gave
Maria
Maria.dat
das
the
Buch
book.acc
‘Hans gave Maria the book.’ German
Recall the assumption spelled out in Section 1.3, that a minimal requirement on seman-
tic composition is that their semantic types are compatible (assuming a set of compositional
mechanisms, in particular Functional Application (25) for arguments and Predicate Modi-
fication (26) for modifiers). On the standard analysis, ApploSource takes two arguments of
25Though as we pointed out in Section 4.2 above, in a situation semantic perspective, eventualities would
be viewed as a type of situation.
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type e and returns a function of type <<e,st>,<st>>, as shown in (74). In order for glauben
(‘believe’) to be able to combine with ApplP, then, glauben must itself be of type <e,st>,26,27
i.e. selecting for individuals, rather than propositions.28 We might of course imagine a differ-
ent version of ApploSource, which selects for propositions, rather than individuals, as its first
argument. However, without further, independent, motivation for such a move, we assume
a classic, independently motivated, semantics for ApploSource. This move, then, raises the
question of what kind of individual does believe-verbs select for.
The answer to this question, we argue, lies in the entailment contrast discussed in Section
4.1. While believe+DP preserves the epistemic entailments of the corresponding CP-case,
know -verbs do not; they describe relations of acquaintance to their DP-complements. We
also saw that this was not a function of the nature of the DP, but followed from the verbs
themselves. This contrast, then, must be due to something about the lexical semantics of
the verbs. We propose that know and believe-verbs (a) select for different types of indi-
viduals, and (b) denote different types of relations to these individuals. As shown in the
templatic analysis given in (78), know -verbs return predicates of states or events involving
“acquaintance” (very broadly speaking) with some individual x, as shown in (84-a): this
individual can be a particular like John or the tea cup or content individual like the rumour
(that p). (In Section 5.6, we show that factive know -verbs involve an evidential acquaintance
relation; see Tables 5.6–5.7 for the final analysis of these predicates.) believe-verbs, on the
other hand, describe fundamentally doxastic or epistemic states, and select specifically for
content individuals (xc). As shown in (84-b), believe-verbs return predicates of states that
are true if the intentional content p of xc is true in all of the attitude holder’s doxastic
alternatives.
26Where s is an eventuality, either a state or an event.
27It is of course also conceivable, though not very plausible, that glauben took ApplP as its first argument,
rather than the opposite. I will not consider that option here, as this would cause serious problems for the
composition with clauses and DPs.
28Note that it doesn’t necessarily follow from the Applicative facts that this holds also for believe in
English. However, in the interest of keeping our theory as restrictive as possible, and given that German
otherwise appears to pattern with English (both in terms of the know/believe-contrast discussed here, and
in their semantic-pragmatic properties, as we saw experimental evidence of in Section 3.2), I will assume
that English believe is also of type <e,st>.
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(78) know and believe-verbs [Schematic templates: see §5.6]
a. know -verbs : λxe.λsl.VERBAQ(s)(x)
b. believe-verbs : λxe.λsl.VERBDOX(s)(cont(x)(ws))
By including the content-function (repeated in (79)) in the lexical semantics of believe,
it follows that believe DP entails the belief that p (as per the Hintikkan approach, and also
in line with Kratzer 2006 and Moulton 2009b).
(79) cont(xc)(w) = {w′ : w′ is compatible with the intentional content determined by
xc in w}
Given that know -verbs do not include the content function in their lexical semantics, but de-
scribe relations of acquaintance with particulars, the belief that p does not follow from know
DP (contrary to the Hintikkan approach). This then captures the fact that the entailment
contrasts are not due to the complements, but follow from the verbs themselves.29
The applicative facts and the entailment contrast motivates analyzing the clausal com-
plements of believe as content individuals.30 As we mentioned in Section 4.3.2.1.1, we can
derive a CP of type e from a proposition (the semantic type of TP) via a complementizer
that shifts propositions into a content individual (xc), as shown in (80) (where p can be any
proposition):
(80) Clausal complements of believe-verbs
a. [[CoV −cont]]w = λp<st>.ιxc.cont(xc)(w) = p
b. [[CPV −cont]]w = ιxc.cont(xc)(w) = p
Let us turn now to the type of clausal complements of know -verbs. The entailment contrasts
motivate the claim that know -verbs do not extract propositional content from content indi-
29This move raises questions about the opacity of the complements of know -verbs. I address these in
Section 4.4.2.
30The argument against polysemy in Section 4.3.1 focused on know -verbs; however, the same considera-
tions apply in the case of the believe-class.
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viduals, but rather, describe an acquaintance relation to such individuals. The arguments
against polysemy then spoke against positing a separate lexical item for CP-arguments.
Taken together, this motivates analysing know -class verbs as in (84-a), regardless of whether
they take a DP or a CP-complement, with the consequence that know -verbs do not denote
doxastic relations to their clausal complements. In Section 4.4.2, we discuss the conse-
quences, and note some advantages, of this analytical consequence.
The question is whether the clausal complements of these two types of verbs are them-
selves different. One possibility is that clausal complements of know and believe are the
same: that they are both content individuals, as in (80). Another option is that the gram-
mar makes available a different type of C-head, which specifically shifts propositions to
particulars (xr). Such an alternative is provided in (81):
(81) Possibility for clausal complements of know -verbs (to be rejected)
a. [[CoV −part]] = λpst.ιxr.situation(xr) & exemplifies(xr)(p)
b. [[CPV −part]] = ιxr.situation(xr) & exemplifies(xr)(p)
A problem with the alternative in (81), however, is that, at least without further qual-
ification, it wrongly predicts that all verbs of the know -variety should be factive, given the
adoption of Kratzer’s (2002) exemplification-relation (see discussion around (24) in Section
4.2). On Kratzer’s (2002) account of what it means to know a fact, facts are particulars
that exemplify propositions —in the same way that particulars such as tea cups, people,
and rumours exemplify properties.
Moreover, it seems intuitive that, for instance, knowing the story of Robin Hood implies
that you know the content of that story, not just that your are familiar with its existence.31,32
31As with I know of the story of Robin Hood, where the story of Robin Hood is the res argument (e.g. Quine
1956, Stechow and Cresswell 1982, Charlow and Sharvit 2014). In English, these arguments are typically
introduced in PPs, as shown in (82):
(82) a. Mary’s belief (about John) was that he no longer lives in the US.
b. Mary believed (of/about John) that he no longer lives in the US.
32Thanks Florian Schwarz, p.c., for this point.
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On the alternative in (81), there is nothing that captures this fact. On the alternative
in (80), on the other hand, the attitude holder is acquainted with an individual, which
is characterized by its content, as well as any other properties (like being kind, tedious,
repetitive, and so on). We thus adopt the alternative in (80) for both types of verbs:
(83) Clausal complements of verbs (final analysis)
a. [[CoV −cont]]w = λp<st>.ιxc.cont(xc)(w) = p
b. [[CPV −cont]]w = ιxc.cont(xc)(w) = p
This move also has the nice consequence that it simplifies our typology of complementizers:
we now have one verbal complementizer of type <st,e> (involved with attitude verbs as well
as with the copula), and one nominal complementizer of type <st,st>.
The full composition of the two types of verbs and the various (im)possible combinations
of complement types is spelled out in (85)–(87) (based on the meanings of the two types of
verbs given in (78); repeated in (84) for clarity), highlighting clearly the epistemic equiva-
lence of believe+DP and believe+CP (the internal composition of content DPs is given in
(44)). (Note that on this analysis, sentences like I believe Lisa (that p) involve either a
contextually supplied value or existential closure of the content argument, unlike sentences
like I know Lisa; in line with their respective interpretations.)
(84) know and believe-verbs [Schematic templates: see §5.6]
a. know -verbs : λxe.λsl.VERBAQ(s)(x)
b. believe-verbs : λxe.λsl.VERBDOX(s)(cont(x)(ws))
(85) Clausal complements of verbs vs. content DPs
a. [[it’s raining ]]w = ιxc.cont(xc)(w)=λw′.rains(w′)
b. [[the claim that it’s raining ]]w = ιxc.cont(xc)(w)=λw′.rains(w′) & claim(xc)(w)
Schematic templates of clausal and nominal complements of know and believe-verbs (see
Section 5.6 for the full analysis of factive know -verbs; where we show that these encode an
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evidential presupposition).
(86) know -verbs with CP/DP complements
a. CP-complements (e.g. it’s raining):
λsl.VAQ(s)(ιxc.cont(xc)(w)=λw′.rains(w′))
b. Content DP (e.g. the claim that it’s raining):
λsl.VAQ(s)(ιxc.cont(xc)(w)=λw′.rains(w′) & claim(xc)(w))
c. Regular entities (e.g. Lisa):
λsl.VAQ(s)(Lisa)
(87) believe-verbs with CP/DP complements
a. CP-complements (e.g. it’s raining):
λsl.VDOX(s)(cont(ιxc.cont(xc)(w)=λw′.rains(w′))(ws))
b. Content DP (e.g. the claim that it’s raining):
λsl.VDOX(s)(cont(ιxc.cont(xc)(w)=λw′.rains(w′) & claim(xc)(w))(ws))
c. Regular entities (e.g. Lisa):
# λsl.VDOX(s)(cont(Lisa)(ws))
Before concluding this section, we should note that there is clearly more to be said about
the Source-construction. One question, which we will not attempt to tackle here, is how the
Source-DP is introduced in English, which, as we have seen, lacks Source Applicatives. In
German, the composition works out without difficulty, as shown in (88).
(88) Composition of Source-construction in German
a. [[believe Mary that it’s raining ]] :
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b. vP<st>
vo<e,st>
believe
ApplP<<e,st>,<st>>
DPe
Mary
ApplP<e,<e,st>,<st>>>
Applo<e,<e,<e,st>,<st>>>> CPe
that it’s raining
c. λes.[VERBDOX(e)(cont(ιxc.cont(xc)(ws)=λw′.raining(w′))(ws)) &
TH(e,ιxc.cont(xc)(ws)=λw′.raining(w′)) &
source(ιxc.cont(xc)(ws)=λw′.raining(w′),Mary)]
Roughly, this is a predicate of eventualities of believing the propositional content ‘it is
raining’ (the meaning of the CP), where the source of that content is some Mary.
As we saw in (72) above, English does not allow two DPs: it is possible to have a Source-
DP or a content DPs, but not both. This speaks to there being only one case-assigning
head present in the syntax. The question for the semantics, then, is how the Source-DP is
introduced in the first place? In the case of content DPs, we have argued that the clause
is selected for by the noun (Section 4.3.2.1.3). However, there is no reason to think that
entities like Bill select for clauses. Moreover, contrasts in the movement possibilities confirm
that that-clauses form a constituent with content nouns, but not with Source-DPs:
(89) a. The rumour that Bill is moving to Canada surprised Mary/is unbelievable.
b. *Bill that he is moving to Canada surprised Mary/is unbelievable.
Another option would be to say that the Source-DP is lexically introduced by believe-verbs.
This, however, would require us to say that believe in English, is of type <e,<e,<st>>>, given
that on the current approach, the Source-DP cannot be an argument of believe:
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(90) believe her that p : vP: TYPE CLASH
her.acce <st>
believe<e,st> CPe
(91) believe the claim that p : vP<st>
believe<e,<st>> DP.acce
One reason to not take this route, is that we have no reason, besides this contrast, to think
that English believe and German glauben differ in this respect. More importantly, however,
while the bare DP-case clearly implies some contextually salient proposition, the inverse
does not hold in the bare CP-case:
(92) a. Iy believe youx. ↝ ∃ p s.t. y believes x that p
b. Iy believe [P that it’s raining]. ↝̸ ∃ x s.t. x is the source of p
Here, there is no inference that some (contextually salient) individual is the source of p.
This speaks against believe selecting for the Source-DP.33
Another question is why know -verbs should not be possible in the Source-construction.
On the analysis given here (78), their semantic types are compatible with the selectional
requirements of ApploSource. One possibility for why know -verbs are not possible in this
construction might then be that the meaning resulting from combining know -verbs and
ApplP is anomalous. Whereas believe-verbs when combined with ApplP describe predicates
of states of believing some propositional content p (of a content individual xc), where the
source of that content is some individual y, the resulting meaning in the case of know would
be a predicate of states or events of acquaintance with an individual xc, where y the source
of xc. While the former meaning strikes me as more transparent, it is not obvious to me,
however, that the latter meaning is anomalous. And in fact, as we will see in Section 5.6.2
33Thanks Florian Schwarz, pc. for this point.
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where we discuss the DP status of emotive factives, there is reason to think that at least
this subtype of the know -class does make reference to something like a source situation or
individual. This suggests that the selectional requirements of know -verbs are likely more
complex than suggested here.
Regardless of these complications, the main conclusions to take away from this chapter
still hold: (i) that clausal complements of attitude verbs like know and believe denote content
individuals, rather than propositions, and (ii) that these two types of predicates differ fun-
damentally in how they relate to those individuals. While believe-verbs describe epistemic or
doxastic relations to propositions (à la Hintikka), know -verbs describe acquaintance-based
relations to particulars. Connecting the conclusions of this section to the discussion on
content nouns in Section 4.1, we arrive at a three-way split among predicates that select
that-clauses (content nouns, know -verbs, and believe-verbs). This split is mediated by two
general types of complementizers: a nominal type (<st,st>), and a verbal type (<st,e>).
This analysis proposed here for the lexical semantics of know -verbs, believe-verbs, and
content nominals, has allowed us to explain the following empirical observations: the DP-
to-CP entailment contrasts between know and believe-predicates and its correlation with
the ability to occur in the Source-construction (Section 4.1), the ability of clauses to occur
with content nominals in equative sentences (Section 4.3.2.1.1), and the argument-status of
clausal complements of content nouns (Section 4.3.2.1.3). A more specific proposal for the
semantics of factive verbs and fact that nominals is offered in Section 5.6, where we argue
that factive know -verbs involve an evidential acquaintance relation (see summaries in Tables
5.5, 5.6–5.7).
Before concluding this chapter, Section 4.4.2 provides some discussion on the analysis of
know -verbs as involving a primarily acquaintance-based relation, rather than as a primarily
epistemic predicate, pointing to some potential issues, as well as some observations in favour
of this approach.
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4.4.2 Knowledge without belief?
In the previous section, we proposed a lexical semantics for attitude verbs like know which
was primarily acquaintance-based, rather than epistemic. Primary motivation for this ap-
proach came from the observation that know -verbs and believe-verbs differ in whether a
sentence with a DP-complement entails the corresponding sentence with a CP-complement:
(93) Uegaki (2015, p. 626)
John {knows, discovered, reported, predicted} the rumor that Mary left. ⊭
John {knows, discovered, reported, predicted} that Mary left.
(94) Adapted from Uegaki (2015, p. 626)
John {believed, doubted, trusted} the rumor that Mary left. ⊧
John {believed, trusted, doubted} that Mary left.
This move, however, is likely to raise a number of eyebrows. The idea that knowledge
entails belief is fairly standard both in the linguistic and the philosophical literature, as we
saw reflected in the Hintikkan approach discussed in Section 1.1. However, while it’s clear
that many (perhaps most) uses of know that p implies the belief that p, there are also uses
that clearly do not imply such belief:34
(96) [About a friend, a former student at Cambridge, who’s confusedly walking on the
grass —something which all students know is not permitted:]
He definitely knows that walking on the grass is not allowed! I guess he’s been away
for a long time and must have forgotten. . .
Importantly, there are no such uses with believe: belief, by definition, must involve an
epistemic state. Acquaintance with an actual situation, corresponding to the content of the
34Similarly to know WH, e.g.
(95) You definitely know {the answer, what to do here}! Just think about it for a minute.
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belief, does not, however, seem to be necessary:
(97) I don’t know why I believe that I’m going to win the Nobel Prize. I just do.
know has also been observed to have uses corresponding to (97), as shown in (98). However,
the use of how, as opposed to why in (97), is telling: this suggests that even in these cases,
there exists a situation through which the speaker knows that p (though exactly what that
situation is may not be known).
(98) I don’t know how I know that I’m going to win the Nobel Prize. I just do.
Another interesting contrast that speaks to this point concerns the (in)compatibility of be
right (often taken to the veridical counterpart of know ; e.g. Anand and Hacquard 2014) with
epistemics or doxastics like believe vs. acquaintance-based predicates like know. With verbs
like believe, be right to VERB is possible, and means roughly that the epistemic intuition is
correct (99). With verbs like know, however, be right to VERB is infelicitous (100):
(99) a. You are right to believe that this distinction has important moral implications.35
b. You are right to doubt that she was dead by that time.36
c. You are right to trust that it is time to wear your heart on your sleeve.37
(100) a. #You are right to know that Bill and Anna broke up.
b. #You were right to hear/have heard that Bill and Anna broke up.
c. #You were right to discover/have discovered that Bill and Anna broke up.38
There is also evidence supporting the claim that some of the predicates that are generally
taken to be ‘weak’ (non-factive) doxastics, are in fact acquaintance verbs like know :
35From https://samharris.org/the-marionettes-lament/.
36From https://www.reddit.com/r/serialpodcast/comments/2m428a/how_do_we_know_for_sure_
hae_was_dead_by_236/.
37From http://kristinfontana.com/starcast/2015/07/08/.
38With some of these predicates, there is an alternative reading of be right, as in You were right to find
out that they broke up.. What this means, however, is not the epistemic intuition that is right, as in (99),
but rather that the act of finding out was justified.
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(101) It’s a rainy Christmas Eve all over the UK and the question is who is number one
on the Radio One chart show tonight? “Is it Blue or the unexpected Christmas
sensation from Billy Mack?” You might have guessed it although you may
not believe it. . . It’s Billy Mack!39
In Sections 5.6.1–5.6.2 of Chapter 5, we present an analysis of factivity, which might be
viewed as a ‘decompositional’ development of Kratzer’s (2002) account of what it means to
know a fact, given in (102).
(102) S knows p if and only if (Kratzer 2002, p. 664)
a. There is a fact f that exemplifies p,
b. S believes p de re of f, and
c. S can rule out relevant possible alternatives of f that do not exemplify p.
We propose that the basis for factivity (in the sense of the projection-prone inference that
the speaker is committed to p) is a presupposition of an evidential modal base, anchored to
a Judge, which entails p (akin to the condition in (89-c)). Depending on the type of factive
predicate, however, the judge can either be bound by the speaker (as we argue is the case
for doxastic factives), or by the attitude holder (the case of the emotive factives), or it can
be contextually provided (the case of fact that nominals). The belief-component in (89-b),
however, plays no role in our account of factivity.
Nevertheless, this is obviously not the last word on this issue. Regarding the source of
the doxastic component of know -verbs, one potential option is to treat it like an inference
of some kind, stemming perhaps from the evidential relation. Another possibility is to go
further down the decompositional route, proposing that belief is a possible, but not essential
component of knowledge. An interesting direction for further work in this area is to combine
the insights from the semantics with a derivational approach to the internal composition
of words, such as that offered by Derivational Morphology (e.g. Halle and Marantz 1993,
39From the movie Love Actually.
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Harley and Noyer 1999, Embick and Marantz 2008, among others).This is clearly an issue
beyond the scope of the current project, but I hope that the discussion here has provided
some interesting new directions for future work on the topic.
4.5 Summary
This chapter has argued for a unified, acquaintance-based semantics for ‘propositional’ and
‘acquaintance’ know and other predicates where sentences with DP-complements fail to
entail the corresponding CP-sentences. This is unlike believe-verbs, which we take to describe
a fundamentally epistemic or doxastic relation to propositions (in line with the Hintikkan
approach).
The central empirical observation of this chapter, was the contrast in the availability
of the Source-arguments between the know -class and the believe-class, and the correlation
of this split to the DP-to-CP entailment contrast (Section 4.1). Rather than placing the
explanatory burden on the complement itself, the account offered here places it on the
type of relation described by the verb. Verbs like know, mention, discover, and explain (in
addition to other aspects of meaning) describe a primarily “acquaintance”-based relation to
an individual. Verbs like believe, trust, and doubt (besides other components of meaning)
describe primarily epistemic or doxastic relations to propositions (in the Hintikkan sense).
To further capture the argument-structural properties of these verbs, and of content
nouns which take clausal arguments, we proposed in Section 4.4.1 that clausal complements
of verbs are individuals (in line with Cresswell 1973, Chierchia 1984, 1985, Potts 2002,
and Woods 2016a). The semantics of this individual, however, borrows elements of the
account of Kratzer (2006) and Moulton (2009b); specifically, the feature that propositions
(the semantic type of TPs) are selected by a C-head which embeds the content function.
Rather than returning a predicate of propositional content, as on the Moulton-Kratzer view,
we argue that it returns an individual of propositional content, as shown in (103):
(103) Clausal complements of verbs
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a. [[CoV −cont]]w = λp<st>.ιxc.cont(xc)(w) = p
b. [[CPV −cont]]w = ιxc.cont(xc)(w) = p
This proposal, then, also explains the availability of that-clauses in equatives.
The basic, schematic meanings for the two types of predicates are given in (104). The key
difference is that believe-verbs select specifically for content individuals (xc), and describe
states that are fundamentally doxastic or epistemic, as on the standard Hintikkan view.
Verbs like know, on the other hand, describe relations of “acquaintance”, broadly construed,
to a theme, which may be regular, particular individuals like Lisa and the tea cup, or content
individuals like the rumour (that p).
(104) know vs. believe-verbs [Schematic templates: see §5.6]
a. know -verbs : λxe.λsl.VERBAQ(s)(x)
b. believe-verbs : λxe.λsl.VERBDOX(s)(cont(x)(ws))
In Chapter 5 (Sections 5.6.1–5.6.2), we refine the analysis provided for the know -verbs,
showing that factive predicates of this general type are evidentials, rather than doxastics.
Regarding the internal composition of content DPs, we argued that content nouns select
for propositions, contrary to the Kratzer-Moulton approach (discussed in Section 4.3.2),
where that-clauses, predicates of propositional content, combine with nouns via Predicate
Modification. This motivated positing a separate nominal complementizer of type <st,st>.
The details of the proposal for content nominals are repeated in (105) (from (44) above):
(105) Clausal complements of content nominals
a. [[CoN ]] = λp<st>.p
b. [[CoN ]]([[John moved to Canada]]) = λw.John moved to Canada(w)
c. [[claim]] = λp<st>.λxc.λw.[claim(xc)(w) & cont(xc)(w) = p]
d. [[claim]]([[that John moved to Canada]]) =
λxc.λw.[claim(xc)(w) & [cont(xc)(w) = λw′.John moved to Canada(w′)]]
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e. [[the claim that John moved to Canada]] =
ιxc.λw.[claim(xc)(w) & [cont(xc)(w) = λw′.John moved to Canada(w′)]]
The full semantic composition of the two types of verbs and the various (im)possible com-
binations of complement types are repeated here (from (85)–(87) above):
(106) Clausal complements of verbs vs. content DPs
a. [[it’s raining ]]w = ιxc.cont(xc)(w)=λw′.rains(w′)
b. [[the claim that it’s raining ]]w = ιxc.cont(xc)(w)=λw′.rains(w′) & claim(xc)(w)
(107) know -verbs with CP/DP complements
a. CP-complements (e.g. it’s raining):
λsl.VAQ(s)(ιxc.cont(xc)(w)=λw′.rains(w′))
b. Content DP (e.g. the claim that it’s raining):
λsl.VAQ(s)(ιxc.cont(xc)(w)=λw′.rains(w′) & claim(xc)(w))
c. Regular entities (e.g. Lisa):
λsl.VAQ(s)(Lisa)
(108) believe-verbs with CP/DP complements
a. CP-complements (e.g. it’s raining):
λsl.VDOX(s)(cont(ιxc.cont(xc)(w)=λw′.rains(w′))(ws))
b. Content DP (e.g. the claim that it’s raining):
λsl.VDOX(s)(cont(ιxc.cont(xc)(w)=λw′.rains(w′) & claim(xc)(w))(ws))
c. Regular entities (e.g. Lisa):
# λsl.VDOX(s)(cont(Lisa)(ws))
As is clear from (107)–(108), incorporating the content function in the meaning of believe-
verbs, but not know -verbs, allows us to account for the DP-to-CP entailment contrasts
discussed in Section 4.1. In Section 4.4.2, we discussed potential objections to this un-
orthodox approach to the semantics of know, where belief is not taken to be a fundamental
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component of its meaning. In the following chapter, we finally turn to the question which
we has haunted this dissertation: What is factivity? If it’s not a presupposition that p
is Common Ground (as we showed in Chapters 2 and 3), and it doesn’t necessarily entail
belief, then what is it?
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Chapter 5
Factivity
In Chapters 2 and 3, we observed that factive predicates vary with respect to the discourse
status of their complement, such that doxastic allow for the embedded proposition to be
asserted, in the sense of providing discourse new content, while emotive factives require
p to be Given, in the sense of Schwarzschild (1999). On the syntactic side, we found (i)
that the potential for embedding discourse new information correlates with the availability
of embedded V2 in Swedish and German, and wh-extraction in English, and (ii) that the
complements of the emotive factives are (overtly or underlyingly) DP. In Chapter 4, we
examined the entailment patterns and argument structure of verbs like know and believe,
finding (i) that such verbs embed content individuals, rather than propositions, and (ii) that
the two types of verbs differ in terms of how they relate to their argument. While verbs
like believe describe a fundamentally epistemic or doxastic relation to the embedded content
(1-b), verbs like know (a set which includes all of the factive verbs as well as a number
of non-factive verb) describe primarily acquaintance-based relations, in addition to other
aspects of meaning (1-a):
(1) know vs. believe-verbs [Schematic templates]
a. know -verbs : λxe.λsl.VERBAQ(s)(x)
b. believe-verbs : λxe.λsl.VERBDOX(s)(cont(x)(ws))
These findings raise a number of questions for the theory of factivity and the semantics
of factive verbs. On the standard conception of factivity (and presuppositions in general),
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factive verbs require p to be Common Ground; a view which is clearly at odds with the
observation that doxastic factives generally allow p to be discourse new information. More-
over, the observation that emotive factives obligatorily select for DPs raises the issue of
what, if any, semantic dimension this reflects (we saw in Chapters 2 and 3 that is can-
not simply be Givenness, given that response stance verbs like accept also require p to be
Given, but allow CP-complements). In this chapter, we look in more detail at the semantics
of doxastic and emotive factives, observing that the doxastic-emotive split tracks a separate
semantic distinction in terms of the types of (linguistic and pragmatic) contexts that allow
for cancellation or suspension of the inference of speaker commitment to p.
This chapter is structured as follows: Section 5.2 introduces previous approaches to
factivity. We focus in particular on a set of recent proposals which have attempted to ac-
count for the (non-)projection of the factive presupposition through various pragmatic means
(we refer to these proposals broadly as ‘pragmatic approaches’), as contrasted with tradi-
tional approaches, which take presuppositions to be lexically encoded properties (‘lexical
approaches’). In Sections 5.3 and 5.4, we present new experimental results from two co-
authored studies studies (with Hezekiah Akiva Bacovcin (Bacovcin and Djärv 2017, Djärv
and Bacovcin 2018), and Jérémy Zehr and Florian Schwarz (Djärv, Zehr, and Schwarz
2018), respectively). These two studies test, and falsify, core predictions of the pragmatic
approaches to factivity. The main findings of Sections 5.3–5.4 are summarized in Section
5.5.
The key analytical claims of this chapter (and to a certain extent, this dissertation) are
provided in Section 5.6. In Section 5.6.1, we examine the complex interplay of evidence,
belief, and justification, which ultimately seems to determine the contexts in which the
global inference that the speaker is committed to p arises. Our main conclusions are: (i) that
while only the behaviour of the emotive factives is incompatible with pragmatic approaches
to factivity (Section 5.2.0.2), the kinds of contexts that lead to presupposition suspension
(for both types of factives), are problematic also for traditional lexical accounts (Section
5.2.0.1); and (ii) that the types of contexts that allow for suspension or cancellation of the
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speaker commitment inference with unembedded emotive factives, closely parallel the types
of contexts often observed to allow for suspension or cancellation of the speaker commitment
inference with embedded doxastic factives. Overall, a central insight emerging from this
chapter is that factivity is less of a uniform phenomenon than has previously been proposed,
both in terms of the semantic and pragmatic properties associated with factive verbs, and
in the realization of these properties in emotive vs. doxastic factives.
Building on the observations made in Sections 5.3 and 5.4, Section 5.6.1 outlines a
novel account of factivity in terms of (for doxastics) lexical or (for emotives) contextual
entailments about evidential support for p. Specifically, the account offered here ties the
speaker commitment inference to a presupposition that the evidential modal base of a Judge
entails p. The ability of the judge to be bound by different individuals (the speaker, in the
case of doxastic factives, the attitude holder, in the case of emotive factives, and via an
index, in the case of fact that nominals) accounts for the variable projection and cancellation
behaviour of the factive inference across predicates and (linguistic and pragmatic) contexts.
While this approach identifies a common source for the triggering and (non-)projection of the
speaker commitment inference for the emotive and doxastic factives, it is also able to capture
a number of observed differences regarding their entailment properties, their interaction with
operators, and sensitivity to contextual effects.
In Section 5.6.2, we return to the discourse status of the embedded proposition, exam-
ining the link between (a) the semantics of emotive factives, the syntactic status of their
clausal complements as DPs or CPs, and the pragmatic status of their complements as Given
or discourse new information. We argue that the emotive factives, unlike both the doxas-
tic factives and the response predicates, in addition to the presupposition of the attitude
holder’s evidential support for p, additionally impose a requirement that a situation or indi-
vidual, providing the source of the attitude holder’s evidential basis for p, is familiar or has
an anaphor in the context. With all the empirical and theoretical pieces in place, we present
our analysis of the semantics of the different types of factives predicates. By dissociating
the (projection-prone) inference of speaker commitment to p, from the discourse status of
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p as new vs. Given content, we are able to give a semantically explanatory account that
does not present a conflict for the pragmatics, and which moreover, is able to capture the
distribution of DP-complements with emotive factives vis-à-vis other attitude predicates.
Finally, in Section 5.7, we look at some outstanding issues regarding variation in the
effects of prosodic focus: Section 5.7.1 presents a probabilistic model (from Djärv and Ba-
covcin 2018) accounting for weak QUD-effects with both factive and non-factive predicates,
observed in Section 5.3. Section 5.7.2 points to potential cross-linguistic variation regarding
factivity and focus. Section 5.8 concludes.
First, we introduce the in more detail the notion of factivity, and the basic semantic
properties of doxastic and emotive factives, respectively.1
5.1 Two types of factives
As we have seen above, factive predicates constitute a sub-type of propositional attitude
predicates; i.e. predicates which denote attitudes towards propositional objects, as illus-
trated with the verbs claim, believe, deny, regret, and know in (2). Each of the sentences
in (2) expresses a different attitude on the part of the attitude holder, (Anna) towards the
proposition denoted by the embedded finite that-clause (Lisa got the job).
(2) a. Anna claimed that [P Lisa got the job].
b. Anna believed that [P Lisa got the job].
c. Anna denied that [P Lisa got the job].
d. Anna regretted that [P Lisa got the job].
e. Anna knew that [P Lisa got the job].
Factive predicates are also a classic type of presupposition trigger. While there is substantial
1In the previous chapter, we argued that belief is not a necessary part of the semantics of verbs like
know. Note that in this chapter, however, we will continue to use the notions of belief or commitment to
p loosely in our discussion of the data (introducing more specific distinctions when necessary), given that
factive sentences in the general case clearly imply belief either on the part of the speaker or the attitude
holder, and this is mostly in line with previous work. For convenience, we will also stick with the labels used
throughout this dissertation, referring to the two types of factives and doxastic and emotive factives.
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variation among different kinds of presupposition triggers, they all give rise to inferences
which (a) tend to be not-at issue in the discourse, and (b) typically survive when embedded
under operators that otherwise target entailments, such as modals and negation. The second
of these properties is referred to as presupposition projection, and is illustrated with the
factive predicate be sad in (3), and with the trigger stop in (4).
(3) a. Anna is sad that [P Lisa got the job]. ↝ Anna / p↝ p
b. Anna isn’t sad that [P Lisa got the job]. ↝̸ Anna / p↝ p
(4) a. Anna stopped smoking. ↝ Anna no longer smokes↝ Anna used to smoke
b. Anna didn’t stop smoking. ↝̸ Anna no longer smokes↝ Anna used to smoke
Regarding the first property, it is probably intuitive that the sentences in (3) are statements
about Anna and her emotive attitude towards Lisa getting the job, and not primarily claims
about Lisa getting the job. Similarly, it should be intuitive that the sentences in (4) are not
claims that Anna used to smoke, but statements about whether she gave it up or not. This
point can be made more clearly using explicit Question-Answer pairs, such as (5) and (6)
(this diagnostic draws on the notion of a Question Under Discussion [QUD], from Roberts
1996, 2012, Büring 2003; which we discussed in Section 2.5.1 above).
(5) Q. Why is Anna looking so mopey?
A. She’s sad that Lisa got the job.
(6) Q. Why is Lisa looking so giddy?
[Answer: Lisa is happy because she got the job.]
A. She got the job.
A’. #Anna is sad that Lisa got the job.
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Following Simons (2007), Simons, Tonhauser, Beaver, and Roberts (2010), among others,
we might say that in sentences involving factive verbs, the main clause typically constitutes
the Main Point or the at-issue content of the sentence. As we saw in Chapters 3 and 4,
however, the doxastic factives present a challenge for this idea.
Another necessary distinction to introduce at this point is that between presupposition
projection (which is illustrated in (3) and (4)) and triggering. The projection prob-
lem concerns the question of when and why presuppositions —typically, but not always—,
survive in embedded context. The triggering problem, on the other hand, concerns the
question of how presuppositions arise to begin with, and why it is that only certain content
gets to be presupposed. In Section 5.2.0.2, we will see that while the projection question
itself presents a fairly straightforward problem, the way that people have understood the
triggering problem is more complicated, and appears to depend on what they take to be the
explanandum; in particular, whether it is the purported Common Ground status of p, or
the inference that p is true.
In terms of the type of relation or attitude expressed, factive predicates come in a
range of flavors.2 However, a major distinction can be made between predicates like know,
discover, and be aware, which express cognitive relations between the attitude holder and the
embedded proposition, and regret, appreciate, and be sad, which denote emotive attitudes.
(7) Two types of factives
a. Doxastic Factives: e.g. know, discover, find out, realize, be aware
b. Emotive Factives: e.g. regret, resent, appreciate, be happy, be surprised
This distinction has been present since early work on this topic. In seminal work on
factivity, Karttunen (1971) distinguished between ‘full factives’ like regret and ‘semifactives’
2Regarding the question of what type of relations or attitudes have the potential to give rise to a factive
presupposition, Anand and Hacquard (2013) argue that this follows directly from the lexical semantics of
the attitude predicates themselves: factive verbs foreground the doxastic component, because they are about
the doxastic states of a sentient experiencer, whereas veridicals are about the public discourse commitments
of an agent with respect to some projected Common Ground, thus backgrounding the doxastic component.
See also Anand and Hacquard (2009, 2014), Anand, Grimshaw, and Hacquard (2019) for discussion.
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like discover.3 Karttunen noted that while projection is the typical case for all factive
verbs, as shown in (8), some factive verbs, like discover and realize, sometimes lose their
presuppositional status in embedded contexts. For example, they do not necessarily project
from the antecedents of conditionals, in contrast to other factives such as regret, as illustrated
in (9).
(8) a. John found out that [P the proposal offended them]. ↝ p
b. John didn’t find out that [P the proposal offended them]. ↝ p
(9) Adapted from Djärv, Zehr, and Schwarz (2018, p. 368)
a. If I discover later that [P the proposal offended them], I will apologize. ↝ p
b. If I regret later that [P the proposal offended them], I will apologize. ↝̸ p
(9-a), unlike (9-b), does not convey a commitment to the embedded proposition, p, on the
part of the speaker, despite the fact that both discover and regret generally give rise to the
global inference that the speaker is committed to p.
In more recent work on presuppositions, Karttunen’s contrast has been subsumed under
a more general distinction between ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ triggers (following Abusch 2002, 2010).4
The difference is that the presupposition of soft, but not hard triggers, are easily suspendable.
This contrast is illustrated in (10) with the soft trigger win and the hard trigger too.5
(10) Jayez, Mongelli, Reboul, and Van Der Henst (2015, p. 174)
a. I don’t know whether Paul participated in the race, but if he won, he must be
very proud.
b. ?? I don’t know whether Paul participated in the race, but if Mary participated
3As we saw in Chapters 2 and 3, this terminology is still widely used in the syntactic literature (in the
study of Main Clause Phenomena, factive islands, etc.), where it’s generally used to distinguish between ‘more
presuppositional’ factives (the ‘full’, or emotive factives), and less presuppositional—or more ‘assertive’—
factives (the ‘semifactives’ or doxastic factives).
4While Abusch doesn’t use the terms doxastic and emotive, she mentions Karttunen’s discussion of
discover as a case of soft trigger.
5Note that Jayez, Mongelli, Reboul, and Van Der Henst 2015 offer a somewhat different distinction, cast
in terms of a split between ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ triggers.
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too, they probably had a drink together just after.
In both (10-a) and (10-b), the context makes it clear that the speaker does not know whether
Paul participated in the race. In (10-b), we find that this appears to conflict with the
presupposition of too, that someone else other than Mary participated (with Paul being the
only contextually available individual). In (10-a), however, there is no such conflict, despite
the fact that win also typically projects a presupposition of participation. We observe a
similar contrast also in the first person conditionals in (9) above, where in (9-a), the presence
of the first person conditional simply leads to the suspension of the inference that p is true.
In (9-b), on the other hand, this inference is not affected by its environment. (11)–(12)
further illustrate the relative ‘softness’ of the presupposition of the doxastic factives.
(11) Beaver (2010, p. 14)
. . . I haven’t tried this with wombats, though, & if anyone discovers that [P the
method is also wombat-proof], I’d really like to know! ↝̸ p
(12) Abrusán (2016, p. 167)
I have no idea if Mary is cheating on John. But if he discovers that [P she is], he
will be sad. ↝̸ p
In these examples, the factive sentences behave no differently from equivalent sentences with
non-factive verbs, as shown in (13)–(14).
(13) . . . I haven’t tried this with wombats, though, but if anyone thinks that [P the
method is also wombat-proof], I’d really like to know! ↝̸ p
(14) I have no idea if Mary is cheating on John. But if he is under the impression that
[P she is], he’s probably sad. ↝̸ p
Intuitively then, it seems that the ‘soft-hard’ distinction tracks the contrast between Hooper
and Thompson’s (1973) ‘assertive’ and ‘non-assertive’ factives; whereby doxastic factive be-
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have in one sense more like the non-factive predicates say and think than like the emotive
factives. However, the empirical picture will turn out to be much more complex. In partic-
ular, as we will show in Section 5.4, there is also a clear sense in which the emotive factives
are actually the ‘weaker’ ones. Drawing on a separate distinction proposed by Sudo (2012),
between ‘entailed’ and ‘non-entailed’ triggers, we observe in Section 5.4 that—in unembed-
ded contexts—the doxastic factives behave as though their presupposition is actually part
of the entailed content of the sentence, while the presupposition of the emotive factives does
not behave like a regular entailment.
5.2 Previous approaches to factivity
The hallmark property of factive predicates like discover, know and regret is that, unlike
their non-factive cousins like say, believe and deny, they imply the truth of their complement
(15-a) vs. (15-c). However, unlike purely veridical predicates like be right and be true,
which also imply that p is true in unembedded contexts (15-b), factive predicates retain this
inference, also when they are embedded under entailment cancelling operators: (16-b) vs.
(16-c). As we mentioned above, this property is known as projection.
(15) Unembedded
a. Anna believed that [P Lisa got the job]. ↝̸ p Non-factive
b. Anna was right that [P Lisa got the job]. ↝ p Veridical
c. Anna discovered that [P Lisa got the job]. ↝ p Factive
(16) Embedded
a. Anna didn’t believe that [P Lisa got the job]. ↝̸ p Non-factive
b. Anna wasn’t right that [P Lisa got the job]. ↝̸ p Veridical
c. Anna didn’t discover that [P Lisa got the job]. ↝ p Factive
In the tradition going back to Stalnaker (1974, 1978), the presupposition of factive
predicates that p=1 is standardly analyzed as a requirement that the embedded proposition
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p is entailed by the context; modelled in terms of the Common Ground [CG], which is
made up by the propositions mutually taken to be true by the discourse participants. The
Context Set is the intersection of the propositions in the CG: the worlds in which all of the
propositions in the CG are true. The idea is that in order for the sentences in (15-c) and
(16-c) to be felicitous, the proposition that Lisa got the job has to be entailed by the context
set. Previous work on presuppositions can be grouped broadly into two types of approaches,
which we will refer to here broadly as the lexical and the pragmatic approach, respectively.
We review these in subsections 5.2.0.1 and 5.2.0.2, focusing on accounts addressing factivity.
5.2.0.1 Lexical approaches
In the dynamic semantics framework of Heim (1982, 1983), Kamp (1981) (see also Heim
1992, Van der Sandt 1992, Groenendijk and Stokhof 1990, Kamp and Reyle 1993, Chierchia
1995 and subsequent work), the meaning of a sentence is viewed as ‘instructions’ to change
or update the discourse context with new information: “meaning is context change potential”
(building on Stalnaker’s 1978 notion of context). On this framework, presuppositions are
taken to be lexically encoded on their hosts as ‘admittance’, ‘domain’, or ‘definedness’
conditions on the context, which must be satisfied in order for a context update to be defined
(in different terms, for the truth-conditional computation to proceed, or be licensed). This
then, is how these approaches answer the triggering question. In particular, presuppositions
must be satisfied in (entailed by or have an antecedent in) the context, in order for the
utterance to be felicitous, or for a context update to be defined. Presupposition projection
simply amounts to this context being the global context, as in (17).
(17) Adapted from Djärv and Bacovcin (2018, p. 2)
[Context: John and Mary are discussing the season finale of The Great British Bake
Off, which they watch together every week.]
a. Mary: How did you like the season finale? Were you pleased with the outcome?
b. John: OMG, I’m SO happy that [PS Nadiya won]! She was always my favourite.
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Suppose, however, that the presupposition is not obviously met in the context, but that the
context is nevertheless consistent with the presupposed content (ps). In this case, the hearer
is understood to be able to enrich the context with ps, or silently add ps to the context,
for the presupposition to be satisfied, and the context update to proceed. This is what is
typically referred to as global accommodation (see also Stalnaker 1974, Lewis 1979):
(18) [Context: Mary doesn’t ever watch The Great British Bake Off, but her best friend
John is obsessed with it, and she usually asks him about it after each episode.]
a. Mary: How did you like the season finale? Were you pleased with the outcome?
b. John: OMG, I’m SO happy that [PS Nadiya won]! She was always my favourite.
Here, given that there is no reason for Mary to doubt John’s statement about who the
winner was, Mary can simply add the proposition ‘Nadiya won’ to the context. Suppose,
however, that we’re in the context in (19).
(19) [Context: Mary doesn’t really watch a lot of TV, but her best friend John is obsessed
with The Great British Bake Off, and so she decided to give it a go and watch the
season finale, so she could discuss the outcome with him. Mixing up the various
versions available on Netflix, however, she accidentally ended up watching the final
episode of The Great Kiwi Bake Off, instead, the winner of which was Annabel.]
a. Mary: How did you like the season finale? Were you pleased with the outcome?
b. John: OMG, I’m SO happy that [PS Nadiya won]! She was always my favourite.
In this case, the ps ‘Nadiya won’ conflicts with Mary’s beliefs. Adding the ps to the
context would therefore result in a contradictory context, i.e. one that entails both ‘Nadiya
won’ and ‘Annabel won’.6 Hence, because Mary cannot add ‘Nadiya won’ to the context, she
now is also unable to update her context with the proposition ‘John is happy that Nadiya
won’. The typical reaction in such cases of ‘presupposition failure’ would be along the lines
6Assuming that there’s only one winner.
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of the ‘hey, wait a minute’ response.7
(20) Hey, wait a minute! I thought Annabel won the Bake Off. . .
On this approach, embedded sentences work the same as unembedded sentences, in the case
where there is no conflict with the context, such as those in (17) and (18):
(21) a. Mary: How did you like the season finale? Were you pleased with the outcome?
b. John: No way – I’m not happy that [PS Nadiya won]! Remember her Black
Forest Gâteau?!
Here, given that the presupposition ‘Nadiya won’ is satisfied in the context (or easily ac-
commodated), what gets added to the context is that John is not happy about this state
of affairs. Broadly speaking, then, we might say that on lexical approaches, projection is
accounted for by saying that embedding operators target only truth-conditional or asserted
content, but not other types of meaning, including presuppositions.8
However, suppose that globally accommodating the presupposition would lead to a con-
tradictory context, i.e. one that both entails that p and not p, as in (19). In such contexts,
as we saw above, it has been observed since Karttunen (1971, 1974), that in embedded cases,
the inference that p may simply fail to project at a global level (and as a consequence, no in-
consistency arises, unlike in the unembedded case). The relevant examples from Section 5.1
are repeated here (recall that emotive factives tend not to allow this kind of presupposition
suspension):
(22) a. If I discover later that [PS the proposal offended them], I will apologize.
b. . . . I haven’t tried this with wombats, though, & if anyone discovers that
7Following (Shanon 1976, Von Fintel 2004), the ‘hey, wait a minute’ response is often used as a diagnostic
for presupposed content.
8Though as we will see in Section 5.2.0.2, this idea is central also to more recent, pragmatic approaches
to presuppositions, such as Simons, Tonhauser, Beaver, and Roberts (2010) et seq. While these authors
take issue with the idea that presuppositions are lexically encoded domain conditions on the context (as
opposed to regular entailments), they argue that (non-)projection follows directly from the (non-)at issue
status of the presupposed content, relative to a Question Under Discussion à la Roberts (1996); in a sense
then, clearly echoing the notion that operators target only asserted content.
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[PS the method is also wombat-proof], I’d really like to know!
c. I have no idea if Mary is cheating on John. But if he discovers that [PS she is],
he will be sad.
d. If I realize later that [PS I have not told the truth], I will confess it to everyone.
On these approaches, non-projection is accounted for by invoking a special operation, local
accommodation (Heim 1982, 1983), which effectively adds the presupposed content to the
level of asserted or truth-conditional content, where it can be targeted by operators like
modals and negation. In the dynamic framework, the sentence’s instructions to update the
context will now include ¬ps. For a sentence like (16-c), Anna didn’t discover that Lisa got
the job, the updated context will now include NOT(Lisa got the job & Anna comes to believe
that Lisa got the job). On this approach then, local accommodation is typically seen as a
‘last resort’ strategy, licensed only in embedded contexts, when adding p to the CG would
lead to a contradiction, uninformativity or problems with presupposition binding.
5.2.0.2 Pragmatic approaches
Recent work on presuppositions, however, has challenged the approach outlined in the pre-
vious section (see, among others, Simons 2001, 2004, 2007, Beaver 2010, Abusch 2002, 2010,
Simons, Tonhauser, Beaver, and Roberts 2010, Simons, Beaver, Roberts, and Tonhauser
2017, Abrusán 2011b, 2016, Anand and Hacquard 2013, Romoli 2012, Tonhauser, Beaver,
Roberts, and Simons 2013, Tonhauser 2015, 2016, Tonhauser, Beaver, and Degen 2018;
building on insights by Stalnaker 1974); pointing to the observation that presuppositions
are not arbitrary properties of lexical items, but seem to be systematically associated with
their respective ‘hosts’, or triggers. For instance, what guarantees that p, specifically, is a
presupposition of know, or why it is that factives systematically give rise to that inference.
While there is substantial variation among these proposals, they all share the assumption
that p is simply a regular lexical entailment of factive verbs (i.e. that factive verbs are just
a special case of veridical predicates, like be true or be right). The presuppositional status
of p is then taken to be pragmatically derived, as a consequence of the discourse status of p
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with respect to a particular Question Under Discussion (Roberts 1996, 2012, Büring 2003).
A common feature of several of these proposals is the appeal to the information structure
of the utterance, and in particular prosodic focus, in order to account for the triggering
(Abrusán 2011b, 2016) or projection (Simons et al. 2017, Tonhauser 2016) of presuppositions
of factive predicates. Based on examples such as (23), these proposals challenge the idea that
presupposition suspension only happens in a restricted set of environments (see discussion
of local accommodation in Section 5.2.0.1). For instance, Beaver (2010) provides examples
like (23), supporting the empirical claim that prosodically marked focus determines factive
presupposition projection.
(23) A professor to a student: (Beaver 2010, p. 93)
a. If the TA discovers that your work is [plagiarized]F , I will be forced to notify
the Dean.
b. If the TA [discovers]F that your work is plagiarized, I will be [forced to notify
the Dean]F .
The specific empirical claim made based on examples like that in (23), is that with focus in
the matrix clause (23-b), the inference that p=1 projects as usual; however, when focus is
on content in the embedded clause (23-a), no truth-inference projects. Taking this as their
explanandum, work in this tradition has argued that the lexical approach fails to account
for the impact of discourse structure on projection, proposing alternative mechanisms for
determining the distribution of presuppositions. The following section reviews three such
approaches from the recent literature: the projection accounts of Simons et al. (2010) and of
Simons et al. (2017) (the latter adopted also in Tonhauser 2016), and the triggering account
of Abrusán (2011b, 2016).
For our purposes, two key aspects of these ‘pragmatic accounts’ will be questioned. The
first is the empirical assumption of several (though not all) pragmatic accounts (see Section
5.2.0.2.2), that the triggering or projection of presuppositions is fundamentally tied to the
status of the presupposed content as non-at issue, with respect to some Question Under
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Discussion. Experimental results presented in Section 5.3 will show that, in the case of
factivity, this assumption is in fact not empirically well-supported.
Secondly, we will question the theoretical assumption, shared (to my knowledge) by all
pragmatic accounts, that the content which ends up presupposed or projecting, is in fact part
of the conventional lexical entailments of the trigger. (We might think of this as the inverse
of the process of local accommodation: rather than ‘adding’ the presupposed content to the
level of entailed content for it to take scope under operators, pragmatic accounts argue that
when entailments are assigned backgrounded or not-at issue status, they end up escaping,
or projecting from, the scope of entailment-targeting operators.) This assumption will be
called into question by the experimental results in Section 5.4 and further observations in
Section 5.6.1. These results show that while the assumption that p is entailed by factive
predicates might be supported in the case of the doxastic factives, in the case of the emotive
factives, p does not behave like conventionally entailed content.
Before moving on to our discussion of these proposals, however, an important point
regarding these proposals is in order.
5.2.0.2.1 Factivity: p=1 vs. p is Common Ground
Within the broad heading of QUD-based approaches to factivity and presupposition, there
are two dominant ways of accounting for the presence of presupposition (projection). Either
in terms of QUDs where the (entailment) p provides the at-issue or pragmatic Main Point
of the Utterance (a term due to Simons 2007), or in terms of QUDs where p fails to be
entailed. The first approach is found in Simons (2001, 2004, 2007), Abrusán (2011b, 2016),
and Anand and Hacquard (2014). The second one is found in for instance Simons et al.
(2010, 2017), and Tonhauser (2016).
Importantly however, among the proposals appealing to the Main Point or at-issue status
of p to account for presuppositionality, there is a deep (and generally unacknowledged)
divide. The proposals discussed in Section 5.2.0.2.2 all use the notion of Main Point or
at-issue status to account for the presence of the global inference that p=1. Of course, if
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we are truly in a world such as that assumed by traditional lexical accounts, where the
projective inference that p=1 and the Common Ground status of p are simply two sides of
the same coin, then we would expect the two properties to co-vary. In particular, we would
expect that the if a predicate has the property that its complement, p, typically projects in
embedded contexts, then this predicate should also impose the ‘domain’ condition on the
context, that p must be Common Ground — independently of any embedding operators.
However, the very point made by Simons (2007) was that, at least for certain factive
predicates, these two properties come apart, and therefore must not be two sides of the
same coin. That is, given the QUD raised by (24-a), it is clear that in (24-b), the embedded
proposition p is what provides the at-issue or Main Point content of the utterance; and
moreover, that p must not be Common Ground.
(24) Simons (2007, p. 1045)
a. Where did Louise go last week?
b. Henry discovered that [P she had a job interview at Princeton].
However, as Simons observed, (24-b) still gives rise to the inference that the speaker takes
p to be true. Hence, what Simons’s (2007) work effectively showed us, is that the two prop-
erties traditionally taken to define factivity: the inference that p=1, and p being Common
Ground, need to be disassociated. The same point was made very clearly by the experi-
mental results in Section 3.2.6.1: the doxastic factives were interpreted as among the most
likely to introduce p as discourse new information. Nevertheless, they showed consistently
ceiling-level ratings for speaker-commitment in the negative polarity. These observations
effectively demonstrate that the two properties traditionally taken to define factivity: the
projective inference that p=1, and p being Common Ground, need to be disassociated.9
9While Simons doesn’t distinguish explicitly between doxastic and emotive factives, she does tie the
availability of so-called ‘embedded MPU’ readings to the ability of the matrix predicate to function paren-
thetically (Urmson 1952), e.g. serving an evidential function. Importantly, however, the ability of a given
predicate to function parenthetically is not absolute, but varies with the (linguistic and pragmatic) context
(a conclusion supported also by the experimental results by Djärv, Heycock, and Rohde 2017 discussed in
Section 2.5.2). Contrast the examples in (25) and (26).
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In terms of the kind of pragmatic approach that appeals to the Main Point or at-issue
status of p (Simons 2001, 2004, 2007, Simons et al. 2010, Abrusán 2011b, 2016, Anand and
Hacquard 2014), we find that manipulating the QUD is able to successfully account for one
aspect of factivity as traditionally understood, namely whether or not p is understood to be
Common Ground. Thus, this approach deals effectively with one dimension of the triggering
problem (the CG status of p). Accounts appealing to QUDs where p fails to be entailed,
on the other hand, are primarily concerned with the projection problem. Regarding the
other dimension of the triggering problem, regarding the inference that p=1, both kinds of
pragmatic accounts take p to be a regular lexical entailment of factive predicates (similarly
to veridical predicates like be right10). The question for these accounts then, then, is whether
manipulating the context in embedded contexts, to the effect that p either fails to be entailed
or gets assigned Main Point/at-issue status, is able to account for the presence of the global
inference that the speaker takes p to be true.
5.2.0.2.2 QUD-based approaches to projection11
In the following three sub-sections, we look in more detail at how QUD-based approaches
attempt to deal with cases where p does not project.
Simons, Tonhauser, Beaver, and Roberts (2010)
On the view advanced by Simons, Tonhauser, Beaver, and Roberts (2010), the relevant factor
for determining whether or not certain content projects is the (non-)at-issue status of that
(25) Where did Louise go yesterday? (Simons 2007, p. 1050)
a. #Henry forgot that [P she had a job interview at Princeton].
b. #Henry remembered that [P she had a job interview at Princeton].
(26) Sorry, we’re going to have to change our plans for dinner tonight. . . (Simons 2007, p. 1050)
a. Henry forgot that [P he had an evening appointment].
b. Henry just {realized, remembered} that [P he had an evening appointment].
10See for instance Anand and Hacquard (2014) for discussion.
11The discussion in this section is adapted from joint work with Hezekiah Akiva Bacovcin (Djärv and
Bacovcin (2018): Section 2.1; primarily prepared by the first author).
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content.12 Specifically, they argue that projection is restricted to only those implications of
embedded sentences which are not-at-issue relative to the Question Under Discussion in the
context. They formulate this as an ‘iff’ statement:
(27) Simons et al. (2010, p. 309)
[W]e propose an alternative explanation based on the following claim, which is
intended to apply to all content which occurs in embedded contexts: Meanings
project IFF they are not at-issue, where at-issueness is defined in terms of the
Roberts’ (1996) discourse theory.
(28) Hypotheses about what projects and why (Simons et al. 2010, p. 315)
a. All and only those implications of (embedded) sentences which are not-at-issue
relative to the Question Under Discussion in the context have the potential to
project.
b. Operators (modals, negation, etc.) target at-issue content.
To define at-issueness, they adopt the notion of the QUD from Roberts (1996, 2012). As we
saw in our discussion of Jensen and Christensen’s (2013) account of V2-licensing in Section
2.5.1, the QUD, roughly speaking, is the topic of discussion in the present discourse. It may,
but need not, correspond to an actual question asked. Theoretically, the QUD is formulated
as a set of alternative propositions. For instance (allowing for domain restriction), a question
like that in (29-a) corresponds to the set of propositions, the QUD, in (29-b):
(29) a. Where is Anna?
b. {p: Anna is at home, Anna is at work, Anna is at the gym, . . . }
For a conversational move to be felicitous, it must attempt to contribute to resolving the
12Note that this proposal is intended to target a much wider range of non-projective meanings than
what is classically recognized by presupposition theory, including non-restrictive relative clauses, epithets,
honorifics, and appositives. For discussion of the differences and similarities between different kinds of non-
projective meanings, see Simons et al. (2010) and references cited therein, as well as more recently, Kennedy,
Bill, Schwarz, Crain, Folli, and Romoli (2015), Schwarz (2016), and Bill, Romoli, Schwarz, and Crain (2016).
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current QUD. This can be done either by completely resolving it, thereby eliminating all
the alternatives but one, as in (30-a), or partially resolving it, thereby eliminating at least
one alternative, as in (30-b).
(30) a. She’s at work.
b. I’m not sure, though I know she’s not at home. . .
Additionally, a speaker may give an answer that addresses the current QUD by giving an
answer that contextually entails an answer to it. The example in (31) is from Simons et al.
(2010, 316). Here, given that it is Common Ground that the legal drinking age is 21 (or
younger), the answer in (31-b) contextually entails an answer to the QUD raised by the
question in (31-a). (For more discussion, see Simons et al. 2010, and Roberts 1996, 2012.)
(31) a. Is Avi old enough to drink?
b. He’s twenty-two.
At-issueness then, is defined in terms of relevance to the QUD ((32) is repeated from (103)
in Chapter 2):
(32) Relevance to the QUD (Simons et al. 2010, p. 316)
a. An assertion is relevant to a QUD iff it contextually entails a partial or complete
answer to the QUD.
b. A question is relevant to a QUD iff it has an answer which contextually entails
a partial or complete answer to the QUD.
Although they don’t discuss the effect of focus in embedded sentences, as in (23) above
(repeated in (33)), Simons et al. (2010) point out that, given the assumption that focus is
a signal of the QUD, their proposal predicts that operators should associate with focused
material, whereas intonationally backgrounded content should project. They give (34) to
show that this prediction is borne out.
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(33) A professor to a student:
a. If the TA discovers that your work is [plagiarized]F , I will be [forced to notify
the Dean]F .
b. If the TA [discovers]F that your work is plagiarized, I will be [forced to notify
the Dean]F .
(34) Simons et al. (2010, p. 318); originally from Kratzer (1989)
a. Paula isn’t registered in [Paris]F
(≈ Paula is registered somewhere, not in Paris.)
b. [Paula]F isn’t registered in Paris
(≈ Someone is registered in Paris, not Paula.)
That is, in the b-sentence (with focus in the matrix clause), what is at issue is something
about the TA (whether they discovered that the students work is plagiarized). The embedded
proposition (the students work is plagiarized) is not-at-issue, and should therefore be able
to project. However, in the a-sentence (focus in the embedded clause), what is at issue is
something about the student’s work (whether it is plagiarized). Hence, the prediction is
that the proposition ‘the student’s work is plagiarized’ should not project.
In some sense, then, the idea that operators only target at-issue, or asserted content
(28-b), does in many ways echo the idea behind lexical approaches to projection (Section
5.2.0.1). Where these approaches differ crucially, is in their treatment of non-projection,
which they take to be licensed in a much wider set of contexts than those which are taken
to license local accommodation on lexical approaches.
The following section reviews a recent update of this work. Here, the authors focus
specifically on the projection behaviour of focus in factive sentences.
Simons, Beaver, Roberts, and Tonhauser (2017); Tonhauser (2016)
Building on Beaver (2010), Simons, Beaver, Roberts, and Tonhauser (2017) develops an ac-
count, adopted in Tonhauser (2016), whereby the focus-sensitivity of factive presuppositions
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is accounted for in terms of focus leading the hearer to construe a particular QUD, defined
as the Current or Congruent Question [CQ]. The claim is that the content of the embedded
clause will project if it is entailed by the CQ.13 Tonhauser (2016) provides the following
definition of the CQ, adapted from Simons et al. (2017).
(35) Tonhauser (2016, p. 952)
The Current Question of an utterance is a privileged subset of the focus alternatives
set of the uttered sentence (given a structural analysis of that sentence, including
focus marking) which meets the following conditions:
a. The proposition expressed is a member of the Current Question and
b. The Current Question has at least one additional member.
For instance, a sentence such as that in (36-a), with narrow focus in the embedded clause,
will give rise to the set of focus alternatives in (36-b).
(36) a. Perhaps John discovered that [Jane]F left town.
b. {p: for some entity a, John discovered that a left town}
In this case, the CQ for the utterance does not entail the proposition that Jane left town.
Therefore, ‘Jane left town’ should not project. The existential claim that ‘someone left
town’, however, is entailed by the CQ and projects. In contrast, a sentence such as (37-a),
with narrow focus on the factive predicate, will give rise to the focus alternatives in (37-b).
(37) a. Sarah: Perhaps John [discovered]F that Jane left town.
b. {p: for some relation R, John R that Jane left town}
To the extent that the relations R in the focus alternatives set are all veridical (compare
13Although note that Simons et al. (2017, p. 192) end up invoking a more complex notion of QUD,
involving also a Discourse Question, which “provides the topic of a segment of discourse and imposes relevance
constraints on conversational contributions.” They thus hypothesize that in some instances “Projection of
the content of the complement of an attitude verb occurs if the best explanation for relevance of the CQ
to the DQ requires attribution of acceptance of that content to the speaker.” As pointed out by Abrusán
(2016), for sentences taken out of context, this still requires the stipulation that the implicit CQ is veridical.
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(38-a) and (38-b)), the CQ will entail p, and p will project. Tonhauser (2016) points out
that although focus sets are contextually determined, it is still an open question what the
most common focus sets are for different predicates in different contexts. The assumption
on this account is that for projection to take place, the relevant CQs for these types of
sentences contain only veridical relations, as in (38-a). If the CQ involves also non-veridical
relations, as in (38-b), the embedded content is not predicted to project.
(38) Tonhauser (2016, p. 953-4)
Perhaps he [discovered]F that she’s a widow.
a. Example projective CQ:
{he discovered that she’s a widow, he knew that she’s a widow, he was happy
that she’s a widow}
b. Example non-projective CQ:
{he discovered that she’s a widow, he thought that she’s a widow, he speculated
that she’s a widow}
Hence, this account predicts that with focus in the embedded clause, there should be
no CQ that entails p, and p should therefore not be able to project.14 With focus on the
matrix predicate however, there exists at least one possible CQ that entails p, and thus, we
expect projection to be more likely, if not obligatory, in this context.
Next, we review a proposal by Abrusán (2011b, 2016), which appeals to the Main Point
status of p (along the lines of Simons et al. 2010), rather than whether or not p is entailed
(as in the proposal reviewed here), as a way addressing the triggering problem.
14Although Simons et al. (2017, 192) then add that “Projection of the content of the complement of an
attitude verb occurs if the Current Question for the utterance entails this content.”—with the caveat that
“this hypothesis presents one circumstance in which projection occurs: this is intentionally formulated with
if and not iff.” However, the authors do not formulate a clear hypothesis for what those circumstances should
be, and whether they would take projection from such alternative mechanisms to be possible in a context
where the CQ does not entail p—i.e. where there is focus in the embedded clause.
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Abrusán (2011b, 2016)
Abrusán (2011b) develops an account, adopted in Abrusán (2016), to address the triggering
problem for factive predicates and additive particles. In a nutshell, she argues that entail-
ments of a sentence become presupposed if they do not have Main Point status. Drawing on
work in cognitive psychology and computational vision, the idea is that whatever content
we don’t pay attention to ends up being presupposed. Abrusán presents a focus-sensitive
triggering mechanism for presuppositions that generates two types of main points; a default
(grammatically defined) main point, and a secondary (pragmatically defined) main point.15
(39) a. Default Main Point: these are the semantic entailments of the sentence that
are “by nature about the event time of the matrix predicate” (p. 502)
b. Secondary Main Point: this is the content that (at the event time of the sen-
tence) most directly addresses a grammatically signaled QUD.
The secondary main point may (but need not) be different from the default main point. If
they are different, the sentence ends up with two main points, neither of which is presup-
posed. The following example illustrates the derivation of the default main point:
(40) John knows (at t1) that it is raining (at t1). (Abrusán 2011b, p. 508)
a. φ = John believes (at t1) that it is raining (at t1).
b. ψ = It is raining (at t1).
The sentence in (40) is taken to have (at least) two entailments, that in φ and that in ψ.
The entailment in φ (John’s belief that p) is necessarily about the event time of the matrix
predicate (John’s knowledge that p) — it follows from the lexical meaning of know that the
attitude holder’s belief spans the same temporal interval as their knowledge.16 However, for
the entailment in ψ (that it is raining), this is not so. Although in (40) the event time of
φ is the same as the event time of ψ, this is not the case across all temporal alternatives, a
15Here, we only sketch a brief overview of Abrusán’s proposal, see discussion in the paper for more detail.
16Though see discussion around example (96) in Section 4.5.
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notion Abrusán invokes to distinguish ‘accidental’ from ‘non-accidental co-temporaneity’:
(41) Abrusán (2011b, p. 508)
a. John knows (at t1) that it was raining (at t1).
T-alternative: John knows (at time t1) that it was raining (at time t2)
b. John managed (at time t1) to solve the exercise (at t1)
T-alternative: *John managed (at time t1) to solve the exercise (at t2)
Thus, Abrusán’s mechanism predicts that, as the default main point is about the ‘matrix
event’ (John’s attitude towards p), we interpret the sentence in (40) as presupposing that it
is raining (at t1), by default. The output of the default triggering mechanism is then subject
to further modulation by contextual factors. That is, contextual factors such as focus can
‘point our attention’ to content which otherwise would’ve been presupposed by default, thus
eliminating the presupposition before it ever gets triggered (at a global level).
Thus, the ‘suspension’ facts that we observed above [those in (33)] with focus
do not in fact show a removal of a presupposition by focus; instead, focus has
interacted with the presupposition triggering mechanism and has prevented the
relevant presupposition from being triggered to begin with. In other words,
content that would otherwise be presupposed stays part of the main point (at-
issue content) of the sentence. (Abrusán 2016, p. 171)
Note that Abrusán (2011b) claims that, unlike on the account of Simons et al. (2010),
such pragmatic modulation is only possible if there are sentence internal factors signalling
a shift in the discourse structure. Hence, simply introducing a particular question into the
discourse should not be enough to remove a presupposition. Abrusán (2011b, 2016) discusses
three such grammatical factors; prosodic focus, clefts, and evidentials (submitting that there
are likely other such factors).
Regarding focus, Abrusán (2011b, p. 522-6) looks primarily at the example in (33).
What is important for Abrusán, is that focus in the embedded clause (If the TA discovers that
your work is PLAGIARIZED,. . . ) makes salient the question What will the TA discover?.
Since the most direct answer to that question is the proposition in the embedded clause (the
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default presupposition), this content is now predicted to not be presupposed. Hence, given
that focus is (at least in English) prosodically marked, whether or not the complement of a
factive predicate will project depends crucially on the prosodic contour of the utterance.
. . . when the content of what would become the presupposition is focused, no
presupposition is predicted to be generated. (Abrusán 2016, p. 168)
The second case that Abrusán (2011b) deals with involves what she refers to as eviden-
tials; sentences in which a factive attitude verb like discover, realize, and figure out is used
parenthetically, as in (42), and (24) from Simons (2007), repeated below:17
(42) Abrusán (2011b, p. 527); adapted from Simons (2007)
a. Why isn’t Louise coming to our meetings these days?
b. Henry {discovered, realized, figured out, learned} that [P she’s left town].
(43) Simons (2007, p. 1045)
a. Where did Louise go last week?
b. Henry discovered that [P she had a job interview at Princeton].
Abrusán claims that, because the embedded proposition constitutes a (secondary) main
point, “it is not predicted to be presupposed” (p. 528). However, (42), and (24) are unem-
bedded sentences. As we saw in Section 5.2.0.2.1, manipulating the Main Point status of p
for unembedded sentences successfully accounts for whether or not p is taken to be Com-
mon Ground. However, it has no effect on the inference that p is true (the sentence remains
veridical). It is clear, then, that the ‘evidential’ case addresses one dimension of triggering
(the CG status of p), as we already saw in Simons (2007). It is not clear, however, how
this fits with the focus-case in (33): first of all, those sentences are all embedded. Second,
what those sentences seem to show is that the inference that p=1 varies with prosody. That,
then, looks like a case of projection, not triggering. While Abrusán is explicit that what she
17It is not clear to me that these cases are consistent with Abrusán’s claim that the factors signalling
a shift in the QUD have to be sentence-internal. We leave this issue to the side for the purpose of this
discussion.
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intends to address is the triggering problem, and not projection, it is clear that this cannot
be the case. While it seems intuitive that what is at-issue in (44-a) is different from that in
(44-b), there is no sense in which the inference that p=1 is weaker in (44-a) than in (44-b).
(44) a. The TA discovered that your work is [plagiarized]F .
b. The TA [discovered]F that your work is plagiarized.
It seems, then, that the effect of focus must only be operative in embedded contexts.18 The
proposals reviewed here all take the observation —that focus affects presuppositions in a way
that is better explained by a QUD-based pragmatic account than by a local accommodation-
based lexical account— to motivate a move away from both a lexical account of presuppo-
sition triggering, and away from using local accommodation as a theoretical tool to explain
instances of non-projection in embedded environments.
However, this move does not to seem to be warranted. I agree with the advocates of the
‘pragmatic approach’ that the effect of focus should not be analysed as a trigger for local
accommodation. However, this claim will be based on different considerations, specifically
the results of the experimental investigation in Section 5.3, showing that the effect of focus
is in fact much weaker than has generally been assumed in this literature. What these results
demonstrate, is that focus in the embedded clause (45-a)–(46-a) only slightly weakens the
inference that p is true. This can be compared with the sentences (47), where the presence
of a first person conditional or an explicit ignorance context really seems to entirely remove
any inference that the speaker is committed to p.
(45) A professor to a student:
a. If the TA discovers that your work is [plagiarized]F , I will be [forced to notify
the Dean]F .
b. If the TA [discovers]F that your work is plagiarized, I will be [forced to notify
the Dean]F .
18Though note that Özyildiz (2016, 2017a) observes a similar effect of focus in Turkish, in unembedded
sentences. We return to the question of variation in this respect in Section 5.7.2.
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(46) a. Paula isn’t registered in [Paris]F
(≈ Paula is registered somewhere, not in Paris.)
b. [Paula]F isn’t registered in Paris
(≈ Someone is registered in Paris, not Paula.)
(47) a. If I discover later that [PS the proposal offended them], I will apologize.
b. . . . I haven’t tried this with wombats, though, & if anyone discovers that
[PS the method is also wombat-proof], I’d really like to know!
c. I have no idea if Mary is cheating on John. But if he discovers that [PS she is],
he will be sad.
d. If I realize later that [PS I have not told the truth], I will confess it to everyone.
Thus, provided that we can find an independent explanation for the weak effect of focus
observed, it seems premature to entirely give up the idea of lexically triggered factivity and
local accommodation as a way of eliminating embedded presuppositions in certain contexts.
We turn now to these experimental studies.
5.3 Factivity and the QUD: new experimental results19
5.3.1 Experimental background: (Tonhauser 2016)
Tonhauser (2016) conducted an experiment designed to test the predictions of the approach
of Simons et al. (2017) outlined in Section 5.2.0.2.2 for factive presupposition projection.
In order to test the effect of discourse structure on projection, the experiment manipulated
prosody by placing narrow focus on the factive matrix predicate or within the embedded
clause, using items such as (48).
(48) Dana (about Scott and Valeria)
[Context: overhearing a conversation at a party]
19The content in this section is adapted from joint work with Hezekiah Akiva Bacovcin (Djärv and
Bacovcin 2018: Sections 2.2–3.
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a. Perhaps he [noticed]F that she is a widow. H* on predicate
b. Perhaps he noticed that [she]F is a widow. L+H* on pronoun
c. Perhaps he noticed that she is a [widow]F . L+H* on content
The target sentences, which included a factive verb and the modal particle perhaps (Perhaps
he noticed that she is a widow.) were presented aurally, as illustrated in Figure 5.1.
Figure 5.1: Tonhauser’s experimental set-up (Tonhauser 2016, 944).
The predicates used were discover, realize, know, be aware, and notice. Two unembedded
control sentences (I am tired. and I was invited to the party.) were also included to make
sure that participants were paying attention.
The prediction was that narrow focus in the embedded clause would reduce projec-
tion. Projection was measured as the speaker’s commitment or certainty of the truth of
the embedded proposition. Hence, after hearing the target sentence, the participants were
presented with a question such as (49). The dependent variable was the participants’ rating
of the speaker’s certainty on a 7-point likert scale (1=not certain—7=certain).
(49) Is Dana certain that Valeria is a widow?
Tonhauser found a significant difference between the main clause focus condition and both
conditions with focus in the embedded clause, in the direction predicted by the QUD-based
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approach (focus on pronoun received lower ratings than predicate focus; β = -0.68, p<.05,
and focus on the content noun (e.g., widow) received lower ratings than predicate focus; β =
-0.49, p<.05). The results are illustrated in Figure 5.2 from (Tonhauser 2016, 945).
Figure 5.2: Graph of results from Tonhauser (2016, 945).
Tonhauser not only concludes from this that prosody influences projection for utterances
with factive predicates embedded under an entailment canceling operator, but that the
results provide evidence for the QUD-based analysis from Simons et al. (2017) outlined
in Section 5.2—whereby information structure (here mediated by focus) drives projection.
That is, the condition with narrow focus in the matrix clause will give rise to the CQ in
(50-a), which (given a domain of veridical relations R) entails p (predicting projection),
and the conditions with narrow focus in the embedded clause will give rise to the CQs in
(50-b) and (50-c), neither of which entails p (predicting non-projection). On the assumption
that presuppositions are derived when a proposition is entailed by the CQ, only (50-a) will
generate a factive presupposition, and thereby project.
(50) a. {p: for some relation R, John R that she is a widow} (48-a)
b. {p: for some entity a, John discovered that a is a widow} (48-b)
c. {p: for some property pi, John discovered that she is a pi} (48-c)
She further argues that the classical analyses of projection (Heim 1983, et seq), where
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presuppositions are lexically encoded on the factive predicate, are unable to predict the
observed results.
Although Tonhauser’s (2016) study shows that information structure (mediated by
prosody) indeed has an influence on presupposition projection, it is less clear that the results
provide strong support for the claim that projection is in fact driven by the QUD. To begin
with, the contrast observed between the embedded clause and matrix clause focus condi-
tions was small. Secondly, and more critically, the experiment did not include any baseline
conditions for projection and non-projection (i.e., unembedded sentences,20 and sentences
with non-factive clause embedding predicates, respectively). That is, if the construal of a
particular CQ is what gives rise to projection (by either entailing or not entailing p), then
we would expect to see a distribution of responses like that in the left-hand graph in Figure
5.3. (main clause focus may lead to less projection than unembedded controls to the extent
that non-veridical alternatives are considered for R.) On the other hand, if presuppositions
are lexically encoded on certain (factive) verbs, then we would expect to see a distribu-
tion similar to that in the right-hand graph in Figure 5.3, where focus-placement inside vs.
outside of the embedded clause has no effect on projection.21
Figure 5.3: Predictions for (the strong versions of) pragmatic QUD-based (left) and lexically
based (right) approaches to presupposition projection.
Without a baseline of comparison between cases where (the equivalents of) projection
20The two unembedded control sentences in Tonhauser‘s experiment were not included in the analysis.
21Note that the bars for the factive verbs are lower than that for unembedded sentences; this is to take
into account potential instances of local accommodation.
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and non-projection respectively are uncontroversially expected, as reflected in straightfor-
ward judgements about the presence or absence of the relevant inference (that the speaker
is committed to p), it is difficult to assess the claim that Tonhauser’s results specifically
provide evidence in favor of the QUD-based approach of Simons et al. (2017). Hence, our
experiment, reported in Section 5.3.2 below, crucially includes baseline conditions for pro-
jection and non-projection to assess more directly how the effects of prosody and potentially
independent lexical factivity compare.
To foreshadow, while we replicate the findings reported in Tonhauser (2016), that
prosody does have an impact on factive presupposition projection (focus on material in
the embedded clause decreases the strength of the projected inference that p is true), we
find that the focus-based difference was an order of magnitude smaller than the difference
between lexically factive and non-factive predicates, independently of focus placement. This
finding is important, as it undermines the central empirical underpinning of these accounts;
that focusing embedded content is able to either entirely eliminate the factive presupposition,
or prevent it from projecting.
5.3.2 Experiment: factivity and the QUD
5.3.2.1 Design
This experiment closely follows Tonhauser’s (2016) design in order to maximize comparabil-
ity, with some modifications (see Section 5.3.2.3). We used the same general set-up where
the participants were told to imagine that they happened to overhear a conversation at a
party, involving sentences similar to those used by Tonhauser. The stimuli were presented
aurally, and varied focus in the matrix clause (on the factive predicate) and the embedded
clause (on the subject). Unlike Tonhauser (2016), we did not include a third condition with
focus on the embedded predicate (Tonhauser’s L+H* on content condition; (48-c)), given
that Tonhauser only observed a very small difference between the two conditions with focus
in the embedded clause, and that the proposals considered here make the same predictions
for the two embedded focus conditions. The dependent variable was the participants’ rating
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of the speaker’s certainty about whether the embedded proposition holds, measured on a
7-point Likert scale. The participants were told that there is no right or wrong answer, but
to simply choose the answer they preferred.
5.3.2.2 Participants
57 undergraduate students, recruited though the University of Pennsylvania’s Psychology
department’s subject pool, participated in the study for course credit. They all reported
being native speakers of English and having normal hearing. The participants were given a
link to the experiment to take the experiment on their own over the internet. The experiment
was implemented in Ibex.22 It took approximately 10 minutes to complete. Data from all
participants were included in analysis.
5.3.2.3 Materials
In addition to the prosodic variation (factive main clause focus vs. embedded clause focus),
the current experiment included three embedding conditions (factive matrix predicate vs.
non-factive matrix predicate vs. unembedded), as in (51).
(51) a. John might’ve discovered that Anna left town. Factive
b. John might’ve believed that Anna left town. Non-factive
c. Anna left town. Unembedded
The auditory stimuli were recorded on a Blue Snowball microphone in the Phonetics Lab
in the Linguistics department at the University of Pennsylvania. The target sentences were
produced by splicing together the recordings of the different matrix and embedded sentences
to avoid any unintended prosodic variation. As shown in (51), we also changed the embed-
ding operator from perhaps to might’ve. This was done to avoid a potential metalinguistic
interpretation of perhaps, along the lines of ‘I don’t know whether this answers your question,
22See http://spellout.net/ibexexps/SchwarzLabArchive/THProsPs/experiment.html for an archived
version of the experiment.
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Verbal
Unembedded ——
Doxastic Factive discover, realize, notice
Emotive Factive regret, love, resent
Non-factive believe, hope, say
Adjectival
Unembedded ——
Doxastic Factive be informed, be conscious, be aware
Emotive Factive be happy, be disappointed, be upset
Non-factive be hopeful, be worried, be concerned
Table 5.1: Factive and non-factive predicates used in the experiment (verbal and adjectival).
but perhaps the fact that he discovered that p is relevant’.23
As has been observed in the presupposition literature going back to Karttunen (1971),
doxastic and emotive factives differ in several regards with respect to the status of the factive
presupposition concerning the embedded content (e.g. Simons 2001, Abusch 2002, 2010,
Chemla 2009, Romoli 2015, Abrusán 2016, and Djärv et al. 2018). Hence, the present study
included both doxastic and emotive factive predicates. We also considered the possibility
that a difference between verbal (e.g., discover) and adjectival forms (e.g., be aware) could
affect projection. Therefore, we balanced the number of verbal and adjectival predicates
across the different embedding conditions. The full list of predicates is given in Table 5.1.
The 48 test items involved a speaker (Sarah), uttering a sentence about some other people
(John and Anna). Each item had variations in all 8 conditions; [factive main clause focus
vs. embedded clause focus] × [doxastic factive matrix predicate vs. emotive factive matrix
predicate vs. non-factive matrix predicate vs. unembedded], as illustrated in (52). Each
subject saw all conditions across items, but the different lexical content in the embedded
clause associated with an item was only shown in one condition, counter-balanced across
subjects using a latin-square design.
(52) a. Doxastic, embedded clause focus:
23Thanks to Satoshi Tomioka, p.c., for this point.
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Sarah: John might’ve discovered that [Anna]F left town.
b. Doxastic, main clause focus:
Sarah: John might’ve [discovered]F that Anna left town.
c. Emotive, embedded clause focus:
Sarah: John might’ve regretted that [Anna]F left town.
d. Emotive, main clause focus:
Sarah: John might’ve [regretted]F that Anna left town.
e. Non-Factive, embedded clause focus:
Sarah: John might’ve believed that [Anna]F left town.
f. Non-Factive, main clause focus:
Sarah: John might’ve [believed]F that Anna left town.
g. Unembedded, ‘embedded clause focus’:
Sarah: [Anna]F left town.
h. Unembedded, ‘main clause focus’24:
Sarah: Anna left town.
As in Tonhauser’s study, the target sentence was followed by a question such as (53), asking
about the speaker’s commitment to p.
(53) Is Sarah certain that Anna left town?
The set up of the experiment is illustrated in Figure 5.4:
5.3.2.4 Statistical methods
To test our predictions, we used two different statistical methods: Conditional Inference
Trees and Bayesian Mixed Effects Models. The Conditional Inference Trees were used to
test whether there was significant clustering of focus conditions and embedding predicates
on the basis of certainty ratings. The model was given only the lexical identity of the pred-
24No marked focus pattern.
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Figure 5.4: Task used in the current experiment.
icate in each trial, not the a priori assigned category. Conditional Inference Trees cluster
data by finding clusters within predictors that have a significant effect on the dependent
variable. We used them to validate the a priori identification of types of embedding predi-
cates (i.e., factive/non-factive, emotive/doxastic). They were fit using the partykit package
in R (Hothorn and Zeileis 2015 and Hothorn et al. 2006).
Bayesian Linear Mixed Effects models were used to test whether there was a substantial
effect of focus on subjects’ perception of the speaker’s certainty in the embedded proposition.
Bayesian models estimate the probability distribution over parameter values in a model
rather than try to find a single point estimate. Their output provides a quantification of
uncertainty after accounting for data. This uncertainty can be displayed with a credible
interval. We report a 90% credible interval, which provides the range of parameter values
such that there is a 95% chance that the value is above the bottom of the range and a 95%
chance that the value is below the top of the range. If zero is within the credible interval,
then the data was insufficient to determine whether any effect is positive or negative and
that a null effect is still a plausible hypothesis. The Median (Table 5.2) gives the best
estimate of the effect size, i.e., the number of points changed on the scale in that condition.
The model was fit with the rstanarm package in R (Stan Development Team 2016).
For the Mixed Effects model, predicate type was coded using two variables Non-factive
Diff. (1 for non-factive; 0 for Factives and Unembedded) and Unembedded Diff. (1 for
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unembedded; 0 for Factives and Non-factives). Focus was included by a variable Fact. main
clause focus (1 if the factive predicate was focused; 0 if the embedded subject was focused).
We also included the interactions between the focus variable and the two predicate type
variables. The intercept, thus, modelled certainty ratings for focused factive predicates.
Only random intercepts for subject and item were included, since more complex models
failed to converge.
5.3.2.5 Results
The Conditional Inference Tree (illustrated in Figure 5.525) clustered (most) factives together
as a single group. The only exception was be informed, which patterned with some of the
adjectival non-factives.26 Adjectival non-factives were gradually ranked higher than the
verbal non-factives, but lower than the factives. Factives and verbal and adjectival non-
factives were rated below the unembedded conditions, although the factives (even with
embedded clause focus) were much closer to the unembedded conditions than to the verbal
non-factives.
25See Appendix A.3 for a graphic of the clusters of the analysis
26See Anand and Hacquard (2014) for an argument that its verbal counterpart inform is non-factive,
contra Schlenker (2008).
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Figure 5.5: Mean speaker certainty ratings by embedding predicate and focus condition:
black lines indicate clusters from Conditional Inference Tree cluster with stars indicating
that a cluster contained focus based sub-clusters according to the Conditional Inference
Tree model).
The results of the Bayesian Mixed Effects Model are summarized in Table 5.2. A sur-
prising result was that adjectival non-factives did not neatly behave like either verbal non-
factives or factives, nor did they behave like a coherent class. Instead there was a gradient
difference between be hopeful which was fairly non-factive-like, be concerned which was more
factive-like (similar to be informed) and be worried which was somewhere in the middle. Fo-
cus was shown to have a significant effect within the factive category, which was supported
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5% LB Median 90% UB
Factives (Intercept) 5.0 5.2 5.4
Non-Factive Diff. -2.0 -1.9 -1.7
Unemb. Diff. 0.6 0.7 0.9
Fact. Pred. Focus 0.03 0.2 0.3
N.F. Focus. Interact. -0.5 -0.3 -0.04
Unemb. Focus Interact. 0.2 0.4 0.6
Table 5.2: Parameter estimates from the Bayesian Mixed Effects Model.
by the mixed effect analysis, for which all credible values according to the Bayesian model
were positive (meaning that being in the main clause focus condition reliably led to higher
certainty ratings). However, the magnitude of the difference between the factive and non-
factive categories (model estimate of 1.9 points) was an order of magnitude larger than the
difference between predicate and embedded clause focus for factives (model estimate of 0.2
as seen in the Fact. Pred. Focus row). In addition to the expected effect of focus in the
factive category, there was also a reliable effect of focus with both the verbal non-factives
and in the unembedded condition. In the unembedded condition, the effect of focus was
stronger than with factives, and in the same direction (focus on the subject led to decreased
ratings). However, for verbal non-factives, the effect of focus was in the opposite direction:
embedded clause focus led to increased ratings.
For illustrative purposes, Figure 5.7 shows the mean scores by condition27 (Non-factives:
3.28, Factive EC-focus: 5.2, Factive MC-focus: 5.38, Unembedded: 6.22). Comparing this
graph to the prediction plots in Figure 5.6 (repeated from 5.3) clearly illustrates the main
finding of this experiment, that prosodically mediated focus does not determine (though it
does weakly influence) factive presupposition projection. Figure 5.8 shows a breakdown of
the results by focus-type.
5.3.2.6 Discussion
This experiment successfully replicated the results from Tonhauser (2016): focus on the
embedded subject leads to decreased certainty ratings for the factive inferences introduced
27Collapsing over the embedded and main clause focus in the non-factive condition.
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Figure 5.6: Predictions for (the strong versions of) pragmatic QUD-based (left) and lexically
based (right) approaches to presupposition projection.
Figure 5.7: Mean speaker certainty ratings by embedding condition and focus condition.
by the presupposition triggers under investigation. However, we crucially find that this effect
is substantially smaller than the difference associated with the traditional lexical distinction
between factive and non-factive predicates, with the latter patterning overall very closely to
unembedded content.
Thus, the inclusion of baseline comparisons for projection and non-projection in our
first study puts the overall results in a very different perspective. The relatively small size
of the effect of prosodic focus on factives, in combination with the finding that we still find
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Figure 5.8: Mean speaker certainty ratings by embedding predicate and focus condition.
substantially higher certainty ratings for factives in the embedded clause focus condition,
compared to non-factive predicates, argues against the accounts reviewed in Section 5.2.0.2,
whereby prosodically mediated focus, as a signal of the QUD, is able to either completely
eliminate the factive inference or prevent it from projecting. Nevertheless, the existence of
a robust (if small) effect of prosody on judgements of certainty about whether the speaker is
committed to the embedded content still requires an explanation, even if a lexical approach
to presupposition triggering and projection were adopted.
When looking at the impact of focus, we provide novel evidence that the prosodic ma-
nipulation actually had an effect for all predicate types. One surprising lexical contrast with
regards to the prosodic effects was a gradient difference between verbal and adjectival non-
factives. Adjectival non-factives (to varying extents) showed more projection-like behaviour
than verbal non-factives. Surprisingly, we also observe that focus placement impacted projec-
tion judgements for clauses embedded under non-factive predicates, in the opposite direction
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from factives. For non-factives, focus in the embedded clause gave rise to a weak ‘projection-
like’ inference, something that is unexpected on both lexical and pragmatic accounts. While
these focus effects were significant, they were all an order of magnitude smaller than the
lexical differences mentioned above. Based on these results, Bacovcin and Djärv (2017)
and Djärv and Bacovcin (2018) argued that factive presuppositions are lexically triggered.
They argued however, that focus may give rise to inferences about the Common Ground,
via the QUD, that are completely independent of factivity, thus giving rise to a weak effect
of prosody across predicate types. To capture this effect, they proposed a general, prob-
abilistic, mechanism for integrating multiple (potentially conflicting) inferences about the
Common Ground, and discussed how that mechanism interacts with the projection of factive
presuppositions. While we will not end up following Bacovcin and Djärv (2017), Djärv and
Bacovcin (2018) in adopting the lexical account (see discussion in Section 5.6.1), I believe
that the probabilistic model of the weak QUD-effects provided by these authors, nevertheless
provides an interesting perspective on the nature of these effects (and one which is compat-
ible also with the account ultimately proposed here; see Sections 5.6.1–5.6.2). Section 5.7.1
presents this model.
Importantly, our account (like the pragmatic accounts) relies on the assumption that
changes in prosodic focus evoke different QUDs and associated focus alternative sets. Though
we do not report on this here, in the paper, we ran a second experiment designed to explic-
itly test the availability of various QUDs with different focus placement. In particular, we
contrasted focus on the matrix predicate with focus on the embedded subject. The objective
was to determine whether a QUD like ‘Who left town: was it Anna or someone else?’ is a
more viable QUD with embedded clause focus than with focus in the matrix clause, as our
model assumes (see Section 5.7.1). The results of this experiment corroborate our prediction
that a QUD on only the embedded clause is licensed by a complex sentence with narrow
focus in the embedded clause. See Djärv and Bacovcin (2018, Sec. 5) for details.
It is also worth noting that we found no difference between doxastic and emotive factives.
This is interesting in light of the observation that the two types of factives differ in terms
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of their sensitivity to the kinds of contexts that are standardly thought to trigger local
accommodation on lexical accounts. This lack of an interaction indicates that besides from
being quantitatively different from those cases (in terms of the size of the effect), the impact
of focus is also qualitatively different (in that it affects doxastic and emotive factives equally).
To conclude this section, the current results are clearly incompatible with the assump-
tions that provide the empirical basis for the accounts reviewed in Section 5.2.0.2.2: that the
(global) inference that the speaker is committed to p (in embedded contexts) depends on
the (not) at-issue status of p with respect to the QUD, signaled by prosodic focus. Above,
we presented data questioning the empirical basis for the way in which these approaches
deal with projection in embedded contexts. Next, we turn to the question of the status of
p in unembedded contexts. As we saw above, the Common Ground status of p depends on
properties of the discourse (namely the QUD), at least for the doxastic factives. However, in
unembedded contexts, pragmatic accounts predict that the inference that p is true should
be essentially invariant, given that they take p to be part of the lexically entailed content of
factive verbs. The next section tests this assumption, in the context of doxastic and emotive
factives.
5.4 Factivity and entailment: new experimental results28
5.4.1 Soft, hard, and entailed, presuppositions
Before moving on to the experiment, this section gives a brief (non-comprehensive) overview
of recent work aiming to experimentally substantiate between sub-classes of triggers (for a
recent review of experimental work on presuppositions more generally, see Schwarz 2016,
and also Schwarz 2015).
Regarding the ‘soft-hard’ distinction introduced in Section 5.1, Tiemann, Schmid, Bade,
Rolke, Hertrich, Ackermann, Knapp, and Beck (2011) find variation in acceptability judg-
ments, in contexts that do not explicitly support the trigger’s presupposition, but are never-
28The results reported in this section are adapted from joint work with Jérémy Zehr and Florian Schwarz
(Djärv, Zehr, and Schwarz 2018: Sections 1.2–2.)
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theless consistent with it. Likewise, Domaneschi, Carrea, Penco, and Greco (2014) find that
while some presupposition triggers leave a lasting impact – suggesting that their presuppo-
sition is accommodated -, others essentially seem to be ignored: after reading short texts
containing various triggers followed by a distractor task, subjects are more likely to answer
questions based on the contribution of triggers like stop, compared to a greater likelihood
of failing to consider the presupposition such as that of the prefix re- (as in reintroduce).
Tiemann (2014) and Tiemann, Kirsten, Beck, Hertrich, and Rolke (2015) report a similar
lack of consideration of the presupposition of again when answering questions, even without
a delay in the task. These findings then, provide experimental support for a theoretical
soft-hard distinction.
On the other hand, Schwarz (2014) reports results from a visual world eye tracking
study that do not pattern as predicted by a theoretical view that assimilates soft triggers
to implicatures (see Chemla and Bott 2013, Romoli 2012, 2015, Kennedy, Bill, Schwarz,
Crain, Folli, and Romoli 2015, a.o.). Importantly for our discussion in Section 5.6.1, Jayez,
Mongelli, Reboul, and Van Der Henst (2015) conducted an acceptability judgement study
looking at the hard triggers too and regret. Their results suggest that these, too, can fail to
project from antecedents of conditionals in contexts that globally establish ignorance with
respect to the truth of the presupposition, at least with sufficient contextual support.
In the remainder of this section, we review a set of experiments by Cummins, Amaral,
and Katsos (2013) and Amaral and Cummins (2015), which provided the conceptual and
methodological basis for the experiments reported in Section 5.4.2. These authors investi-
gated various triggers in English and Spanish, testing the acceptability of Yes, although. . .
and No, because. . . continuations, as illustrated for again and stop below:29
(54) Did Brian lose his wallet again?
a. Yes, although he never lost it before.
b. No, because he never lost it before.
29Similar tasks involving the selection of the best answer from a set of options had previously been used
to investigate clefts and focus (Onea and Beaver 2011, Velleman, Beaver, Destruel, Bumford, Onea, and
Coppock 2012, Destruel, Velleman, Onea, Bumford, Xue, and Beaver 2015).
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(55) Did John stop smoking?
a. Yes, although he never smoked before.30
b. No, because he never smoked before.
Importantly, they found that, across all of the triggers that they looked at, both yes and
no responses of this sort were degraded relative to controls, suggesting that contradicting
the presupposition is never entirely free. Interestingly, however, the triggers in their results
fell into two classes regarding the extent to which yes. . . and no. . . responses differed
from one another: for expressions such as stop and still, there was a fairly substantial,
statistically significant difference in acceptability between the response options, with higher
ratings for no than for yes. In contrast, expressions such as again and too yield comparable
acceptability ratings for both continuations. Importantly for our purposes, they also found
regret to pattern with the first set of triggers, exhibiting a significant difference between
continuations. This is directly relevant to our findings below, and at first sight may seem
incompatible with them; we discuss this in footnote 36.
The findings of Cummins et al. (2013) align broadly with the soft-hard distinction.31 And
in line with common claims about this distinction, the interpretation offered by these authors
is indeed that the first set of triggers more easily allows for ‘local accommodation’, leading
to the relatively greater acceptability of the no-responses for these triggers. However, there
is a potential additional dimension to the variation as well, which can be related to Zeevat’s
notion of lexical triggers, which constitute cases where the presupposition is a requirement
that comes with the asserted component of the trigger. As Amaral and Cummins (2015,
p. 169) put it, in these cases “the responses in condition [yes-continuation] appear self-
contradictory, if we assume that the presupposition is a logical prerequisite for the at-issue
content of the trigger.” That is, the content introduced in the question cannot be affirmed
independently of the presupposition. Our experiments presented in Section 5.4.2 below build
on essentially this notion, which we couch in terms of the distinction, introduced in Section
30Note that Cummins et al. (2013) do not explicitly provide the continuations they used for stop, so this
is our best guess at what they looked like for this question, which is listed in the materials in their appendix.
31They relate their results to Zeevat’s (1992) distinction between ‘lexical’ and ‘resolution’ triggers.
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5.1, between entailed and non-entailed presuppositions.
The experiments in Section 5.4.2 test the theoretical claim of pragmatic accounts, that
—in unembedded contexts— the presupposed content is part of the conventionally entailed
content of the trigger. The results from these experiments will show that view is problematic
for the emotive factives, suggesting that at least for these predicates, the basic assumption
of the pragmatic accounts is not met. The results are, however, consistent with the claim
that p is an entailment of the doxastic factives.
5.4.2 Experiment: factivity and entailment
This study was designed to test the hypothesis that doxastic, but not emotive, factives
encode the embedded proposition p as part of their conventional entailments (Table 5.3).
Factive Type cognitive attitude that p emotive attitude that p
Entailed content p & attitude attitude
Table 5.3: Hypothesis: doxastic, but not emotive, factives conventionally encode their
embedded proposition p as part of their entailment.
To test this hypothesis, we employed a yes/no-continuation task, similar to that used by
Cummins et al. (2013) (previous section). The task paired a factive question with a response
of the form yes, although. . . or no, because. . . , followed by a denial of the content of p:
(56) Is Anna {aware, happy} that [P Ryan is coming to the wedding]? /
Does Anna {realize, appreciate} that [P Ryan is coming to the wedding]?
a. Yes, although he isn’t.
b. No, because he isn’t.
The starting point for our investigation was the hypothesis that we find different re-
lationships between different subcomponents of meaning for emotive and doxastic factives.
Generally speaking, both types of factives contribute (at least) two meaning components,
that of the attitude involved (which relates the matrix subject’s mental state to the embed-
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ded proposition), and that of the embedded proposition p (conveying that p is true). We
propose that these two components stand in a different relationship to each other for the two
types of factives, such that for emotive factives, p can be disentangled from the subject’s
attitude in a way that it cannot for doxastic factives. The basic intuition is that it is quite
easy to imagine that one is happy about a certain state of affairs, but is simultaneously
wrong about it. It is harder to see how one can discover something which is not true. In
this vein, (57-a) is a coherent statement, whereas (57-b) gives rise to contradiction:32
(57) a. John was happy that his parents are coming to town, although it turned out
that he was in fact mistaken/although it turned out that they had to cancel.
b. #John discovered that his parents are coming to town, although it turned out
that he was in fact mistaken/although it turned out that they had to cancel.
As mentioned above, we build on the proposal by Sudo (2012), that certain triggers
(e.g., change of state verbs like stop) have their presupposition represented as part of the
entailment at the lexical level, whereas others (such as gender features on pronouns or the
additive presupposition of also) do not. We hypothesized that doxastic and emotive factives
differ in terms of their entailment properties — specifically, that p, while generally surfacing
as projective content for both types of factives, is also part of the conventionally entailed
content of doxastic factives, whereas it is not for emotive factives, as shown in Table 5.3.
While the overall approach taken here is quite similar to that of Cummins et al., our hy-
pothesis provides a slightly different angle on the expected outcomes by focusing on whether
or not an affirmative answer is possible when the presupposition is explicitly denied at the
same time. Our basic assumption was that a yes-response necessarily commits the speaker
to the entailed content introduced by the question. However, it may in principle be possible
to deny a presupposition, to the extent that it is introduced entirely at a separate level and
not part of the conventionally entailed content. This leads to diverging predictions based
on our hypothesis: if the content of the embedded proposition is entailed, as we propose is
32On this point, Egré (2008, p. 103) also observes that the emotive regret behaves differently from doxastic
know in false-belief environments.
297
the case for the doxastic factives, saying yes and then denying the content of the embedded
proposition should be contradictory, and thus only no will be a viable response. But for
the emotive factives, where we hypothesize that the content of the embedded proposition is
not part of what is entailed, it should in principle be possible to just endorse the (emotive)
attitude by responding yes, even if qualifying immediately by noting that the embedded
proposition is false.
We still take it that selectively addressing only certain aspects of the meaning of a com-
plex statement in an answer may come at a cost, i.e., it is indeed plausible that the default
impact of an affirmation involves endorsing both entailed and presupposed content, whole-
sale, as it were. What’s crucial for our approach is that in principle it may be possible that
non-entailed presuppositions can be denied along with a yes-response, while entailed ones
cannot. If so, that leads to a prediction for our hypothesized difference between doxastic and
emotive factives, namely that the latter should yield a greater acceptance of yes-responses
than the former.
Note that the hypothesis makes no specific prediction for the relative acceptability of
denials of presupposed content with no-answers, which require targeting the presupposed
content with negation (commonly taken to involve local accommodation). It’s possible that
the different relationship between presuppositions and entailments has a reflex here, too, but
this does not necessarily follow from our hypothesis. Next, we report on two experiments
to test these predictions: Experiment 1, where the participants were asked to chose which
of the yes vs. no answer-options they preferred, and Experiment 2, which uses acceptability
ratings to target the acceptability of yes-responses more directly.
5.4.2.1 Experiment 1
5.4.2.1.1 Design
In Experiment 1, participants were presented with questions containing a doxastic or an
emotive factives and had to indicate their preference with respect to yes and no-answer
options. There were additional response options to express that ‘Both options are equally
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good.’ or ‘Both options are equally bad.’
(58) {Did Mark find out/Was Mark surprised} that [P his parents are visiting]?
a. Yes, although they had to cancel because of the weather.
b. No, because they had to cancel because of the weather.
c. Both options are equally good.
d. Both options are equally bad.
If, as hypothesized, doxastics but not emotives entail the content of the embedded propo-
sition, we expect that the yes-responses should be more readily available for the questions
with an emotive factive, compared to those with a doxastic one. That is, for the emotive
factives, we expect both the yes and the no-responses to be in principle available. Assuming
more or less comparable availability of the yes and no-responses, the both good and both
bad responses should be chosen more frequently for emotive factives (depending on how the
potential cost of local accommodation (for no) or targeting only one aspect of meaning (for
yes) affects acceptability judgments). For the doxastic factives on the other hand, we expect
these to allow only the no-responses, as these should be clearly better than yes-responses
(even if involving some cost for local accommodation). Hence, both good should be impos-
sible with the doxastic factives, given the unacceptability of the yes-response. The both bad
option might get chosen for the doxastic factives, if subjects dislike both local accommo-
dation and cancellation/suspension. However, this is likely to be the dispreferred choice,
assuming that local accommodation does make no-responses available.
5.4.2.1.2 Participants
Thirty-six native speakers of English participated in the study. The participants were re-
cruited on Prolific.ac, a crowd-sourcing tool for recruiting participants to participate in
scientific studies online. Participants were paid at rate of 5.20 GBP per hour for their partic-
ipation. The task took approximately 10 minutes to complete. No participant was excluded
from the analyses.
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5.4.2.1.3 Materials
All items presented short written dialogues between two speakers. There were two varia-
tions of twenty-four experimental items, corresponding to the two predicate types: doxastic
(realize, find out) and emotive (be disappointed, be surprised) factives, as illustrated in (58)
above. Each subject only saw a given item in one version, with item-condition pairings
counterbalanced across subjects. In addition, there were twenty-four filler items where fac-
tives were paired with different continuations. Given the prediction for the critical part of
the experiment, that the yes-responses should be endorsed to a greater extent in the emo-
tive condition than in the doxastic condition, the fillers were designed to yield the opposite
preference. Hence, among the fillers, the emotive factives favoured a no-response, and the
doxastic factive favoured a yes-response, as illustrated in (59) and (60), in order to coun-
teract the potential risk of introducing an overall bias against the yes-responses. The both
good and both bad options in (58) were available for the fillers, too.
(59) Was Mike disappointed that John decided to quit football? [Emotive filler]
a. Yes, although he didn’t think John was a very good player.
b. No, because he didn’t think John was a very good player.
(60) Was Mary surprised that Bill got the grant? [Doxastic filler]
a. Yes, although she was on the grant committee.
b. No, because she was on the grant committee.
The participants were given the following instructions: “In this experiment you will read
short questions. You will then be asked to choose which answer you prefer, given a choice
of two answers. You also have the opportunity to say that you think that both answers are
equally good or equally bad. There is not a right or a wrong answer. Simply choose the
answer that you prefer, given the preceding question.” In order to control for variability
stemming from the two predicate types influencing the answers across conditions, we used
a block design. Thus, half of the participants saw the emotive factives in a randomized
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order first, and the doxastic factives in a randomized order last, and vice versa for the other
half of the participants. Each block contained both fillers and critical items. Additionally,
the items were divided into two groups, in order for each specific predicate to be evenly
distributed across participants, thus creating a two-by-two Latin square design.33
5.4.2.1.4 Analysis
The results were analyzed as logistic mixed effects regression models in R (version 3.1.2) using
the glmer function of the lme4 package (version 1.1-11) and its bobyqa optimizer. Results
from maximally complex converging models are reported here (Barr et al. 2013). We ran
four types of models regarding the predicted outcomes: models predicting the observation
of a yes-response (to the exclusion of all the others), of a no-response (to the exclusion of
all the others), of a both good -response (to the exclusion of all the others) and of a both
bad -response (to the exclusion of all the others). These models tested for a fixed effect
of predicate type (emotive, doxastic). For each of these simple-effect models, we also ran
a version testing for an effect of block order (emotive-doxastic, doxastic-emotive) and its
interaction with predicate type. Participants and items were added as random effects, with
a random slope for predicate type per participant, and a random slope for predicate type
and block order (in the relevant models) per item. Our different baselines exhausted the
logical space of effects and interactions. The models did not include data-points for the filler
items, and no other data-point was excluded.
5.4.2.1.5 Results
The results are summarized in Figure 5.9. The response patterns for the first block showed
a clear contrast between the doxastic and the emotive factives. There was a main effect
of predicate type on the observation of no- and both bad -responses in the first block (resp.
p = 0.00247, β = 1.2433, SE = 0.4107 and p = 0.024687, β = 1.6566, SE = 0.7375), with
no-responses being more frequent for the doxastic factives and both bad -responses being
33An archived version of the experiment is available at:
http://spellout.net/ibexexps/SchwarzLabArchive/YesNoFact/experiment.html
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more frequent for the emotive factives. There was also a significant interaction with block
order for the no-responses (p = 0.02423, β = 1.3729, SE = 0.6092) but not for the both bad -
responses; the significant main effects between the two types of factives disappeared in the
second block (predicate type for no p = 0.7260, β = 0.12959, SE = 0.36983; predicate type for
both bad p = 0.678, β = 0.3225, SE = 0.7768), suggesting that exposure to one type of factive
predicate had a strong effect on the participants’ responses, potentially through priming
one type of interpretation, or through adjusting the participants’ standards for evaluation.
There was no such significant main effect on the observation of yes- and both good -responses
(all p > 0.17, β ≤ 0.5). We observed the same results in simple models, excluding block
order as a predictor: no- and both bad -responses were more frequent with doxastics than
with emotives (no: p = 0.0222, β = 0.5266, SE = 0.2303; both bad : p = 0.0223, β = 0.7232,
SE = 0.3165) but there was no significant effect of predicate type for yes- and both good -
responses (yes: p = 0.737, β = 0.08468, SE = 0.25253; both good : p = 0.809, β = 0.07354,
SE = 0.30382).
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Figure 5.9: Left: proportion of responses for the two types of factives in block 1, where
the contrast between the doxastic (“cognitive”) and the emotive factives is significant for the
no and the both bad -responses. Center and right: responses for the four response types
(yes, no, both good, both bad), by block. The contrast between the two types of factives is
neutralized in Block 2.
To summarize, even though the contrasts between the two verbs are subtle, and subject
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to influencing each other across blocks, there is nonetheless a clear contrast between the
two types of factives with respect to the availability of no-responses. Even though there
was no direct, visible contrast in the availability of yes-responses and both good -responses,
the contrast in both bad -responses is in line with our hypothesis, according to which the two
aspects of meaning identified as part of the semantics of the two types of factives (the attitude
and the p components) contribute to the overall semantic properties in different ways for
the emotive and the doxastic factives — specifically in terms of the truth of the embedded
clause being part of the conventional entailment in the case of doxastic factives, but not for
the emotive factives. Under this view, participants were not sufficiently inclined to consider
an interpretation where either negation targeted p directly or where an affirmative response
selectively endorsed the conventionally entailed content (for emotive factives). At the same
time, participants did display a sensitivity to the contrast in entailment in that they were
more amenable to accepting a no-response for doxastic factives, because it should be easier
to target the embedded proposition p with negation when it is conventionally entailed.
However, there is at least one alternative interpretation of the results which basically
attributes the contrast in no-responses to varying availability of local accommodation, and
does not posit a difference between factives in terms of whether or not p is part of the
conventionally entailed content. To spell out a specific version of this alternative, it might be
that only emotives are lexically associated with a conventional presupposition that p (which
at the same time is part of the entailed content as well). In contrast, the presuppositional
status of p would result from a pragmatic derivation in the case of doxastic factives, in
line with the proposals by Simons, Romoli and others. Based on these assumptions, no-
responses for doxastics are expected to be easily acceptable, to the extent that the pragmatic
derivation does not (or at least not necessarily) take place under negation.34 For emotives
on the other hand, both a yes and a no-response would require cancellation of a hard-coded,
conventional presupposition, which would lead participants to generally prefer the both bad
34For Romoli in particular, the justification after no would block or cancel this derivation, in the same
way that the sometimes implicature normally associated with not always does not arise in I don’t always
curse because I never curse.
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response to indicate a presupposition failure.
In order to disambiguate between these two interpretations of the results, Experiment
2 used an acceptability rating task where subjects were only presented with one answer
option at a time. This allowed us to test for a contrast in the acceptability of yes-responses
between the two types of factives more directly. As discussed above, our hypothesis predicts
that yes-responses paired with denials of p will be more readily available for emotive factives
than for doxastic factives. In contrast, the alternative interpretation we just considered does
not predict such a contrast in the yes-responses, as both types of factives should yield low
ratings for yes-responses, based on the crucial assumption that factives uniformly include a
conventional entailment that p.
5.4.2.2 Experiment 2
5.4.2.2.1 Design
Experiment 2 used an acceptability rating task to provide an independent assessment of the
acceptability of yes and no continuations. Participants saw only one response at a time
(Yes, although. . . or No, because. . . ), as shown in (61) and (62).
(61) a. Is Maria {aware, happy} that [P Mike is moving back to Chicago]?
b. Yes, although he isn’t.
(62) a. Is Maria {aware, happy} that [P Mike is moving back to Chicago]?
b. No, because he isn’t.
Specifically, the participants were asked to rate to what extent the answer sounds natural
to them, in light of the question, by choosing a value between 1 (‘completely unnatural’)
to 7 (‘completely natural’) by clicking the number or pressing the corresponding key. They
were instructed that there was no right or wrong answer. If doxastic, but not emotive fac-
tives conventionally entail p, then we expect to see a contrast between the doxastic and the
emotive factives in the yes-responses, such that yes is rated significantly lower for the dox-
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astics than for the emotives. Again, no specific predictions were made for the no-responses.
In addition to the slight change in the nature of the task, the stimuli were refined from
Experiment 1 to be more uniform, in particular by consistently using future-oriented pro-
gressive forms (e.g., is moving to Chicago) in the embedded clause and expressing denial in
the response-continuation via VP-ellipsis. This was done to avoid potential other pragmatic
strategies of reconciling the denial with the initial affirmative or negative response, which
may have given rise to additional variation in response patterns for the original materials.
5.4.2.2.2 Participants
Sixty-two undergraduate students at the University of Pennsylvania, all native speakers of
English, participated in the study for course credit through the Psychology department’s
subject pool. The experiment took approximately 15 minutes, and was carried out on
computers in the Experimental Study of Meaning lab.
5.4.2.2.3 Materials
As illustrated above, the items consisted of short dialogues between two speakers, as in (61)–
(62). Versions of the twenty-four critical items were created in four conditions, corresponding
to the two predicate types—doxastic and emotive, and the two answer types—yes, although
and no, because. We also included a between item adjective-verb manipulation, such that
half of the items contained verbal factives (appreciate, realize), and half of them, adjectival
factives (happy, aware). Forty-eight filler items were also included. These were designed
with two purposes in mind: first, to provide a floor and a ceiling baseline for the yes- and
no-responses; and second, to counterbalance the number of good and bad yes- and no-
responses. Half of the fillers therefore used a non-factive matrix predicate (think), where
the no-answers would be infelicitous, and the yes-answers would be fully acceptable, as in
(63). The other half involved a question with two conjuncts, as in (64). Here, it would be
the yes-answers that were infelicitous, while no would be an acceptable response.
(63) Does Sue think that Bill’s parents are going to the wedding?
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a. #No, because they are. [Bad Control]
b. 3Yes, although they aren’t. [Good Control]
(64) Is John going to Paris and Rome this summer?
a. 3No, he’s not. [Good Control]
b. #Yes, although he isn’t going to Rome. [Bad Control]
The participants were given the following instructions: “In this experiment you will read
short dialogues between two people in the form of a question and an answer. You will then
be asked to rate to what extent the answer sounds natural to you in light of the question,
by choosing a value between ‘completely unnatural’ (1) to ‘completely natural" (7). There
is not a right or a wrong answer. Simply make the choice based on how well you feel the
answer works for the preceding question.” In contrast to Experiment 1, the factive and
emotive items were randomly mixed, but answer type (yes vs. no) was separated by blocks,
with order counter-balanced across groups.35
5.4.2.2.4 Analysis
The ratings were analyzed using linear mixed effects regression models in R (version 3.1.2),
using the lmer function of the lme4 package (version 1.1-11). All models included predicate
type (emotive, doxastic) and answer type (yes, no) as fixed effects. Given that we made
no predictions about category (adjective, verb) nor about block order (yes-no, no-yes), we
fitted models excluding them both (simple models) and models including either one as
predictors (models including both would not converge). We tested for the maximally complex
models, including all possible interactions of predictors and all random slopes for participants
and items as random effects, and our baselines exhausted the logical space of effects and
interactions. The models included only the data points of the experimental items.
35The experiment is available at:
http://spellout.net/ibexexps/SchwarzLabArchive/YesNoRating/experiment.html?Home=true
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5.4.2.2.5 Results
The results are presented in Figure 5.10. Responses were similar in the first and second
block (main effects t ≤ 1.35, β ≤ 0.45; two-way interactions t ≤ 0.3, β ≤ 0.15; three-way
interaction t = 0.302, β = 0.13988, SE = 0.43359) and for adjectives and verbs (main effects
t ≤ 1.5, β ≤ 0.35; two-way interactions t ≤ 1.63, β ≤ 0.44; three-way interaction t = 1.216,
β = 0.37898, SE = 0.31167). As predicted, the response patterns showed the yes-ratings
to be significantly higher for the emotive than for the doxastic factives (simple model:
t = 4.954, β = 0.76, SE = 0.1534; t ≥ 3.1 and β ≥ 0.59 otherwise), with no difference in the
no-ratings (simple model: t = 0.625, β = 0,1005, SE = 0.1607; t ≤ 0.785 and β ≤ 0.1683
otherwise). There was also an interaction between predicate type and answer type (simple
model: t = 4.083, β = 0.8605, SE = 0.2108; t ≥ 2.61 and β ≥ 0.67 otherwise).
Yes No
0
2
4
6
Bad control Cognitive Emotive Good control Bad control Cognitive Emotive Good control
Type
Sc
or
e (
0=
Co
mp
l. u
nn
atu
ra
l, 6
=C
om
pl.
 na
tur
al)
Figure 5.10: Mean ratings by answer type and predicate type: emotive × doxastic (“cogni-
tive”) factive type (merged blocks).
With Experiment 2, we replicated the main conceptual result from Experiment 1, in
that we elicited a contrast between emotive and doxastic factives. The contrast no longer
consists in participants endorsing no-answers more readily as responses to questions with
doxastics than with emotives; rather, we now see that participants rate yes-answers as more
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natural as responses to emotives than to doxastics.36
Importantly, the results from Experiment 1 were not only compatible with our hypothe-
sis, but also with an alternative hypothesis based on potential differences in the availability
of local accommodation. However, the results from Experiment 2 are not in line with the
predictions of such an alternative view: that view assumes that p is conventionally entailed
both by doxastic and emotive factives, therefore yes-answers should be rated as low for emo-
tive as for doxastic factive questions (under the assumption that yes commits the speaker
to all the entailed content). On the other hand, our hypothesis naturally fits these results:
participants were able to understand the affirmative reply as singling out the entailed con-
tent to the exclusion of the embedded proposition p to some extent for emotives. This led to
an increase in acceptability of yes-continuations, in contrast to doxastics, which were visibly
as low as the baseline controls in this regard. This is consistent with the idea that emotives
do not, but doxastics do, conventionally entail p, given the assumption that it is in principle
possible to selectively affirm the conventionally entailed content with a yes-response.
5.4.2.3 Discussion (Experiments 1 and 2)
We argued that the results from Experiments 1 and 2 supported our hypothesis, that dox-
astic and emotive factives differ in terms of whether p is entailed (in addition to being
presupposed). While the first experiment did not support that notion directly, the results
were consistent with this idea; however, they could also be explained by an alternative
hypothesis that locates the difference entirely in terms of the interaction of negation (and
more generally, no-answers) with the triggers. Experiment 2 sought to get a more direct
comparison of the acceptability of yes-responses paired with a denial of the presupposition,
and found a significant difference (and corresponding interactions) between the two types of
factives. This showed that an explanation of the contrast has to extend beyond negation.
36Cummins et al. (2013) report results for regret, which look similar to other triggers that we would see
as candidates for entailing their presupposition. However, there is no direct point of comparison to other
types of factives, and furthermore, their materials seem pragmatically skewed by using embedded clauses
that the matrix subject is virtually guaranteed to be an informed authority on, such as Did Fiona regret
buying the house?
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We might note, in this context, that in a later experiment (available in Schwarz, Djärv,
and Zehr 2018; not reported here), we replicated these findings in Italian. This, then,
provides evidence that this contrast found here between doxastic and emotive factives is
fundamentally tied to their respective lexical meanings, and not a simple lexical quirk of
these items in English (in line with the findings of the cross-linguistic study in Section 3.2.
We interpreted these results in terms of a more general distinction between presuppo-
sition triggers, where some – like doxastics – entail their presupposition, whereas others –
like emotives – do not. This shows us that the pragmatic accounts discussed in Section
5.2.0.2 cannot account for the presupposition behaviour of emotive factives. We also saw in
the previous section that the predictions of these accounts, regarding the effects of prosodic
focus, were not borne out for either type of factive. Before moving on, let us take stock of
the theoretical and empirical landscape at this point.
5.5 Taking stock
Section 5.1 pointed to a key observation regarding the two types of factives, originally due
to Karttunen (1971), that factive verbs tend to lose the inference that p is true in certain
embedded environments. In particular, where the context is inconsistent with the speaker
being committed to the truth of p. This includes first person conditionals and so-called
explicit ignorance contexts, illustrated in (65). Going back to Heim (1983), presupposition
‘suspension’ in such contexts is typically accounted for by invoking a special operation,
local accommodation, which allows the presupposition to take scope under the embedding
operator (see Section 5.2.0.1).
(65) a. If I discover later that [PS the proposal offended them], I will apologize.
b. . . . I haven’t tried this with wombats, though, & if anyone discovers that
[PS the method is also wombat-proof], I’d really like to know!
c. I have no idea if Mary is cheating on John. But if he discovers that [PS she is],
he will be sad.
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Without the speaker’s ignorance having been made clear by the context, or in a non-first
person context, the sentences project a global inference that the speaker is committed to p:
(66) [Context: at the office, about two co-workers who are dating:]
If John discovers that [P Mary is cheating on him], he will be sad. ↝ p
As noted originally by Karttunen (1971), doxastic and emotive factives differ in this
regard, as shown in (67). In recent work on presuppositions, this contrast has been subsumed
under a more general split between ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ presupposition triggers (Abusch 2002,
2010) (Section 5.1).
(67) Karttunen (1971, p. 64)
a. Soft trigger: doxastic factive realize ↝̸ p
If I realize later that [P I haven’t told the truth], I’ll confess it to everyone.
b. Hard trigger: emotive factive regret ↝ p?
If I regret later that [P I haven’t told the truth], I’ll confess it to everyone.
This distinction, then, aligns nicely with the findings from Section 3.2.6.1, showing
that doxastic, but not emotive factives, allow for embedded assertions, in the sense that
the embedded proposition p may be discourse new information. Emotive factives, on the
other hand, require p to be Given (in the sense of Schwarzschild 1999). As illustrated in
(68), doxastic factives pattern with speech act verbs and doxastic non-factives (traditionally
considered to be ‘assertive’), whereas emotive factives pattern with response stance verbs:
(68) [Uttered out of the blue:] Guess what — (Caplan and Djärv 2019)
a. John {told me, thinks, discovered} that [P Bill and Anna broke up].
b. #John {appreciates, doubts} that [P Bill and Anna broke up].
The exact relationship between these two dimensions is not straightforward, however. To
start, while the doxastic factives only lose the ‘factive inference’ in embedded contexts (23),
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their ability to introduce discourse new content (68) is only present in unembedded sentences,
as we saw in Chapter 3.
The experimental findings from the experimental and corpus studies of Chapter 3 showed
that there is some syntactic reality behind this pragmatic intuition, in that doxastic factives,
just like the speech act verbs and the doxastic non-factives, but unlike the emotive factives
and the response verbs, allow for embedded V2 in Swedish and German (Section 3.2.6.3).
We also saw, in Section 2.3.1, that these contexts also allow for wh-extraction from the
embedded clause (in English). These findings support the popular idea (e.g. Speas and
Tenny 2003, Tenny and Speas 2004, Rizzi 1997) that an extended C-domain is the syntactic
realization of assertion. Importantly, this was not due to selection, contra Wiklund et al.
(2009) and Kastner (2015), as shown by the large effect of matrix negation on both discourse
novelty ratings and the acceptability of embedded V2. Nor did speaker or attitude holder
commitment to p play any role in defining the contexts that allow embedded V2, contra
Truckenbrodt (2006), Wiklund (2010), Julien (2015) and Woods (2016a).
This distinction between the two types of factives, was also observed, in Section 2.5.1, to
be in line with a separate distinction, due to Simons (2007), whereby the doxastic factives
(like say, think and believe), but generally not the emotive factives (nor the response verbs),
allow their complement to provide the pragmatic Main Point of the Utterance.
(69) Where did Louise go last week? (Adapted from Simons 2007, p. 1045)
a. Henry {told me, thinks, discovered} that [P she had an interview at Princeton].
b. #Henry {appreciates, doubts} that [P she had an interview at Princeton].
As shown by experimental evidence from Djärv, Heycock, and Rohde (2017), however (Sec-
tion 2.5.2), the restriction on emotive factives against embedding Main Point content is not
a hard one, but can be overridden by appropriate pragmatic context, as shown by the felicity
of the following Question-Answer pair:
(70) Djärv, Heycock, and Rohde (2017)
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a. I hear that you went to Paris last summer. What was the city like?
b. I was surprised that the city was really great.
Djärv et al. (2017) also found that, contrary to Jensen and Christensen (2013), having
pragmatic Main Point or at-issue status, relative to the QUD, did not have any effect on
the availability of embedded V2, thus showing us that this pragmatic notion is not what is
relevant for licensing an extended C-domain.
Regarding factivity (and presuppositions in general), the status of p as Common Ground
and the projective inference that the speaker is committed to p, are generally taken to be two
sides of the same coin. As we saw in Section 5.2.0.2.1 (building on Simons 2007), however,
these two dimensions come apart. In each (felicitous) case in (68)–(70) involving a factive
verb, the speaker is understood to be committed to p. There is no sense, however, that p is
CG. On an account whereby these two properties are inextricably linked, such as the classic
lexical account (Section 5.2.0.1), this is unexpected.
However, this assumption has been adopted also by a number of pragmatic accounts,
who argue that the Main Point or at-issue status of p is what determines whether p projects
(Simons et al. 2010) or whether a presupposition that p gets triggered (Abrusán 2011b,
2016). As evidence, they cite the following kinds of examples:
(71) A professor to a student: (Beaver 2010, p. 93)
a. If the TA discovers that your work is [plagiarized]F , I will be [forced to notify
the Dean]F . [Claim: ↝̸ p]
b. If the TA [discovers]F that your work is plagiarized, I will be [forced to notify
the Dean]F . [Claim: ↝ p]
(72) Simons et al. (2010, p. 318); originally from Kratzer (1989)
a. Paula isn’t registered in [Paris]F
(≈ Paula is registered somewhere, not in Paris.)
b. [Paula]F isn’t registered in Paris
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(≈ Someone is registered in Paris, not Paula.)
Regarding the claim about the triggering of the inference that the speaker is committed to p,
we argued in Section 5.2.0.2, that this cannot be right. In the unembedded sentences in (69)–
(70), as well as in (73-a), the embedded proposition is understood as being pragmatically
at-issue. Regardless, the sentences retain their p=1 inference.
(73) a. The TA discovered that your work is [plagiarized]F .
b. The TA [discovered]F that your work is plagiarized.
Hence, we concluded that manipulating the QUD was indeed able to account for one dimen-
sion of factivity, as traditionally understood, namely whether or not p is understood to be
Common Ground.
In Section 5.3, we asked whether manipulating the QUD would affect the projection
of the p=1 inference, as predicted by Simons et al. (2010), as well as by the entailment-
based accounts of Simons et al. (2017) and Tonhauser (2016). Our experimental results
showed that, while participants used the prosodic manipulation as a guide to the QUD,
prosodic focus had only a very small effect on their estimates of speaker commitment to p
(relative to the effect of predicate type: factive vs. non-factive). The sentences with factive
predicates all showed more-or-less ceiling-level projection scores. Moreover, unlike in the
classic local accommodation cases, e.g. (67), there was no difference between the doxastic and
the emotive factives. Surprisingly, we also observe that focus placement impacted projection
judgements also for clauses embedded under non-factive predicates, in the opposite direction
from factives. From these results, we conclude that, contrary to these pragmatic accounts,
projection does not depend on the status of p relative to the QUD.37
At this point, everything seems to point to a picture whereby the doxatic factives are
37We return to the weak effect of focus in Section 5.7. Following Bacovcin and Djärv (2017), Djärv and
Bacovcin (2018), we take the effect of focus, and the interaction with predicate type, to be an orthogonal
effect to the p=1 inference triggered by factive verbs; Section 3.1.5 outlines a probabilistic model, from Djärv
and Bacovcin (2018), to account for the effect focus, and the reverse effect found with the non-factives.
Section 5.7.2 notes, however, that languages may differ with respect to the effect of focus.
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‘less factive’ and ‘more assertive’ than the emotive factives – as reflected in their pragmatics,
as well as their syntax. However, the empirical (and therefore theoretical) picture turns out
to be slightly less straightforward than that.
As we mentioned above, without embedding, presuppositions are generally not suspend-
able in this way, as shown with the existence presupposition of the definite article in (74).
(74) Abrusán (2016, p. 166)
a. The King of France did not eat the cake: there is no King of France.
b. #The King of France ate the cake, but there is no King of France.
It was therefore somewhat surprising to see that the ‘hard’ emotive factives, unlike the
‘soft’ doxastic factives, allow for suspension of the p=1 inference in unembedded contexts.
This contrast was experimentally established by Djärv, Zehr, and Schwarz (2018), reported
in Section 5.4 (see also Schwarz, Djärv, and Zehr 2018 for a replication of this experiment
in Italian). (75)–(77) from Djärv, Zehr, and Schwarz (2018) illustrate their main finding:
(75) a. Is Eve aware that [P Ben is coming to the bar mitzvah]?
b. #Yes, although he isn’t. Doxastic Factives
(76) a. Is Eve happy that [P Ben is coming to the bar mitzvah]?
b. (#)Yes, although he isn’t. Emotive Factives
(77) a. Does Eve think that [P Ben is coming to the bar mitzvah]?
b. Yes, although he isn’t. Non-factives
Based on the premise that answering yes to a question commits the speaker to all entail-
ments of the question (but not other aspects of meaning38), Djärv et al. (2018) argued that
their results reflect a contrast in entailment (along the lines of Sudo’s (2012) distinction be-
38Consider for instance scalar implicatures:
(78) a. Did some of the students pass the test? [some implies that not all students passed the test]
b. Yes, in fact all of them did.
314
tween entailed and non-entailed presuppositions), such that only the doxastic, but not the
emotive factives entail their presupposition that p. (As pointed out by Djärv et al. (2018),
these results are problematic for the premise of pragmatic accounts, that p is part of the
conventionally entailed content of factive predicates.)
While this might seem unintuitive, given that the doxastics are otherwise the ‘softer’ of
the two, we show in Section 5.6.1 that these results are in fact two sides of the same coin.
This discussion will also undermine the idea that doxastic factives entail their presupposition.
Rather, as we will see shortly, the relevant contrast has to do with whether or not there is
a lexically encoded presupposition of (the speaker’s) evidential modal base entailing p. We
show that this is the case for doxatic, but not emotive factives. The critical evidence for this
claim comes from an examination of the role of ‘non-commitment contexts’, and how it plays
out with the two types of factives across embedding contexts. In Section 5.6.1, we spell out
core of the current approach to (emotive and doxastic) factives, and extend this account to
fact that nominals. In Section 5.6.2 we offer a solution to the issue of (i) the link between
the semantics of emotive factives, (ii) the syntactic status of their clausal complements as
DPs, and (iii) the pragmatic information-status of their complements as a specific type of
Given information.
5.6 Analysis: doxastic and emotive factives
5.6.1 Evidence, belief, and justification
In the previous section, we claimed that the results of Djärv, Zehr, and Schwarz (2018) (that
emotive, unlike doxastic factives, allow for cancellation of the p=1 inference in unembedded
sentences) are in fact not indicative of a contrast in the entailment of p per se, but reflect
a contrast in whether or not the speaker’s evidential support for p is a lexically encoded
condition on the context —i.e. whether this is a presupposition (in the traditional sense).
Recall the examples in (75)–(76): as we saw in Section 5.4, the contrast in the acceptabil-
ity of yes-answers observed between the doxastic and emotive was relatively small, though
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significant (Section 5.4.2.2.5), and both much more degraded than responses to questions
with non-factive verbs (77). Consider, however, the examples in (79). Here, contradicting
the ‘presupposition’ is quite natural —and of course, no global inference that the speaker is
committed to p arises.
(79) a. John is happy that [P his parents are coming to visit him], though they actually
had to cancel their trip because of the weather. (Poor John will be sad when
he finds out!) ↝̸ p
b. I’m really not sure what Mary’s deluded reasons are for believing that her boss
likes her, but she’s sure happy that [P he does]. ↝̸ p
c. Crazy John believes everything he reads! Now he read that the sun is going to
be swallowed by an intergalactic T-Rex, and he’s quite sad that [P the world is
about to end]. But of course it’s not! ↝̸ p
The feature shared by each of these examples, is that the speaker makes it clear that she
does not endorse the attitude holder as a reliable source of p being true, or has evidence
showing that the attitude holder is misinformed. This idea was in fact present also in Djärv
et al.’s (2018) discussion of the contrast (though they argued for a theoretical distinction in
terms of entailed presuppositions):
The basic intuition is that it is quite easy to imagine that one is happy about a
certain state of affairs, but is simultaneously wrong about it. It is harder to see
how one can discover something which is not true. (Djärv et al. 2018, p. 372).
Note also that, as shown by (80)–(81), it is not necessary for the speaker to explicitly
contradict p in order for the inference that the speaker is committed to p to disappear:
(80) Reliable Attitude Holder:
John, my boss, is extremely measured and rational. He’s meticulous and always
knows what’s going on in the office—in particular in the accounting department. . . Now,
I don’t know anything about this myself, but John’s upset that our accounting offi-
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cer, Mary, has been embezzling and is threatening to take her to court. ↝ p
(81) Unreliable Attitude Holder:
John, my boss, is a paranoid hothead who tends to jump to conclusions and makes
assumptions based on loose evidence and hearsay. Also, he really does not under-
stand the details of accounting. . . Now, I don’t know anything about this myself, but
John’s upset that our accounting officer, Mary, has been embezzling and is threat-
ening to take her to court. ↝̸ p
The same is true of emotive factives in embedded contexts:
(82) a. John is not at all happy that [P his parents are coming to visit him]. However,
that all doesn’t really matter now, since apparently they ended up having to
cancel their trip because of the weather. ↝̸ p
b. Crazy John believes everything he reads! Now he read that the sun is going to
be swallowed by an intergalactic T-Rex, and he’s not happy that [P the world
is about to end]. But of course it’s not! ↝̸ p
These examples, then, clearly corroborate the experimental findings of Djärv et al. (2018),
that it is possible for the speaker to not be committed to p, and still felicitously use emotive
factives.
However, they also reveal another important fact: namely that the contexts that license
the suspension of the inference that p=1 with (embedded or unembedded) emotive factives,
closely mirrors the contexts in which p fails to project with embedded doxastic factives.
That is, where the speaker does not know whether or not p holds (first person conditionals,
explicit ignorance contexts), as we saw in (65), repeated here:
(83) a. If I discover later that [PS the proposal offended them], I will apologize.
b. . . . I haven’t tried this with wombats, though, & if anyone discovers that
[PS the method is also wombat-proof], I’d really like to know!
317
c. I have no idea if Mary is cheating on John. But if he discovers that [PS she is],
he will be sad.
Of course, as we have seen above, with unembedded doxastic factives, it is never possible
for the speaker to contradict the presupposition, regardless of the context:
(84) a. #John is aware that [P his parents are coming to visit him], though they
actually had to cancel their trip because of the weather.
b. #I’m really not sure what Mary’s deluded reasons are for believing that her
boss likes her but she’s sure aware that [P he does].
c. #Crazy John believes everything he reads! Now he read that the sun is going
to be swallowed by an intergalactic T-Rex, and he’s now aware that [P the
world is about to end]. But of course it’s not! ↝̸ p
On the classical, lexical view, whereby both kinds of factives presuppose p, and contexts
inconsistent with p being Common Ground trigger local accommodation, the contrast illus-
trated in (85) is unexpected: why should doxastic and emotive factives differ in terms of the
kinds of embedded contexts that allow suspension of the p=1 inference?
(85) Karttunen (1971, p. 64)
a. If I realize later that I haven’t told the truth, I’ll confess it to everyone. ↝̸ p
b. If I regret later that I haven’t told the truth, I’ll confess it to everyone. ↝ p?
The examples in (79)–(82) and the results of Djärv et al. (2018), now allow us to answer
both this, and some related questions.
First, however, recall from Section 5.2.0.1 that on the dynamic framework of Heim
(1983), the presuppositions of a sentence must be Common Ground, in order for a context
update to be defined. If factives uniformly presupposed p, then we’d indeed be hard pressed
to account for the contrast in (85). However, the data from Simons (2007), Djärv, Zehr,
and Schwarz (2018), Caplan and Djärv (2019) and Section 3.2 has already shown us that
318
factives do not require p to be Common Ground (neither emotives, nor doxatics). The
relevant examples are repeated in (86):
(86) a. Guess what! John discovered that [P Bill and Anna broke up].
b. Where did Louise go last week?
I heard that [P she had a job interview at Princeton].
c. I hear that you went to Paris last summer. What was the city like?
I was surprised that [P the city was really great].
So if factives don’t presuppose p, then what do they presuppose? And if they don’t pre-
suppose p, then were does the inference that the speaker takes p to be true come from?
And what explains its variable occurrence and projection behaviour across the two types
of factives? Our proposal is that the answer to all of these questions lies in the parallel
between the contexts that allow suspension of the speaker commitment inference with the
(embedded and unembedded) emotives, and the contexts that trigger local accommodation
with the doxastics. The key observation are summarized in (87).
(87) a. Doxastic, but not emotive factives, allow “suspension” of the inference that p
is true in embedded, but not unembedded contexts, when the context entails
that the speaker’s beliefs are inconsistent with believing p.
b. Emotive, but not doxastic factives, allow “suspension” of the inference that p
is true in embedded and unembedded contexts, when the context entails that
the speaker does not take the attitude holder to be justified in believing p.
To this, we might add another important observation, namely that emotive factives pre-
suppose that the attitude holder believes that p. For doxastic factives, on the other hand,
attitude holder commitment is part of the asserted or conventionally entailed content of the
sentence. We saw evidence of this in the experimental study in Section 3.2.6.1 (Figures
3.22–3.23), where attitude holder belief that p received high ratings for the negated emotive
factives, but low scores for the negated doxastic factives. The example in (88) also illustrates
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this point: as a default, the attitude holder’s belief that p projects from under embedded
emotives, but not from under embedded doxastics.
(88) a. Mary doesn’t know that [P Bill moved to Canada].↝ Speaker believes p↝̸ Attitude holder believes p
b. Mary doesn’t appreciate that [P Bill moved to Canada].↝ Speaker believes p↝ Attitude holder believes p↝̸ Attitude holder appreciates p
What all of the facts speak to, then, broadly speaking, is that doxastic factives pre-
suppose speaker holder commitment to p, and assert attitude holder commitment to p.
Emotive factives, on the other hand, presuppose attitude holder commitment, and assert
speaker commitment to p. It is not the case, then, that the apparent “resistance to local
accommodation” of emotive factives is because of some quirk about how they interact with
embedded operators, or because they are ‘hard triggers’. It’s just that the contexts that
are inconsistent with the presupposition of doxastic factives —and therefore trigger local
accommodation in embedded contexts—, are not the same as the kinds of contexts that
are inconsistent with the presupposition of emotive factives. Hence, these contexts do not
trigger local accommodation with emotive factives in embedded contexts.
The question, then, is why emotive factives generally give rise to the projecting inference
that the speaker is committed to p. Do we perhaps want to treat that, too, as a presupposi-
tion of emotives, alongside the presupposition of attitude holder commitment? The answer
is no. Suppose that we went down this route. If so, we’d have to explain why it is that in
the case of the emotives, this inference is contextually defeasible in unembedded contexts,
whereas with doxastics, it is not — and relatedly, why it is that speaker commitment to p
appears to be a real domain condition of doxastics, whereas for emotives, this is not a re-
quirement. So clearly, speaker commitment to p is not a presupposition of emotive factives.
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Our preliminary analytical claims are summarized in Table 5.4:39
Preliminary Analysis: Doxastic & Emotive Factives
Attitude Commitment(p)(AH) Commitment(p)(Speaker)
Doxastics Asserted Asserted Presupposed
Emotives Asserted Presupposed Pragmatic default inference
Table 5.4: Preliminary analysis of doxastic and emotives factives.
Nevertheless, in the default case, speaker commitment to p does project with both types
of factives. We saw that in the experimental results in Section 3.2.6.1 (Figures 3.26–3.27),
and this is clearly the general intuition. It is worth noting here, there seems to be a general
tendency to assume that the speaker is committed to the embedded proposition, (more
or less) regardless of the embedding predicate (we see this in the generally high speaker
commitment scores assigned to the non-factives in the experiment reported in Section 3.2.6.1
(Figures 3.26–3.27). The central contrast, then, seems to be the fact that the emotives are
much more degraded with the yes, but not p responses than the non-factives (Figure 5.10).
This shows us that the emoitves are not like non-factives either: they come with a very
strong (though contextually defeasible) default assumption that the speaker endorses the
attitude holder’s perspective, along the lines of: if the attitude holder is committed to p,
then probably they are right about p.
But why should there be such a default assumption? Clearly, there is no such inference
attached to beliefs in general. Recall also our discussion in Section 4.4. Here, we argued
that verbs like know (a set which includes both the doxastic and the emotive factives) do not
in fact encode belief as a necessary or core part of their meaning. Rather, we argued that
these verbs are fundamentally “acquaintance”-based predicates. Just like the know -class
encompasses a wide range of predicates, including both factive and non-factive verbs,40
39This table represents a preliminary meaning schema for the two types of factives, and not the final
analysis. We use the label ‘Attitude’ very broadly, as a shorthand for the primary asserted meaning associated
with different factives: for instance, discover asserts that there was some, external event, leading to the
attitude holder coming to believe p; with realize, this event is internal. With forget, there was a time at
which the attitude holder ceased to believe that p, etc. For the emotives, the Attitude is some emotional
relation.
40See Section 4.1 for a discussion of the relevant predicates.
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the notion of acquaintance that we have in mind encompasses a wide range of relations
from communicative relations like mentioning or reporting, to emotive relations like fearing,
appreciating, or loving, to familiarity-based or cognitive relations like discovering, noticing,
remembering, or assuming. Our theoretical proposal is that what the factive verbs among
this class (as well as fact that nominals) have in common, is that they carry a presupposition
of evidential support for p. This idea was present also in Kratzer’s (2002) account of what
it means for a subject (S) to know a fact, which we discussed in Chapter 4 ((89) is repeated
from (102) above), though Kratzer argued that de re belief, too, is a necessary condition on
knowledge:
(89) S knows p if and only if (Kratzer 2002, p. 664)
a. There is a fact f that exemplifies p,
b. S believes p de re of f, and
c. S can rule out relevant possible alternatives of f that do not exemplify p.
Leaving the belief-component to the side, we will offer a ‘decompositional’ version of (89).
First, to capture the contrast between emotive and doxastic factives, it will be useful to
invoke a more general notion of a Judge (J ), in place of Kratzer’s S. We propose that the
judge can be bound by the attitude holder [AH], the speaker [SP], or might be contextually
bound [X]. To formalize the condition that “S can rule out relevant possible alternatives of
f that do not exemplify p” (89-c), we invoke the notion of an evidential modal base, which
is anchored to the judge [MBEV ID(J)]. Our hypothesis is that what makes a verb factive is
that the evidential modal base is part of its presupposed content (it specifically has to be
part of the presupposed content, in order for it to (a) project in the default case, and (b)
fail to project in the kinds of embedded contexts that will trigger local accommodation). To
account for the data discussed above, we propose that in the case of the emotive factives,
the judge is bound by the attitude holder, whereas with the doxastic factives, the judge is
bound by the speaker. As we saw in Section 4.4.1, there is also good evidence for extending
this analysis to fact that nominals. As shown in (90), the content nominal the fact does
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not actually require speaker commitment to p, nor a factive predicate; there just has to be
some, contextually available judge. As shown in Table 5.5, we implement this as an index
(1) on the noun fact : this index may be bound by the attitude holder, or it may receive its
value through the assignment function g.41
(90) a. On the Satellite Hypothesis, this is explained by the fact that the object DP is
not licensed.
b. I don’t believe the fact that teachers have extra eyes behind their heads.42
c. I don’t agree with fact that it would be harder to live in Montreal than in
Toronto.43
d. Nearly 37% of the Americans believe that the concept of the impact of climate
change on health and global warming is a hoax, out of which 64% don’t believe
the fact that this is really going to change the way they live.44
e. George Osborne has said he doesn’t regret the fact that his government did not
plan for Brexit.45
Table 5.5 summarizes the current proposal:46
41We assume that the interpretation of free variables follows the Traces and Pronouns rule of Heim and
Kratzer (1998).
42From https://www.facebook.com/.
43Overheard at dinner (Vancouver, Canada, July 1, 2019).
44https://www.tourmyindia.com/blog/shocking-facts-climate-change-global-warming/.
45https://www.mirror.co.uk/news/politics/george-osborne-said-doesnt-regret-12197801.
46Note that an interesting issue arises here with regards to the analysis of know -verbs in Section 4.4.1
(thanks Florian Schwarz, p.c. for this comment):
(91) know vs. believe-verbs [Schematic templates]
a. know -verbs : λxe.λsl.VERBAQ(s)(x)
b. believe-verbs : λxe.λsl.VERBDOX(s)(cont(x)(ws))
As we saw, this analysis, whereby believe-verbs describe fundamentally doxastic relations to content individ-
uals (whose propositional content is extracted using the content-function of Kratzer 2006, Moulton 2009b),
and know -verbs describe fundamentally acquaintance-based relations to any type of individual, gave us the
asymmetries discussed in Section 4.1 regarding DP-to-CP entailments and Source-DPs. The key move was
to propose a single lexical entry for both know -DP and know -CP (and other verbs that pattern like know ;
including both the emotive and doxastic factives).
The problem that arises at this point is that the analysis proposed here (Table 5.5) requires that know
and other factive verbs encode an evidential presupposition that the modal base of the Judge entails p. But
of course we do not want such an presupposition in the case of I know John, for instance.
An intriguing alternative, which we leave for future work on this topic to explore, is that the presence
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Analysis: Presuppositions of factives
Type of factive Judge Presupposition
Doxastic factives Speaker [Sp] MBEV ID(Sp) ⊧ p
Emotive factives Attitude Holder [AH] MBEV ID(AH) ⊧ p
fact that nominal Contextually bound [X] MBEV ID(1) ⊧ p
Table 5.5: Presuppositions of different types of factives, including fact that nominals.
Allowing for the evidential modal base to be tied to different Judges allows us to account
for the variable distribution of the ‘factive inference’ (i.e. that the speaker is committed to p)
across embedding environments for different predicates. Given that doxastic factives presup-
pose that the evidential modal base of the speaker entails p, the inference that the speaker
is committed to p can only be canceled in those embedded contexts that are inconsistent
with this presupposition (i.e. the classic ‘local accommodation contexts’: explicit ignorance
contexts, first person conditionals, etc.).
For the emotive factives, however, what is presupposed is that the evidential modal base
of the attitude holder entails p. Hence, with sufficient cognitive distance from the attitude
holder, it is possible for the speaker to endorse the attitude holder’s evidential support for p
(yes, the attitude holder has evidence to support p), while distancing themselves from either
the evidence itself (the attitude holder might be trusting unreliable sources, be misinformed,
or hallucinating. . . ), or from the conclusion that p (that what counts as evidence for the
attitude holder need not qualify as evidence for the speaker). Given that no reference to the
speaker is made at a lexical level, this kind of ‘endorsement-cancellation’ is possible in both
embedded and unembedded environments. As we saw in (88), attitude holder commitment
to p behaves like a presupposition of emotives. Importantly, the current analysis also predicts
that attitude holder’s commitment to p should only be cancellable in embedded contexts
that are inconsistent with this presupposition. This seems to be borne out:
or absence of this evidential presupposition is what marks the difference between the forms kennen/känna
and wissen/veta in German and Swedish (discussed in Section 4.3.1). This possibility raises a number of
interesting questions for the lexical semantics, and the interface between the semantics and the morphology.
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(92) Is Mary sad that [P Bill is moving to Canada]?
a. Well, Mary is off hiking in Siberia and hasn’t been in touch with anyone for
weeks, so she’s probably neither happy nor sad that he’s moving.
b. #Well, Mary is off hiking in Siberia and hasn’t been in touch with anyone for
weeks, so she’s probably very upset that he’s moving.
As apparent form (90), the same is true of the fact that nominals: with sufficient cogni-
tive distance, it is possible for the speaker to distance themselves from the content of the
embedded proposition.
Finally, by appealing to an evidential, rather than a doxastic modal base, we can explain
the strong pragmatic default inference of speaker commitment to p, found with both the
emotive factives and with fact that nominals: given that the speaker is committed to there
being some evidence for p (even if this is not the speaker’s own evidence), the speaker is
also likely to endorse the conclusion that p. The doxastic modal base, on the other hand,
provides a much weaker basis for endorsing the attitude holder’s perspective; hence, we don’t
get this strong pragmatic default inference in the case of purely doxastic predicates.
In the following section, we turn to the other pragmatic dimension typically associated
with factive verbs, but shown here to differ between the doxastic and emotive factives,
namely the discourse status of p. In particular, we attempt to pin down the link between (a)
the semantics of emotive factives, discussed in this and the previous chapter; (b) the syntactic
status of their clausal complements as DPs, and (c) the pragmatic information-status of their
complements as a specific type of Given information, both discussed in Chapters 2 and 3.
5.6.2 Definiteness, Givenness, and discourse novelty
Recall that in the tradition going back to Kiparsky and Kiparsky (1970), the syntactic status
of the complements of emotive factives as DPs is a consequence of their factivity; the idea
being that factive predicates select a clause with a potentially null DP corresponding to the
fact, as illustrated in (93), repeated from (22) in Section 2.2
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(93) [vP v [DP D [NP FACT [CP that p ] ] ] ]
In a more recent implementation of this idea, Haegeman and Ürögdi (2010), Haegeman
(2014), and Kastner (2015), among others, argued that the status of complements of emotive
factives as DPs follow not from their status as factives, but from the discourse status of p
as discourse old, or Given, information: a notion which is intended to capture the response
stance predicates, along with the factives.47
As we saw in Chapter 2 (in particular, §2.3), however, neither of these proposals are right.
First, both the doxastic factives and the response stance verbs can take CP-complements. In
fact, what the tests in this section showed us, was that among the approximately 20 verbs
from the five predicate classes examined, the emotive factives were unique in that their
clausal complements must be underlyingly DPs: all other verbs were found to take both CP
and DP-complements.48 Regarding the discourse status of p as Given, we saw in Section
3.2.6 that both the emotive factives and the response verbs —unlike the doxastic factives
and the other non-factives— require p to be Given. Hence, it cannot be that DP-selection
simply tracks the status of p as Given.49
The question, then, is whether the syntactic selection of emotives for DP-complements is
tied in some principled way to their semantic and/or pragmatic properties, or whether this
is simply a syntactic quirk of these predicates. To answer this question, let us take stock of
what properties we have seen so far, in terms of the semantic and pragmatic properties of
the emotive factives, vis-à-vis the other predicate types examined here.
First, as we argued in Chapter 4, the emotive factives, like other verbs of the so-called
know -class, describe acquaintance-relations to individuals, as shown in (94), repeated from
Section 4.4.1.
47Haegeman and Ürögdi (2010), Haegeman (2014) and Kastner (2015) use the terms ‘referential’ and
‘presuppositional’, respectively, but it’s clear from their discussions that they both have a similar notion of
Givenness in mind.
48With the exception of suppose, which apparently only allows CP-complements.
49We did argue, however, that the status of p as discourse new vs. Given tracks the availability of an
extended CP. However, this is in contrast with a either smaller CP or a DP, not in contrast with a DP per
se.
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(94) know -verbs : λxe.λsl.VERBAQ(s)(x) [Schematic template]
In the previous section, we then proposed that what distinguishes the factive verbs among
this class is that they presuppose that there is an evidential modal base [MBEV ID(J)],
anchored to a Judge (J ), which entails p. For the doxastic factives, J is bound by the
speaker, for the emotive, J is bound by the attitude holder, and in the case of fact that
nominals, J is contextually bound (see Table 5.5 for a summary).
The second piece of the puzzle, comes from Chapter 3 (§3.3), where we discussed what,
precisely, is meant when we say that the emotive factives and response stance verbs require
p to be ‘discourse old’. As we’ve mentioned at various points in this dissertation (most
explicitly discussed in §5.2.0.2.1), the relevant notion cannot be that p is Common Ground.
Neither the response stance verbs nor the emotive factives impose such a requirement on
the context. (This point is also illustrated by negated verbs like think and say, which
pattern with the response verbs for this purpose.) Rather, the relevant pragmatic dimension,
we argued, is Schwarzschild’s (1999) notion of Givenness, which implies that p has some
antecedent in the discourse. Importantly, while the response predicates and the emotive
factives both share this general property, they differ in whether this antecedent has to be
linguistic or not, as shown in (95)–(96), repeated from Section 3.3:
(95) [Context: Mary and Bill are lying on the beach on a beautiful sunny day. Not
having previously discussed the weather, Mary says:]
a. I’m so happy that it turned out to be such a nice day!
b. #I {doubt, didn’t say} that it’s going to rain later.
(96) [Context: Mary and Bill are on the subway. They overhear someone say:
“I read that [P Weinstein is going to prison].” Mary turns to Bill and says:]
a. I doubt thatP will ever happen.
b. I’m happy he’s finally getting what he deserves. (implied by going to prison)
These examples showed us that the response predicates (along with negated verbs like say
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and think) require an actual linguistic antecedent (such that p has either been proffered, or
that the question of ?p has been raised). They then make an assertion about the attitude
holder’s stance towards p (accept or reject). For the emotives, what matters is that the
source of the attitude holder’s evidential support for p is contextually provided, though this
need not necessarily be via a linguistic antecedent. It is this source of the attitude holder’s
evidence for p, we propose, that triggers the selection of a DP. In (95), the source is the
situation of lying on the beach on a sunny day. In (96), it is the claim uttered by someone
in the context. Note also that this is not the case for the doxastic factives: as we saw above,
p can be introduced as entirely discourse new information, with no situation supporting p
present in the context.
Recall the analysis offered in Section 4.4.1 for clausal complements of verbs:
(97) [[CPV −cont]]w = ιxc.cont(xc)(w) = p
While the discussion in Chapter 4 emphasized the need to analyze clausal complements
of verbs as individuals, we were intentionally vague about the role of the iota-operator. This
question becomes important now, in light of the proposal that the obligatory DP-selection
of emotive factives is linked to their requirement that the source of the attitude holder’s
belief is contextually provided. While a comprehensive discussion of the different varieties
of definiteness found in natural language is well beyond the scope of the current discussion,
a distinction which is relevant here is that between uniqueness and anaphoricity (see for
instance Heim 1982, Schwarz 2009, 2013, and references therein). In the tradition of Frege
(1892), Russell (1905) and Strawson (1950), we define the iota-operator as follows:
(98) ιx.f(x) is defined iff there exists a unique x such that f(x)
In the context of (97), what this ends up saying is simply that there has to be a unique
individual xc which has the intentional content p. This, we propose, is present with all
clausal complements of attitude verbs.
The emotive factives, however, additionally impose a stronger form of definiteness,
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namely a requirement that a situation or individual, providing the attitude holder’s evi-
dential basis for p, is familiar or has an anaphor in the context. While the uniqueness-
requirement of the iota-operator in (97)/(98) doesn’t provide this, natural language also
makes available a definite article that encodes this kind of anaphoricity. Schwarz (2009)
(building on Stalnaker 1978, Kamp 1981, Heim 1982, Roberts 2003, Neale 2004, and El-
bourne 2005) distinguishes between the two types of definite articles in (99):
(99) Schwarz (2009, p. 182-183)
a. Weak article: λsr.λP.ιx.P(x)(sr) [DP D [ NP ]]
b. Strong article: λsr.λP.λy. ιx.P(x)(sr) & x = y [DP 1 [ D [ NP ]]]
The strong article is essentially a semantically more complex version of the weak article
(≈(98)), in that it in addition to the uniqueness requirement introduces an anaphoric index
(1), which gets assigned a value by the assignment function g. (100) from Schwarz (2009)
illustrates:
(100) Schwarz (2009, p. 181)
a. [[[ thestrong sr ] book ] 1 ]
b. [[(100-a)]]g = ιx.book(x)(sr) & x = g(1)
We propose, then, that it is this presupposition of the emotive factives, of an such a
discourse antecedent, that triggers selection of the strong definite article, realized in an
optionally null DP.50 Evidence for the claim that the emotive factives—and non-factives—
are semantically more complex than the doxastics, making particular reference to the source
of the attitude holder’s evidential basis for p, comes from pairs such as (101); no such
50This of course raises the question of how the semantic composition works out. On the view of Moulton
(2009b) (discussed in Section 4.3.2) where clauses are predicates (of type <e,st>), the composition with
the determiner would work out straightforwardly. On the current view, the answer is unfortunately less
straightforward. We argued in Chapter 4 that if the CP is selected by a verb, it will be of type e, whereas
if it is selected by a noun, it will be of type <st>. To properly explore this issue, we should ideally look at
languages with a richer system of overt clausal determiner. As this would presently take us too far afield,
we leave this issue for future work.
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alternations are available with the doxastic predicates.
(101) a. The rumour that Bill is moving to Canada {surprised, angered, worries} me.
b. I’m {surprised, angry, worried} that Bill is moving to Canada.
c. I’m {surprised, angry, worried} about the rumour/fact that Bill is moving to
Canada.
Our final complete of the two types of factives is summarized in Tables 5.6–5.7 (leaving to
the side the issue of the doxastic component of these predicates):
Analysis: Doxastic factives
Select for Individuals of type e
Asserted content (1) The attitude holder’s acquaintance relation to x (discovery,
realization, forgetting, remembering, noticing, hearing, etc.)
Presupposed content The speaker’s evidential modal base entails p
Table 5.6: Semantic analysis of doxastic factives, final version.
Analysis: Emotive factives
Select for Individuals of type e
Asserted content The attitude holder’s emotive relation to x (happiness, sadness,
surprise, anger, etc.)
Presupposed content
(1) The attitude holder’s evidential modal base entails p
(2) The source of the attitude holder’s evidential modal base has
an antecedent in the discourse
Table 5.7: Semantic analysis of emotive factives, final version.
Fact that nominals, we argued, additionally carried a presupposition, similar to that
of the factive verbs: MBEV ID(J) ⊧ p. Unlike in the case of the verbal factives, however,
the Judge is not intrinsically tied to either speaker or attitude holder, but is realized as an
index on the noun, which might either be bound or receive its value through the assignment
function.
To summarize, in this and the previous section, we spelled out a novel analysis of the
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meaning of factive verbs in terms of (for doxastics) lexical or (for emotives) contextual en-
tailments about evidential support for p. While this approach identified a common source
for the triggering and (non-)projection/occurrence of the inference that the speaker endorses
p, for the two types of factives, it was also able to capture a number of observed asymmetries
regarding their apparent entailment properties, their interaction with operators and sensi-
tivity to contextual effects. Importantly, this analysis does not tie factivity (i.e. speaker
commitment to p) to the discourse status of p.
We also spelled out the link between the semantics, syntax, and pragmatics of emotive
factives, vis-à-vis other predicate types. In previous work, the presence of a D-layer in the
complements of emotive factives has been tied either to their status as factive, or to the
status of their complements as Given information. In the previous two chapters, however,
we saw that neither of those claims are correct. The account developed here, instead links
the presence of this D-layer to the presupposition of the emotives that the situation (or
content individual) which provides the attitude holder’s evidential basis for p, must have an
antecedent in the context.
Before concluding this chapter, and the dissertation, we return briefly to the issue of
focus, and how it may interact with both factivity and the type of embedded clause in
different languages.
5.7 Towards accounting for variation in prosodic effects
5.7.1 Focus and projection-like inferences51
In Section 5.3, we saw experimental data from Bacovcin and Djärv (2017), Djärv and Ba-
covcin (2018) showing that prosodic focus does not impact projection (or triggering) in the
way predicted by the pragmatic accounts of Abrusán (2011b, 2016), Simons et al. (2010,
2017), and Tonhauser (2016) (building on observations by Beaver 2010). We did, how-
ever, observe a weak effect of focus on speaker commitment ratings, for both factive and
51The content in this section is adapted from joint work with Hezekiah Akiva Bacovcin (Djärv and
Bacovcin 2018; Section 4.)
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non-factive predicates. Importantly, however, the effect went in different ways for the fac-
tive and the non-factive predicates: for the factives, focus-placement in the embedded clause
slightly weakened the inference that the speaker is committed to p, whereas for non-factives,
focus in the embedded clause slightly strengthened this inference.
In Bacovcin and Djärv (2017), Djärv and Bacovcin (2018) (more explicitly in the latter
paper), we proposed a novel account of how focus interacts with factive presupposition
triggering/projection. On this account, the QUD-inferences generated by focus-placement
in the embedded clause will either strengthen (for non-factives) or weaken (for factives) the
inference that the speaker is committed to the embedded proposition, by giving the hearer
cues as to the current state of the Common Ground. We argued that these independent
inferences had to be combined with the inferences of the presupposed and asserted contents
of the utterance, thus explaining the observed interaction between Focus Type and Predicate
Type. In the case of focus on material in clauses embedded under non-factive predicates,
the QUD inferences have the effect of supplementing the lack of a factive inference from non-
factive predicates by giving rise to an existence inference: focus on the embedded subject
generates a QUD that entails that for some individual, the embedded predicate holds in
the Common Ground. Here, the existence inference generated by focus is stronger than any
inferences from the non-factive predicate (i.e., no inference at all). Thus, prosody is expected
to give rise to effects resembling a weak factive presupposition. In the case of focus on
material in clauses embedded under factive predicates however, this type of QUD inference
conflicts with the inference that the speaker is committed to p. Here, the existence inference
generated by focus in the embedded clause is weaker than the truth inference generated by
the factive predicate (that for a specific individual, the embedded predicate holds in the
Common Ground). This conflicting QUD inference can then weaken the inference drawn
from the lexically factive predicate. However, it does not eliminate the factive inference
entirely.52
52Note that we also found that prosody had an effect on main clauses, e.g. Anna left town vs. ANNA left
town. While this effect may appear surprising, given that the speaker is directly asserting the proposition in
these cases, we interpreted the effect in the unembedded condition as being due to at least some participants
interpreting focus on the subject as a question (an interpretation that was promoted by a tendency for the
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To account for the data in embedded cases, we proposed that the standard lexical ac-
count of presupposition triggering and projection, as discussed in Section 5.2.0.1, should be
adopted (and then supplemented with an independent account of the semantics/pragmatics
of prosody). The lexical theory would account for the attested large difference found between
non-factive and factive predicates (the former come with lexically encoded presuppositions,
while the latter do not). Though we do not adopt this approach here, the current approach
still predicts a large difference between factive and non-factive verbs, in terms of the in-
ference that the speaker is committed to p, and should therefore be compatible with the
approach of Bacovcin and Djärv (2017), Djärv and Bacovcin (2018).
The effect of prosody, we proposed, is completely independent from lexical factivity, thus
giving rise to the weak effect of prosody across predicate types. In particular, we claimed
that the final interpretation of an utterance is a synthesis of multiple inferences based on
lexically encoded content, presupposition triggering and projection, and pragmatic reasoning
about QUDs (as well as other inferences not discussed here, e.g., implicatures), which may
conflict with one another.
From the pragmatic account, we adopted the assumption that focus reflects the pres-
ence of particular QUDs. Our proposal assumed that these QUDs themselves give rise
to particular inferences about the current state of the Common Ground (hence similar to
presuppositional inferences about the presence of a proposition in the Common Ground).
Depending on the nature of these inferences, they can provide support for or against the
probability that the embedded proposition is held to be true. Thus, we assumed that the
certainty measure that we collected (i.e., to what extent participants assume that the speaker
is committed to the truth of p) reflect the participants’ estimation of the speaker’s estimate
of the probability that the embedded proposition is true. Such probabilities will be affected
recordings to include a slight rising intonation at the end of the utterances with Embedded Clause focus).
This interpretation is corroborated by comments left by two participants at the end of the experiment. We
therefore leave this to the side for the remainder of the discussion. (An anonymous reviewer of the paper also
raised the concern that this final rise might have been a confound in the sentences involving factive attitude
verbs. While this is possible, we noted that such an effect should in fact result in even lower certainty ratings
than would follow from the effect of focus alone; thus making the estimated effect of focus a generous one—
and hence not a problem for the current account.)
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by the total sets of inferences and assertions generated by the speaker’s utterance. This
conjecture (that prosodic differences can give rise to differential preferences for particular
QUDs) was supported by the results of a second experiment reported in Djärv and Bacovcin
(2018); not included here for reasons of space.
Our proposal assumed that three different types of inferences that can arise from any of
our utterances: (1) the asserted content of the utterance, which for the embedded conditions
never entail p (the assertions are only about the attitude holder’s relation to p); (2) the
projected presuppositional content of the utterance, which only make claims about the
status of the current Common Ground; and (3) the inferences from the QUD, which also
only make claims about the current Common Ground. Table 5.8 shows the inferences for the
four relevant embedded conditions. These three types of inferences need to be reconciled in
order for the final meaning of the utterance to be determined. Given that these inferences
can be contradictory (see the bolded elements from Table 5.8), there must be a mechanism
for resolving the contradictions in determining the ultimate meaning of the utterance.53
Our model assumed (following the current literature on the effects of focus) that focus
on the matrix predicate naturally gives rise to the QUD “What doxastic (or emotive) rela-
tionship does John have with the proposition Anna left town?”. We assume that Embedded
Clause focus can give rise to at least three possible QUDs: “Who left town?”, “Who did John
discover that they left town?” and “Who might John discover that they left town?”. Of these
three possible QUDs, only one has implications that are relevant for the Common Ground
status of the proposition “Anna left town”, namely “Who left town?”. This question implies
that it is Common Ground that someone has left town (while the questions that include
John’s doxastic states have no direct implications about town leavers in the actual world).
Crucial for our analysis of the effect of focus is only that the question “Who left town?”
53Note that this would only be a contradiction if we assumed that “Anna left town” is assumed to mean
“Only Anna left town”. While the exclusivity of statements is a natural pragmatic consequence of the Maxim
of Quantity, we assumed a non-exhaustive interpretation, and show that while it does not directly contradict
the presupposition, its inference of uncertainty with respect to the Common Ground is still in tension with
the inference from the presupposition. If an exhaustive interpretation was adopted, the effects of focus would
be slightly larger (since the QUD would rule out both the possibility that no one left town and that more
than one person left town). Crucially, however, the direction of the effect would be the same.
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Predicate Focus Assertion Presupposition QUD Inference
Factive EC It is possible that
John discovered that
Anna left town
It is CG that
Anna left town
It is CG that someone
left town, but not CG
who that person is.
Factive MC It is possible that
John discovered that
Anna left town
It is CG that
Anna left town
It is CG that John has
some relationship with
the proposition Anna
left town.
Non-
factive
EC It is possible that
John believed that
Anna left town
N/A It is CG that someone
left town, but not CG
who that person is.
Non-
factive
MC It is possible that
John believed that
Anna left town
N/A It is CG that John has
some relationship with
the proposition Anna
left town.
Table 5.8: Complete set of inferences in each condition; CG=Common Ground (bolded
inferences in a row are contradictory. MC=Main Clause; EC=Embedded Clause.)
be more accessible in Embedded Clause focus conditions than in the Main Clause focus
condition (a hypothesis that is explicitly tested, and supported, in a second experiment: see
Djärv and Bacovcin 2018, Sec. 5).54
To capture gradient responses in certainty, we adopted the formal device of modeling
current conversational states as probability distributions over possible worlds rather than
sets of possible worlds, e.g., that there is a probability of 0.1 that the real world isWa, rather
than thatWa is a member of the set of candidates for the real word. This move to probability
distributions over worlds is similar to the move take by Rational Speech Act models; e.g.,
Goodman and Frank 2016 and citations therein. Given that this is a probabilistic model,
the laws of probability must be observed, in particular that the probability over all possible
worlds must sum to 1. The goal of conversation under such a model is to concentrate the
probability distribution (i.e., move the probability of any given world close to either 1 or 0
54It is worth noting that the QUD “Who left town?” does not even need to be the current QUD, it merely
needs to be assumed to be on the QUD stack (i.e., it is possible that some participants reconstruct “Who
did John discover that they left town?” as the current QUD, but that this is a sub-topic of the broader
QUD of “Who left town?”). As long as the question is present on the QUD stack, it has implications for the
structure of the Common Ground.
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Wa Wab Wb Wn
Baseline (B) 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
Presupposition (P): Anna left town 0.5 0.5 0 0
QUD (Q): Who left town? 0.33 0.33 0.33 0
Table 5.9: Various inferences and their formal representation as probability distributions
over possible worlds.
and away from 1/# of possible worlds).
For the purpose of exposition, we used a simple model of the set of possible worlds
relevant for the discussion at hand. For ease of discussion, we assume that the relevant
proposition is “Anna left town” and that there are only two possible candidates for town
leavers: Anna and Bob. This creates four possible worlds: Wa in which Anna left town, Wb
in which Bob left town, Wab in which both Anna and Bob left town, and Wn in which no
one left town. Table 5.9 shows the baseline probability over the worlds and the meaning of
the two main inferences (the presupposition and the QUD "Who left town?"). Crucially,
the question “Who left town?” rules out the world in which no one left town (since the
question gives rise to the inference that someone left town). The presupposition “Anna left
town” puts all of the probability mass on the worlds in which Anna in fact left town. For
simplicity we assume that the probability mass is equally distributed over the remaining
worlds in each case.
Given that neither the presupposition nor the QUD are actually asserted in any of the
embedded utterances means that the reconstructed model of the Common Ground is only
being indirectly inferred by the eavesdropper (or participant in the conversation). Thus, the
baseline model (B from Table 5.9) in which all worlds are possible is always a live possi-
bility. The eavesdropper must then combine this default baseline with any other inferences
derived from the utterance to reconstruct a plausible model of the Common Ground. For
mathematical ease, we assume that the assigned probability in the reconstructed model is
the average of the probabilities contributed to that world by each of the inferences at play.
We assumed that the certainty scores given in Experiment 1 are a reflection of the prob-
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P(A) Wa Wab Wb Wn
MC, NonFact (B) 0.5 0.25 (1/4) 0.25 (1/4) 0.25 (1/4) 0.25 (1/4)
EC, NonFact (B+Q) 0.58 0.29 (7/24) 0.29 (7/24) 0.29 (7/24) 0.13 (3/24)
MC, Fact (B+P) 0.76 0.38 (3/8) 0.38 (3/8) 0.13 (1/8) 0.13 (1/8)
EC, Fact (B+P+Q) 0.72 0.36 (13/36) 0.36 (13/36) 0.19 (7/36) 0.08 (3/36)
Table 5.10: Probability over worlds for each condition via averaging of inferences; probability
estimated to two decimal points (exact fraction in parentheses); Probability of Anna leaving
town is the sum of Wa and Wab. MC=Main Clause; EC=Embedded Clause).
ability given in the first column of Table 5.10 (for P(A) the probability that Anna left town
with or without Bob).55 Namely, for Non-Factive verbs, the existence of the QUD inference
in the Embedded Clause Focus condition causes a small rise in the estimated certainty that
Anna left town with respect to the Main Clause Focus condition, since the probability that
no one left town (Wn) has decreased relative to the baseline. For Factive verbs, Embedded
Clause Focus decreases the probability (and thus the certainty rating) that Anna left town
relative to the presupposition, since it increases the probability that only Bob left town.
Notice also that this explains why the factive conditions show slightly lower certainty than
the unembedded condition. That is, the baseline is still on the table in the factive condition,
since the proposition “Anna left town” is only being inferred about the Common Ground
instead of explicitly asserted, as in the unembedded case (where presumably the P(A) that
Anna left town is 1 after the assertion).
Before concluding this section, it is worth noticing that previous lexical and pragmatic
accounts, in their current form, are not able to capture this observation that focus has an
effect on both factive and non-factive predicates (in opposite directions) without invoking
additional theoretical machinery. The effect on non-factive predicates is not predicted by
either the pragmatic or standard lexical theories. The pragmatic accounts argue that focus
causes presuppositions (and their certainty judgements) to be lost, not gained. The lexical
55The true linking hypothesis between this model and actual experimental results are likely to be more
complex. In particular, it is unlikely that each type of inference is actually given equal weight in determining
overall meaning. Nevertheless, the pattern of probability distributions mirrors the pattern of certainty ratings
seen in the experiment.
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accounts are silent on the consequences of prosodic effects altogether. On the current model,
this effect falls out as a welcome consequence of the theory itself.
Of course, this model shares certain assumptions of the proposals in Abrusán (2011b,
2016), Simons et al. (2010, 2017), and Tonhauser (2016), as they all predict that prosodically
mediated focus gives rise to QUD-inferences which may weaken the inference from the factive
verb that p is true. However, the present approach differs crucially from these authors on
two points. First, in terms of the type of effect that focus has; we showed in our second
experiment that focus in the embedded clause merely makes available a QUD that weakens
the factive inference (Djärv and Bacovcin 2018, Sec. 5). Secondly, in terms of the size of the
focus-based effect on the speaker-commitment inference; we show that this is an order of
magnitude smaller than the effect of the type of predicate (factive vs. non-factive) (Section
5.3). Because our proposal separates QUD inferences from lexically triggered inferences,
focus does not uniquely determine a QUD that prevents the triggering or projection of
the p=1 inference, but merely makes available a ‘non-factive’ inference, alongside other
components of meaning, thus leading to the small effect of prosody.
The current experiment was carried out in English, as a way of testing the predictions of
pragmatic approaches to factivity for sentences embedded under operators like modals and
negation. As mentioned in Section 5.2.0.2, none of the accounts examined here claims that
prosodic focus (or other manipulations of the QUD) should eliminate the inference that the
speaker is committed to p in unembedded sentences (at least not for doxastic factives; the
account proposed here argue that certain contexts may have this effect for emotive factives;
importantly though, these are not manipulations of the Main Point or at-issue content of the
utterance). Interesting questions arise however, when we look at data from other languages.
The last section of this chapter provides a brief survey of some recent cross-linguistic findings.
5.7.2 Focus and factivity cross-linguistically
Looking at factivity in Turkish, Özyildiz (2016, 2017a,b) presents data suggesting that when
unembedded factive predicates take a nominalized complement clause, the inference that p
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is true varies with prosody, similarly to what was observed (albeit as a very weak effect) for
English (the translations are from Özyildiz 2017a).
(102) Turkish (Özyildiz 2017a, p. 6)
a. Tunc˛
Tunc˛
[Hillary′nin
Hillary-gen
kazan-dIgˇ-I-nI]
win-nmz-3s-acc
[biliyor]F .
knows
‘Tunc˛ knows that Hillary won.’ ↝̸ p
b. Tunc˛
Tunc˛
[Hillary′nin
Hillary-gen
[kazan-dIgˇ-I-nI]F
win-nmz-3s-acc
] biliyor.
knows
‘Tunc believes that Hillary won.’ ↝̸ p
The empirical picture from Turkish turns out to be fairly complex. As Özyildiz demon-
strates, the availability of the p=1 inference depends on an interaction of focus placement
and the type of embedded clause. If a factive verb takes a nominalized complement (the
default, or unmarked option), the p=1 inference depends on focus-placement. If know takes
a finite clause, headed by the discourse particle diye,56 no inference that p is true arises,
regardless of focus –showing us that focus does not add presuppositions. (See also Moulton
2009b, Bogal-Allbritten and Moulton 2016, Hanink and Bochnak 2016, Bondarenko 2019,
among others.)
(103) Turkish (Özyildiz 2017b, p. 3)
a. Tunc˛
Tunc˛
[Hillary′nin
Hillary-gen
kazan-dIgˇ-I-nI]
win-nmz-3s-acc
biliyor.
knows
‘Tunc˛ knows that Hillary won.’ ↝̸ p
b. Tunc˛
Tunc˛
[Hillary
Hillary
kazan-dI
win-pst.3s
diye]
diye
biliyor.
knows
‘Tunc˛ believes that Hillary won.’ ↝̸ p
Preliminary judgement data from Cypriot Greek also reveals an effect of focus similar
to that in English and Turkish.57 Here, it is possible to have a definite article (to) on top
56Grammaticalized from the verb say. See Berrebi and Bassel (2017) on complementizers grammaticalized
from say-verbs cross-linguistically.
57Thanks to Christos Christopoulos for these judgements.
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of the embedded clause, as well as a resumptive pronoun (to) preceding the matrix clause.
In the regular case, with neither a definite article nor a resumptive pronoun, we observe
that, again, the inference that p=1 varies with focus in the same direction as in English and
Turkish, as shown in (104). However, both the definite and the resumptive pronoun force
focus placement to be on the matrix verb, thus blocking the non-factive reading, as shown
in (105)–(107).
(104) Cypriot Greek
a. O
the
John
John
kseri
know.3sg
[oti
[that
[epies]F
went.pfv.pst.2sg
kriti
Crete
].
].
Parolo
Even.though
pu
that
en
neg
epies.
went.2sg.
‘John knows that you went to Crete. Even though you didn’t go.’
b. #O
the
John
John
[kseri]F
know.3sg
[oti
[that
epies
went.pfv.pst.2sg
kriti].
Crete].
Parolo
Even.though
pu
that
en
neg
epies.
went.2sg.
‘John knows that you went to Crete. Even though you didn’t go.’
(105) a. *O
the
John
John
kseri
knows
[to
[def.neut.nom
oti
that
[epies]F
went.2sg
kriti
Crete
].
].
(Parolo
Even.though
pu
that
en
neg
epies.)
went.2sg.
‘John knows that you went to Crete. Even though you didn’t go.’
b. #O
the
John
John
[kseri]F
knows
[to
[def.neut.nom
oti
that
epies
went.2sg
kriti].
Crete].
Parolo
Even.though
pu
that
en
neg
epies.
went.2sg.
‘John knows that you went to Crete. Even though you didn’t go.’
(106) a. *O
the
John
John
kseri
knows
to
it.neut.acc
[oti
[that
[epies]F
went.2sg
kriti
Crete
].
].
(Parolo
Even.though
pu
that
en
neg
epies.)
went.2sg.
‘John knows that you went to Crete. Even though you didn’t go.’
b. O
the
John
John
[kseri]F
knows
to
it.neut.acc
[oti
[that
epies
went.2sg
kriti].
Crete].
#Parolo
Even.though
pu
that
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en
neg
epies.
went.2sg.
‘John knows that you went to Crete. Even though you didn’t go.’
(107) a. *O
the
John
John
kseri
knows
to
it
[to
[def
oti
that
[epies]F
went.2sg
kriti
Crete
].
].
(Parolo
Even.though
pu
that
en
neg
epies.)
went.2sg.
‘John knows that you went to Crete. Even though you didn’t go.’
b. O
the
John
John
[kseri]F
knows
to
it
[to
[def
oti
that
epies
went.2sg
kriti].
Crete].
#Parolo
Even.though
pu
that
en
neg
epies.
went.2sg.
‘John knows that you went to Crete. Even though you didn’t go.’
The observation then appears to be that in Cypriot Greek, the inference of speaker
commitment to p varies with focus in the same direction as in English and Turkish. Here,
however, the interaction with clausal definiteness goes in the opposite direction from Turkish:
only in non-nominalized clauses, is there an interaction with focus. Another surprising
contrast is that—unlike what has been reported for English, Greek and Turkish both appear
to show this contrast in unembedded sentences. While this observation is highly unexpected
on previous theoretical accounts of focus, it appears to be in line with the model from Djärv
and Bacovcin (2018), discussed in the previous section, given that it does not relate the
focus effects in any way to the presence or absence of operators.
A natural question arising in the context of the experimental results from English, re-
ported in Section 5.3, is to what extent the magnitude of the effect observed for Turkish
is different from the magnitude of the effect observed in English. To address this question,
comparative experimental data would be useful, given the empirical claim, examined in Sec-
tion 5.3, that focus categorically eliminates the speaker commitment to p inference also in
English. Regardless of the magnitude of the effect of focus, however, the interaction with
the type of embedded clause is intriguing, and calls for further investigation. In particular,
to address this issue, further investigation of variation in both the lexical meaning of factive
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predicates and in clausal nominalizations across languages, is needed.58
Before concluding this chapter, a final open issue ought to be flagged: as we saw in
Figure 5.8 in Section 5.3, the adjectival non-factives (be hopeful, be worried, be concerned)
fell somewhere in between the verbal non-factives and the factives, both in terms of their
overall speaker commitment scores, and in terms of the direction of the effect of prosody.
Here, we have focus on verbs; we leave the question of adjectival factive and non-factive
predicates for future investigation.
5.8 Summary
By the end of Chapter 3, we had seen a lot of data calling into question two received views in
the semantics literature: (i) the idea that factive predicates require p to be Common Ground,
and (ii) the analysis of know as the factive version of believe. Investigating in some detail
the syntax and pragmatics of embedded assertions, we found that a more fine-grained notion
of Givenness vs. discourse novelty —distinct from and independent of factivity— is what
matters for the projection of an extended C-domain. Previous work has tied the presence of
a D-layer in the complements of emotive factives either to their status as factive, or to the
status of their complements as Given information. In the previous two chapters, however,
we saw that neither Givenness, nor factivity, determines the status of the embedded clause
as a DP. We were thus left with the questions of (a) what it means for an embedded clause
to be factive, and how (if at all) this relates to the notions of assertion and Givenness, and
(b) what (if anything) about the semantics or pragmatics of the emotive factives accounts
for the observation that they select DPs.
In this chapter, we looked at previous lexical and pragmatic accounts of factivity. In
Sections 5.3 and 5.4, we saw new experimental results from two studies undermining two
of the key empirical underpinnings of pragmatic approach to factivity: we find that neither
does the presence of the speaker commitment inference depend on the Main Point or at-issue
58It is interesting, for instance, in light of the Greek and Turkish data, that the experiment in Section
5.3 found no difference between doxastic and emotive factives.
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status of p with respect to the Question Under Discussion, nor do emotive factives treat the
embedded proposition as conventionally entailed content.
Section 5.6.1 examined in more detail the kinds of (non-)embedded contexts that allow
for the suspension of the speaker commitment to p inference with emotive and doxastic
factives. Based on the observations in this section, we spelled out a novel analysis of the
meaning of factive verbs in terms of evidential support for p (building on work by Kratzer
2002). In particular, we argued that what factive predicates have in common, is a presup-
position that the evidential modal base of a Judge entails p (MBEV ID(J ) ⊧ p): for doxastic
factives, this is the speaker; for emotives, it is the attitude holder. We also looked briefly
at fact nominals, suggesting that they encode the Judge as an index on the noun, which
may either be bound or receive its value via the assignment function. While this approach
identified a common source for the triggering and (non-)projection (or with the emotives,
the non-occurrence) of the inference that the speaker endorses p, for the two types of fac-
tives, it was also able to capture a number of observed asymmetries regarding their apparent
entailment properties, their interaction with operators and sensitivity to contextual effects.
In Section 5.6.2, we returned to the link between the syntax, semantics, and pragmatics,
of the different predicates investigated here, focusing on the contrast between the doxastic
and the emotive factives. Rather than pointing to factivity, or Givenness per se, the account
developed here links the presence of this D-layer under the emotive factives to their presup-
position that the situation or individual providing the attitude holder’s evidential basis for
p, must have an antecedent in the context.
A point worth making regarding the current proposal, is that the doxastic factives have
been noted to being able to function as evidentials (e.g. Simons 2007, Abrusán 2011b, 2016);
an observation which has been linked to their ability to embed at-issue content, or introduce
discourse new information. On the analysis presented here, this is because they are in
fact evidentials. The emotive factives are evidentials too, but not ‘speaker-evidentials’ like
the doxastic factives; rather, they are ‘attitude holder-evidentials’. Moreover, the emotive
factives, unlike many of the doxastic factives, make assertions that are generally not relevant
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to the status of p. This, then, goes a long way towards accounting for the contrast in terms
of introducing (non-)at issue content, though, as we saw in Section 2.5), this is not a hard
and fast restriction: in contexts where the attitude plays a relevant role with respect to the
QUD, emotive factives may function as evidentials too.
Finally, Section 5.7 presented a probabilistic model, from Bacovcin and Djärv (2017),
Djärv and Bacovcin (2018), aiming to capture the weak QUD-based effects observed in
Section 5.3. This section also looked at some apparent cross-linguistic variation in the effects
of focus, regarding the presence or absence of embedding operators, the type of embedded
clause (nominalized vs. non-nominalized), as well as the type of nominalization, pointing
to interesting questions and directions for future research. This section also pointed to
recent work on so-called factivity alternations, i.e. verbs whose factivity depends on the
type of embedded clause. A core insight emerging from this chapter is that factivity is
less of a uniform phenomenon than has previously been proposed, both in terms of the
semantic and pragmatic properties associated with factive verbs, and in the realization of
these properties in emotive vs. doxastic factives. The decompositonal analysis developed
here was able to capture this variability. An interesting question for future work, then, is
whether this perspective is able to capture also the kind of variation observed with these
factivity alternations across different languages.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions
6.1 Main findings of the dissertation
A central question of this dissertation was how and to what extent the lexical semantics of
attitude predicates constrain the interpretation of their complements as asserted or presup-
posed. To answer this question satisfactorily, however, we needed a theory of the semantics
of attitude verbs and clausal complementation, a theory of assertion, a theory of factivity,
and a theory of the syntax-meaning interface — and we needed it all to add up.
A starting point for the journey that lead to this dissertation, was the realization that
the different theoretical and empirical pieces that were needed to solve the puzzle, did in fact
often not add up. For instance, we found that the notion of factivity had been stretched
too thin: Semantically and pragmatically, it was intended to encompass simultaneously
the (non-)at issue status of the embedded proposition p, the inference that the speaker is
committed to p, and the tendency of this inference to survive in embedded contexts. In terms
of the broader theoretical picture, factive verbs are typically analysed as a classic instance
of a presupposition trigger, where presuppositions are viewed as the flip-side of assertions.
Meanwhile, in work on the syntax-pragmatics interface, factivity has been invoked as a way
of accounting for a wide variety of complementation patterns, including the availability of
wh-extraction, V-to-C movement, topicalization, speech act adverbs, and different types of
clausal anaphora.
As we saw in Chapter 3, however, factive verbs are not uniformly ‘non-assertive’, neither
in terms of the syntax nor the pragmatics of their complements. In fact, this tension was
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present right from the start, in Karttunen 1971 and Hooper and Thompson 1973. Recog-
nizing this tension, a lot of work on the syntax-pragmatics interface has tried to appeal to
different notions of assertion, such as speaker (or attitude holder) commitment to p, or the
status of p as the Main Point or at-issue content with respect to the QUD; thus trying to
circumvent the issue of factivity altogether.
As I hope to have shown, the key to the puzzle lay in the factive predicates themselves.
Looking at the different types of context sensitivity displayed by the emotive and doxastic
factives respectively (Chapter 5), we found that factivity is in fact less a uniform notion than
is generally assumed. Dissociating the (projection-prone) inference of speaker commitment
to p, from the discourse status of p as new vs. Given content, enabled us to give a semantically
explanatory theory that does not present a conflict for the pragmatics, and which moreover,
nicely captures the distribution of DP-complements with emotive factives vis-à-vis other
attitude predicates.
By approaching factivity, presupposition, and assertion from the point of view of the
interfaces of the syntax, semantics, and pragmatics, we have shown that we can maintain
the view that some aspects of assertion and presupposition are lexically and syntactically
encoded: in Chapter 3, we saw that V2 and wh-extraction are licensed by assertion; where
assertion is the flip-side of Givenness (in the sense of Schwarzschild 1999). Other purported
Main Clause Phenomena, on the other hand, we found not to be sensitive to this dimension.
In the case of presupposition, we tied the obligatory presence of a D-layer in the complement
of emotive factives to their presupposition that a situation or individual providing the atti-
tude holder’s evidential basis for p, must have an antecedent in the context (Chapters 2 and
5). Givenness itself, however, does not imply the presence of a D-layer: response stance verbs
(including negated verbs like say, believe, and discover) do not select for DPs (Chapter 2).
Yet, there is a sense in which they require p to be Given (Chapter 3). However, the notion
of Givenness is different in this case. Similarly to Schwarz’s (2009) ‘strong’ definite article,
the response stance verbs, unlike the emotive factives, require that p itself has an linguistic
antecedent in the discourse (Chapter 5). It seems, then, that ‘clausal definiteness’ is not
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about questions or propositions in the Common Ground, but about particular situations or
individuals being contextually accessible.
This observation, that the grammar isn’t sensitive to questions, is mirrored in two of the
empirical findings reported in this dissertation. In Chapter 2, we saw experimental results
from Djärv, Heycock, and Rohde (2017), showing that being at-issue or the pragmatic Main
Point with respect to the Question Under Discussion, is not relevant to the licensing of
embedded V2; though it does matter for the interpretation of a complex utterance. In
Chapter 5, we presented experimental results from Bacovcin and Djärv (2017), Djärv and
Bacovcin (2018) showing that the inference that the speaker is committed to p does not
depend on the status of p with respect to the QUD. However, manipulating the QUD does
alter the status of p as backgrounded or not: by separating the discourse status of p from
the speaker commitment inference, we can nicely capture this asymmetry.
In Chapter 4, we examined the interpretation of DP and CP-complements of attitude
verbs and content nouns. We observed that the availability of what we referred to as a
Source-DP, in addition to the clausal complement (1), tracks whether or not a sentence
with a DP-complement will entail the corresponding CP-case (2):
(1) a. I believe John that it’s going to rain.
b. *I know John that it’s going to rain.
(2) a. John believes the rumour that Mary left. ⊧ John believes that Mary left.
b. John knows the rumour that Mary left. ⊭ John knows that Mary left.
These and related data lead us to propose a basic distinction between know -verbs, which
describe (broadly speaking) acquaintance-relations to individuals (a set which includes both
factives like discover, hear, and appreciate, and non-factives like fear, mention, and expect),
and believe-verbs, which describe epistemic or doxastic relations to propositional content
(we identified believe, trust, and doubt as predicates of this type). We also argued that
while content nouns select propositions (mediated by a nominal C-head of type <st,st>) (3),
attitude verbs that are able to combine with both clauses and DPs select for individuals
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(mediated by a verbal C-head of type <st,e>) (4).
(3) Clausal complements of nouns
a. [[CoN ]] = λp<st>.p
b. [[CPoN ]] = λw.John moved to Canada(w)
(4) Clausal complements of verbs
a. [[CoV −cont]]w = λpst.ιxc.contw(xc)(w) = p
b. [[CPV −cont]]w = ιxc.cont(xc)(w) = p
We offered the schematic analysis of the two types of verbs given in (5):
(5) know and believe-verbs [Schematic templates]
a. know -verbs : λxe.λsl.VERBAQ(s)(x)
b. believe-verbs : λxe.λsl.VERBDOX(s)(cont(x)(ws))
In Chapter 5, we expanded on our analysis of the factive members of the know -class,
arguing that the source of the (generally projective) inference of speaker commitment to
p comes from a presupposition of certain know -verbs, of an evidential modal base which
entails p. To account for a number of observed asymmetries in the types of linguistic and
pragmatic contexts that allow for cancellation or suspension of the speaker commitment
inference across factive predicates, we argued that this evidential modal base is always an-
chored to a Judge, which, depending on the type of factive predicate, is bound by different
individuals. In the case of the doxastic factives, the judge is bound by the speaker, whereas
in the case of the emotive factives, the judge is bound by the attitude holder. This accounts
for the observation that doxastic factives only allow suspension of the speaker commitment
inference in embedded contexts that are inconsistent with the speaker having evidence for
p (e.g. explicit ignorance contexts and first person conditionals); consistent with the view
that such contexts trigger local accommodation of the relevant presuppositions (Heim 1982,
1983). Emotive factives, on the other hand, allow suspension or cancellation of the speaker
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commitment inference also in unembedded contexts, provided that there is sufficient ‘cog-
nitive distance’ between the evidential base of the speaker and the attitude holder (in line
with the experimental findings of Djärv et al. 2018, reported in Section 5.4).
The analysis of the two types of factives proposed in this dissertation (Chapter 5) is
repeated in Tables 6.1 and 6.2:
Analysis: Doxastic factives
Select for Individuals of type e
Asserted content (1) The attitude holder’s acquaintance relation to x (discovery,
realization, forgetting, remembering, noticing, hearing, etc.)
Presupposed content The speaker’s evidential modal base entails p
Table 6.1: Semantic analysis of doxastic factives, final version.
Analysis: Emotive factives
Select for Individuals of type e
Asserted content The attitude holder’s emotive relation to x (happiness, sadness,
surprise, anger, etc.)
Presupposed content
(1) The attitude holder’s evidential modal base entails p
(2) The source of the attitude holder’s evidential modal base has
an antecedent in the discourse
Table 6.2: Semantic analysis of emotive factives, final version.
We further extended our analysis of factivity to fact that nominals, arguing that these
carry the same presupposition, though unlike in the case of the verbal factives, the judge
is not intrinsically tied to either speaker or attitude holder, but realized as an index on the
noun, which might either be bound or receive its value through the assignment function.
Thus, fact that nominals, like the emotive factives, allow the speaker to distance themselves
from the content of the embedded proposition in unembedded contexts, given sufficient
cognitive distance. While this account identifies a common source for the triggering and
(non-)projection or occurrence of the speaker commitment inference for the different types of
factives, it is also able to capture a number of observed asymmetries regarding their apparent
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entailment properties, their interaction with operators and sensitivity to contextual effects.
Importantly, it also does not tie the speaker commitment inference to the discourse status
of p, thus allowing us to capture the ability of doxastic to embed asserted content.
Finally, a point I hope to have demonstrated, is that phenomena emerging at the inter-
face of structure, meaning, and context are best understood through an integrated empirical
approach, which considers carefully each component individually, as well as their interac-
tion. Here, we have brought together and connected three separate strands of research on
propositional attitude reports, investigating the relevant empirical phenomena from a com-
bination of cross-linguistic experimental work, statistical analysis of large-scale corpus data,
and careful consideration of fine-grained semantic and syntactic judgements.
6.2 Directions for future work
With this dissertation, I hope to have contributed to the larger enterprise of theoretical
research into attitude reports and clausal embedding, as well as research about the nature
of selection and the relationship between the syntax, the semantics, and the pragmatics.
Here, I point to some of the many outstanding questions and promising directions for future
research.
In Chapter 5, we touched on the issue of ‘factivity alternations’ found in certain lan-
guages; where the interpretation of attitude verb varies depending on the type of clausal com-
plement. A key insight of this dissertation is that factivity is less of a uniform phenomenon
than has previously been proposed, an observation which the decompositonal analysis de-
veloped here was able to capture. An interesting question for future research, is whether
this perspective is able to capture also the kind of variation observed with these factivity
alternations across different languages. In this context, we also observed some potentially
interesting variation in terms of the effects of focus, regarding the presence or absence of
embedding operators, the type of embedded clause (nominalized vs. non-nominalized), as
well as the type of nominalization (definite article vs. morphological nominalization). To
probe these interactions further, comparative experimental work would be helpful.
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Relatedly, a promising direction for future research would be to explore in greater detail
the derivational relationship between different predicates involving the same root (e.g. the
attitude verb claim and the content noun claim, as discussed in Chapter 4). Similar issues
arose in the context of the (optional) doxastic component of know, and the unavailability
of the Source-DP with this class of verbs. The identification of the ‘null DP-source’ with
the emotive factives in Chapter 5 offers a starting point for investigating this issue. The
perspective offered by Distributed Morphology, combined with careful semantic analysis,
seems to offer an intriguing possibility for exploring selection and semantic composition
down to the level of the root.
Here, we focused on the clausal complements of verbs. As we saw in Chapters 2 and
5, however, intriguing variations in projection and complementation patterns arose in the
context of verbal and adjectival factive and non-factive predicates (see for instance footnote
30 in Section 2.3.3 on contrasts in DP-licensing, and the results from Section 5.3.2 on varying
projection rates across predicate types). Differences between different kinds of predicates
remain to be further investigated. Similarly, the present discussion focused on finite that-
clauses. Chapter 4 also raised the question of how the current proposal for know that. . .
relates to know whether. . . . We have also touched briefly on the wager -pattern found with
non-finite clauses (Pesetsky 1991, et seq), and its relation to the issues discussed here.
Indeed, many question remain to be addressed regarding the extent to which the perspective
offered here relates and can be extended to different types of predicates and complementation
patterns.
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Appendix A
Appendix
A.1 Regressions from Section 3.2.6.1
A.1.1 Speaker belief
Coefficient Estimate Std. Error t-Statistic Pr(>|t|)
VerbClass = SpeechAct (Intercept) 1.059e-01 9.567e-02 1.107 0.274474
VerbClass = Dox.NonFact -6.611e-01 1.353e-01 -4.887 1.41e-05 ***
VerbClass = Response.Pos 5.926e-01 1.657e-01 3.577 0.000862 ***
VerbClass = Response.Neg -1.121e+00 1.657e-01 -6.768 2.52e-08 ***
VerbClass = Emo.Fact 6.960e-01 1.353e-01 5.144 6.00e-06 ***
VerbClass = Dox.Fact 2.466e-01 1.353e-01 1.823 0.075180 .
Polarity = Neg -7.252e-01 6.640e-02 -10.922 < 2e-16 ***
VerbClass = Dox.NonFact : Polarity = Neg 2.469e-01 9.391e-02 2.630 0.008606 **
VerbClass = Response.Pos : Polarity = Neg -7.101e-03 1.150e-01 -0.062 0.950773
VerbClass = Response.Neg : Polarity = Neg 1.644e+00 1.150e-01 14.292 < 2e-16 ***
VerbClass = Emo.Fact : Polarity = Neg 6.293e-01 9.391e-02 6.702 2.59e-11 ***
VerbClass = Emo.Fact : Polarity = Neg 4.485e-01 9.391e-02 4.776 1.90e-06 ***
Table A.1: English MaxNewness data. Output of regression model: predicting speaker
commitment to p from the embedding predicate and polarity of the matrix clause. 2400
observations, from 60 subjects and 40 items.
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Coefficient Estimate Std. Error t-Statistic Pr(>|t|)
VerbClass = SpeechAct (Intercept) 0.13504 0.07334 1.841 0.069846 .
VerbClass = Dox.NonFact -0.28724 0.10371 -2.770 0.007198 **
VerbClass = Response.Pos 0.23507 0.12702 1.851 0.068490 .
VerbClass = Response.Neg -0.54279 0.12702 -4.273 6.03e-05 ***
VerbClass = Emo.Fact 0.65138 0.10371 6.281 2.58e-08 ***
VerbClass = Dox.Fact 0.33663 0.10371 3.246 0.001806 **
VerbClass = Control.unembedded 0.78591 0.09927 7.917 8.32e-11 ***
VerbClass = Control.believes.wrongly -1.43397 0.09927 -14.445 < 2e-16 ***
Polarity = Neg -0.22142 0.06005 -3.687 0.000231 ***
VerbClass = Dox.NF : Polarity = Neg 0.11903 0.08493 1.402 0.161155
VerbClass = Response.Pos : Polarity = Neg -0.02520 0.10401 -0.242 0.808615
VerbClass = Response.Neg : Polarity = Neg 0.82018 0.10401 7.885 4.29e-15 ***
VerbClass = Emo.Fact : Polarity = Neg 0.23020 0.08493 2.711 0.006753 **
Class = Dox.Fact : Polarity = Neg 0.24177 0.08493 2.847 0.004445 **
Table A.2: English MaxContrast data. Output of regression model: predicting speaker
commitment to p from the embedding predicate and polarity of the matrix clause. 3192
observations, from 57 subjects and 56 items.
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Coefficient Estimate Std. Error t-Statistic Pr(>|t|)
VerbClass = SpeechAct (Intercept) -0.08495 0.06947 -1.223 0.223863
VerbClass = Dox.NonFact -0.15468 0.09824 -1.575 0.118124
VerbClass = Response.Pos 0.57426 0.12032 4.773 5.42e-06 ***
VerbClass = Response.Neg 0.02576 0.12032 0.214 0.830861
VerbClass = Emo.Fact 0.64959 0.09824 6.612 1.27e-09 ***
VerbClass = Dox.Fact 0.36913 0.09824 3.757 0.000272 ***
VerbClass = Control.unembedded 1.05895 0.08913 11.881 < 2e-16 ***
VerbClass = Control.believes.wrongly -0.98780 0.08913 -11.083 < 2e-16 ***
Polarity = Neg -0.14958 0.08263 -1.810 0.070391 .
VerbClass = Dox.NF : Polarity = Neg -0.15374 0.11686 -1.316 0.188424
VerbClass = Response.Pos : Polarity = Neg 0.08401 0.14313 0.587 0.557302
VerbClass = Response.Neg : Polarity = Neg 0.46963 0.14313 3.281 0.001048 **
VerbClass = Emo.Fact : Polarity = Neg 0.09746 0.11686 0.834 0.404395
Class = Dox.Fact : Polarity = Neg 0.18814 0.11686 1.610 0.107538
Table A.3: German data. Output of regression model: predicting speaker commitment to
p from the embedding predicate and polarity of the matrix clause. 2576 observations, from
46 subjects and 56 items.
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Coefficient Estimate Std. Error t-Statistic Pr(>|t|)
VerbClass = SpeechAct (Intercept) 1.05517 0.09657 10.926 < 2e-16 ***
VerbClass = Dox.NonFact -0.89211 0.13657 -6.532 2.08e-09 ***
VerbClass = Response.Pos -1.57720 0.16726 -9.429 7.92e-16 ***
VerbClass = Response.Neg -1.64715 0.16726 -9.848 < 2e-16 ***
VerbClass = Emo.Fact -1.09188 0.13657 -7.995 1.40e-12 ***
VerbClass = Dox.Fact -0.23251 0.13657 -1.703 0.0915 .
EmbConditionNew (unembedded) 0.25849 0.12408 2.083 0.0406 *
EmbConditionOld (like you) -1.90503 0.12408 -15.353 < 2e-16 ***
Polarity = Neg -1.68320 0.11412 -14.750 < 2e-16 ***
VerbClass = Dox.NonFact : Polarity = Neg 1.08182 0.16138 6.703 3.72e-11 ***
VerbClass = Response.Pos: Polarity = Neg 1.85280 0.19765 9.374 < 2e-16 ***
VerbClass = Response.Neg: Polarity = Neg 1.53198 0.19765 7.751 2.61e-14 ***
VerbClass = Emo.Fact: Polarity = Neg 1.50170 0.16138 9.305 < 2e-16 ***
VerbClass = Dox.Fact: Polarity = Neg 0.27643 0.16138 1.713 0.0871 .
Table A.4: Swedish data. Output of regression model: predicting speaker commitment to
p from the embedding predicate and polarity of the matrix clause. 1288 observations, from
23 subjects and 56 items.
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A.1.2 Discourse novelty
Coefficient Estimate Std. Error t-Statistic Pr(>|t|)
VerbClass = SpeechAct (Intercept) 1.01136 0.05031 20.103 < 2e-16 ***
VerbClass = Dox.NonFact -0.62042 0.07115 -8.720 2.23e-14 ***
VerbClass = Response.Pos -1.45007 0.08714 -16.641 < 2e-16 ***
VerbClass = Response.Neg -1.56712 0.08714 -17.984 < 2e-16 ***
VerbClass = Emo.Fact -1.30070 0.07115 -18.281 < 2e-16 ***
VerbClass = Dox.Fact -0.23831 0.07115 -3.349 0.00109 **
VerbClass = Control.unembedded 0.38107 0.06432 5.924 7.84e-08 ***
VerbClass = Control.like.you -1.97904 0.06432 -30.767 < 2e-16 ***
Polarity = Neg -1.51244 0.06082 -24.869 < 2e-16 ***
VerbClass = Dox.NF : Polarity = Neg 0.81195 0.08601 9.441 < 2e-16 ***
VerbClass = Response.Pos : Polarity = Neg 1.39197 0.10534 13.215 < 2e-16 ***
VerbClass = Response.Neg : Polarity = Neg 1.50719 0.10534 14.308 < 2e-16 ***
VerbClass = Emo.Fact : Polarity = Neg 1.39518 0.08601 16.222 < 2e-16 ***
Class = Dox.Fact : Polarity = Neg 0.16663 0.08601 1.937 0.05278
Table A.5: English MaxNewness data. Output of regression model: predicting discourse
novelty of p from the embedding predicate and polarity of the matrix clause. 3080 observa-
tions, from 55 subjects and 56 items.
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Coefficient Estimate Std. Error t-Statistic Pr(>|t|)
VerbClass = SpeechAct (Intercept) 0.80150 0.07470 10.730 < 2e-16 ***
VerbClass = Dox.NonFact -0.60821 0.10564 -5.757 1.24e-07 ***
VerbClass = Response.Pos -1.05211 0.12938 -8.132 2.56e-12 ***
VerbClass = Response.Neg -1.11643 0.12938 -8.629 2.46e-13 ***
VerbClass = Emo.Fact -1.00787 0.10564 -9.541 3.30e-15 ***
VerbClass = Dox.Fact -0.41439 0.10564 -3.923 0.000174 ***
VerbClass = Control.unembedded 0.17343 0.09852 1.760 0.082954 .
VerbClass = Control.like.you -1.80063 0.09852 -18.277 < 2e-16 ***
Polarity = Neg -0.70834 0.07624 -9.290 < 2e-16 ***
VerbClass = Dox.NF : Polarity = Neg 0.34512 0.10783 3.201 0.001385 **
VerbClass = Response.Pos : Polarity = Neg 0.77025 0.13206 5.833 6.03e-09 ***
VerbClass = Response.Neg : Polarity = Neg 0.71146 0.13206 5.387 7.70e-08 ***
VerbClass = Emo.Fact : Polarity = Neg 0.73765 0.10783 6.841 9.47e-12 ***
Class = Dox.Fact : Polarity = Neg -0.08238 0.10783 -0.764 0.444913
Table A.6: English MaxContrast data. Output of regression model: predicting discourse
novelty of p from the embedding predicate and polarity of the matrix clause. 3080 observa-
tions, from 55 subjects and 56 items.
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Coefficient Estimate Std. Error t-Statistic Pr(>|t|)
VerbClass = SpeechAct (Intercept) 1.03555 0.07834 13.218 < 2e-16 ***
VerbClass = Dox.NonFact -0.93754 0.11079 -8.462 6.13e-13 ***
VerbClass = Response.Pos -1.53063 0.13569 -11.280 < 2e-16 ***
VerbClass = Response.Neg -1.59373 0.13569 -11.745 < 2e-16 ***
VerbClass = Emo.Fact -1.00820 0.11079 -9.100 3.09e-14 ***
VerbClass = Dox.Fact -0.25137 0.11079 -2.269 0.0258 *
VerbClass = Control.unembedded 0.13558 0.10353 1.310 0.1949
VerbClass = Control.like.you -1.94811 0.10353 -18.818 < 2e-16 ***
Polarity = Neg -1.49252 0.07892 -18.911 < 2e-16 ***
VerbClass = Dox.NF : Polarity = Neg 1.08663 0.11161 9.736 < 2e-16 ***
VerbClass = Response.Pos : Polarity = Neg 1.56006 0.13670 11.413 < 2e-16 ***
VerbClass = Response.Neg : Polarity = Neg 1.45883 0.13670 10.672 < 2e-16 ***
VerbClass = Emo.Fact : Polarity = Neg 1.33680 0.11161 11.977 < 2e-16 ***
Class = Dox.Fact : Polarity = Neg 0.14378 0.11161 1.288 0.1978
Table A.7: German data. Output of regression model: predicting discourse novelty of p
from the embedding predicate and polarity of the matrix clause. 2240 observations, from 40
subjects and 56 items.
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Coefficient Estimate Std. Error t-Statistic Pr(>|t|)
VerbClass = SpeechAct (Intercept) 1.05517 0.09657 10.926 < 2e-16 ***
VerbClass = Dox.NonFact -0.89211 0.13657 -6.532 2.08e-09 ***
VerbClass = Response.Pos -1.57720 0.16726 -9.429 7.92e-16 ***
VerbClass = Response.Neg -1.64715 0.16726 -9.848 < 2e-16 ***
VerbClass = Emo.Fact -1.09188 0.13657 -7.995 1.40e-12 ***
VerbClass = Dox.Fact -0.23251 0.13657 -1.703 0.0915 .
EmbConditionNew (unembedded) 0.25849 0.12408 2.083 0.0406 *
EmbConditionOld (like you) -1.90503 0.12408 -15.353 < 2e-16 ***
Polarityneg -1.68320 0.11412 -14.750 < 2e-16 ***
VerbClass = Dox.NonFact : Polarity = Neg 1.08182 0.16138 6.703 3.72e-11 ***
VerbClass = Response.Pos: Polarity = Neg 1.85280 0.19765 9.374 < 2e-16 ***
VerbClass = Response.Neg: Polarity = Neg 1.53198 0.19765 7.751 2.61e-14 ***
VerbClass = Emo.Fact: Polarity = Neg 1.50170 0.16138 9.305 < 2e-16 ***
VerbClass = Dox.Fact: Polarity = Neg 0.27643 0.16138 1.713 0.0871 .
Table A.8: Swedish data. Output of regression model: predicting discourse novelty of p
from the embedding predicate and polarity of the matrix clause. 896 observations, from 16
subjects and 56 items.
A.2 The wager-class
This appendix offers some further insights to the issue of the licensing and interpretation
of content nominals discussed in Section 4.1. According to Elliott (2016), the crucial differ-
ence between attitude verbs is that between (transitive) verbs that assign a theta-role (e.g.
believe) and (intransitive) verbs that do not (e.g. say). He gives (1) to support this move:
(1) Elliott (2016, p. 4)
a. Jeff believes [DP the {rumour, story, claim} that Britta will be late].
b. *Jeff {thinks, said} [DP the {rumour, story, claim} that Britta will be late].
This claim is also present in Moulton (2009a) and Anand and Hacquard (2014), who tie this
to a contrast between doxastic and speech act predicates, such that the former, but not the
latter is able to license content nominals (see also Moltmann 2003).
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(2) Anand and Hacquard (2014, p. 79)
a. John {believed, considered, judged, imagined} the rumor.
b. *John {admitted, affirmed, declared, said} the rumor.
(3) Moulton (2009a, ex. (5))
a. *Fred said the rumor that Horner is impotent.
b. *We never thought the idea that vitamin supplements in pregnancy lead to healthy
babies.
c. *I didn’t wager the claim that the argument has nothing to do with probability.
d. *He alleged the rumour that Homer was happy.
e. *Fred claimed the story that Steph was dating Phil.
f. *?He yelled his belief that Jesus will return again.
They further claim that the assertives are identical to Pesetsky’s (1991) wager -class: a set of
verbs which do not permit ECM/raising-to-object or a full DP, but can license an A/A-bar
trace (or a weak pronoun) in the subject position of the infinitive:
(4) Rezac (2013, p. 313)
We alleged them/*THEM/*the propositions to be inconsistent.
(5) Runner and Moulton (2017, p. 13)
a. *He alleged Melvin to be a pimp.
b. Melvin, he alleged to be a pimp. Top
c. Who did they allege to be a pimp? WH
d. They alleged to be pimps – all of the Parisians who the CIA had hired in Nice.
HNPS
e. Melvin was alleged to be a pimp. Pass
a. John {assumed, believed, considered, imagined, judged, supposed} Mary to be the
murderer.
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b. *John {admitted, affirmed, announced, asserted, claimed, observed, said, wagered}
Mary to be the murderer.
(6) The wager -class, based on Anand and Hacquard (2014, p. 79)
admit, affirm, announce, mumble, mutter, scream, wager, whisper, shout, sight, yell;
assert, avow, claim, conjecture, declare, decree, disclose, grant, guarantee, intimate,
maintain, note, observe, posit, recollect, say, state, stipulate, verify
However, looking at a wider range of verbs, it appears as though the wager -pattern extends
to a much wider range of predicates, including several doxastic verbs, as shown in (7)–(8):
(7) a. ??I {said, mentioned, claimed} him to be a good guy. Speech Act
b. %/??I {assumed, suppose, guessed, reckoned} him to be a good guy. Doxastic
Non-factive
c. ??I {accepted, admitted, doubted} him to be a good guy. Response Stance
d. ??/*I {noticed, discovered, heard} him to be a cheater. Doxastic Factive
(8) a. He has often been {said, mentioned, claimed} to be a good person.
b. He has often been {believed, assumed, supposed, guessed, reckoned} to be a
good person.
c. He has often been {accepted/admitted/doubted} to be a good person.
d. He has often been {discovered, noticed, heard} to be a good person.
The odd ones out, among the verbs investigated here, are know and believe (9), which are
grammatical in both the active and the passive, and the emotive factives (10), which are
ungramamtical in both cases:
(9) a. I {believe, know} him to be a good guy. Active
b. He is {believed, known} to be a good guy. Passive
(10) a. */??I {appreciated, resented, loved, hated} him to always do such crazy things.
b. *He has often been {appreciated, resented, loved, hated} to have the craziest
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ideas.
Moreover, we find variation among speakers as to whether the speech act verbs allow content
nominals:
(11) Canadian English (attested)
In the following paragraph, he argues the claim that all plainer graphs are K5-free.
For these authors, this points to a contrast in the discourse function of doxastic predicates
like believe and ‘assertive’ predicates like say and argue. The claim is that doxastic attitude
predicates are fundamentally reports of private mental states, whereas assertive attitude
predicates report discourse moves of adding propositions to a projected common ground.
Anand and Hacquard (2014) take this to be reflected in the argument structure of these
predicates, and, further, tie this explicitly to factivity: they argue that no assertive predicate
is factive.
We leave the interesting issue of the wager -class, and possible semantic correlates of case
and DP-licensing for future research.
A.3 Conditional Inference Trees clustering analysis
Figure A.1 shows the clustering from of Conditional Inference Trees clustering analysis (from
Bacovcin and Djärv 2017, Djärv and Bacovcin 2018; Section 5.3.2.5).
362
Figure A.1: Significant clusters from Conditional Inference Tree analysis Bacovcin and Djärv
(2017), Djärv and Bacovcin (2018).
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